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QUOTATIONS 
We rebelled against the English; we rebelled against the French ... 
We rebelled against those who colonized our land and tried to enslave us ... 
We repeated the red revolutions many times and we continued with our white revolutions 
over a number of years ... 
And for this we endured so much suffering, sustained so many losses, and sacrificed so 
many lives ... 
[But] 
When we finally gained our liberty, we began to sanctify the borders they had instituted 
after they had divided our land ... 
And we forgot that these borders were but the boundaries of the 'solitary confinement' and 
the 'house arrest' which they had imposed upon us! 
Abu Khaldun Sati' al-Husri, al- 'Uruba Awa/an [Arabism first] (1955), 
quoted in A Dawisha, Arab Nationalsim in the Twentieth Century: From 
Triumph to Despair (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), at 286-
287 
'Nos moyens sont certes limites. Nous le savons. Mais nous avons un moyen 
extremement important, c'est notre bon droit. C'est la foi que nous avons en 
cette justice meme, dont YOUS etes, Monsieur le President, Messieurs les 
members de la Cour, le symbole et la personnification memes. Nous avons 
foi en cette justice que est egale pour tous et devant laquelle la raison du 
plus fort n' est pas toujours la meilleure.' 
[Our means are certainly limited. We know this. But we have an extremely 
important resource on our side. It is the faith that we have in justice itself of 
which you are the very symbol and personification, Mr President and 
members of the Court. We have faith in this justice which is equal for all and 
before which the arguments of the strongest do not always prevail.] 
Western Sahara, Oral Statements, Mauritania, Moulaye el Hassen, 3 July 
1975, vol IV, at 309 
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ABSTRACT 
Territorial adjudication before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) goes beyond drawing 
lines on maps; it is a discursive contest over the limits of Jaw and membership in 
international society. For Third World states endowed with 'full' membership in the 
postcolonial era, how are narratives of inclusion and exclusion, as well as law and politics, 
constructed in the courtroom? Within the institutional biases and linguistic parameters 
peculiar to international law, how can postcolonial experiences be rendered intelligible 
before the Court? 
A close reading of four territorial cases involving Arab states provides a particular 
site to explore the legal grammars, or rules of argument, that shape international Jaw as a 
language. The thesis draws on new and Third World approaches to international law 
(NAIL) and (TW AIL) to examine processes of dialogue between the ICJ bench and bar. By 
seeing international law as a constraining and yet dynamic discourse, the thesis maps some 
of the grammars of argument used in contests of selfhood and statehood. Territorial matters 
between Third World states occupy a prominent place on the Court's docket, and perhaps 
more than any other area of law, they require confrontations with international law's 
colonial past. The thesis probes the tension between colonial exclusion and postcolonial 
'inclusion' through the cultural experience of Arab territoriality. Arab statehood is the 
concept through which the thesis tests the extent of international law's universal reach and 
embodiment. Is international law more than a European discourse? How have Arab 
experiences been listened to or silenced? 
A number of common devices and images of international law emerge in the case 
studies. Drawing on Koskenniemi 's work on normative indeterminacy, the thesis 
demonstrates how international law is articulated through the law/politics dichotomy. 
Without the solid ground of normative certainty, international law is instead a discourse 
framed by ongoing attempts at disciplinary boundary-drawing and defensive postures 
against politics. Through non-European examples of authority over territory, Arab 
experiences challenge international law's porous borders. Historical reappraisals are 
important tools for expanding the contours of international law's past and present 
dimensions. Examples of treaties formed through coercion, colonial bias and the non-
recognition of indigenous title over land are offered for examination by participating states, 
but are rarely translated by the bench in its judgments. The thesis shows how the Court 
v 
pursues a narrow, colonial rendering of the past that perpetuates European models of 
statehood and selfhood in the postcolonial era. 
By exploring the domain of territorial adjudication through a critical lens, the thesis 
demonstrates the value of a discursive reading of ICJ cases. In mapping the grammars of 
legal argument, the thesis highlights the possibilities and limits of postcolonial membership 
for Third World states. Discursively, the thesis shows how the Court is a site of only 
limited linguistic creativity: dialects of politics, emotion and history are all uttered, but such 
'extra-curial' utterances rarely shape ICJ judgments. That they are spoken at all, however, 
is significant, and such statements indicate the possibilities for a universalising discourse of 
international law. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
International Court of Justice 
International Legal Materials 
Inter-Governmental Organisation 
International Relations, the discipline 
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Permanent Court of Arbitration 
Permanent Court of International Justice 
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Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamray Rio de 
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Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic 
Third World Approaches to International Law 
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United Nations General Assembly 
United Nations Security Council 
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VCLT 
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, established 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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GLOSSARY 
A titre de souverain (Fr.): exercise of sovereign powers. 
Accord cadre (Fr.): framework agreement. 
Ahdname (Turk.): decree of the sultan. 
Ahl al-l;zall wa'l-'aqd (Ar.) [the people of loosening and binding]: the group of electors of 
the khallfa. 
Ahl al-kitab (Ar.) [people of the book, or dhimmfs]: non-Muslims believing in God, 
Christians, Jews, Sabians and Zoroastrians. 
Al-'arabiyya al-qawmiyya (Ar.): pan-Arabism 
Al-khulafti' al-rashidiin: (Ar.) [the rightly guided Caliphs]: Abu Bakr, 'Umr, 'Uthman, 
'All, who ruled in tum after the Prophet's death in 632. This period is known as 'asr al-
sa 'ada (the Era of Felicity) 
Al-sharq al-awsa/ (Ar.) [The Middle East], a term also used regularly in Arabic parlance. 
Al-umma al-arabiyya (Ar.): the Arab nation 
Aman: (Ar.): protection of life, property and freedom often applying as a writ of safe 
conduct for envoys and foreigners in Muslim lands. 
'aqd al-bay'a (Ar.): contract of allegiance to the caliph or sultan. 
Bai'a (Ar.): oath of allegiance, e.g. for far-flung tribes accepting the spiritual oversight of 
the Sultan of Morocco. 
Bled al-makhzen (Ar.): lands of the government (or literally, storehouse). This term was 
used in the Western Saharan Advisory Opinion to distinguish those lands over which the 
Sultan of Morocco had direct control. 
Bled al-siba (Ar.): lands of dissidence. This term was used to describe peripheral areas of 
the Moroccan Sultan's rule before colonialism, when ties of allegiance through religion 
existed rather than any real territorial control. 
Caid (Ar.): an administrative official of a tribe appointed by the sultan, e.g. in Western 
Sahara. 
Compromis (Fr.): where states in dispute may agree to take that dispute to the ICJ. A treaty 
will then be negotiated outlining the mutually agreed upon nature of the dispute before it is 
then taken to the ICJ. 
Dar al-l;zarb (Ar.): land of war, or that part of the world not under Muslim rule . 
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Dar al-isliim (Ar.): land of peace, or that part of the world under Muslim rule. 
Dar al-~ullJ. (Ar.): land of reconciliation or treaty between Muslim and non-Muslim 
powers. 
Daw/a (Ar.): state. 
De legeferenda (Lat.): law as it should be. 
De lege lata (Lat.): law as it currently stands. 
Dhimma (Ar.): where non-Muslims accept Muslim rule in exchange for protection and the 
payment of a poll tax (jizya ). Such an agreement cannot be concluded with apostates. 
Dirah (Ar.): territory within which a tribe moves. 
Dispositif(Fr.): operative paragraph(s) of a judgment. 
Effectivites (Fr.): state activities of a sovereign kind. 
Erga omnes (Lat.) [against all]: rules applicable and binding on all of the world regardless 
of consent. For example, the prohibition on genocide is binding on all states whether or not 
they are party to conventions detailing its prohibition. 
Ex iniuria non oritur jus (Lat.): an illegal act cannot produce legal rights. 
Fiqh: (Ar.) ['understanding']: the science of Muslim law. 
Forum prorogatum (Lat.): where state parties expressly or impliedly consent to the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ for specific disputes by acts after the initiation of proceedings. This 
is possible under article 40(1) of the ICJ Statute. 
Framework agreement (within the ICJ): where in ill-defined suits, the Court outlines the 
general aspects of the case and then allows the parties to narrow it. 
IJ.adfth (Ar.): collections of the sayings of the Prophet, one of the sources oflslamic law. 
lfajj (Ar.): the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. One of the five obligations for a Muslim, along 
with prayer, fasting during Rama<,lan, the shahada (the profession of faith in Allah and his 
prophet, Muhammed), and zakat, or charity. 
/f arbf (Ar.): a person from dar al-f:rarb. 
ljma' (Ar.): one of the four sources of sharf 'a, based on the consensus of legal/religious 
scholars. 
Ijtihad (Ar.): independent human reasoning. This phase m the development of legal 
doctrine formally ended in 1 oth century. 
Xlll 
Imam (Ar.): teacher, or the title of a scholar adept in Islamic studies. 
In personam (Lat.): relating to jurisdiction over an individual person. 
Intifii.f/,a (Ar.): shaking off, uprising. Usually associated with Palestinian resistance since 
1987 against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 1967. 
Jihad: (Ar.): literally meaning struggle, used to refer to the waging of Muslim war 
throughout diir al-barb. 
Jizya: (Ar.) poll tax imposed on dhimmfs, instead of zakat and/or military service, expected 
of able-bodied Muslim males. 
Jus ad hello (Lat.): rights to wage war, or 'just war'. 
Jus cogens (Lat.) [compelling law): peremptory norms of general international law. 
Jus gentium (Lat.): general principles of law accepted by civilised nations. 
Jus in hello (Lat.): the rules applicable once hostilities have commenced. 
Jus inter gentes (Lat.): law between nations, i.e. international law. 
Jus naturale (Lat.): natural law. 
Kaimakam: (Turk.) governor of a kaza. 
Kaza: (Turk.) Ottoman administrative district, a unit smaller than a sarijak. 
khadim al-l;zaramayn al-sharifayn (Ar.) [servant of the two holy shrines]: A title given to 
the Caliph as overseer of Mecca and Medina. 
Kha/if at ra~i'iil al/ah (Ar.): successor of the messenger of God. The full title bestowed on a 
khalifa by Sunnis. 
Kharaj (Ar.): land tax imposed in Muslim lands on dhimmTs. 
Madhhah (Ar.): jurisprudential school oflslamic fiqh: Malik!, Shafi'!, I:Ianball, I:Ianafi. 
Mujtahid (Ar.): a practitioner of ijtihiid, or independent reasoning. 
musta'min (Ar.): protected person, referring to non-Muslims such as traders and 
ambassadors who were afforded basic rights and protections within diir al-islam. 
Opinio iuris (Lat.): the opinion of jurists; this is one of the sources of international law. 
Pacta sunt servanda (Lat.): [agreements must be honoured) agreements are binding and are 
to be implemented in good faith. 
XIV 
Qawm (Ar.): people. 
Qawmiyya (Ar.): pan-Arabism, or Arab nationalism. 
Qiyas (Ar.): reasoning by analogy from existing principles. This is one of the four sources 
of the sharf 'a. 
Qur'iin (Ar.) ['the recitation']: the central text of Islam, believed to be the word of God, 
revealed to his Prophet and written down after Muhammed. 
Res communis (Lat.): not capable of being placed under state sovereignty, such as the high 
seas and outer space. 
Res judicata (Lat.) [a thing that has been judged]: The rule refers to the practice whereby 
arbitral bodies do not consider a case that has already been determined by another arbitral 
body. 
Res nullius (Lat.): things or land not under the territorial sovereignty of a state, but able to 
be so. 
Res sic stantibus (Lat.) [things standing so, or remaining the same]: agreements entered 
into on the basis that circumstances will remain unchanged. 
Sanjak (or, sancak) (Turk.): an Ottoman subprovince. 
Sharf 'a (Ar.) [path to water]: Islamic law. 
Sheikh (Ar.): elder man of a tribe; an Islamic authority. 
Shl'a: (Ar.): referring to those Muslims who saw Muhammed's rule being continued 
through 'All and his descendents. Shl' as are the second largest group within the Muslim 
world after Sunnis. 
Siyar (Ar.) [the conduct of rulers]: The system of international law developed by Muslim 
states/empires for their relations with non-Muslim states. 
Sul/an (Ar.) [deriving from the word for power]: title of a political ruler in contrast to a 
religious leader or teacher, Imam. 
Sunna: (Ar.) [manner of acting; rule of conduct; mode oflife]: lessons learned from the life 
of the Prophet, mainly through the f;adfth. It is one of the four sources oflaw. 
Sunni: (Ar.): deriving from the word sunna, meaning words or actions or the example of 
the Prophet. Sunnis followed Abu Bakr and are the vast majority of Muslims. 
Tanzimat (Turk.): Generally used to refer to the period between 1839-1876 when the 
Ottoman Empire implemented a number of reforms. 
xv 
Taqlld (Ar.) [imitation]: marks the end of the period of ijtihiid whereby Muslims were 
expected to respect the authority of legal scholars of past generations - the personal 
interpretation of sources was now forbidden. 
Terra nullius (Lat.): land belonging to no-one. 
Travaux preparatoires (Fr.): Preparatory work; the preliminary drafts, minutes, 
conferences etc contributing to the final draft of a treaty. 
Umma (Ar.): this can be translated as community or nation, but it always refers to the 
community of Muslims and its boundaries are not defined by territory or state rule, but 
belief. 
Uti possedetis juris (Lat.; Roman Law) [as you possess]: A decree of the Praetor that the 
ownership of property in question should remain in possession of the person. In 
international law, it is the idea that old administrative boundaries will become international 
boundaries when a political subdivision achieves independence. Based on the Latin phrase: 
uti possidetis, ita possideatis (as you possess, so may you possess). 
Vali (Turk.): administrative ruler of a vilayet. 
Vilayet (Turk.): largest administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire. 
Watan (Ar.): nation. 
Wataniyya (Ar.): nationalism. 
Ziiwiyya (Ar.) [corner]: used in the Maghreb as the name of a religious school. The term 
was used in the Libya/Chad case in relation to the SeniisI religious order's outposts in the 
Sahara. 
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PREFACE 
Journeys through Scholarly Quicksands and My Quest for Solid Ground 
Writing a PhD is both a personal and an intellectual journey. Parts of this journey are 
revealed in scholarly statements of the thesis, but many silences remain. Here I want to 
reflect on some of the agendas informing my research. 
When I started out along a path shrouded in fog, few things were clear to me except 
my interest in all things Arab and a belief that the disciplinary boundaries of law would 
provide a more solid framework than the field I had abandoned, international relations (IR). 
I had come to find incessant disciplinary debates within IR tedious; my eyes were tired and 
sought other horizons. Reading critical and postcolonial international legal material 
extended my gaze and convinced me that I needed to step outside the IR box and move into 
another box, international law. International law seemed to provide a neat and easy 
framework: the simplicity of ICJ cases contained my focus and provided me with much-
needed boundaries. 
It was surprising then that my intellectual journey has taken me full-circle: after 
seeking solace in doctrine, I realised that all I could rely on was the knowledge that there 
was no solid ground. My travels through quicksand has become enduring and after some 
instability, I have now accepted the (im)permanency of the terrain. 
I came to the PhD with only a general knowledge of international law and a deep-
seated dislike of real property law. These were not good beginnings, but I sensed that in the 
collision between the law on territory and the Third World rich material was waiting to be 
excavated. I was not wrong. At first, when aspects of the law confused me and led me into 
blind alleys, I maintained a faith in the certainty of doctrine and my own lack of 
experience: surely if judgments from the ICJ did not explain things clearly, this was about 
my own gaps of knowledge? Most commentaries on the case law seemed to maintain a 
faith in law's certainty, suggesting that all I needed to do was improve my own 
undertstanding. Most scholarship on title to territory is removed from sustained critical 
engagement and many authors writing about territory regard applicable laws as solid and 
knowable. Commentary and criticism on jurisprudence tend to reinforce the promise of 
doctrine. In those cases, for example, where the Court's judgment did not cover the field, 
XXIX 
most scholarship readily completes the task; there is a clear body of rules to apply in all 
instances and normative indeterminacy, or norm conflict, is not countenanced. 
It was in the encounter between international law and colonialism, however, that my 
footsteps started to falter: I needed to put on the sturdiest boots that could withstand much 
more than the luscious landscapes of Europe, the site where the law on territory had been 
forged. Three of my four case studies have taken me to some of the world's most extreme 
topographies: the Sahara and the Qatari peninsula. Like the rest of the world, these lands 
are now home to their own cartographic lines, but the law explaining these markings only 
told part of the story, and I needed to undertake my own expedition to make sense of these 
cases. 
When one first enters the intricacies of a boundary dispute, there is a sense of 
excitement. Surely I could live out my explorer fantasies and become a legal Freya Stark? 
The voluminous archival and cartographic materials obligatory in such disputes transport 
the reader to another time and another location. Legal teams are not only paid handsome 
sums to convince the Court of their side's legal merits, but they also partake in storytelling 
by taking us into a world of diplomatic dealings, tribal intrigues, pearl-fishing and imperial 
rivalries. Wading through the mounds of paper produced for a case, however, tends to 
cause confusion rather than clarity, not only in relation to the legal arguments but ' the' 
historical record as well. Even the most simple 'facts' are presented in diametrical 
opposition in contentious disputes, reminding us of the contingency of fact, history and 
ultimately, law. Mystique was compounded by illegible maps and documents . Could the 
Court decipher the materials any better than I could, or was this part of the strategy: to wrap 
the past in mystery and look to law for its clarification? 
Once I became comfortable in the unknown worlds of blurry maps and smudged 
Osmanltct (Ottoman Turkish) documents, I tried to find at least some clarity in relation to 
the law on title to territory. Perhaps the documents were far from pristine, but the law must 
be better? Yet, the law was always mired in its contested relationship with the past, and, 
just like the documents themselves, doctrine required interpretation and translation. There 
was not one law, nor one history. Korhonen reminds us that '[n]orms complete with 
meaning and significance do not exist a priori as independent objects which could be 
picked up by whomever, whenever.' 1 Thus, once again, I found myself Jost in the 
1 0 Korhonen, 'New International Law: Silences, Defence or Deliverance?' (1996) 7 European Journal of 
International Law I, at 1. 
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quicksands of legal argument: how did law hang together beyond its surface of rules and 
principles? Why in Third World territorial disputes were colonial practices usually 
condoned, and did this mean that the law itself was colonial and incapable of moving 
beyond its racist past? 
My answers to these questions are still somewhat tentative, but I can now say at 
least that international law is never an exercise in resolving rules per se. Instead, it always 
rests on deeper structures that inform its self-image, make sense of its past and imbue it 
with its own mix of (usually European) cultural assumptions. In the pleadings I have read, 
which were largely written by European lawyers, there were times when this underlying 
discursive framework was expanded, but only in limited ways. Perhaps because of the fear 
of ensuing chaos, the international system and its legal institutions are too heavily invested 
in particular narratives of international law's origins to endow Third World experiences and 
voices with the status they seek. 
Writing the thesis has also clarified my relationship with the Arab world. Over the 
course of my studies, the most commonly asked question of me has been, 'what sparked 
your interest in the Arab world?' There are many things that roll off the tongue in response: 
the culture, the food, the music, and my travels there, but none of these explanations went 
to the core of my interest. Reading about the encounter between the European and non-
European world, though, I soon came to realise that the Arab world (and parts of the wider 
Muslim world like Turkey - I have been there seven times) was my ' other'. No other part 
of the globe arouses such interest, such fascination and also such repulsion for me. I 
constantly renegotiate my relationship with the region and its culture, and in finding out 
more I have come to realise just how close and yet how far I am from ever being an Arab. 
When I lived in Jordan this was brought home to me, because I could never, ever, become a 
local and part of me did not want to: I wanted to observe and yet be part of the milieu at the 
same time. This is a difficult pose to strike, and it is one requiring constant re-positioning. 
It has meant that I am forever evaluating my own assumptions, prejudices and conceptions 
about the region as well as my research. I hope it is helpful in reading the thesis to 
recognise these background journeys. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1) The Postcolonial Paradox 
I nternational law is a discursive practice that both constrains and enables its central actors, states. We can understand the relationship between states and international law 
as an irresolvable conflict and ask the perennial question, how can sovereignty be 
constrained?1 Or we can step into the discursive process and recognise that the relationship 
between international law and states is one of constant negotiation; international law as a 
language can only be understood in the context of ongoing conversations about the nature 
and boundaries of the discipline. When we then look to the international order of 
contemporary nation-states, postcolonial membership suggests an expansive, inclusive 
international legal language. States only recently recognised as such now participate in and 
speak the language of international law through the guarantee of international legal 
personality. The boundaries of membership, however, are not clearly delimited. How 
should postcolonial states speak the language of international law? Further, bow can 
postcolonial entities use the law's lexicon to ensure their selfhood and statehood in a world 
that denied it for so long? This is the paradox of postcoloniality: non-European states must 
use a discourse that has both contrained and enabled them. International law is thus 
premised not so much on the tension between sovereignty and rules, but on its potential for 
inclusion and exclusion. Who can speak the language of international law and what are its 
'legal grammars' or rules of speech?2 
Cultural diversity in a world of nation-states is not synonymous with linguistic 
plurality at the level of international law. Postcolonial membership offers a way of 
1 A Anghie, imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of international Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), at 36. 
2 M Koskenniemi , From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of international Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2"d edition, 2005), at 11. 
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expanding the discourse of international law, but languages evolve slowly, and thus ' new' 
states speaking international law must either leave most of their vocabularies and grammars 
at the courtroom door or seek the assistance of a translator. What linguistic compromise is 
reached, for example in adjudication, and how has the language of international law 
responded to different dialects used in adjudication? 
Scholars in the field of international law have confronted the question of 
disciplinary diversity and renewal in a number of ways.3 In the postcolonial era, narratives 
of international law's progress and multiculturalism abound, but such accounts only tell 
part of the story. Most scholars advance claims about international law's potential through a 
particular understanding of international law that I term 'mainstream'. The word 
' mainstream' lacks precision, but it is used to denote approaches to international law that 
tend to see law as determinate and distinct from other fields of human endeavour. The 
outcome of such a perspective supports a reified image of law, comprising a set of 
knowable doctrines and principles. 4 Unlike critical approaches to international law, 
sometimes termed 'New Approaches to International Law' or NAIL, which are alive to 
international law's discursive and reflexive qualities, mainstream scholars characterise 
international law as a body of rules separate and distinct from the politics of speech. By 
seeing law as doctrine rather than discourse, determinacy is not in issue. Thus, mainstream 
accounts see no paradox in the postcolonial condition: new states are able to harness the 
tools of a law that is untainted by its colonial past. 
From within the critical fold, a sensibility towards Third World concerns has 
emerged that challenges mainstream narratives of progress after colonialism. Scholars 
linked to 'Third World approaches to international law', or TWAIL, seek to explore 
'post'colonial continuities rather than ruptures. TWAIL research has focused on historical 
legacies, suggesting that Third World states and their peoples face a paradox: how can they 
speak the language of law and remain 'post' colonial? Resort to self-reflective, sceptical and 
often historical methodologies by many TW AIL scholars aligns them closely with the 
research agendas developed within NAIL. Thus, TW AIL scholarship is in sympathy with 
NAIL, but it is also distinguished by a particular commitment to Third World 
emancipation. 
3 Particularly, see D Kennedy, 'When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box' (1999-2000) 32 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 335. 
4 For a discussion about the reification of international law, see J Boyle, 'Ideals and Things: International 
Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of Language' (1985) 26 Harvard international Law Journal 327. 
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This commitment is evident in the use of the term, 'Third World'. Mickelson ' sees 
the Third World as occupying a historically constituted, alternative and oppositional stance 
within the international system. The "Third World" terminology itself may appear out-of-
date, but its very contingency, involving an insistence on history and continuity, may in fact 
be one of its strengths. '5 Although the term has become much more elastic since its use in 
the age of decolonisation, Rajagopal argues that it can still serve to rally peoples, states and 
international lawyers. 'The nature of this "Third World" engagement with international law 
- of resistance, allure, exploitation and co-optation - has significantly affected the content 
and structure of modem international law and raises profound challenges of history, theory 
and method for the whole discipline of international law.' 6 TW AIL scholars regard 
colonialism as the unifying experience for Third World states, and the thesis responds to 
this interest by exploring narratives about colonialism in the courtroom.7 
2) Scope of the Study 
The thesis develops both NAIL and TW AIL agendas by focusing on the discursive 
practices used in International Court of Justice (ICJ) disputes. With its status as the pre-
eminent international legal body, the ICJ elicits significant scholarly attention. Mainstream 
analyses of its doctrinal statements allow us to understand part of ICJ discourse, but they 
also obscure other aspects. What is the nature of debate between the bench and the bar and 
what patterns emerge across the cases? Through a critical understanding of law as 
language, these questions become easier to answer, and yet rarely does critical, and 
especially TW AIL, attention focus on ICJ discursive structures.Pleadings in particular are 
overlooked, and yet it is in this space of argumentative contest that a postcolonial law can 
be developed in detail. 
I acknowledge that states do not speak directly in ICJ disputes. Usually foreign 
legal counsel hailing from a select group of First World institutions represents both First 
and Third World states. Why do Third World states rely on such counsel? The thesis is not 
concerned with discovering the position of given Third World states in some reified way. 
5 K Mickelson, 'Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse' ( 1998) 16 
Wisconsin international Law Journal 353, at 360. 
6 B Rajagopal, 'Counter-hegemonic International Law: rethinking human rights and development as Third 
World strategy' (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 767, at 768. 
7 W Tieya, 'The Third World and International Law' R St. J Macdonald & D M Johnston (eds), The Structure 
and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (The Hague; Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) 955-976, at 961. 
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This is not possible and does not assist the broader aims of the thesis. Third World states 
are instead used as a tool for exploring the extent to which non-European experiences and 
legacies can be used to transform the language of international law. In its exploration of the 
arguments used to found title to territory, the thesis tries to straddle the mainstream and 
critical research agendas by mapping the legal grammars of discourse.8 With rules that are 
indeterminate, how do postcolonial states advance their interests and which argumentative 
strategies and substantive claims are endorsed by the Court? 
ICJ territorial disputes are the focus of the thesis because they allow for an extended 
exploration of the postcolonial paradox. Over the last few decades, the Court's docket has 
increased significantly and territorial disputes involving Third World states have been the 
most numerous. Some of international society's newest members have come to the Court in 
a bid to delimit the borders of their statehood through a law shaped by European 
experience. Thus ICJ territorial disputes are a microcosm of the broader dilemma 
confronting Third World states in their membership of international society. What language 
can be spoken in the Court to capture their experiences of colonialism? Can international 
law be decolonised? What narratives emerge across the cases? 
3) Central Research Questions 
The many questions raised above touch on some of the basic themes of the thesis. More 
specifically, the thesis rests on two central research questions. The first asks: 
What are the structures of legal argument that emerge in ICJ territorial disputes 
involving Arab states? 
This question requires an account of the strategic and substantive uses of international law 
as language. It entails an analysis of pleadings and judgments to enable us to map out 
patterns in the process of adjudication. The second question opens up the postcolonial 
paradox: 
What do these structures suggest about the scope for universalising the discourse of 
international law? 
8 D Kennedy, 'The Last Treatise: Project and Person (Reflections on Martti Koskenniemi 's From Apology to 
Utopia) (2006) 7 German Law Journal 982. 
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In a world covered by independent nation-states, international law's jurisdictional reach is 
now universal. Geography, however, is not necessarily synonymous with a law or a culture9 
that we can describe as both ' international ' and 'universal'. Keal defines a 'universalising 
discourse ... [as] one that either expands, or has the potential to expand, the boundaries of a 
community to which it refers.' 10 Territorial disputes showcasing narratives about 
colonialism and the conferring of membership of international society for non-European 
entities not only involve boundary delimitation, they display international legal discourse 
being redefined and redrawn through argument. When postcolonial states choose to speak 
in the language of international law and offer accounts of statehood at odds with European 
experiences, international law will either absorb or deny such claims. Within the confines 
of international law's grammar and lexicon, international law's boundary can be 
challenged. Thus, the thesis asks, are the boundaries to emerge suggestive of a 
universalising discourse? 
The thesis is concerned with international legal discourse in a postcolonial era and 
the cultural lens it relies on is the Arab experience. Arab states hailing from a rich and 
distinct cultural and legal tradition serve as a focus. By exploring one part of the 
geographical, cultural and discursive world, the universality of international law can be 
interrogated. 
4) Why Arab? 
What do I mean by ' Arab ' and 'Arab world' in the thesis and why should this term be used 
instead of others? States straddling the Atlantic Ocean and the Arabian Sea have variously 
been grouped together under the categories of the 'Middle East', the 'Near East' ,the 'Arab 
world ' as well as the Muslim or Islamic World. There is little consensus on the exact 
boundaries of these regions; each evokes a particular set of characteristics along linguisti c, 
cultural or religious lines. At a more conceptual level, Said speaks of the division between 
the Occident and the Orient, which was imagined by Europe and gave rise to Orientalist 
discourses. In his study of this European discourse, Said offers a basic definition and 
geographical location of Orientalism, which is ' mainly, although not exclusively, of a 
9 D Z Cass, 'Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law' ( 1996) 65 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 34 1, at 349. 
JO P Keal , European conquest and the rights of indigenous people: The moral backwardness of international 
society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 86. 
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British or French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions take in such disparate 
realms as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, the Biblical texts and 
the Biblical lands .. .' 11 An awareness of the way in which these lands and their cultures 
were constructed by European thought and practice highlights the role that both 
geographical and conceptual indicators can play. European scholarship has tended to place 
Arab peoples in a number of culturally pre-determined regions; it is important in framing 
my analysis that such categories be interrogated. No category is value-free, and in choosing 
to study Arab states, I have singled out a particular cultural and legal grouping that is 
sufficiently united to serve as a coherent site of study. However, it is important to be 
conscious of the boundary-drawing involved in such categories, and thus cultural and 
geographical borders of the Arab world are interrogated throughout this study. 
Although the 'Middle East' (as well as its rarer variant, the 'Near East') is now used 
as a common point ofreference by inhabitants within the region, 12 the term itself is steeped 
in colonialist and Orientalist overtones and is unhelpful for explanatory purposes. An 
American naval officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, apparently coined the term, 'Middle East' in 
1902, by referring to the area between Arabia and India. 13 The perspective reflected an era 
when Europe dominated the globe. The term 'Middle East' often includes non-Arab states, 
such as Iran and Turkey, and sometimes Pakistan, largely because of their Islamic 
composition and geographical proximity to the centres of Islam. For the purposes of my 
interest in civilisational contributions to international law, the 'Middle East' is a term that 
lacks conceptual rigour and is not used in the thesis. 
Arab states have also been subsumed under the umbrella of the Islamic world. Arab 
states are a part of the Islamic world, but this category is too broad for my aim of using 
particularism to interrogate universalism. Using the term 'Arab' allows us to separate Arab 
states from non-Arab states, especially as the experiences of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan have 
all been distinct from those of the Levant, the Gulf and North Africa since the end of the 
First World War. Equally, although states typically included under the umbrella of the 
'Middle East' , as well as further afield in the Mus lim world, have all experienced the 
civilising influences of Islam, it is too broad a category because it includes states as diverse 
as the examples of Algeria, Iran, Bosnia and Indonesia. 
11 E Said, Orienta/ism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin, 1978), at 4. 
12 ln Arabic, 'Middle East' is rendered as 'al-sharq al-awsa:.J ' .For a discussion about the term 'Middle East', 
see N R Keddie, ' ls There a Middle East?' (l 973) 4 Jnternational Journal of Middle East Studies 255. 
13 J Allain, International Law in the Middle East: Closer to Power than Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), at 
3-4. 
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Both the UN and the ICJ have drawn attention to Arab civilisation in the official use 
of Arabic and the appointment of Arab judges. The UN's recognition of cultural diversity is 
rooted in the Statute of the ICJ itself. Article 38(1) catalogues the sources of international 
law, to include treaty law, custom and the writings of legal experts. The list also provides 
for application of 'the general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations' . 14 Arab civilisation falls within this category, 
particularly in relation to the appointment of judges. Under the Statute, judges are selected 
not only in relation to their qualifications, they also serve as a 'representation of the main 
forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world' .15 Arab civilisation 
should be able to contribute significantly to a culturally expansive international law of the 
future. 
Thus I focus on 'Arab' states in my analysis, but acknowledge the limitations 
involved in such boundary drawing. The Arab world is a large and diverse region, but it is 
at least united in its use of Arabic and politically by the Arab League. 16 The Arab world can 
be identified as comprising North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, 
Sudan and Egypt; the Levant: Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria; and the Gulf: Iraq, Oman, 
Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen.17 
These states can all be understood as Arab, where Arabic is spoken, but they each contain 
local flavours, divergent practices of Islam, vastly uneven levels of development, as well as 
radically different forms of political rule ranging from the secular socialist regimes of 
Tunisia and Algeria, to Libya's unique form of republic, to the tribal monarchies 
throughout the Gulf. 
Studies focusing on Arab civilisation have been tom between the tendencies of 
trying to depict Arab specificities while not singling out the region for cultural 
exceptionalism. In his study of public spheres in Jordan, Lynch is aware of balancing these 
two concerns. He argues that it is possible to produce research that is sensitive to the Arab 
14 Statute of International Court of Justice. 
15 Article 9, Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
16 The creation of the Arab League is discussed in Chapter Two at 93-95. The League's members include: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. 
For details, see the League's website: http://www.arablcagueonline.org/las/index en.jsp. 
17 Certain terms in Arabic correspond to these areas as well. Typically, the Arab world has been divided into 
its Asian and African parts by the expressions, al-Maghreb (for North Africa, excluding Egypt, meaning the 
eastern place in Arabic) and al-Mashreq (for West Asia, meaning the western place in Arabic). Also, a 
common term to connote the heart of the Arab World (that is, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Egypt and 
the ::.. ijaz, Saudi Arabia) in Arabic is biliid al-sham. When l was travelling from Jordan to Syria, Syria and/or 
Damascus (Dimashq) were referred to as al-sham. 
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position but not Orientalist in its tone about Arab uniqueness. 18 Such research cannot rise 
above specificity unless general theories applied elsewhere are used for the Arab world as 
well. Thus it is useful to develop an awareness of Arab cultural specificities, but a constant 
juggling act is required between appreciating regional social institutions on the one hand 
and local diversity at the political and legal level on the other. 
Scholarship about the relationship between the Arab world and international law 
requires reevaluation, both from the mainstream and the 'Newstream' or NAIL. 19 
Typically, mainstream attention has perpetuated Orientalist discourses through sh1dies 
constructing the Arab world as especially averse to legalism. Terrorism is the obvious 
example here.20 I use Arab experiences not to exceptionalise them but to highlight that both 
European and non-European experiences of authority over territory are contingent. Regions 
and peoples across the globe can contribute to the development of a universalising 
discourse of international law in their own particular way, and it is important to remember 
that both European and non-European experiences are particular and not necessarily 
transferable. Examples drawn more broadly from African ICJ territorial disputes 
demonstrate that the Arab world should not be treated differently per se. International law 
as a discourse created in Europe has excluded not only Arabs but also most of the world, 
and continues to do so in more subtle ways in the postcolonial era. 
TWAIL scholarship also has overlooked the Arab experience in its project of Third 
World emancipation. Typically, TWAIL scholars have focused on southern Africa, 
subcontinental Asia or Latin America in their analyses of the 'Third World'. Straddling 
North Africa and West Asia, Arabs are geographically proximate to some of these 
locations, but are they also culturally? Are Arab states part of the Third World or not? The 
thesis suggests that we need to examine how Third World experiences - especially 
pertaining to colonial legacies - are explored in Arab adjudication. Do ICJ cases involving 
Arab states touch on concerns of the Third World more generally? What are the similarities 
and differences between Arab and non-Arab Third World states? These questions are 
particularly pertinent to Chapter Three, with its dispute between Libya and Chad,21 and 
Chapter Six, where a number of Third World submissions are compared in the Wall 
18 M Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), at 33-34. 
19 Generally, see Cass, supra n 9. 
20 IM Porras, 'On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw' (1994) Utah Law Review 119. 
21 Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (1994) ICJ Reps, p. 6. 
8 
Introduction 
Opinion. 22 I suggest that TW AIL scholarship should embrace Arab experiences m its 
project of interrogating the structures of international law. 
5) Case Selection 
Over its lifetime, the Court has increasingly come to hear territorial disputes arising from 
the Third World, including Arab states. Although the Palestinian impasse might suggest a 
region struggling with international law's relevance, the Court has examined other issues, 
such as territorial and maritime delimitation cases. 23 Thus far, the Court has heard two 
contentious and two advisory territorial cases involving Arab states. This is a small sample, 
but it is balanced across the Court's jurisdictions, and provides sufficient scope for 
comparison within and across the cases. Further, in this thesis discursive analysis of the 
arguments employed requires detailed analysis. Because two of these cases hail from Africa 
and two from Asia, the thesis also highlights how Arab states operate in a broader 
discursive, postcolonial environment. 
6) Thesis Structure 
The thesis comprises three parts. Part One provides the conceptual and historical tools 
necessary to appreciate the case studies as boundary-drawing exercises not only between 
states but also within the language of international law itself. Chapter One introduces 
accounts of ICJ adjudication as well as critical studies of international legal discourse to 
highlight oversights in the study of territorial disputes. The tools provided by critical 
22 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) (2004) ICJ Reps, p. 136. 
23 Aside from the case studies of the thesis, other ICJ cases involving Arab states include: Case Concerning 
the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (1982) ICJ Reps, p. 18; Case Concerning the 
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (1985) ICJ Reps, p. 13; Application for Revision and 
Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (1985) IC.I Reps, p. 192; Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 197 I Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya/United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objects) (1998) ICJ Reps, p. 9; Case Concerning Questions of 
interpretation and Application of the J 97 J Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/United States of America) ( 1998) ICJ Reps, p. 115. 
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sensibi1ities to language are applied in my reading of the case studies and serve as the basis 
for the first central research question noted above. The second central research question is 
also considered in Chapter One, which explores the underlying assumptions about 
international law and its universality in the literature. To understand the particular heritage 
of modem Arab states, Chapter Two undertakes a broad historical review and investigates 
whether the Arab-Islamic tradition contains theories and practices supportive of the 
postcolonial territorial state. The chapter surveys the interrelationship between public 
international law and Islamic international law, as well as some themes emerging from state 
practice across the Arab world. It also explores instances of European engagement with the 
Ottoman Empire to understand how the Sublime Porte and its Arab subjects were included 
and excluded in the emerging international system. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
experiences of modern Arab entities and their struggles with territorially delimited 
statehood to conclude that Arab history contains both opposition and support for the norm 
of territorial delimitation. 
The analysis in Part Two shifts to the case studies and looks at contentious matters 
before the ICJ. Part Two begins with an introductory discussion about the nature of the 
Court's contentious jurisdiction, as well as some themes that have emerged from ICJ 
jurisprudence on territory. Chapter Three introduces the first case, the Frontier Dispute 
between Libya and Chad.24 The chapter's discussion showcases the different argumentative 
strategies available to postcolonial states through the contrasting positions of the parties. 
While Libya championed non-European title to territory and challenged the colonial record, 
Chad's pleadings were reliant on the postcolonial dividends of French rule. Chapter Four's 
consideration of the territorial and maritime dispute between Qatar and Bahrain does not 
rest on such extreme positions,25 but similar themes about the impact of consent under 
colonial rule, the validity of treaties and non-European modes of authority are explored. 
Both cases contain extensive historical discussion, and so much of Part Two interrogates 
narratives about the legacies of colonialism on territorial delimitation. 
Part Three turns to the Court's advisory jurisdiction and looks at two cases about 
territory and self-determination. After an introductory discussion, Chapter Five examines 
the various argumentative strategies and ideas used at the bar and the bench in the Western 
24 Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute {Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) ( 1994) ICJ Reps, p. 6. 
25 Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar/Bahrain) (Merits) (200 1) ICJ Reps, p. 40. 
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Sahara Case.26 The case shares many themes with contentious territorial matters, but its 
advisory nature allowed greater participation for states and thus more scope for comparison 
about their respective positions. The case is renowned for its support for self-determination, 
but the thesis is more concerned with the way it can reveal discursive patterns about the 
colonial legacy. The Western Sahara Case contained debates on the legal validity of non-
European modes of authority, and its engagement with the Islamic tradition harks back to 
Chapter Two's historical themes. 
The last case study in Chapter Six is most distinct, because it is not a typical title to 
territory matter dealing as it does with a form of neocolonialism in the UN period. The Wall 
Opinion included a large number of states from the First and Third Worlds arguing not only 
about territorial authority over the Occupied Palestinian Territories but also about the role 
expected of the ICJ and international law in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Due to the large 
number of states participating, the argumentative practices of the earlier cases are 
highlighted in greater relief. Although this case can be seen as being radically different 
form classic title to territory cases explored above, the thesis is most interested in the 
discursive similarities across the cases. The three earlier cases highlight the discursive 
constraints that postcolonial states face on entering the Court. By 2004, Third World states 
hold the indisputable majority in the UN and the chapter highlights this with its discussion 
of debates that took place in the UN over the advisory opinion request. However, to what 
extent have Third World states been able to shape the discourse of the Court itself? The 
chapter shows that although Third World states constituted a majority of participants whose 
arguments generally convinced the Court, the narrow judgment itself indicates that the 
position of Third World states is not wholly decolonised. Many of the more extreme 
argumentative gestures adopted by Third World states as well as Arab references to history 
were overlooked by the bench in its judgment. Thus, the final case study presents a 
continuum of sorts between colonial and postcolonial discourses of international law. The 
Wall Opinion is a significant step along the path of linguistic renewal, but the legal lexicon 
in 2004 was not entirely new. 
The interrelationship between selfhood and territory is one of the most significant, 
underlying themes across the four cases. In a postcolonial world, there is room for some 
discursive variation in adjudication, but only through membership in international society. 
The thesis explores how postcolonial states can negotiate the boundaries of modern 
26 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) (1975) ICJ Reps, p.12. 
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statehood through speech. With its emphasis on ICJ territorial adjudication, the thesis 
echoes Berman's question, 'Can international law, written by history's victors, muster the 
courage to look painfully, frankly, at the horrors of its own past?'27 A close reading of four 
postcolonial territorial cases reveals the limits and the possibilities of a universalising 
international legal discourse. The thesis highlights that the options for retelling and 
reshaping international law are small, but significant. Language is dynamic and so, within 
its own conventions and biases, international law too contains the seeds of change. The first 
step is to understand how to speak the language of international law, and thus my aim is to 
map out argumentative possibilities of the discipline in a postcolonial era. 
27 N Berman, 'In the Wake of Empire', (1999) 14 American University International Law Review 1515 (First 
Annual Grotius Lecture, American Society of International Law), at 1554. 
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Methodological Tools for Understanding !CJ Territorial Disputes 
1) Introduction 
A s a discursive exercise in argument, international adjudication is premised on the interrelationship between speaking and listening within the confines of a 
courtroom. International lawyers observe and listen to the flow of debate in 
assessing conflicting claims and their ultimate resolution by the international community's 
pre-eminent legal decision-making institution, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). An 
impressive body of international law scholarship attests to a wealth of devotion to the 
institution of the ICJ and its associated jurisprudence. A clamour of scholarly voices is 
never far from the corridors of the Peace Palace in various efforts to dissect and discuss the 
finest points of legal doctrine. Territorial disputes have been of especial interest to scholars 
of international adjudication, and with the rise of Third World participation in the Court, it 
would seem that international law is more inclusive than ever. Mainstream scholars have 
seized on the example of Third World territorial dispute resolution before the ICJ to 
illustrate broader claims about the nature of international law in this UN postcolonial era: 
we can now speak of a law that is universal; indeed, of a law that is truly international. 1 
A much rarer scholarly sensibility is the inclination and capacity to listen to the 
silences in and beyond the practice of territorial disputes. This is understandable: with the 
many voices of the Court's judges and regularly-appearing legal counsel, most scholars are 
1 S Pahuja, 'The Postcoloniality of International Law' (2005) 46 Harvard international Law Journal 459, at 
461-462. 
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content to focus on the more discernibly 'legal' strains resounding in the courtroom. A 
scholarly sub-discipline has emerged that is dedicated to studying these speech acts and 
judgments; perhaps the field of international law is served well enough by such efforts. 
Further, those scholars of a more critical disposition have often perpetuated these silences 
by failing to develop the explanatory tools required in attuning our ears to less familiar 
sounds. Although both new and Third World approaches to international law (NAIL and 
TWAIL) have sought to develop methodologies sensitive to the silences and dark sides of 
international law, thus far their efforts in relation to territorial adjudication have remained 
under-developed. Scholarly silences are especially pronounced because of a general 
tendency to overlook the pleadings phase of proceedings;2 law becomes judgment, rather 
than argumentation and debate. 
A critical analysis of judgments, pleadings and the gaps in between is vital to an 
assessment of the extent to which the Court as a forum of international law allows for 
universalism. Thus, through an appraisal of both mainstream and critical approaches, the 
chapter aims to highlight the limitations of current literatures on the nature of ICJ 
adjudication. The chapter will also develop the conceptual tools required for understanding 
the case studies. 
The following analysis is structured around my central research question about the 
extent to which the ICJ can serve as a site for universalism in the postcolonial era. Rather 
than simply examining the prevailing materials on territorial adjudication and critical 
alternatives, this chapter refracts ideas through the prism of universalism: what are the 
underlying assumptions about international law as well as its universality in these 
literatures? One of the subsidiary research question about how to understand the 
relationship between colonialism and international law in Arab territorial disputes can only 
be considered after a detailed examination of the theoretical and methodological 
2 Most studies of ICJ disputes fail to discuss pleadings in even the most cursory manner. Exceptions, 
however, are noteworthy and inform readings of the case studies in Parts Two and Three of the thesis. Of 
particular note is Koskenniemi 's general discussion of territorial pleadings in M Koskenniemi, From Apology 
to Utopia: The Structure of international Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2"d ed, 
2005), at 282-300, 385-387; and his detailed consideration of the Libya/Chad dispute as discussed in Chapter 
Three: M Koskenniemi, 'L' Affaire du Differend Territorial (Jamahiriya Arabe Libyenne c. Tchad) Am~t de la 
Cour Internationale de Justice du 3 fevrier l 994' (1994) 40 Annuaire fram;ais de droit international 442. 
Knop also offers a close reading of the pleadings in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion as discussed in 
Chapter Five: K Knop, Diversity and SeliDetermination in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). Berman's insightful consideration of a PCIJ case is exceptional and indicates that 
much fruitful work remains even with PCIJ jurisprudence: N Berman, 'The Nationality Decrees Case, or, Of 
Intimacy and Consent' (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 265. 
15 
Chapter One: 
Listening for Silences in and beyond the Courtroom: Methodological Tools f or Understanding !CJ Territorial Disputes 
foundations of international legal approaches to universalism. Accordingly, this chapter 
focuses on universalism and then the case studies offer specific instances of purported 
universalism in their exploration of colonialism and international law. 
This chapter both deconstructs and reconstructs an understanding of universalism 
and a methodology of adjudication in five sections. In section one, I ask whether we can 
regard increased Third World participation in ICJ disputes as a triumph of universalism or 
something else. Section two explores cri tical scholarship on the nature of legal universalism 
and the mainstream research agenda. Section three examines some critical characterisations 
of international law and language as a precursor to section four's analysis of the linguistic 
devices deployed in ICJ scholarship. In particular, section three develops the idea of 
silence, by suggesting that, rather than there being a lack of argument, it is a lack of 
capacity to hear other voices - or other dialects - that prevents universalism in the 
courtroom. Section four brings attention to the recurring narratives underpinning 
mainstream studies of ICJ disputes to understand how claims of universalism are made as 
well as how they can be sustained - or undermined. Section five is a return to fundamentals 
with its summation of my own perspective and position on international Jaw. This chapter 
concludes on a cautious note by showing that international law contains only limited tools 
for becoming a universalising discourse. This is a start though. The key is to understand 
both international law ' s speech as well as its silence in advancing the scope of international 
law's universalising potential. 
4) Problematising Postcolonial Participation: Can We Now Speak of a ' World Court'? 
The mainstream international legal academy places faith in the progressive promise of 
international law. Past or ongoing weaknesses may be admitted, but vocational training also 
brings with it the desire to improve and strengthen the principled application of 
international rules. For Kennedy, no matter how 'difficult the project will be, international 
lawyers share an orientation to a past of sovereign states and a future of international law. 
The discipline looks forward, confident that we will arrive in the future with history at our 
side.' 3 The gaze then of the international lawyer projects itself always into a future 
guaranteed under a law that is more secure and inclusive in our postcolonial era. A striking 
3 D Kennedy, ' When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box' (1999-2000) 32 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 335, at 347. 
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example of this purported progress has been the increased participation of Third World 
states in ICJ disputes, and this is especially so in the sphere of territorial matters.4 Various 
reasons have been offered to explain this development, and they will be explored below in 
an attempt to investigate whether we can now speak of a court able to listen to and speak 
for the world's states. The progressivist narrative of mainstream work is only capable of 
explaining part of this story of participation; greater consideration is still required as to why 
Third World states choose to come before the Court.5 
In the English-speaking world (and especially the United States), the ICJ is often 
characterised as the 'World Court' .6 How is this term commonly understood and what 
should a world court actually look like? First, it is important to note that the ontology of the 
World Court is a strange one, as it is populated almost exclusively by states.7 Allott argues 
that a ' court epitomizes the social reality of the society in which it is an institution. A court 
epitomizes the legal reality whose legal relations it enforces. ' 8 From this, it is possible to 
extrapolate the nature of the represented society from a given court. As applied to the ICJ, 
this would suggest that the Court works for a society of states, and yet, as Allott concedes, 
this is not really the case;9 the Court operates in a society of many actors, but only allows a 
select few to speak. Despite this restriction on locus standi, the Court is empowered to hear 
any matter of international concern, and given that a fabric of independent states now spans 
4 For example, as noted by G Distefano, 'The Conceptualization (Construction) of Territorial Title in the 
Light of International Court of Justice Case Law' (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 1041, at 
1042; RY Jennings, 'International Courts and International Politics', D Freestone et al (eds), Contemporary 
Issues in International Law: A Collection of Josephine Onoh Memorial Lectures (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002) 
13-28; M Mubiala, 'La Contribution des Etats Africains a la Renaissance de la Cour Internationale de Justice' 
(1995) African Yearbook of International Law 173; P M Munya, 'The International Court of Justice and 
Peaceful Settlement of African Disputes: Problems, Challenges and Prospects' (1998) 7 Journal of 
International Law & Practice 159, at 189; and S M Schwebel, ' The impact of the International Court of 
Justice', M Shahabuddeen (ed), Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Amicorum discipulorumque fiber: Paix, 
developpement, democratie, vol 1 (Brnssels: Brnylant, 1998) 663-674, at 668. 
5 Not only have scholars understudied reasons for Third World participation before the ICJ, Romano argues 
that this is the case in relation to dispute resolution per se: 'so far there are no comprehensive, systematic 
studies of the factors detennining the resort by developing countries to international judicial fora.' C P R 
Romano, 'international Justice and Developing Countries: A Quantitative Analysis' (2002) 1 Law & Practice 
of International Courts and Tribunals 367, at 370. 
6 Abi-Saab points out that the expression, 'world court' is peculiar to English: G Abi-Saab, ' The International 
Court as a World Court', V Lowe & M Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty years of the International Court of Justice: 
Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 3-16, at 3. 
7 Article 34(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states: 'Only states may be parties in cases 
before the Court'. There is also some provision for the involvement of international organisations: Article 34 
(2-3). 
8 P Allott, 'The international Court of Justice and the idea of justice', V Lowe & M Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty 
Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 17-39, at 27. 
9 Ibid. 
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the globe, we can see the Court as the pre-eminent tribunal for this gee-political reality. 10 
Having acknowledged this context, we can apply Abi-Saab's definition of 'world court': 'it 
is expected to be universalist in its composition, outlook and vocation, truly representing 
and at the service of the international community in its entirety, and not dominated by the 
legal or social culture or special interests of any segment thereof.' 11 
Although it is relatively easy to characterise the Court m its more recent 
manifestation as a universal forum, both Abi-Saab and Elias point out that the jurisprudence 
generated by its predecessor, the PCIJ, was exclusionary in the way most cases only 
considered Third World states as objects, and not subjects, of international law. 12 
Difficulties in denying this heritage are exacerbated by the commonly held view that 
despite the name change, the ICJ and the PCIJ are one and the same entity. This was felt 
especially keenly in the earlier period of the ICJ. 13 Bedjaoui, a former president of the ICJ, 
enunciates this narrative of institutional continuity: ' the present Court is but the 
continuation of an international justice born at the dawn of this century in the delicious 
coolness of this charming tree-lined city of The Hague.' 14 Other recent members of the 
10 Many critical and mainstream scholars, however, question the significance of the Court, indicating that 
labels like 'world' court are deceptive and misrepresent the power and impact of the Court on the 
international stage. For example, Kennedy argues that 'the Court is one cultural and political institution 
among others, crafting its decision to enhance its legitimacy and pull towards compliance, the decision one 
drop in the ocean of world public opinion'. D Kennedy, 'The Nuclear Weapons case', L Boisson de 
Chazoumes & P Sands (eds), international Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 462-472, at 464. Some mainstream perspectives tend to 
lament the weaknesses of the Court, hoping for a stronger institution. This theme is explored below in section 
four. 
11 Abi-Saab. 'The International Court as a World Court, supra n 6, at 3. 
12 G Abi-Saab, 'The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An Outline' (J 962) 8 
Howard Law Journal 95, at 98. Elias was making the point in particularly vis-a-vis African states, but the 
comment applies to the majority of the non-European world: 'Africa has in one aspect or another been before 
the Court since the days of the League of Nations, though unfortunately more often as the object ratl1er than 
the subject of international Jaw.' T 0 Elias, The International Court of Justice and some contemporary 
problems: Essays on international law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), at 299. 
13 According to McWhinney, 'The Court's deliberate intellectual orientation towards a technical, analytical, 
logical approach; its established clientele, from the pre-War and immediate post-War years, of politically and 
economically stable Western states; and the absence of any compensating political sophistication, on the pai1 
of the newly emerging, newly decolonised, Afro-Asian countries, as to the Court's potentiality for poli tical 
conflicts-resolution and for remarking "old" International Law, meant that it continued to operate and to have 
the reputation, as a "European" tribunal well after the United Nations proper had begun to undergo 
fundamental changes in its personality and character as a result of the wholesale admission of new states from 
1955 onwards.' E McWhinney, The International Court of Justice and the Western Tradition of International 
Law: The Paul Marlin Lectures in International Relations and law (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1987), at 67. 
14 M Bedjaoui, 'Celebration of the Fiftieth Anni versary of the International Court of Justice' ( 1996) 8 African 
Journal of international Comparative Law 617, at 621. For this narrative of PCIJ/ICJ continuity, see RP 
Anand, Studies in international Law and History: An Asian Perspective (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), at 
159; E McWhinney, 'The International Court of Justice and International Law-making: The Judicial 
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Court, including Judges Jennings and Weeramantry, disagree with this characterisation of 
the Court. 15 Irrespective of the relative merit of these divergent perspectives, however, the 
image of the PCIJ serving European interests was hard to ignore for recently independent 
states entering international society on the eve of independence. 16 
Given these institutional characteristics of the ICJ, especially m its first few 
decades, European and Third World scholars have recognised the postcolonial paradox 
Third World states faced: to use the Court or not to use the Court. 17 The paradox for Third 
World states is that it could be argued that to protect themselves, they must rely on the very 
weapons once created by their fom1er colonial overlords. 18 Many reasons have been 
advanced to account for minimal Third World ICJ engagement, but the main strands 
running through the literature have tended to focus on the context of the Cold War, 19 the 
debacle of the South West Africa cases,20 under-representation of non-European judges and 
Activism/Self-Restraint Antinomy' (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of International Law 3, at 4 . It is also noted by 
Thirlway, who argues 'it is somewhat artificial to treat ... [the PCIJ] independently of the decisions of the 
postwar Court - an artificiality that Rosenne avoids by treating the jurisprudence of the two international 
courts as a seamless whole.' H Thirlway, 'International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of Justice: 
The Rise of the International Judiciary (Book Review)' (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 
246, at 249. 
15 R Y Jennings, 'The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years' (1995) 89 American Journal of 
International Law 493, at 493. Jennings' main reason for distinguishing the lCJ and the PCJJ is the fact that 
the JCJ functions as the primary judicial organ of the UN . See also Weeramantry on the JC.T's contextual 
differences: C G Weeramantry, 'Expanding the Potential of the World Court', N Jasentuliyana (ed), 
Perspectives on International Law (Boston: Kluwer, 1995) 309-346, at 341. 
16 For an informative overview of the PCJJ's jurisprudence vis-a-vis colonial/mandate entities, see S Rosenne, 
'Decolonisation in the International Court of Justice' (1996) 8 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 564. 
17 For example, Fatouros points out that in many ways international law is especially useful for Third World 
states as it can act as a weapon of the weak. A A Fatouros, 'Jnternational Law and the Third World' (1964) 50 
Virginia Law Review 783, at 791. 
18 Generally, see M L Sarin, 'The Asian-African States and the Development of International Law', F E 
Snyder & S Sathirathai (eds), Third World Attitudes Toward International Law: An Introduction (Dordrecht; 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) 33-51, at 39. 
19 Mcwhinney especially notes this factor. Generally, see McWhinney, The International Court of Justice and 
the Western Tradition, supra n 13; E McWhinney, 'Western and Non-Western Legal Cultures and the 
International Court of Justice' (1987) 65 Washington Un iversity Law Quarterly 873; and E McWhinney, 
"'Internationalizing" The International Court: The Quest for Ethno-cultural and Legal-systemic 
Representativeness', E G Bello & BA Ajibola (eds), Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias: vol I 
Contemporary International Law and Human Rights (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 277-289. 
20 International Status of South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) (1950) ICJ Reps, p. 128; Admissibility of 
Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) (1956) JCJ Reps, p. 23; 
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia/South Africa; Liberia/South Africa) (Preliminary Objectiom) (1962) ICJ 
Reps, p. 319; South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia/South Africa; Liberia/South Africa) (Second Phase) (1966) 
ICJ Reps, p. 6; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) noh1iithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) (1971) ICJ Reps, 
p. 12. Jn 1960, Ethopia and Liberia had filed claims before the ICJ arguing that South Africa had failed to 
meet its requirements towards the territory of South West Africa under the League of Nations Mandate 
regime. In 1966 with the casting vote of the Court's Australian judge, Sir Percy Spender, standing to contest 
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legal norms, as well as deep-seated Third World cultural (as opposed to political) aversion 
to third party dispute resolution. In relation to the last point, it is surprising how both Third 
and First World scholars have readily applied cultural stereotypes to the entire non-
European world. Third World scholars such as Sinha and Tieya have suggested that Third 
World states preferred the avenues of negotiations and mediation; adjudication was not 
culturally appropriate.21 Prott lends her own European assessment to the ' problem' of 
Third World participation by arguing that only in Western societies had there developed the 
requisite notion of an independent judiciary divorced from politics. Thus, non-European 
states expected certain 'non-legal' solutions from the Court and were unsure about how to 
approach it. 22 Writing much more recently, and perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, 
Romano cautions against making such generalisations about the Third World being less 
culturally inclined toward litigation.23 
Although many commentators have avoided cultural stereotypes in their accounts of 
Third World participation, most have at least identified the importance of diversity on the 
ICJ's bench in accounting for initial Third World reticence in using the Court. 24 Why 
would Third World states trust an institution unrepresentative in its officers and the laws 
they applied? Mainstream scholarship suggests that only once some of these characteristics 
changed would Third World states be willing to entrust matters before this tribunal. As 
Third World jurists themselves, both El-Erian and Weeramantry single out Article 9 of the 
Court's Statute for discussion: 
the matter was denied to Ethiopia and Liberia. With a different bench and condemnation of its 1966 judgment, 
in 1971 the Court ruled that South Africa's presence in the territory was illegal. Despite this ruling, Namibia 
(the name of the territory since 1968) only gained its independence in 1990. For discussion about the cases, 
see J Crawford, The Creation of States in international Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2"d ed, 
2006), at 586-598. 
21 According to Sinha in relation to 'pacific settlement of disputes, the newly independent States prefer 
methods of negotiation, inquiry, mediation and conciliation rather than adjudication of legal rules.' SP Sinha, 
'Perspective of the Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International Law', FE Snyder & S 
Sathirathai (eds), Third World Attitudes Toward international Law: An Introduction (Dordrecht; Boston: 
Martious Nijhoff, 1987) 23-31, at 29. For a counter-argument, claiming that negotiations are more important 
than resort to the ICJ within the 'standard of civilized behaviour', see L Nader, 'Civilization and its 
Negotiations', P Caplan (ed), Understanding Disputes: The Politics of Argument (Oxford: Providence, 1995) 
39-63, 41. 
22 L V Prott, ' Role, Consensus and Opinion Analysis at the International Court of Justice' (1983) 14 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 69, al 72. 
23 C P R Romano, ' International Justice and Developing Countries (Continued): A Qualitative Analysis' 
(2002) l Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 539, at 57 1. 
24 lt is striking that in reading many discussions about the representation of !CJ judges, never once did a 
mainstream or Third World perspective express any concern about the gendered nature of the Court ; it was 
worry ing to have only European males, but not non-European males. This oversight in understanding the 
concept of a representative bench is explored in H Charlesworth & C Chinkin, The Boundaries of 
International Law: A Feminist Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) at 80-81. 
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At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be 
elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the 
body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the 
principal legal systems of the world should be assured. 
El-Erian argues that this requirement of civilisational representation is significant and is 
unique in the UN system, which is otherwise based on equitable geographical distribution 
of its personnel.25 Weeramantry regards this provision as fundamental for the possibility of 
a universal Court, able to speak for and speak to the world's many civilisations. 26 
Weeramantry's example of inter-civilisational jurisprudence contained in his own separate 
opinions is testimony to such a possibility.27 In the words of Anghie, Weeramanty ' suggests 
that international law is not alien to the Third World; it is part of the heritage of Third 
World countries which have contributed to its development.' 28 Despite Weeramantry's 
efforts, however, he has recently doubted the scope for such inter-civilisational dialogue on 
bench, noting that 'it has not happened thus far in any significant measure, and such input, 
has been miniscule. '29 
Although genuine civilisational representation has yet to be realised, and perhaps 
can never be, it is clear that the issue of the ratio of European/non-European judges at the 
ICJ has been a continuing motif in the literature accounting for Third World reluctance 
especially in the early years of the Court. For Romano, 'the issue of the distribution of seats 
in the ICJ has always been highly contentious, notably among the Asian group, which is 
representative of such a large part of the world's population but relatively underrepresented 
on the bench. ' 30 Some useful quantitative studies highlight the continuing discrepancies in 
the geographical and civilisational composition of the bench.31 
Numbers aside, however, it is difficult to establish any direct link between the ICJ's 
bench and its jurisprudence. Anghie reminds us that there are no specific qualities 
25 A El-Erian, 'The International Court of Justice and the Concept of Universality ' (1981) 19 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 197, at 204. 
26 C G Weeramantry, Universalising International Law (Leiden: Martunis Nijhoff, 2004), at 3. 
27 Especially, see Legality of the Threat or Uye of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (Advisory Opinion) 
(1996) ICJ Reps (diss. op. Weeramantry), at 449-555; and GabCikovo-Nagymaros Case (Hungary/Slovakia) 
(1997) !CJ Reps (sep. op. Weeramantry), at 96-110. 
28 A Anghie, 'C. G. Weeramantry at the International Court of Justice' (200 l) 14 Leiden Journal of 
international Law 829, at 845. 
29 Weeramantry, Universalizing international Law, supra n 26, at 3. 
30 Romano, ' International Justice and Developing Countries (Continued) ', supra n 23, at 579. 
31 C Harland, ' International Court of Justice Elections: A Report on the First Fifty Years' (1996) 34 Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law 303. For more recent statistics, see Romano, 'International Justice and 
Developing Countries', supra n 5. 
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possessed by Third World judges, but they do at least bring with them certain personal 
expenences: 
To label a judge as a 'Third World' judge based on the positions he [sic] takes on 
specific issues is a relatively simple, and perhaps simplistic way of characterizing a 
judge. The more complex issue is the relationship between the Third World judge 
and international law itself, given that historically, international law has 
marginalized Third World peoples and legitimized their dispossession and 
32 
conquest. 
Bedjaoui echoes this idea by argumg that the work of a judge is deeply personal; 
conscience, rather than political factors, influences legal determinations. 33 Other writers 
have dismissed any relationship between a judge's nationality and her jurisprudence, 
especially because most Third World jurists are themselves educated in Europe or North 
America and often are well-versed in the Peace Palace's markedly European culture upon 
arrival.34 
Despite the fact that there are strong arguments negating a link between Third 
World judges and structural change within the ICJ, the South West Africa affair has since 
been explained as being very much about First World judicial bias. 35 Along with the 
Nicaragua case, these two examples are constructed as polar opposites in accounts of Third 
World ICJ participation.36 This narrative of dark and light is part of ICJ literature; no study 
of the Court is complete without a discussion and comparison between these watersheds. 
Time and again, the dark days of the Court's 'betrayal' in its 1966 South West Africa 
decision are singled out in a bid to distinguish and exceptionalise this episode in the Court's 
32 Anghie, 'C. G. Weeramantry', supra n 28, at 844-845. For an interesting study about the problems faced by 
Third World judges and lawyers in their municipal jurisdictions, see R L Abel, 'The Underdevelopment of 
Legal Professions: A Review Article on Third World Lawyers' (1982) American Bar Foundation Research 
.Journal 871. 
33 Bedjaoui, supra n 14, at 622-623. Dupuy also regards the institution of the judge as especially important in 
advancing the cause of the Court: ' it seems that the best way for improving the role of the ICJ as a world 
court rests in the hands of the judges themselves, and in the way they view the true function of the Court 
within the international legal system. It is more a matter of judicial policy than of technical efficiency 
improvements, even if it is true that some such improvements could be achieved.' P-M Dupuy, 'The Danger 
of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice', 
( 1998-1999) 3 1 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 791 , at 802. 
34 Abi-Saab talks more broadly about the way in which many Third World jurists educated in the West are 
excessively positivist and incapable of questioning legal rules. Abi-Saab, ' The Newly Independent States', 
supran 12,at!OO. 
35 For a nuanced and contextual consideration of the South West Africa affair and its rooL<> in European 
intellectual history, see S N Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self 
Determination in International Law (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
36 Supra n 20; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/ USA) (Merits) 
(1986) ICJ Reps, p. 14. 
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practice. 37 The casting vote of a First World judge gives further weight to this extraordinary 
affair that prompted profound distrust across the Third World. For example, Munya 
rejected any notion of universalism after this episode, naming the ICJ as the 'Western Court 
of Justice'.38 Rarely do accounts acknowledge the relative unimportance of the Court for 
Third World states before the South West Africa cases or suggest other reasons for its 
associations with colonial/mandatory rule at the level of international legal discourse itself. 
Irrespective of this earlier context, however, narratives lauding the rise of Third 
World participation must show how Third World attitudes have changed radically since the 
unfortunate experience of South West Africa. The soul-searching prompted by South West 
Africa resulted in a greater awareness of the influence of Third World judges, and 
commentators have documented the phenomenon of Third World states lobbying for their 
own jurists. 39 By the time the Court was tested in Nicaragua, 40 the typical narrative 
suggests that Third World interests were vindicated: the Court could now shine for the 
interests of the majority world. Furthermore, in 1986 with this instance of First World 
reversal, the ICJ's Chamber also handed down its cause celebre of later territorial 
judgements, the Frontier Dispute,41 which demarcated the boundary between two African 
states, Burkino Faso and Mali.42 This judgment has served as the blueprint for later Third 
World territorial disputes, which largely revolve around ad hoc agreements seeking the 
Court's assistance in solidifying borders. Over a decade later and with unprecedented Court 
activity, Judge Ajibola noted: 'This increase in the volume of cases before the Court is 
obviously a reflection of an increasing confidence that states now have in the Court. It 
suggests that states are now more amenable to submitting their differences to adjudication 
37 M Pomerance, 'The ICJ and South West Africa (Namibia): A Retrospective Legal/Political Assessment' 
(1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 425, at 430. Adede offers an example of this narrative of 
exception: he describes how President Judge Spender advised Judge Khan to step down for the 1966 case, 
thus changing the balance of the Court. Such an account may well be factually correct, but in focussing on 
these superficial factors, it is easier to distinguish this episode and overlook pervasive structural explanations 
for why it was possible at all for the Court to reach such a decision. A 0 Adede, 'Judicial Settlement in 
Perspective', A S Muller, D Raic & J M Thuninszky (eds), The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role 
after Fifty Years (The Hague; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) 47-8 1, at 51 -53. 
38 P M Munya, 'The International Court of Justice and Peaceful Settlement of African Disputes: Problems, 
Challenges and Prospects' ( 1998) 7 Journal of International Law & Practice 159, at 173. 
39 McWhinney, 'Western and non-Western Legal Cultures', supra n 19, at 880-882; Pomerance, supra n 37, 
at 431. 
40 Pomerance, Ibid, at 435. 
41 Distefano, supra n 4, at 1042. 
42 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali} (1986) ICJ Reps, p. 554. The case is discussed 
briefly in Part Two's Introduction, at 99- 11 7. 
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than they were in the past.' 43 Former events and PCIJ memories aside, then, most 
commentators feel confident in viewing the Court as qualitatively different from its early 
days, partly as a result of increased Third World participation. Perhaps, in the twenty first 
century, it is even possible to posit a Court universal in its reach and representation. 
Third World participation in the Court is noteworthy, but it does not prove the 
Court's universalism or legitimacy. Rarely have scholars celebrating the Court's 
'relevance' advanced convincing structural reasons for the seeming shift in Third World 
proclivities. For example, most mainstream accounts about the work of the Court disregard 
quotidian realities for Third World decision-making about adjudication.44 Concerns about 
representation, language, time delays and funding nevertheless are real. 45 For example, 
little attention has been paid to the impact that an almost exclusively European bar must 
have on the choices available to states.46 Some scholars especially from the Third World 
are alive to these limitations and biases, but rarely is this feature acknowledged elsewhere. 
Pellett is a notable exception, when he concedes that 'in the small world of public 
international law we may speak of the "mafia" of the International Court of Justice' .47 
Reasons for this situation are many, but one factor is the way in which lawyers well-versed 
in the Court's languages of English and French will ipso facto feel more at home than some 
of their counterparts. In a rare discussion about the impact that language restrictions have 
on participants, Judge Oda described the difficulties he has faced in keeping pace with 
native English or French speakers on the bench.48 Many Third World lawyers and judges 
possess the Court's official languages as mother tongues too, but this is not always the 
case.
49 
43 B A Ajibola, 'Dispute Resolution by the lntcmational Court of Justice' (1998) 11 Leiden Journal of 
international Law 123, at 124. 
44 In a discussion about some of the difficulties and drawbacks of ICJ litigation, see G Guillaume, 'The Future 
of International Judicial Institutions' ( 1995) 44 international & Comparative Law Quarterly 848. 
45 Sinclair notes state concern over delays as an important reason for avoiding !CJ litigation: I Sinclair, 'The 
Court as an Institution: Its Role and Position in International Society', D Bowell e t al, The International Court 
of Justice: Process, Practice and Procedure (London: The British Institute of International & Comparative 
Law, 1997) 21-26, at 23. 
46 For some illuminating statistics about non-European lawyers at the Court, see K T Gaubatz & M 
MacArthur, ' How International is "International" Law?' (2000-200 I) 22 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 239, at 250-260. 
47 Quoted in Romano, ' International Justice and Developing Countries (Continued)', supra n 23, at 561, note 
79. This point is also made by McWhinney, "'Internationalizing" the International Court', supra n I 9, at 288. 
48 S Oda, 'Conunent', D Bowett et al (eds), The International Court of Justice: Process, Practice and 
Procedure (London: The British Institute oflntemational & Comparative Law, 1997), 94-10 I. 
49 The relevance of language is rarely noted in the literature, but an exception is Richard Falk, who discusses 
'Western cultural hegemony' as symbolised by the Court's location in The Hague working only in French 
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Of similar neglect is the factor of litigation expenses preventing Third World 
participation. The ICJ Statute requires states to fund the costs of a case,50 and these may be 
prohibitive for many Third World states. On the initiative of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) at the UN,51 the General Assembly introduced the Secretary-General's Trust Fund 
derived from the voluntary contributions of member-states to support needy states in 
covering litigation costs for contentious cases founded on a compromis. Jennings argues 
that the 'fund is clearly an important step in enabling poorer countries to take advantage of 
the Court for the disposal of disputes within its contentious jurisdiction, where the parties 
are able to make a special agreement. ' 52 Such an initiative - even though limited in its 
accessibility and future liquidity - is commendable and could serve as another factor in 
boosting Third World participation before the Court. Bekker, however, laments the lack of 
scholarly or media attention on the fund's impact thus far.53 
Factors such as the increased representation of Third World judges and the 
Nicaragua judgment have bolstered the Court's legitimacy, but it remains unclear whether 
this can account for why Third World states now rely on the Court more than ever before. 
Many mainstream scholars have praised the Court for its postcolonial progress and now 
invoke the narrative of universalism, but critical scholarship, introduced in the next section, 
questions not only the arguments advanced but also the methods used in constructing such 
a narrative. 
5) NAIL and TW AIL on the Politics of Law and the Possibility of Universalism 
Mainstream accounts of the Court' s universality rest on assumptions about the nature of 
international law. This is equally true of those voices questioning and challenging such a 
and/or English. R Falk, Reviving the World Court (Charlottesvi lle : University Press Of Virginia, 1986), at 
180. 
50 Article 64, Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
51 T Bien-Aime, 'A Pathway to The Hague and Beyond: The United Nations Trust Fund Proposal' (1989-
1990) 22 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 671. For a brief overview of the 
scheme, see 'United Nations: Secretary-General's Trust Fund to Assist Stales in the Settlement of Disputes 
through the International Court of Justice ' (1989) 28 lLM 1589. 
52 Jennings, 'The Jntemational Court of Justice after Fifty Years' , supra n 15, at 50 I. 
53 P H F Bekker, ' International Legal Aid in Practice: The lCJ Trust Fund' (1993) 87 American Journal of 
International Law 659, at 660. It has been very difficult to access detailed infonnation about the fund's 
beneficiaries, but I am aware that the fund was used by Burkino Faso and Mali in the Fronter Dispute in 
applying the Chamber's boundary detennination, and Chad drew on funds in its dispute with Libya in the 
Territorial Dispute, discussed in Chapter Three below. In his 2002 survey, Romano notes that since its 
inception, four requests for assistance have been made. Romano, ' International Justice and Developing 
Countries (Continued)', supra n 23, at 554. 
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depiction of the ICJ. Thus, debates about the nature of the Court are part of a broader 
disciplinary debate about how to study international law.54 Methodology is an exercise in 
boundary-drawing and a conscious choice about which knowledges to privilege and which 
to silence. 55 It is the task of critical scholars to probe these ' blind spots ' within the 
discipline to deny the naturalness and inevitability of prevailing power relations, 56 
including those constructed through the discourse of international law in and beyond the 
courtroom. International law is structured by a dynamic of difference and NAIL and 
TWAIL scholars have highlighted this dynamic in a number of ways.57 Reappraisals of 
binary oppositions such as masculine/feminine, colonial/postcolonial, universal/particular 
and law/politics demonstrate how difficult it is to speak of universalism. By studying the 
dark side of dichotomies at play in international legal discourse, 58 this section 
problematises the narrative of universalism and progress as explored in section four's 
consideration of some themes in the literature about the ICJ. The section first surveys some 
basic characteristics of NAIL scholarship before considering TWAIL's particular 
perspective on Third World concerns revolving around colonialism. 
Summaries inevitably simplify scholarship and this perhaps 1s especially so in 
relation to NAIL, which seeks to open up, rather than contain and confine, international 
legal research.59 Thus, instead of attempting a survey of NAIL literatures, some relevant 
54 For a good illustration of some of these contrasting methodologies, see the special issue dedicated to 
method in international law: (1999) 93 American Journal of International law. In particular, see the editorial 
comments: S R Ratner & A-M Slaughter, 'Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for 
Readers' (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 291; and A-M Slaughter & SR Ratner, 'The 
Method is the Message' (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 41 0. 
55 H Charlesworth, 'Feminist Methods in International Law' (1999) 93 American Journal of International 
Law 379, at 368 & 381. This idea is also explored in relation to terrorism and international law, see I M 
Porras, 'On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw' ( 1994) Utah Law Review 119. 
56 The idea of disciplinary blind spots is invoked by a number of critical scholars, who speak of mainstream 
methodological oversights. Some examples include: Charlesworth, supra n 55, at 386; and Kennedy, 'When 
Renewal Repeats, supra n 3. 
57 For example, as elaborated in A Anghie, 'Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: 
Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations' (2002) 34 New York University 
Journal of International law and Politics 513, at 518-519. 
58 The idea of the dark side is noted by Koskenniemi when he discussed the need to deconstruct the promise 
of liberalism and appreciate those it overlooks in this world of endless conswner choice: 'Not to fall under the 
spell of that shopping mall requires focusing on its dangers, discontinuities and mechanisms of exclusion. If 
"deconstruction" is able to bring out that dark side, the reality of the mall at night, it may provide a means for 
critical identification and practice. ' M Koskenniemi, ' Letter to the Editors of the Symposium' ( 1999) 93 
American Journal of international Law 35 1, at 361. David Kennedy also explores this image in a number of 
his writings, the most extensive being: D Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International 
Humanitarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
59 This is pointed out by: T Skouteris, 'Fin de NAIL: New Approaches to International Law and its Impact on 
Contemporary International Legal Scholarship' (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of international Law 415, at 418, 
footnote 6. 
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themes are explored instead so as to problematise the self-image of international law within 
the discipline as well as to raise questions about universalism. 6° Critical approaches rose to 
prominence in the eighties especially with the work of David Kennedy and Martti 
Koskenniemi.61 Kennedy described his approach, and those of his peers, as 'Newstream', 
and this was a term that encapsulated critical reappraisals of the discipline until its later 
metamorphosis in the nineties into 'NAIL'. Critical scholars are concerned with exploring 
the inner workings of the discipline of international law. Excavations have revealed 'biased 
discursive structures,' usually hidden under the veil of liberalism, 62 which is typically 
depicted as normatively neutral in a system straddling sovereignty and its constraint. 63 
Critical scholars challenge liberalism's promise of equality by revealing the 'background 
conditions and norms' of international law, which generate not only disciplinary blind spots 
and biases, but also exclusion for actors on the ground.64 
Critical approaches are alive to the effects generated by the perpetuation and 
seeming naturalness of dichotomies and none more so than the tension between law and 
politics. By separating law from politics, mainstream scholars can construct an image of 
international law untouched by considerations of power and domination. In so doing, the 
bulk of international legal scholarship perpetuates ongoing exclusion and silence in a 
gesture that is - at least covertly - fiercely political. Conversely, critical scholars elide law 
with politics, showing us that the two cannot be separated; international law is a 'tradition 
and a political project',65 played out in a special institutional and discursive setting that 
provides it with particular meaning. Thus for Koskenniemi, law ' is a surface over which 
political opponents engage in hegemonic practices, trying to enlist its rules, principles and 
60 For some surveys of NAIL contributions, see J A Beckett, 'Countering Uncertainty and Ending Up/Down 
Arguments: Prolegomena to a Response to NAJL' (2005) 16 European Journal of international law 213; D 
Z Cass, 'Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law' (1996) 65 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 341; Kennedy, 'When Renewal Repeats ', supra n 3; AL Paulus, ' International 
Law after Postmodemism: Towards Renewal or Decline of International Law?' (2001) 14 Leiden Journal of 
international law 727; N Purvis, 'Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law' (1991) 32 Harvard 
International Law Journal 81. For a brief discussion and bibliography of NAIL scholarship, see T Skouteris 
& 0 Korhonen, 'Under Rhodes' Eyes: The "Old" and the "New" International Law at Looking Distance' 
( 1998) I I Leiden Journal of international Law 429. 
61 Especially see the work of Koskenniemi listed in the bibliography; and D Kennedy, ' A New Stream of 
International Law Scholarship' (1988) 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal 1. 
62 This term is used in C Thomas, 'Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory: Observations 
on Methodology' (2000) 45 Villanova law Review 1195, at 1219. 
63 See generally, Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra n 2; and M Mutua, Keynote Address, Third 
World Approaches to International Law, Albany Law School, 20-21April2007. 
64 Kennedy, ' When Renewal Repeats ', supra n 3, at 409-410. 
65 M Koskenniemi, 'The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics' (2007) 70 
Modern Law Review I, at I. 
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institutions on their side, making sure they do not support the adversary. ' 66 For 
international lawyers, the 'point is . .. not to be ashamed of.. .underlying choices but to make 
them in the open, to open them up for critique and rebuttal. '67 Kennedy suggests that we 
ask not 'whether politics or where politics, but what politics. ' 68 
Once law is understood as a discursive political practice, it is impossible to regard 
rules as objective or to resolve definitively conflicts over competing norms in a horizontal 
system; international law becomes indeterminate. The consequences of this position have 
resulted in profound mainstream mistrust. Thus, Skouteris notes that ' [ d]espite the growth 
of NAIL writing, engaged scholarly response has been spectacularly absent.' 69 Political 
ramifications within NAIL are also internally destabilising, as its call for context can also 
be deconstructed, making it impossible to know which account to favour.70 The consolation 
at least is that NAIL is alive to the politics of choice in its methodological schemes. 
Ultimately, NAIL provides the conceptual tools for exposing structural biases and 
contingencies at the heart of international law. Whether it can serve as a political platform 
for progressive change is still to be seen, especially in relation to law as a universalising 
discourse. 
A number of approaches based around identity have taken up the themes of NAIL in 
various shades of harmony and dissonance.71 For example, both feminist and Third World 
concerns have their roots in earlier projects, but they have often combined these along a 
broader critical trajectory, so that it is possible to note a whole range of critical subfields 
within NAIL. 
TW AIL is one critical approach which shares many similarities with earlier Third 
World as well as NAIL scholarship in its quest to interrogate the universality of 
international law. Kennedy identifies the central TWAIL concerns as being: 
How is domination and inequality reproduced? 
What has international law got to do with it? 
How can we fight this domination?72 
66 M Koskenniemi, ' International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration' (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 197, at 200. 
67 Paulus, supra n 60, at 753. 
68 Italics in the original, Kennedy, ' When Renewal Repeats, supra n 3, at 412. 
69 Skouteris, supra n 59, al 419-420. 
70 Paulus, supra n 60. 
71 As noted in Kennedy, 'When Renewal Repeats', supra n 3, at 391-392 and especially footnote 22. 
72 D Kennedy, Keynote Address, Third World Approaches to International Law, Albany Law School, 20-21 
April 2007. 
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Chimni echoes this by pointing out that TW AIL' s focus is centred on struggles of Third 
World peoples; he argues, however, that a NAIL tendency toward rejecting all rules and 
offering no alternatives is unhelpful.73 TWAIL began as a movement in the mid nineties, 
but draws heavily on the consciousness and practice of earlier Third World jurists seeking 
to advance the rights of the developing world in the context of decolonisation.74 Gathii 
notes that these earlier scholars, or TW AIL I scholars, were largely concerned with how to 
reform international law so that it could fulfil its promise of equality and universality in a 
postcolonial world.75 Although a nationalist strand rejected international law altogether, an 
integrationist strand advanced a multicultural law, built on European and non-European 
norms.76 A number of first and Third World scholars therefore focused on an historical 
account of international law's pre-colonial origins and many argued and continue to argue 
that international law was once based on the interaction between European and non-
European independent states. Colonialism and its denial of international legal personality 
cannot be ignored, but with its demise, many scholars were keen to show how international 
law was also culturally rich and non-discriminatory.77 Such studies have contributed to our 
understandings of the history of international legal relations and their contribution is 
explored in Chapter Two. 
'TWAIL II' scholarship is more cautious about embracing optimistic narratives of a 
postcolonial international law:78 structural biases continue to exclude and silence much of 
73 B S Chimni, 'Towards a Radical Third World Approach to Contemporary International Law' (2002) 5 
International Centre for Comparative Law and Politics Review 14, at 23-24. 
74 Baxi suggests that 'Third Worldism offers histories of mentalities of self-determination and self-
govemance, based on the insistence of the recognition of radical cultural and civilisational plurality and 
diversity.' U Baxi, 'What may the 'Third World' expect from International Law?' (2006) 27 Third World 
Quarterly 713, at 714. An emphasis on development is also an important element in Third World work as 
argued by L Marasinghe, 'Third World Jurisprudence of the Twenty-First Century', A Anghie & G Sturgess 
(eds), Legal Visions of the 2J5' Century: Essays in Honour of Judge Christopher Weeramantry (The Hague: 
Kluwer, 1998) 49-71, at 55. 
75 J T Gathii, 'Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on Developing 
Countries to International Legal Theory' (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 263, at 265. 
76 Ibid, at 273. 
77 For example, Ab.i-Saab speaks of the period of decolonisation as a re-acquisition of sovereignty for the 
Third World: Abi-Saab, 'The Newly Independent States', supra n 12, at 103-104. See also M A Ajomo, 
'International Law, the United Nations and Decolonization', E G Bello & B A Ajibola (eds), Essays in 
Honour of.Judge Taslim Olawale Elias: vol I Contemporary International Law and Human Rights (1992) 77-
92, at 79; P C Jessup, 'Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations' (1964) 58 American Journal of 
International Law 341; M Shahabuddeen, 'Developing Countries and the Idea of International Law', 
McDonald, R St. John (ed), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) 
721, at 726. 
78 For some discussions of the basic differences between TW AIL I and TWAIL II approaches, see B S 
Chimni, 'Towards a TW AIL Theory of Interpretation: Some Notes', Conference Paper, TW AIL Ill, Albany 
Law School, 20-21 April 2007. 
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the Third World, but in different ways from those of the colonial period. Thus, TWAIL II 
has channelled its energies in exploring the legacies of colonialism to show that colonialism 
is a constant 79 and that international law is a 'medium of conquest and domination'. 80 
Particular attention has been paid to understanding how international law is not a practice 
based on regulating relations between sovereign states; instead, it is structured by an 
ongoing dynamic of cultural difference.81 Continuity, rather than change, is highlighted, 
and so it becomes much more difficult to speak of an era after colonialism. Pahuja captures 
this idea when she posits that the "'post" in postcolonial designates a state neither clearly 
beyond nor after the colonial.' 82 Our consciousness as international lawyers and the 
experience of Third World peoples cannot escape the reality that 'first of all there was 
colonialism'.83 Although TWAIL is devoted to the interests of Third World peoples (as 
opposed to Third World states),84 Mickelson reminds us that colonial legacies are no less 
important for the First, as opposed to the Third, World, especially regarding the distribution 
of wealth.85 More recent European narratives of good governance are remarkably similar to 
the nineteenth century's 'Standard of Civilisation,' 86 and so current TWAIL research is 
especially intrigued with the cultural implications of persisting economic inequalities for 
Third World peoples.87 
79 A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) at 315. 
80 M Mutua, 'Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider' (2000) 45 
Villanova Law Review 841, at 843. 
81 Anghie, Imperialism, supra n 79, at 4-5. 
82 Pahuja, supra n I, at 469. 
83 V Nesiah, 'Placing International Law: White Spaces on a Map' (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of international 
Law I , at 21. 
84 BS Chimni, 'Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto', A Anghie et al (eds), The Third 
World and International Order: Law, Politics and Globalization (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 47-73, at 
51; and A Anghie & B S Chimni, 'Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts' (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International law 
77, at 78. 
85 K Mickelson, 'Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse' (1998) 16 
Wisconsin international law Journal 353, at 409-410. 
86 The 'Standard of Civilisation' is discussed in more detail below in Chapter Two, at 78-8 1. 
87 Anghie discusses the notion of 'good governance' as the new standard of civilisation in Chapter Five, 
Anghie, Imperialism, supra n 79. Chimni makes the same point in Chimni, 'Third World Approaches', supra 
n 84, at 61. Other work drawing on TWAIL sensibilities has also characterised postcolonial World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund interventions as a new regime of capitulations for some of the non-European 
world. For example, see A Anghie, 'Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical 
Perspective' (2000) 45 Villanova law Review 887; A Anghie, ' international Financial Institutions', C Reus-
Smit (ed), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 217-237; DP 
Fidler, 'A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International Law, Structural Adjustment , and the 
Standards of Liberal, Globalized Civilization' (2000) 35 Texas International Law Journal 387; D P Fidler, 
'The Return of the Standard of Civilization' (2001) 2 Chicago Journal of International Law 137; J T Gathii, 
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Perhaps because TWAIL II emphasises economic relations in a bid to expose the 
public/private dichotomy of liberalism, little attention has been given to territorial 
adjudication. To date, no TWAIL scholars have offered a close reading of Third World 
pleadings before the ICJ, confining themselves instead to the Court's judgments.88 
Although we cannot speak of one Third World approach or one Third World, 89 both 
TW AIL I and TW AIL II scholars have used this label as a tool of resistance in working out 
how to understand the relationship between international law and its universality. Kennedy 
reminds us that critical approaches encounter a dilemma: 'frame breakers are generally 
either interpolated back into the disciplinary vocabulary or placed outside the field'. 90 
There is thus a distinction 'between people operating within the disciplinary lexicon and 
people pursuing criticism and reform outside it. '91 TW AIL scholars cannot be placed in one 
camp, but it is clear that there is discomfort for some TW AIL scholars about how to work 
with or work against international law. The structural implications, particularly of TW AIL 
II scholarship, provide little hope for a law that can transcend its exclusionary dynamics, 
and yet Anghie argues that TW AIL must continue to ask not if but how to 'construct an 
international law that is responsive to the needs and aspirations of the peoples of the Third 
World.'92 
The tension between hope and despair within TW AIL scholarship complicates its 
approach to universalism. When reading TWAIL accounts of colonialism's continuing 
legacy, it is unclear if international law is being abandoned or if there is an attempt to 
change it. Writers disagree on this, but both Chirnni and Anghie , for example, argue that 
international law cannot be rejected: 'International law is a field of contestation over 
meanings, approaches, solutions, remedies, and one that TW AIL cannot surrender.' 93 
Pahuja has noted this irresolution in the work of Anghie, arguing that 'the concept of 
'Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: Decentring the International Law of 
Governmental Legitimacy' (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 1996. 
88 Some (re)considerations of ICJ judgments must be noted: J T Gathii, 'Geographical Hegelianism in 
Territorial Disputes Involving Non-European Land Relations: An Analysis of the Case Concerning 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia)' (2002) 15 Leiden Journal ofinternational Law 581; and Nesiah, 
supra n 83. 
89 Chimni, 'Towards a Radical', supra n 73, at 14. 
9° Kennedy, 'When Renewal Repeats, supra n 3, at 460. 
91 Ibid, at 463. 
92 Anghie, Imperialism, supra n 79, at 2. 
93 Anghie & Chimni, supra n 84, at 101. 
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universality is under-theorised. ' 94 Anghie himself has conceded this point: there is the will 
for universalism within many TW AIL accounts, but no robust theoretical mechanism 
advanced about how to move beyond international law's imperialising structures.95 It would 
seem then that especially TW AIL II scholarship has perhaps been too successful in 
revealing the dynamics of difference. Some of TWAIL's leading figures have shown us 
how to understand inequalities at the heart of international law, thus fulfilling the first two 
questions raised by Kennedy above. They have also made a convincing call to resistance,96 
and Kennedy argues that the way to fight back is in producing new legal maps.97 Given the 
persistent tension in TWAIL scholarship over law's universalism, we need to draw new 
maps. By considering the specific case of Arab territorial adjudication, this thesis will map 
out the possibilities for universalism before the Court. 
6) Speaking in Tongues: International Law as Language 
The most important conceptual tool for the thesis is a critical sensibility towards the 
discursive qualities of international law.98 One of the hypotheses informing my research is 
that the construction of law in the courtroom is a process of argumentation. Such an 
assumption is just as relevant outside the courtroom in academic discussion: institutional 
particularities and conventions influence ICJ disputes, but otherwise, they are a part of the 
discursive practice that is international law writ large. This section reviews NAIL 
approaches to language so that we can then apply them first in our reading of ICJ scholarly 
literature in the chapter and then to ICJ territorial disputes in mapping the scope for 
universalism. 
94 S Pahuja, 'Review: Antony Aoghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of international Law' (2006) 
69 Modern Law Review 486, at 488. 
95 Angrue, imperialism, supra n 79, at 317. 
96 For example, see B Rajagopal, international Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third 
World Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); B Rajagopal, ' Counter-hegemonic 
International Law: rethinking human rights and development as Third World strategy' (2006) 27 Third World 
Quarterly 767. 
97 Kennedy, 'Keynote Address ', supra n 72. 
98 For an overview of constructivist approaches to international law from within the International Relations 
discipline, see F Kratochwil, 'Thrasymmachos Revisited: On the Relevance of Norms and the Study of Law 
for International Relations' 37 (1984) Journal of International Affairs 343; and C Reus-Smit, ' The Politics of 
International Law', C Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of international Law (Cambrdige: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 14-44. 
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Critical international legal scholarship has shown us not only that language matters, 
but that international law itself is language; there 'is no escape from language. '99 For Cass, 
'[i]f law is a set of arguments generated by language then it is the discussion or 
conversation about the arguments that creates the concepts themselves, not the actual 
behaviour of states, their consent, or their beliefs.' 100 Thus, language does not describe 
behaviour and rules; it actually constitutes them. In the words oflinguist Joshua Fishman: 
Language is not merely a means of interpersonal communication and influence. It 
is not merely a carrier of content, whether latent or manifest. Language itself is 
content, a referent for loyalties and animosities, an indicator of social statuses and 
personal relationships, a marker of situations and topics as well as of the societal 
goals and the large-scale value-laden arenas of interaction that typify every speech 
community.101 
This understanding of language is applicable to any form of discourse, including 
international law, and it is echoed by Boyle's work on international law. Like Fishman, 
Boyle denies the possibility of language as something a priori, or as an incontestable 
representation of social ' fact' . In relation to the international law debate about sources, 
Boyle argues that '[t]he idea of finding the essence or the real source of law distracts us 
from the reality that, in a very important sense, it is being created by our categories and 
definitions rather than being described by them.' 102 
Once we apply this sensibility about language to international law, the result is 
indeterminacy: there can be no external reference point and no rule that is beyond choice; 
all rules are rooted in politics. Koskenneimi' s impressive scholarship is particularly 
intrigued with international law's discursive indeterminacy. Responding to a request for 
methodological comment in a special issue of the American Journal of International Law, 
Koskenniemi reveals his understanding about language and indeterminacy: 103 
Legal styles are styles of argument, of linguistic expression. The accounts of 
method contained in the symposium readily accept this and seek to establish a 
99 Cass, supra n 60, at 361. 
100 Ibid, at 359. 
101 Italics in original, J Fishman, 'The Sociology of Language', N Coupland & A Jaworski (eds), 
Sociolinguistics: A Reader and a Coursebook (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997 (1972)), quoted in Y 
Suleiman, A War of Words: Language and Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004 ), at 14. 
102 J Boyle, 'Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of Language' (1985) 26 
Harvard Journal of International Law 327, at 332. 
103 Koskenniemi's work explores the theme of international law as language. For a more detailed list of his 
work in this regard, please consult the bibliography. 
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firm relationship between that language and the world that it is assumed to reflect. 
In order to describe or assess the relationship between language and the world, 
however, there should be some way that is independent of language to which the 
forms of language could be compared. There is, however, no such way. The 
languages create worlds and do not 'reflect' them. 104 
Koskenniemi thus shows us that law cannot be separated from its linguistic and political 
context. 
Although NAIL forces international lawyers to grapple with this indeterminacy, it is 
also reassuring for those lost in this vision of Babel: international law is at least imperfectly 
structured by a series of conventions and dominant narratives that limit what is 
professionally preferable. 105 According to Kritsiotis, 'in the same way as power itself, 
international law prescribes its own limitations as a language and discipline - in the 
methods and arguments it allows, in its sources, in the interpretations and principles it 
accepts, and in its own modus operandi. ' 106 International lawyers are political actors, but 
Koskenniemi recognises that '[w]e don't choose to use the concepts of international law 
when we enter international legal discourse. Rather we must take a pre-existing language, a 
pre-existing system of interpreting the world and move within it if we wish to be heard and 
understood.' 107 The use of the first person pronoun here is important because international 
law is necessarily a community-generated discourse. International lawyers are therefore 
members of an 'interpretive community' rewriting the rules of their own success. 108 For 
Korhonen, international lawyers must be mindful of the socialising function of international 
law: 
In order to be able to make a meaningful argument in international law one has to adapt to 
the meaning-structures, the already-defined problematic, and the direction of epistemic 
interest that together amount to the world-view of the discipline. 109 
104 Koskenniemi, ' Letter to the Editors', supra n 58, at 359. 
105 This idea is also reflected in Chirnni 's notion of permissible interpretations of treaties, discussed in 
Chimni, ' Towards a TWA! L Theory', supra n 78. 
106 D Kritsiotis 'The Power of International Law as Language' ( 1997- 1998) 34 California Western Law 
Review 397, at 403. Reisman echoes these ideas when he writes, ' International law requires, among other 
things, a limited common language of signs, symbols and values which can permit elites in different territorial 
communities to ascertain what their common interests are and to arrange for means for implementing them. ' 
WM Reisman, ' Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Impact on International Law and Politics', MW Janis & C 
Evans (eds), Religion and international Law (Cambridge, MA: Martin us Nijhoff, 1999) 357-384, at 357. 
107 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra n 2, at 12. 
108 Bolh Kennedy and Chimni touch on this idea of interpretive communities. For example: Kennedy, 'When 
Renewal Repeats', supra n 3, at 346; and Chimni, 'Towards a TWAlL Theory' , supra n 78. 
109 0 Korhonen, 'New International Law: Silences, Defence or Deliverance? ' (I 996) 7 European Journal of 
international law 1, at 6. 
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What are the structures of international legal argumentation and what is the world-view of 
the discipline? The thesis does not answer these questions comprehensively, but the case 
studies are a start in this process. 
From these observations, it follows that success in legal argument is not founded on 
the presentation of compelling doctrinal 'evidence' but rather on the ability to recognise 
and perhaps refashion underlying linguistic structures of international law. 'Therefore, an 
organized conception of. .. situational limitations is indispendisable for the international 
lawyer.' 110 International law is no different from other languages in the way it is built on a 
set of rules of syntax and grammar, and this is acknowledged by its practitioners. The 
mistake made by many lawyers, however, is to recognise only those rules expressed at the 
level of doctrine; instead, doctrine needs to be understood as a malleable tool of argument 
in the hands of those lawyers fluent in the language of international law. 111 Thus, the 
'politics of international law is what competent international lawyers do. And competence 
is the ability to use grammar in order to generate meaning by doing things in argument. '112 
This thesis is a study of international law and not linguistics per se, but it is 
instructive to set out some definitions of language that are applied in my readings of the 
case studies. As discussed above, language is both an open and closed system of the 
communication of and generation of meaning; language is dynamic and adaptive, but it is 
only comprehensible within certain limits of grammatical and lexical usage. Thus, the 
language of international law has developed and changed in response to the speech of its 
interlocutors, international lawyers, but their speech has also been structured and limited by 
the discipline of international law. The thesis builds on the notion of 'grammar' employed 
by Koskenniemi and it interprets the term to mean those general rules of language that 
structure how words or phrases gain meaning. For example, in English, with its minimal 
110 lbid. 
111 This idea is also expressed by Koskenniemi, who argues that the key is not so much which argument is 
used, but 'what rules govern the production of arguments and the linking of arguments together in such a 
familiar and conventionally acceptable way and why it is that no definite resolution of standard problems can 
be attained.' Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra n 2, at 8. 
112 Italics in original, Ibid, at 571. Kennedy 'present[s] international law as a series of professional 
performances rather than an edifice of ideas, doctrines, and institutions recasting the discipline's intellectual 
tools as a lexicon of argument about reform and disciplinary renewal, as well as professional affiliation and 
disaffiliation. For international lawyers, the performances of renewal, criticism, and reform are central to 
professional identity and competence ... ' Italics added. Kennedy, 'When Renewal Repeats, supra n 3, at 337. 
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inflectional endings, syntax or word order fulfils a grammatical funtion, helping us identify 
the subject and object of a verb. 113 
At a more abstract and perhaps less systematic level, international law also has its 
rules or grammars of usage. The thesis is particularly intrigued by international law's 
discursive constraints around the relationship between law and politics. As will be shown in 
the case studies, a variety of devices are drawn on in adjudication to provide definition and 
certainty to the field of international law and the ICJ by the separation of law from politics. 
Because doctrine is indeterminate, determinacy is provided in part by the grammar of the 
law/politics dichotomy. Specific words forming international law's lexicon assist this 
communicative process of limiting international law's indeterminacy. Thus, words and 
phrases carry a particular meaning within the language of international law. The case 
studies also highlight the extent to which new words and new meanings generated by Third 
World states participating in ICJ adjudication are comprehensible in the Peace Palace. Thus 
'lexicon' is used to express utterances that are meaningful within the discourse of 
international law. For example, what does 'consent' mean within the context of treaty 
formation? What incidents and events are permissible in arguing for consent or its absence? 
In Chapter Three where Libya's argument about its lack of experience vitiating consent is 
discussed, is such an idea comprehensible within the disciplinary discourse? Are there 
words in international law' s lexicon that can capture Libya's experiences? 
Because of linguistic and experiential diversity, the practice of international 
discourse is about more than speaking in a lawyerly mother tongue; it is also about 
translation. As international law is a limited language, experiences outside its parameters 
must be spoken anew in a tongue that is intelligible. According to Koskenniemi, '[t)he 
question of the justiciability of international disputes is then a question about the possibility 
of translating values and priorities that contestants in a dispute advance, into the ideolect of 
international law as one aspect of such modernity.' 114 Related to this notion of translation is 
the question of whether international law is actually capable of speaking for various 
peoples, ideas and experiences: can all dialects and languages be rendered in legal 
language? Partly as a result of international law's reliance on the dichotomy between law 
113 For example, with its word order, ' the cat saw the girl' conveys meaning in English by the speaker 
knowing that the subject usually precedes the object. Thus, the cat is the subject of the verb, and the girl, its 
object. 
114 ltalics added, M Koskenniemi ' The Silence of Law/The Voice of Justice', Boisson de Chazournes, 
Laurence & Sands, Philippe (eds), international Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear 
Weapons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 488-510, at 507. 
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and politics, speech that upholds this distinction is invoked to portray law as objective and 
unaffected by (political) indeterminacy. Thus, 'the translation of the disputants' languages 
into the ideolect of formal rules and principles, rights and claims, is expected to produce a 
distancing effect under which a settlement becomes possible irrespective of the quality and 
intensity of the passions it triggers.' 115 Certain experiences challenge legal language to such 
an extent that translation is impossible; they are silenced by their situational 
incomprehensibility. 
Aside from the structure provided by its grammar, international law as language is 
also constrained by the particular institutional biases in which it is articulated. Thus, 
international law as invoked in ICJ territorial disputes will carry with it particular 
conventions that are somewhat distinct from international law more generally. A competent 
lawyer in ICJ disputes accordingly should not only be able to understand the grammar of 
international law, as well as translate her client's needs, but also speak in a particular way 
to suit the sensibilities of the Court. If we apply Korhonen's scholarship about 
situationality, we can say that a competent and successful international lawyer engaged in 
ICJ dispute resolution must be cognisant not only of the general parameters of international 
legal discourse but of those particular to the ICJ. 116 
Shalakany has explored the effect of institutional conventions m the context of 
Third World arbitration. Shalakany notes that disputes over natural resources could have 
been decided in a number of ways because 'the institution and the doctrines [of arbitration] 
are indeterminate enough to assist either party interchangeably.' 117 Why then have Third 
World states consistently lost when trying to maintain ownership of their resources? 
Shalakany points to assumptions underpinning arbitration, such as the belief that arbitration 
is removed from the political sphere because of its structure between equal, consenting 
parties. 118 For example, Shalakany ascribes Libya 's arbitral failures to its refusal to 
maintain the law/politics divide: 'Once Libya's actions were associated with politics and 
the coercive exercise of sovereign powers in an unequal relationship, Libya was simply 
115 Ibid, at 50 I. 
116 Korhonen, 'New International Law', supra n I 09, at 4-9. 
11 7 A A Shalakany, 'Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias under the Specter of 
Neoliberalism' (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 4 19, at 424. 
118 Ibid, at 455. 
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denied access to a whole set of legal interpretations that could have been more favorable to 
its position.' 119 
Arbitration possesses its own distinct set of disciplinary sensibilities, but the basic 
idea is useful in considering why certain themes for discussion are avoided at the ICJ's 
bench, especially in majority judgments. Although territorial disputes are based on the 
language of sovereign power, international law's broader quest for separation from politics 
means that rarely is a court willing to listen to accounts about the effects of power 
inequalities on the creation of treaties or the importance of natural resources for a party's 
case. The case studies in the thesis all present narratives about the struggle over natural 
resources and it will be shown that Shalakany's typology of denial applies equally to these 
disputes: generally, states do not acknowledge the presence of oil, gas or water lying just 
below the surface of courtroom proceedings. 120 
In another institutional performance of the law/politics dichotomy, Koskenniemi 
points out that emotion is also shunned in ICJ speech acts. 121 Emotions are hard to render 
into 'rational' speech and thus, many experiences will necessarily remain untranslatable 
and silenced. For example, in the Court's Advisory Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 
law was simply unable to encapsulate or speak about the horror of such weapons: ' For a 
voice of justice to be heard, law must sometimes remain silent.' 122 The parties and judges 
of the ICJ in the cases explored in the thesis all display different levels of emotional 
outburst and restraint in their attempts of limiting and expanding the linguistic parameters 
of international law. 
7) Interrogating Conventions within Mainstream lCJ Literatures 
119 Ibid, at 456. 
120 Boyle makes a similar point in relation to the quest for a-poli tical language in international law: 'The 
scholars of the Western countries have modelled international law along the fam iliar lines of liberal state 
theory. Their utopian vis ion is that politics can somehow be constrained by (a-political) ru les. This vision 
leads them lo attempt to show that language can somehow provide a neutral conduit for power. The state's 
consent is to something called "a rule." This rule is made up of words and the words can be interpreted in a 
non-political way. Thus, ideological confli ct can be separated from legal argument and the nation state can 
logically give its obedience to the resulting "objective" structure.' Boyle, supra n I 02, at 347. 
121 Koskenniemi provides the example of Bosnia's US legal counsel, who was replaced in the Case 
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina v Yugoslavia) (2003). See CR 93/12, available from the Court's website: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/. Koskenniemi, 'Letter to the Editors', supra n 58, at 360. 
122 Koskenniemi, 'The Silence of Law', supra n 114, at 489. 
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Section two explored some recent mainstream reactions to the Court's increased docket, 
suggesting that this development can be distinguished from the Court's overly-European 
past; it is now possible to speak of a World Court upholding universal norms. A number of 
structural factors, however, challenge such an account. This section explores some 
contributions from the large body of literature about the institutional and jurisprudential 
nature of the ICJ, as well as intersecting studies on territory, and juxtaposes these with 
critical perspectives. Through an application of the tools discussed in sections two and 
three, the following section will show that despite a voluminous literature, accounts of the 
Court's processes of argumentation and the possibility of universalism obscure as much as 
they reveal. After describing the scholarly conventions of mainstream ICJ and territorial 
scholarship, this section then explores three inter-related narratives informing the literature: 
the maintenance of the law/politics dichotomy, particular readings of the relationship 
between the past and the present, and faith in a progressive international law. 
Most writings on the practice of the Court are remarkably similar and can even be 
described as formulaic. 123 Countless books and articles contain near-identical accounts of 
the Court's procedures and summaries of its jurisprudence. Special anniversary volumes or 
festschriften are regularly produced to mark the latest milestone, and often the themes 
contained in such tomes differ very little from previous publications. 124 Nostalgic personal 
123 Collier discusses how studies on the ICJ and dispute settlement tend to follow a recognisable pattern: J G 
Collier, 'The International Court of Justice and the peaceful settlement of disputes', V Lowe & M Fitzmaurice 
(eds), Fifty years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 364-372. 
124 Some examples of these anniversary and festschrift editions consulted here include: E G Bello & B A 
Ajibola (eds), Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias: vol I Contemporary International Law and 
Human Rights (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992); D Bowett et al (eds), The International Court of 
Justice: Process, Practice and Procedure (London : The British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law 1997); B Cheng & ED Brown (eds), Contemporary Problems in International Law: Essays in honour of 
Georg Schwarzenberger on his eightieth birthday (London: Stevens & Sons, 1988) ; Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. & 
Talmon, Stefan (eds), The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1999); R St J Macdonald (ed), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Dordrecht; Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1994); J Makarczyk ( ed), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21s1 Century: 
Essays in Honour of Krysztof Skubiszewski (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996); A S Muller, D Raic & J M 
Thuranszky (eds), The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role after Fifty Years (The Hague; Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1997); V Lowe & M Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty years of the International Court of Justice: 
Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); R S Pathak & R P 
Dhokalia (eds), International Law in Transition: Essays in Memmy of Judge Nagendra Singh (Dordrecbt; 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992); C Peck & RS Lee (eds), Increasing the Effectiveness of the International 
Court of Justice: Proceedings of the JCJ/UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 501h Anniversary of the Court 
(Boston: Martin us Nijhoff, 1997); M Shahabuddeen ( ed), Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Amicorum discipulorumque 
fiber: Paix, developpement, democratie, vol 1 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1998). Some notable exceptions, 
containing more contextualised and critical perspectives are A Anghie & G Sturgess (eds), Legal Visions of 
the 2 J51 Century: Essays in Honour of Judge Christopher Weeramantry (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998); and L 
Boisson de Chazournes & P Sands (eds), International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear 
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accounts of time spent within the Peace Palace also appear, serving to remind us of the 
selective authorship typical of this field .125 Although some authors have questioned the 
power and role of the Court, the bulk of ICJ scholarship continues to display both optimism 
and respect for this pre-eminent 'world' court. This is partly a result of authorship: writings 
about the Court tend to come from international law practitioners (often appearing at the 
Peace Palace), academics or even judges themselves. The 'decorum' required of lawyers 
and judges in the Peace Palace is often mimicked in later appraisals and this is especially so 
in relation to British scholars. 126 American scholars, on the other hand, permit more policy 
perspectives in their writings, but even with such concessions, themes addressed usually 
differ little from those penned across the Atlantic. 
Studies devoted to the law on territory differ little from those on the ICJ. Generally, 
Ratner points out that the 'equation of international law with international adjudication is 
nowhere more pronounced as in the area of territorial sovereignty.' 127 Why then undertake 
yet another study of territorial disputes when so much literature already exists? The point of 
the thesis is to show how existing literatures on both the Comt and territorial disputes only 
tell part of the story of universalism and this is especially so in relation to territorial 
analyses. For example, within the literature on territorial title and disputes, it is surprising 
how often the jurisprudence of the Court is simply presented for summary and overview, 
with perhaps some doctrinal additions. Few analyses of terri torial adjudication have studied 
the process of argumentation between the Court and the parties and this is shown by a 
general lack of attention towards the pleadings. The same is true, not only in relation to 
recognition of the political context outside the Courtroom, but also inside it: discursive 
practices are explored only at the level of doctrine and, where criticism is offered, it is 
almost always within the strict confines of 'law' as opposed to 'politics'. Brownlie also 
points to a dissonance between territorial scholarship and its subject matter: '[m]any of the 
Weapons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Cf Forsythe, who argues that there have been very 
few reviews of the Court on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary because of its marginal role international 
relations: D P Forsythe, 'The International Court of Justice at Fifty', A S Muller, D Raic & J M Thuranszky 
(eds), The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role after Fifty Years (The Hague; Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1997) 385-405, at 385. 
125 For an example of a personal account, see H Thirlway, 'The Drafting of !CJ Decisions: Some Personal 
Recollections and Observations' (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of International Law 15. 
126 Carty argues, 'Particularly in Britain, the discipline of international law is overwhelmingly formalist.' A 
Carty, ' Review Article: Visions of the Past of lntemational Society: Law, History or Politics?' (2006) 69 
Modern Law Review 644, at 644. 
127 S R Ratner, 'Land Feuds and their Solutions: Finding International Law beyond the Tribunal Chamber' 
(2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 808, at 808. 
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standard textbooks, and particularly those in English, classify the modes of acquisition in a 
stereotyped way which reflects the preoccupation of writers in the period before the First 
World War. " 28 This is despite the fact that the ICJ does not rely on this typology; it instead 
usually engages in a weighing up exercise of competing claims to effective control where 
treaties are less than dispositive . 129 
a) Maintaining the Law/Politics Dichotomy 
We saw in sections two and three that law cannot be separated from politics, particularly 
when we understand international law as a language. Despite this inseparability, both ICJ 
jurisprudence and scholarship about the Court have often tried to maintain this distinction 
in various ways. It is easy enough to point to a number of mainstream accounts 
acknowledging the place of politics in the courtroom, 130 but the epistemological 
assumptions informing such accounts are still premised on dichotomy and distinction. We 
can understand mainstream writings as suggesting that politics and law remain qualitatively 
different in both their origins and their practice. Critical approaches, however, would 
question such distinctions and ask why it is necessary to maintain such a division. 
Literatures on ICJ jurisprudence and adjudication are replete with repetitive 
discussions about the law/politics divide, and this is partly a product of the practice of 
adjudication itself. Coleman details how there emerged a distinction between 'political' and 
'legal' (or justiciable) disputes at The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.13 1 Mosler 
adds that the 'need to distinguish legal disputes from disputes of another character -
whether called "political" controversies of "interests" or simply "non-justiciable" - arose in 
connection with attempts to make judicial settlement compulsory.' 132 Aspirations of 
compulsory arbitration and adjudication foundered, however, and remain as elusive as ever. 
128 Brownlie, quoted in Distefano, supra n 4, at 1048. 
129 Ratner, supra n 127, at 815. Post endorses Jennings' earlier idea, by arguing that 'adjudication on 
territorial title is a sixth traditional mode of acquisition of territory in international law.' H Post, 'Adjudication 
as a mode of acquisition of territory? Some observations on the Iraq-Kuwait boundary demarcation in light of 
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice', V Lowe & M Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty years of the 
International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 237-263, at 237. 
13° For a survey of various examples, see A Coleman, 'The International Court of Justice and Highly Political 
Matters' (2004) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 29, at 30. 
131 Ibid, at 32-33. 
132 H Mosler, 'Political and Justiciable Legal Disputes: Revival of an Old Controversy?', B Cheng & E D 
Brown (eds), Contemporary Problems in International law: Essays in honour of Georg Schwarzenberger on 
his eightieth birthday (London: Stevens & Sons, 1988) 216-229, at 220. 
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Under Article 35, 'The Court shall be open to states parties to the present Statute' of the 
ICJ. 133 It may also hear advisory cases that relate to 'any legal question' .134 This phrase has 
encouraged a practice in pleadings, judgments and commentaries about debating the 'legal' 
or 'political ' nature of the dispute at hand.135 Kennedy invites us to think not so much about 
whether disputes are definable as ' legal' or 'political'. Instead when arguments are raised in 
support or opposition of the Court's jurisdiction, we need to ask who is making the claim, 
with what purpose, for what project and to persuade whom. 136 The case studies explore this 
law/politics tension in discussions over jurisdiction, especially in Chapter Six on the Wall 
Advisory Opinion. 137 
Commentators have acknowledged that the Court' s choice about whether to 
exercise its jurisdiction as well as state participation is political, 138 but often there remains 
the idea that at least some aspects of the Court's practice and procedure are free from the 
taint of power politics. Jennings asks whether it is ' possible to make a clear distinction 
between legal and political disputes and if so, by what criteria' .139 In trying to answer this, 
he harks back to the context of early arbitration, where the 'classical idea, that was 
enunciated by no less an authority than Westlake, that it is possible to classify claims as 
being either legal or political, was an academic fantasy born of the desire to establish 
general compulsory court jurisdiction in isolation from the problem of better machinery for 
political decision. ' 140 Like his more recent counterpart, Higgins, Jennings is realistic about 
the presence of political choices and implications, depicting law as an exercise in reduction: 
133 Article 35(1 ). 
134 United Nations Charter, Art. 96(1); Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 65(1). 
135 This is discussed further in Part Three's Introduction, at 193-195. 
136 Kennedy, ' When Renewal Repeats, supra n 3, at 467. 
137 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Ofinion) (2004) lCJ Reps, p. 136. 
13 
'[T]here is really no way of escape from the fact that international courts, like domestic courts indeed, will 
for a good deal of the time find themselves having to decide upon legal questions in respect of which their 
decision, however technical in fom1, must have great political significance.' R Y Jennings, ' International 
Courts and International Politics', D Freestone et al (eds), Contemporary Issues in International Law: A 
Collection of Josephine Onoh Memorial Lectures (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002) 13-28, at 15. ln relation to slate 
participation, Shaw argues that ' recourse itself to the Court constitutes a political as well as a legal act and as 
such may add to political and other pressure upon an opponent with the hope that the pressure in total may 
lead to a resolution of the problem in question.' MN Shaw, 'Peaceful Resolution of 'Political Disputes ' : The 
Desirable Parameters of ICJ Jurisdiction ' , J Dahlitz ( ed), Peaceful Resolution of Major International Disputes 
(New York: United Nations, 1999) 49-75, at 55. 
139 Jennings, ' International Courts and International Politics', supra n 138, at 14. 
140 R Y Jennings, ' The Proper Work and Purposes of the International Court of Justice', D Raic & J M 
Thuranszky (eds), The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role after Fifty Years (The Hague; Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) 33-45, at 43. 
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the rnbric of 'legal dispute' should be understood as indicating not only something 
about the objective character of a dispute submitted to a court, but much more the 
highly technical procedure whereby the Court and the parties together reduced their 
dispute into a form which renders it manageable in an adversarial procedure in a 
court of law ... 141 
Higgins also overlooks the dichotomy in favour of an emphasis on procedure: 
there is little reality in any definition of a political, or legal, question; what is 
relevant is the distinction between a political method and a legal method of solving 
disputes. 142 
Sugihara cites these authors to stregthen his eventual conclusion in support of a discerning 
ICJ, occasionally called on to decline its jurisdiction where politics challenges 'its proper 
bounds as a judicial body.' 143 
Such accounts seem to differ little from Koskenniemi 's idea of legal language, but 
m fact they point to an enduring belief that law can detach itself from the realm of 
particular interest, through neutral procedures. 144 Like critical approaches, the ideas noted 
above distinguish law from politics through language and practice, but their corollary could 
not be more different: in limited spaces law can escape politics, and thus, at least the 
adjudicative performance itself remains pure from interest. Underlying conflicts at the heart 
of disputes are obscured and silenced to preserve a semblance of legitimacy for the process 
of legal dispute resolution. 
This attempt at quarantine is found also at the level of doctrine in territorial disputes 
and accompanying academic commentaries. The degree of diversity and complexity 
generated in this area of international law demonstrates that territorial disputes are often far 
from easily resolved. Diverging accounts found in both pleadings and commentaries 
strengthen the observation that practitioners must rally an impressive arsenal of arguments 
in their quest for success. Oppositional stances therefore are constructed around an 
elaborate evocation of legal doctrine, and commentaries pointing out weaknesses m 
litigation reinforce this theme by faithfully suggesting more robust readings of available 
141 Jennings, quoted in T Sugihara, 'The Judicial Function of the International Court ofJustice with Respect to 
Disputes Involving Highly Political Issues', A S Muller, D Raic & JM Thuranszky (eds), The International 
Court of Justice: Its Future Role after Fifty Years (The Hague; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) 117-138, at 
11 8. 
142 Higgins, quoted in Ibid. 
143 Ibid, at 137. 
144 On the nature of procedure, Sathirathai argues, ' the fact that procedure and substance can yield 
contradictory results affecting states' participation demonstrates that any attempt to move from substance to 
procedure reveals and mirrors the inseparability of law and politics.' S Sathirathai, 'An Understanding of the 
Relationship between International Legal Discourse and Third World Countries' (1984) 25 Harvard Journal 
of international Law 395, at 402. 
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rules and precedents. Such an understanding of legal dispute resolution is based on the 
belief of solid ground: that a rigorous application of the rules will generally result in the 
'correct' result. 145 Rather than recognising the indeterminacy underneath, along with the 
accompanying spectre of political partiality, a resort to doctrine serves to bolster an image 
of law that is insulated and safe from its other: power. 
Faith in the solace of doctrine is not only adopted by lawyers from the privileged 
European world. A number of Third World academics and pleadings of Third World states 
are informed by a re-evaluation of colonial title with the help of European-generated laws 
on title to territory. 146 These accounts invoke such legal principles in a bid to expose the 
illegality of the colonial erasure of Third World legal personality. Through such a gesture, 
these Third World scholars and states suggest that international law can function as a 
legitimate form ofregulation, but only where it is insulated from power politics. 
b) Reading History into International Law 
In contrast with the recurring motif of the law/politics divide, literatures on the ICJ and 
international law more generally are less likely to delve into the annals of history. 
Mainstream narratives of progress discussed further below, however, are steeped in 
particular readings of the historical record. 147 As in the case of law vis-a-vis politics, 
mainstream images of current international legal structures rely on a radical rupture with 
the past, allowing us to speak of the law/history dichotomy as well. Kennedy's discursive 
exploration of disciplinary themes shows us, however, that this narrative of change and 
progress provides only one possible reading of history. 148 Further, it serves to mask the 
perpetuation of practices at the heart of the international law project. In his study of the 
nineteenth century, for example, Kennedy posits how 'the modernism, pragmatism and 
progressivism of today's international Jaw is more rhetorical effect and polemical claim 
than historical achievement, and more part of the internal dynamic of the field's 
145 I also discuss this idea in the Preface. 
146 Some Third World state perspectives are explored below in my examination of pleadings contained in its 
case studies. For a recent example of this, see Udombana's consideration of the Scramble for Africa, N J 
Udombana, 'The Ghost of Berlin Still Haunts Africa! The ICJ Judgment on the Land and Maritime Boundary 
Dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria' (2003) African Yearbook of International Law 13, at 51-52. 
147 For a critical appraisal of the field's oversight of history and its under-theorisation (but wiil1 some 
optimism about more recent efforts), see C Mieville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of 
International Law (London: Pluto, 2005), at 153-156. 
148 For example, see D Kennedy, 'International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion' 
(1996) 65 Nordic Journal of international Law 385. 
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development than artefact of a distant era.' 149 In her appraisal of NAIL literatures, Cass 
suggests that NAIL 's scholarly excavation in pursuit of reinterpreting doctrine has been its 
most important contribution.150 This is especially so for TWAIL accounts of the colonial 
record, which have probed pervasive legal structures of inequality and exclusion.151 
Despite a general historical sensibility infusing NAIL, TW AIL as well as some IR 
literatures, comparatively few writers have delved into the rich historical veins of territorial 
litigation. Yet Merrills reminds us that 'as the Court's case law demonstrates, in territorial 
and boundary cases, the historical record is usually the key to applying the law. For this 
reason, if for no other, evidence of this type will always be significant.' 152 This section 
notes the silences in ICJ scholarship, as well as renderings of the historical ' background' 
found in works on title to territory. 153 It also notes the conceptual tools provided, and yet 
rarely applied to, territorial disputes by critical perspectives. To fill this gap in approaching 
the process of historical argumentation at the ICJ, the foJJowing section develops a method 
of how to read history into territorial disputes. I briefly examine the nature of historical 
inquiry, as well as the scope for interdisciplinary dialogue between international law and 
IR, before applying these insights to a discussion of narratives of progress in ICJ literatures. 
One of the most important themes emerging from the thesis' case studies is the 
desire on the part of Third World states to rewrite the historical record, suggesting that 
there can be no one historical truth informing international law's self-image. Allott also 
argues that in relation to the discipline of international law, there are in fact two strains of 
history: intrinsic history, or accounts of law's internal development, and extrinsic history, 
based on international law's relationship to general histories. 154 Allott acknowledges the 
role of choice in renderings of the past, 155 but stm seems to construe history as 
149 lbid, at 389-390. For another discussion deconstructing the myth of nineteenth century rupture and 
difference from the present, see S N Grovogui, supra n 35, at ch l. 
15° Cass, supra n 60, at 375. Whereas Paulus is mistrustful of this historical turn, suggesting that critical 
scholars are in fact escaping into the past. Paulus, supra n 60, at 739. 
151 Anghie, 'Civilization and Commerce', supra n 87, at 891. 
152 J G Merrills, 'The International Court of Justice and the Adjudication of Territorial and Boundary 
Disputes' (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 873, at 895. 
153 For example, in the words of Justice Lachs, 'Evidence of fact is ... tantamount to a resurrection of history.' 
M Lachs, 'Evidence in the Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Role of the Court', E G Bello & B 
A Ajibola (eds), Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias: vol/ Contemporary international Law and 
Human Rights (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 265-276, at 267. 
154 P Allott, ' International Law and the Idea of History' (1999) I Journal of the History of international Law 
I , at I. 
155 Ibid, at 16. See also for this point: Y Onuma, 'When was the Jaw of International Society Born? - An 
Inquiry into the History of International Law from an lntercivilizational Perspective' (2000) 2 Journal of the 
History of international Law I, at 5-6. 
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ontologically distinct from the present: we can explore the interrelationship between the 
past and present in an objective manner. Thus, according to Allott, history is a 'dream of a 
past which is not our own, history nevertheless becomes our own, and ceases to be a dream, 
when we live in the reality it has formed.' 156 Once conceived, history can take on a life of 
its own, structuring consciousness, but not vice versa. This sense of reification in Allott 's 
typology is also evident in his bifurcation of intrinsic and extrinsic histories, suggesting that 
practices within international law can be distinguished from their broader context. 
Both Berman and Douzinas extend our appreciation of the 'past', by showing that 
like language, there can be no escape from historical and personal preference: what is 
required is a recognition of the complicity of choice. 157 Douzinas' general definition of 
history informs later explorations of historical issues in the cases: 
[H]istory is not a timeline. It is a modality of time that presses against the present. 
Memories live not in a historically rigid sequence but in simultaneity in which we 
may choose from many possibilities to create the present. As in Heidegger, the past 
is a modality of the present; indeed the past is a potentia or the potential of the 
present in its nearness to the future. But this potentia exists not as the ever-present 
denying and withholding, nor as the inescapable nearness of the past, future and 
present but as a stain of past and present in the Now. 158 
When we apply these insights to international law, there is no longer one account of 
international law. In fact, interrogating the place of history in international legal scholarship 
returns us to the dilemma of the law/politics dichotomy, suggesting that all international 
law scholarship is shaped by competing claims to 'past' and 'present', 'stasis' and 
'change'. Methodologically, Berman advocates a genealogical reading for international 
lawyers, which 'sees international law - its doctrines as well as its participants - as 
normatively impure, culturally heterogeneous, and historically contingent.' 159 We need to 
ask how and why history is used and link understandings about international law's past 
with the political desires of both participants and judges in ICJ territorial disputes. 
Although territorial disputes are steeped in history, ICJ judges are unlikely to 
become discerning historians; 160 their focus is on the 'law' and not 'history' . Merrills is 
156 A llott, 'International Law and the Idea of History', supra n 154, at 3. 
157 Historical narratives necessarily are reductions of the past, but the possibilities for such reduction are open-
ended. See C Douzinas, 'Theses on Law, History and Time' (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 13, at 19. 
158 Footnotes omitted, Ibid, at 25. 
159 N Bennan, ' In the Wake of Empire' (1999) 14 American University International Law Review 1515 (First 
Annual Grotius Lecture, American Society oflntemational Law), at 1524. 
160 Douzinas discusses this relationship between the judge and history in trials reviewing the past as a 
'transformation from history as the judge to the judge as historian'. Douzinas, supra n 155, at 15. 
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correct when he argues that we cannot expect the ICJ to engage in all historical material 
raised: questions of time and resources limit ICJ historical enquiry.161 This thesis is alive to 
such considerations, but still regards the common practice of historical obfuscation as 
troubling: what histories are being silenced and why? It is also important to problematise 
the issue of 'choice' by pointing out the seeming irony of post-colonial states presenting an 
arsenal of evidence formed from an often-uncritical acceptance of colonial records. Is this 
complicity with colonialism or deference to ICJ conventions requiring voluminous 
historical 'evidence', which is less plentiful in Arab tribal societies? 
International Relations (IR) historical work on international law should also be 
noted. Beginning in the 1990s, a large body of literature in the fields of international law 
and IR has explored the possibilities of inter-disciplinary collaboration. 162 Some of these 
contributions have developed the research projects of both fields, but a number of 
interdisciplinary studies follow a standard formula and fall into the trap of stereotype and 
simplification. Klabbers captures this tendency when he writes that 'inter-disciplinarity 
often ... presumes a flat, one-dimensional vision of the discipline-to-relate-with, yet such a 
one-dimensional view will rarely if ever, be persuasive.' 163 Diversity within the IR 'canon' 
161 Merrills, supra n 152, at 895. 
162 Some inter-disciplinary examples include: K Abbott, 'Modem International Relations Theory: A 
Prospectus for International Lawyers' (1989) 14 Yale Journal of International Law 335; W J Aceves, 
'Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship (1997) 12 American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 227; A Arend, 'Do legal rules matter? International Law and International 
Politics' (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 107; J Barker, International Law and International 
Relations (London & New York: Continuum, 2000); R J Beck, 'International Law and International 
Relations: The Prospectus for Interdisciplinary Collaboration' (1995) I Journal of International Legal Studies 
119; D Bederman, 'Review Essay: Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law: Legal 
rules and international society' (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 469; M Byers, 'Custom, Power and the 
Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective (1995) 17 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 109; M Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in 
International Relations and International Law (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); CA 
Cutler, 'Critical Historical Materialism and International Law: Imagining International Law as praxis', S 
Hobden & J M Hobson (eds), Historical Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 181-199; M Finnemore, 'Are legal norms distinctive?' (2000) 32 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 699; R Keohane, 'International Relations and 
International Law: Two Optics' (1997) 38 Harvard International Law Journal 487; S Scott, 'International 
Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and International Politics' (1994) 5 
European Journal of International Law 313; S V Scott, International Law in World Politics: An introduction 
(Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2004); J K Setear 'An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International 
Relations Theory and International Law (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 139; A-M Slaughter 
Burley, 'International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda' (1993) 87 American Journal 
of International Law 205; A-M Slaughter, A S Tulumello & S Wood, 'International Law and International 
Relations theory: A new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship' (1998) 92 American Journal of 
International Law 367. 
163 J Klabbers , 'The Relative Autonomy of International Law or The Forgotten Politics of Interdisciplinarity ' 
(2005) 1 Journal of International Law & International Relations 35, at 37. Compare Simpson's considered 
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is simplified so that many international lawyers employing IR tools are often drawing on 
only a small area of IR, and this is usually the dominant schools of (neo )realism or neo-
liberal institutionalism. Such schools offer little in this chapter's quest for historical 
awareness, 
164 but beyond the 'neo-neo' paradigm of IR, 165 contributions from 
constructivism, and especially the English School, are useful in broadening our 
understanding about the evolution of international law as an institution within international 
society. 166 The thesis does not embrace the inter-disciplinary project per se, but it does 
acknowledge the contribution of IR, especially in Chapter Two in its discussion of debates 
over the European nature of international society.167 
c) Narratives of Progress and Untapped Potential 
Perspectives on how to approach the past are important when speaking of international 
law's progress and development, especially since the establishment of the UN. In relation 
to the ICJ, we saw in section two how writers noted the moribund state of the Court 
especially in the sixties and seventies, but that a 'renaissance' signalled a significant shift in 
the fortunes of the Court. 168 This is particularly so in 'in the field of territorial and boundary 
disputes, [where] the Court has had notable successes' in the opinion of various mainstream 
scholars.169 Further, we also saw how greater Third World participation has been linked to 
legitimacy and universalism on the part of the Court. How, though, is this conceptual link 
comparison between IR and international law in G Simpson, 'The Situation on the International Legal Theory 
Front: The Power of Rules and the Rule of Power' (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 439. 
164 For example, Koskenniemi is unnecessarily dismissive of IR's research agenda and I think this is because 
of his definition of IR being largely based on American realism or liberalism. See M Koskenniemi, The 
Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), at 485. 
165 R Powell, 'Review Article: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate' 
( 1994) 48 International Organization 313. 
166 For example W Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: TrusteeshijJ and the Obligations of Power (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2003 ); G Gong, The Standard of "civilization" in International Society (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984); P Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of indigenous Peoples: The Moral 
Backwardness of International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); E Keene, Beyond the 
Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
167 Some useful quantitative studies of territorial disputes in the fields of IR and Political Science also provide 
useful statistical data. For example, see B A Simmons, 'Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: 
International lnstitutions and Territorial Disputes' (2002) 46 Journal of Conflict Resolution 829; and M W 
Zacher, 'The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force' (2001) 55 
International Organization 215. 
168 Guillaume, supra n 44. 
169 Schwebel, 'The Impact of the International Court of Justice', supra n 4, at 663. 
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made, and what assumptions inform such an account? How are images of the Court related 
to perceptions of international law more generally within the literature? The preceding 
discussion on history showed us how, in relegating history to the shadows, international 
lawyers can dissociate their field from earlier practices, which are now regarded with 
disdain. Thus, although mainstream accounts of the Court and international law more 
generally overlook historical discussion, a mixed account of progress and untapped 
potential suggests both a faith in a better Court and a progressivist conception of 
international law,170 able to look to the future, rather than the past. Here, we return to the 
notion of a Court more universal and legitimate. This literature, based either on the Court's 
fulfilled or yet-to-be fulfilled potential , cannot grasp the elusive quality of universalism. 
Instead, approaches beyond mainstream ICJ literature must be developed. 
Most scholarship about dispute resolution is characterised by a world-view that 
places law at the centre of social enquiry. Through its grammar of dichotomy, mainstream 
international law separates itself from politics and then offers an account of social reality 
that ascribes substantial weight to legal explanation. Other 'non-law' factors are 
downplayed and overlooked in these scholarly exercises of living in a world through law. 
Frankenberg captures this analytical tendency in his exposition of the idea of 
' legocentrism' . Legocentrism means that ' law is treated as a given and a necessity, as the 
natural path to the ideal, rational or optimal conflict resolutions and ultimately to social 
order guaranteeing peace and harmony. ' 171 Legocentrism particularly informs many 
accounts of adjudication, which are noteworthy for the absence of contextual, 'non-legal' 
considerations. 
Much of the literature devoted to adjudication has applauded the recent upsurge in 
Third World participation and the Court's docket as a whole, because of legocentrism, 
combined with a deep-seated faith in adjudication. At the level of language, Colson points 
out that the very term 'dispute settlement' suggests that matters have been resolved. 172 Faith 
in the dividends of dispute resolution infuses a literature that sometimes displays a vision of 
peace through adjudication: once states present themselves before the Court, matters will 
17° Korhonen notes more generally that '[i]ntemational law has a tradition of enthusiasm, hope, and a longing 
for positive accounts.' 0 Korhonen, ' Liberalism and International Law: A Centre Projecting a Periphery' 
(1996) 65 Nordic Journal of international Law 481 , at 484. 
171 G Frankenberg, 'Critical Comparisons : Re-Thinking Comparative Law' (1985) 26 Harvard international 
Law Journal 411 , at 445. 
172 E Colson, 'The Contentiousness of Disputes', P Caplan (ed), Understanding Disputes: The Politics of 
Argument (Oxford: Providence, 1995) 65-82, at 66. 
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improve. 173 For example, some authors lament comparisons, arguing that fewer Advisory 
Opinions from the ICJ, as compared to the PCIJ are an unmitigated retrogression: the world 
needs more law as voiced by the Court. 174 Others hold up either compulsory arbitration or 
at least greater accession to the 'optional clause"75 as the answer. 176 Jennings cautions 
against such hope, however, pointing out not only that calls for compulsory arbitration have 
gone unheeded since 1899, but that today's Court cannot possibly achieve everything; its 
settlement role is necessarily limited.177 Furthermore, in relation to the Court's increased 
docket, Jennings suggests that this is partly a product of a world with many more states178 
and the recognition of the Court's limited parameters: 'one reason for the recent welcome 
increase of the resort by governments to contentious jurisdiction of the Court. .. is precisely 
that there is already a better realization amongst governments that the adjudication process 
is an excellent way of dealing with certain kinds' of disputes. 179 
Despite Jennings' sober words, a number of mainstream and Third World scholars 
hold firm to the notion of peace through law, presenting the Court's untapped potential as a 
product of political factors beyond the Court's reach. Shahabuddeen articulates this theme, 
when he points out that ' [t]hrough no fault of its own, the World Court has not realized the 
more ambitious of the aspirations of some of its well-wishers.' 180 Other writers' belief in 
the Court's potential suggests a Court and an international law full of progressive 
promise. 181 Perhaps it has failed thus far to fulfil this promise,182 but there is still 'enormous 
173 This faith is expressed by Anand in his dichotomy between the evils of untrammelled sovereignty and the 
pacification offered by the Court: Anand, supra n 14, at 176-179. 
174 M S M Aim, The Role of the International Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of the United 
Nations (The Hague; New York: Kluwer, 2003), at 378. Justice Schwebel is more discerning, arguing, 
'However, the question is not whether the Court is busy; it is whether the Court is effective - whether each of 
its judgments or advisory opinions leaves the world - or even a small comer of it - a better place.' Schwebel, 
surra n 4, at 668. 
17 Article 36(2), Statute of the International Court of Justice. On this point, also see Forsythe, supra n 124, at 
401-402. The basic function of the optional clause is discussed in Part Two's Introduction, page 99-101. 
176 ABILA Committee on Intergovernmental Settlement of Disputes, 'Reforming the United Nations: What 
About the International Court of Justice?' (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of International Law 39, at 42. 
177 Jennings, 'The Proper Work' supra n 140, at 41. 
178 Jennings, 'The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years', supra n 15, at 494. 
179 ltalics in original, 'The Proper Work', supra n 140, at 45. Guillaume echoes this idea by pointing out that 
the Court has established itself as particularly adept at bearing 'middle-range disputes'. Guillaume, supra n 
44, at 851. 
180 M Shahabuddeen, 'The International Court of Justice: The Integrity of an Idea', R S Pathak & R P 
Dhokalia (eds), International Law in Transition: Essays in Memory of Judge Nagendra Singh (Dordrecht; 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 341-36 I , at 361. 
181 For example, in his consideration of the Court's suddenly increased docket, Highet depicts the ICJ as a 
'hot court' after the Nicaragua episode. K Highet, 'The Peace Palace Heats Up: The World Court in Business 
Again?' (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 646, at 654. 
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potential for the use of the Court' .183 Third World participation in territorial disputes is one 
example of this potential, serving as a barometer of legitimacy; surely this portends a Court 
able to act for all states equally in this postcolonial era. 
8) Conclusion: Law is Argument and Contestation about the Quest for Universalism 
In this s~ction, we return to the search for a place and time lived through a universal 
international law. From the review above, it is now possible to settle on the basic tools 
employed throughout the thesis. Most fundamentally, the thesis operates not only on the 
premise of the situationality of law, 184 but also its (re)construction through the practice of 
argument. The thesis will explore and interrogate this process of argument through the 
study of ICJ territorial disputes involving Arab states. How do Arab states depict 
international law, are there recurring themes, and how are these taken up or rejected by the 
Court? The thesis also accepts the challenge first raised by Koskenniemi in 1989 of 
mapping legal grammars. In his recent appraisal of the impact of Koskenniemi 's seminal 
work, From Apology to Utopia, Kennedy argues that Koskenniemi's invitation to delineate 
international legal grammars has yet to be accepted. 185 It is hoped that the thesis makes a 
small contribution to this task. 
Discussion above has shown that scholars are tom about the universalist qualities 
and potentiality of international law. Some regard the engagement of Third World states 
with the ICJ as enough, others doubt the ability of existing structures to speak for and from 
the margins. Still others suggest that international law's indeterminacy and malleability 
allows for both optics: international law nurtures imperialist and anti-imperialist 
tendencies. 186 At the very least, however, universalism must mean the possibility to speak 
182 Anand, supra n 14, at 162; Falk, supra n 49, at 7; S W Tiefenbrun, 'The Role of the World Court in 
Settling International Disputes: A Recent Assessment' ( 1997) 20 Loyola of Los Angeles International & 
Comparative Law Journal I , at 20 & 25. 
183 R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), at 187. 
184 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra n 2, at 26; Korhonen, 'New International Law' , supra n I 09, 
at 4-9; 0 Korhonen, International Law Situated: An Analysis of the lawyer's Stance towards Culture, History 
and Community (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000) at 129. 
185 D Kennedy, 'The Last Treatise: Project and Person (Reflections on Martti Koskenniemi' s From Apology 
to Utopia) (2006) 7 German Law Journal 982. 
186 M Koskenniemi, ' International Law and Imperialism', D Freestone, S Subedi & S Davidson (eds), 
Contemporary .Issues in International Law: A Collection of the Josephine Onoh Memorial Lectures (The 
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in many tongues, of many experiences and of contested histories. It must also mean that 
such narratives can in some way be heard and appreciated, as for example, by the ICJ's 
bench. Scholarship lauding the ICJ's recent record, or even international law's progressive 
future more generally, is inadequate for explaining why Third World - and particularly for 
the thesis, Arab - states come before the Court, how they use it and what the results are. 
Conversely, despite providing us with an array of conceptual tools, critical scholars have so 
far failed to expand our knowledge of the grammars of legal argumentation employed at the 
Peace Palace. The thesis acknowledges the particular discursive contours of the Court, and 
seeks to explore the nature of dialogue generated about international law's past, present and 
future, particularly through the prism of colonialism. Thus, this study embraces the critical 
call to map out the legal grammars informing Arab ICJ disputes. ln so doing, it challenges 
critical and mainstream scholars alike to expand the research agenda of international law by 
interrogating spaces and silences where both universalism and particularism lie. Having 
reviewed the conceptual tools informing the thesis, the next chapter provides the historical 
tools to the case studies by exploring notions of territoriality in the Arab-Islamic tradition. 
Hague: Kluwer, 2002), at 197. Rajagopal echoes this idea when he argues that international Jaw can be both 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic: Rajagopal, 'Counter-hegemonic International Law', supra n 96, at 768. 
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1) Introduction 
C hapter One highlighted tensions faced when studying international adjudication in a postcolonial world and it raised the question of whether we can speak of an 
international law that is universal. Third World states now participate in ICJ 
matters more than ever before, particularly in relation to territorial disputes. Arab states 
have mirrored this trend over the last few decades, suggesting that, like the rest of the Third 
World, they are willing to accept colonialism's legacy, the nation-state. 
The following chapter tries to make sense of the Arab world's engagement with 
international law and adjudication in three ways. First, the chapter provides a narrative 
overview and commentary about the emergence of Arab statehood. In particular, ideas 
about the link between territory and modes of authority in the Arab-Muslim tradition are 
explored so that we can appreciate both the similarities and differences between Arab and 
European trajectories of statehood. Second, the chapter is intrigued with the interplay 
between the Arab and European world/s for understanding the rise not only of the state, but 
also, international law and membership in international society. All of the case studies 
explore the extent to which international law and international legal personality was the 
priviledge of European entities. Here, we can challenge notions of cultural difference, 
especially in looking at Ottoman-European relations and their combined contribution to the 
formation of international law. Third, the chapter considers the development of Islamic 
international law as a practice and as a field of recent scholarship within the discipline of 
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public international law. How have Islamic legal norms and institutions evolved to reflect 
changes in international society and models of statehood? What is the role of Islamic law in 
modem international adjudication and to what extent can Islamic norms inform public 
international law? We can also ask, are current approaches within the discipline adequate 
for understanding the link between Islamic and public international law? 
The following discussion traces the concept of Arab statehood from the era of the 
Prophet to the present, but it does not pretend to offer a definitive account of Islamic legal 
history. Further, Piscatori asserts that it ' is nearly impossible to say with authority at any 
one moment what Islam is and what it is not.' 1 The following section explores particular 
choices and interpretations shaping the chapter's narrative about Islam, the West and the 
development of international law. I also interrogate scholarly agendas informing historical 
accounts to understand how dominant narratives about Islam, international law and Arab 
states shape research within and beyond the international legal academy. The chapter is 
therefore concerned far more with the uses and abuses of history than with a quest for 
historical 'truth'. After exploring the nature of historical enquiry, the chapter then applies 
these insights to three historical periods: the origins of Islam and the rise of the Caliphate; 
Arabs under Ottoman and colonial rule; and finally, Arab forms of statehood and dispute 
resolution in the modem era since the institution of the Mandates. 
2) How Should International Lawyers Study Islamic law and its Contribution to 
International Law? 
Before considering the Arab-Islamic experience of statehood and the rise of international 
law, it is important to gain an awareness of how Islamic legal and political history has been 
constructed and how it can be enhanced. Whil.e interest in Islamic studies has grown 
enormously over the last few decades for scholars working in both international relations 
and international law, much of it is superficial and repetitive. Specialised studies outside 
international law therefore can assist us in developing an Islamic theory of statehood and 
international law able to inform public international law. However, it is important to note 
particular shortcomings and biases of such scholarship. Perhaps because of a real or 
imagined linguistic and cultural gulf, non-specialist scholars have readily accepted 
1 J Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), at 9. 
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dominant narratives about Islamic law and civilisation. In this section, the nature of 
historical and legal scholarship on Islam is discussed. 
We saw in Chapter One that historical understandings play a role in the 
argumentation and judgment of territorial disputes. We also saw that, although states and 
judges acknowledge history's relevance, rarely do they concede the subjectivity of choice 
or the structuring effects of the law/history dichotomy. Like the law/politics dichotomy, 
international legal scholarship tends to separate law from history, but with radically 
different effects. The separation between law and politics allows law to be portrayed as 
neutral and free from the contingencies of interest. Typically, however, when history is 
enlisted in international legal scholarship, it is not so much as an 'other' but as a one-
dimensional ally to arguments founded on law. Like choices informing doctrinal 
arguments, historical narratives are depicted as unmediated accounts of the past. Rarely are 
these accounts seen as worthy of comment or criticism; as Korhonen reminds us, it 'is not 
common to question the discipline's sense ofhistory. ' 2 
Despite dominant narratives about international law's origins, as well as familiar 
watersheds or 'critical dates', international law can never escape scholarly agendas in 
linking the past with the present. Because the discipline of international law is built on 
narratives about its progressive development, for example, it is necessary to render 
particular accounts of the past to support certain readings of the present. Kennedy illustrates 
this in his study of 'primitivist' international law, when he shows that conventional 
paradigms founded on the origin of 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia require a body of 
thought markedly distinct from 'modern' examples. 3 Simplicity behoves us to focus on 
certain historical events and forget others, but we should at least be alive to the choices 
involved when constructing an account of international law that is based, for example, on 
the familiar milestones of 1648, 1789, 1815, 1856, 1885, 1914, 1918, 1939 and 1945. It is 
all too easy to project current realities onto the past, thereby obscuring subaltern voices and 
experiences.4 
Dominant narratives about international legal history contain both rupture and 
stability: the present must be contrasted with the past, but the dynamism of the past must 
2 0 Korhonen, International Law Situated: An Analysis of the Lawyer's Stance towards Culture, History and 
Community (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000), at 129. 
3 D Kennedy, 'Primitive Legal Scholarship ' ( 1986) 27 Harvard International Law Journal I , at 1-3. 
4 Y Onuma, 'When was the Jaw of International Society Born? - An Inquiry into the History of International 
Law from an lntercivilizational Perspective' (2000) 2 Journal of the History of International Law I, at 25. 
55 
Chapter Two: 
Between Faith and Place: Arab-Islamic Approaches to Authority and Territory in The01y and Practice 
also be stabilised into a manageable, 'frozen' form. 5 Once history is both 
compartmentalised and paralysed, it can then be used as an unproblematic tool of legal 
scholarship. According to Korhonen, a ' common stance towards history seems to assume 
that the jurist has some way of reaching the past as it once was, i.e. unmediated by 
intervening circumstances and undistorted by the accumulation of layers of temporally 
alternating meanings and lenses of prejudices. ' 6 Korhonen rejects this approach and instead 
calls on lawyers to recognise their own relationship with both temporality and international 
law's dynamism. 7 Although international lawyers typically strive to 'minimise outside 
contamination' and to 'appear as impartial and non-predisposed as possible', this is 
unattainable.8 Ultimately, Korhonen suggests that international lawyers abandon the ideal 
of objective history, because the 
International jurist is not situated in any middle ground towards history. She uses 
and abuses history in different ways, negotiates continuity and change, and works 
facing a number of schisms - producing reality effects, striking conventions about 
history and law, and having to let them shift. .. The international jurist is often in a 
key position in managing these stabilisations and shifts and she strives to make 
sense of them. She has to negotiate a convoluted situational web where no uniform 
solution can last eternally and where she therefore has to understand the various 
conditions involved.9 
With this sensitivity about the relationship between history and international law, it is now 
possible to explore the relationship between international law and Islamic history. 
Partly in response to the phenomenon of Islamic 'fundamentalism,' and partly from 
a desire to expand the discipline's universal underpinnings, there is now a growing body of 
literature devoted to exploring the historical inter-relationship between international law 
and Islam. Despite this development, Mayer laments its quality, arguing that the 'existing 
literature does not always treat problematic issues in an objective and coherent fashion or 
adequately analyze methodological questions.' 10 Westbrook also argues that scholarship on 
Islamic international law has been disappointing because 'these attempts either fail to 
address the concerns of public international law or fail to locate authority in Islam - fail, 
5 Korhonen, supra n 2, at 136. 
6 lbid, at 129-130. 
7 Ibid, at 135. 
8 Ibid, at 15 1. 
9 Ibid, at 206. 
10 A E Mayer, 'War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International Law', J Kelsay & J T Johnson (eds), 
Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Jslamic 
Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991) 195-226, at 199. 
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that is, to be substantively Islamic.' 11 Some of these difficulties can be attributed to the 
methodology of comparison,12 and Westbrook recognises that writing 'comparative law is 
always difficult because communication is largely about shared meanings, and comparative 
law explores the difference of meanings.' 13 Does the Islamic tradition contain, for example, 
terms that can be rendered in public international law terminology? How can we find 
common meanings across different lexicons? 
Particularly with so few international lawyers educated in Arabic and the principles 
of fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence, it is perhaps unsurprising that sophisticated comparative 
frameworks are rare. Problems of translation abound and, beyond this, Strawson points out 
that 'English texts do not merely present Islamic law, they construct it.' 14 The first step 
required then in appreciating the similarities and differences as well as historical interplay 
between European international law and Islamic law is for scholars to possess substantial 
knowledge beyond the confines of European theory and state practice. Without this 
knowledge, there will not be incentives for international lawyers to develop alternative 
narratives to the dominant one which suggests the birth of international law exclusively 
within European domains. This will also assist the project of universalising the discourse of 
international law. Bedjaoui points out that not only are Western scholars to blame here, 
though; ' even Arab and Muslim jurists themselves are completely unaware of the Islamic 
conception of international law or confine it to the ghetto' .15 He appeals to both Western 
and Muslim lawyers to reverse this oversight by engaging with the rich body of material 
available. 16 The recent work of Judge Weeramantry in his inter-civilisational project attests 
to the potential of such work, 17 but most scholarship still remains under-developed. 
11 D Westbrook, 'Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate Expressions of World 
Order' ( 1993) 33 Virginia Journal of International Law 819, at 821 . 
12 Especially see: G Frankenberg, 'Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law' (1985) 26 Harvard 
International Law Journal 411. 
13 Westbrook, supra n 11 , at 821-822. 
14 J Strawson, 'Islamic Law and English Texts' (1995) 6 Law and Critique 21, at 21. 
15 M Bedjaoui, 'The 1980- 1988 Gulf War and Universal Law: The Severe Judgment of World Legal 
Scholarship upon the Belligerents ', IF Dekker & H HG Post (eds), The Gulf War of 1980-1988: The Iran-
Iraq War in International Legal Perspective (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 279-299, at 295 . 
16 
'And I can restrain myself no longer from appealing to all jurists in the Muslim world to take greater 
personal responsibility and mobilize more efficiently in a decisive effort of creativity, instead of confining 
themselves to an attitude of slavish imitation [taqlid?] which often results in strapping lifeless artificial limbs 
of foreign origin on living human communities.' Italics in original, Ibid, at 296. 
17 C G Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (Kula Lumpur: The Other Press, 
2001). 
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Even where detailed accounts are offered, however, much of this scholarship 1s 
problematic. For example, a dominant approach, championed by scholars versed in Arabic 
and the shari' a has been to effect a reconciliation between Islam and international law at all 
costs.18 These scholars readily acknowledge dissonances such as the doctrine of jihad and 
the issue over enduring peace between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. However, their 
ultimate goal of aligning Islamic and public international law entails that certain elements 
of Islamic law are purged in this apologist project. 19 Points of difference have to be 
overlooked, whereas points of similarity are over-emphasised. Westbrook summarises this 
approach as an 
obsession with the world of Islam and a monolithic world outside; a tendency to 
explain 'Islamic law' within the categories of Western international law (even using 
Latin); a predilection to apologize for the practice of Muslim states, combined with 
often harsh critiques of Western states; the desire to adopt superficially understood 
conceptions of Western politics; and the tendency to give elaborate and tenuous 
historical arguments for the priority of something 'Islamic' in 
existing public international law, however hegemonic and loudly un-lslamic it may 
20 
currently be. 
International lawyers illustrative of Westbrook's criticisms assert that Islam respects pacta 
sunt servanda21 and has even developed a sophisticated body of international humanitarian 
law centuries before the Hague Conferences. Jihad, just war and humanitarianism are all in 
vogue.22 
18 One striking example of anachronism is Al-Ghunaimi's classification of seventh century Arabian city-states 
as analogous to modem nation-states: ' the city of Medina was possessed of the required elements -
population, territory and government - to be classified as a state under the principles of modem international 
Jaw.' Given that the nation-state model had yet to emerge anywhere else, it seems forced to make such an 
anachronistic argument. M T Al-Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of international Law and the Western 
Ar,proach (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), at 55. 
1 W S D Cravens, 'The Future of Islamic Argwnents in International Boundary Disputes between Islamic 
States' (1998) 55 Washington & Lee Law Review 529, at 541. 
20 Westbrook, supra n 11, at 858. 
21 Cravens argues that although Islam contains a doctrine akin to pacta sunt servanda, it lacks the breadth of 
the meaning contained in public international law: Cravens, supra n 19, at 570. Ford also argues that Islamic 
and public international law definitions are not in complete parity: C A Ford, 'Siyar-ization and its 
Discontents: International Law and Islam's Constitutional Crisis' ( 1995) 30 Texas international Law Journal 
499, 521. For scholars generally supportive of the existence of pacta sunt servanda in the Islamic tradition, 
see Al-Ghunaimi, supra n 18, at 212; Mayer, supra n 10, at 201; Weeramantry, supra n 17, at 141. Boisard 
goes even further, suggesting that ' Islam not only reinforced the validity of the axiom, pacla sunt servanda, 
but also introduced it to international relations, making possible the systematic development of conventional 
law, which became a partial substitute for custom,' M A Boisard, 'On the Probable Influence of Islam on 
Western Public and International Law' (1980) 11 International Journal of Middle East Studies 429, at 441-
442. 
22 Moinuddin argues that Western scholars have tended to over-emphasise the importance of jihad and Islamic 
supremacy in classical sources. He points out, however, that a number of Muslim scholars have tried to show 
how the siyar is about much more than this narrow focus. H Moinuddin, The Charter of the is/amic 
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Fascination with certain aspects of Islamic law is linked to the way in which the 
sharf'a has become confined to particular spheres of society's regulation. Most Arab legal 
systems have adopted a hybrid system of law, retaining the sharf'a for private sphere 
matters and favouring European, civil law models for public governance. The regulation of 
personal status, family relations and inheritance has continued to reflect sharf'a principles. 
On the other hand, public law, including international law, has lagged far behind. 23 
Scholars wishing to acquaint themselves with Islamic notions of international law must 
therefore grapple with realities on the ground: very few modern examples of Islamic 
international Jaw are available. Yet, we will see that the Islamic legal tradition contains a 
wealth of learning about international issues from earlier eras, allowing contemporary 
research a platform from which to develop and strengthen a body of modern Islamic 
international legal nonns and practices. Studies about the pacta sunt servanda norm as well 
as countless considerations ofjihiid abound,24 but Islamic international law needs concerted 
invigoration lest it remain an under-developed and somewhat skewed field of study bent on 
treaty law and the laws of war. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge one faces in studying the history of international 
Islamic law is the tension between theory and practice. For example, it is important to 
recognise the primacy of early Islam and its enduring legacy on the evolution of Islamic 
law. The period of the Prophet's life (d. 632) generated the two main sources of Islamic 
law: the Qur 'an and the Sunna. Furthermore, for 'Muslims, the great age of early Islam 
served as an image of what the world should be'25 Although Islamic polities have never 
since emulated this golden age, certain scholarship turns to this era for guidance, thus 
Conference and Legal Framework of Economic Co-operation among its Member States (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1987), at 19-20. 
23 According to Bedjaoui, 'the Islamic law which rose out of the religious revolution of the seventh century 
has historically suffered from the brake being applied in the public domain and from being kept in leading 
strings in tbe private domain. This has resulted in an unbalanced evolution, in that its public (international) 
law limb bas been virtually amputated and its private law limb allowed to develop in a somewhat ingrowing 
manner.' Bedjaoui, supra n 15, at 296-297. Also, see S Zubaida, Law and Power in the Islamic World 
(London: I B Tauris, 2003), at 2. 
24 Some examples of literatures in English surveying Muslim laws of war include: J D R Cockayne, ' Islam 
and International Humanitarian Law: From Clash to a Conversation between Civilizations' (2002) 84 
International Review of the Red Cross 597; J Kelsay, ' Al-Shaybani and the Islamic Law of War' (2003) 2 
Journal of Military Ethics 63; J Kelsay & J T Johnson (eds), Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical 
Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); J 
Rehman, Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from Terrorism (Portland: Hart, 2005); 
and HM Zawati, l s Jihad a Just War? War, Peace, and Human Rights under Is lamic and Public International 
Law (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 200 l ). 
25 A Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962, 
reissued 1983), at 8. 
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overlooking the significance of later state practice and the evolution of certain legal 
theories. Hallaq does not regard this fascination with early Islam as innocent, despite its 
indisputable significance to Islamic thought: the 'choice of concentration on one area or 
another is a function of relevance'26 For example, Hallaq points out that the work of the 
Orientalist, Schacht,27 has tended to explore either Islam's early phases or its most recent; 
at least half a millennia, and especially the Ottoman era,28 remain 'depressingly a term 
incognita'.29 In focusing on the early period in the context of 'debts and borrowings', old-
school Orientalists like Schacht are able to portray Islamic law as 'at best, heavily indebted 
to the legal traditions of the cultures that gave birth to Western civilization and, at worst, 
little more than a replica of these traditions.' 30 
Other studies continue this quest for non-indigenous sources of Islamic civilisation 
by over-emphasising the impact of European ideas and institutions on the Arab world in the 
wake of colonialism. Thus, Hourani opines that scholarship has 'been wrong in laying too 
much emphasis upon ideas which were taken from Europe, and not enough upon what was 
retained, even if in a changed form, from an older tradition.' 31 We can see from the 
opinions of Hallaq and Hourani that a fine balance is required in appreciating Islamic 
culture within the context of changing internal and external conditions. 
Focusing on only certain periods of Islam's history aids the production of a 
distorted and monolithic image of Islamic law and civilisation. As we saw vis-a-vis 
comparative scholarship generally, it is difficult to preserve dynamism and diversity when 
studying two or more subjects; often one will be reduced to a cliche of its former self. 
Boisard questions accounts of Islam's link with public international law for their tendency 
to construct both the West, as well as Islam, as monoliths. Instead, we need to appreciate 
the significant interaction and cross-ferti lisation that took place, as well as the role of 
intermediaries, such as Jews. 32 Beydoun echoes these sentiments when he characterises 
depictions of a cohesive Islamic community as neo-Orientalist simplifications of the 
26 W B Hallaq, 'The Quest for Origins or Doctrine? Islamic Legal Studies as Colonialist Discourse' (2003) 2 
UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law l , at 3. 
27 His classic works being: J Schacht, An introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); and J 
Schacht, The Origins of Mohammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, new ed.). 
28 This relative lack of scholarship on the Ottoman era is also noted in A Hourani, 'How Should We Write the 
History of the Middle East?' (1991) 23 lnternationa/Journal of Middle East Studies 125, al 129. 
29 Hallaq, supra n 26, at 4. 
30 Ibid, at 5. Here, Hallaq is referring to typical narratives of either Near Eastern or Hellenistic creative 
impetus of Islamic civilisation. 
31 Hourani, 'How Should We Write', supra n 28, at 128. 
32 Boisard, supra n 21, at 432-434. 
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diversity and dissonance within Islamic communities.33 According to Barakat, Orientalist 
accounts of the Arab world typically have regarded religion as the central determinative 
force in social life, thus creating a static and reified conception of 'Arab society' as well as 
'Islamic law' .34 For Piscatori, rather than over-determining the role of culture,35 and so as 
to avoid essentialism, 'even a religious code such as Islam must be accepted as variable and 
evolving with changing circumstances.' 36 Historical accounts must probe under-studied 
periods as well as the pervasive role of political choice, whether in the evolution of Islamic 
legal norms or scholarly accounts of such laws. 
How then can we reconcile the need for historical specificity with conceptual 
continuity in understanding the link between the historical development of Islamic law in 
theory and practice? For instance, is it anachronistic to apply concepts such as 'state ' and 
'secularism' to Islamic history? First, it is important that particular scholarly agendas be 
acknowledged honestly when constructing an historical account. Here, in this chapter, my 
reading of mainly secondary material was framed by a desire to understand how Islamic 
communities have lived out the relationship between territory and authority. The conceptual 
framework informing my learning in the subject matter was premised on the desire to locate 
alternative models of political authority over territory. I also wanted to probe stereotypical 
accounts of Islamic societies perpetuated in the West. Typically, the Arab-Muslim world 
has been distinguished from the European experience on account of its tribal structure and 
the role of religion in society, but is such an understanding accurate?37 Being already 
familiar with the fundamentals of Islamic law and Islamic history, I was also interested in 
tracing the development and evolution of ideas and practices that have allowed Arab states 
today largely to accept the nation-state model. Aside from surrnisable realist explanations 
about the interests of state elites, are there earlier experiences and theories from the Arab-
Islamic tradition sympathetic to and supportive of institutions such as the nation-state 
33 K A Beydoun, 'Dar al-Islam Meets "Islam as Civilization": An Alignment of Politico-Theoretical 
Fundamentalisms and the Geopolitical Realism of this World view' (2004-2005) 4 UCLA Journal of Islamic 
& Near Eastern Law 143, at 146. 
34 H Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), at 
120. 
35 J Piscalori, 'Order, Justice, and Global Islam', R Foot et al (eds), Order and Justice in International 
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 262-292, at 265. 
36 Ibid, al 267. 
37 It is common for studies of Arab society to amplify the importance of tribalism. Hourani's scholarship 
points out that the 'structure of Islamic thought and society developed, however, not primarily in the Hijaz 
[the birthplace of Islam, Arabia], but in the great areas of high civil ization which were incorporated into the 
caliphate.' Hourani, 'How Should We Write', supra n 28, at 13 1. For Hourani's application of his premise, 
see A Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (London: Faber & Faber, 1991 ). 
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model, public international law and dispute resolution? Widespread contact across the 
Mediterranean world has produced a variety of institutional and theoretical models, and it is 
on these examples that the chapter will focus while exploring the three points highlighted in 
the introduction. 
Second, the chapter embraces some of the methodological devices developed by 
Piscatori in his 1986 study, which asked the question, 'is there something about Islam 
which makes it incongruous with the idea of nationalism and with the institution of the 
nation-state?' 38 Piscatori answers this question in the negative: there is room for 
compatibility between the territorial state and Islam through an historical approach able to 
surmount essentialism by marrying Islamic theory and practice. One of the four tenets of 
Islamic Jaw is ijma ', or consensus, and Piscatori applies this to his own concepts of ijma' 
al-qawl (consensus of speech) and ijma' al-fa 'ii (consensus of action).39 Piscatori suggests 
that it is best to see Islam 'as the political beliefs and conduct of Muslims, what they say as 
well as what they actually do, '40 rather than holding fast to ahistorical stereotypes. In the 
following three sections, Islamic law and history will be explored as both a product of 
speech and action, within and beyond the diversity of dar al-islam, the abode of Islam or 
peace. 
38 Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States, supra n l , at vii. 
39 Ibid, at 45. 
40 Ibid, at 14. 
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Map #2: The Rise oflslam and the Arab Conquests, source: Z Lockman, Contesting Visions of the Middle 
East: The History and Politics of Orienta/ism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at x-xi 
3) In the Wake of the Prophet's Message: Conguests, Caliphs and the Development of 
Islamic International Law 
The purpose of this section is twofold: to introduce some basic aspects of Islamic law and 
history in the first few centuries of Islam; and from this basis, to discuss classical Muslim 
notions of authority over territory. Because the thesis is concerned with the process of 
argumentation at the ICJ, it does not pursue the agenda of effecting some sort of resolution 
between public international law and Islamic law per se. Secondary scholarship is drawn on 
only for its work on the international legal dimensions of Islam and the extent to which 
Islamic practice contributed to international law's development, which is explored below in 
section three. Of more importance is an appreciation of Islamic approaches to territory and 
authority as well as the centrality of the Caliphate because these ideas are drawn on by a 
number of parties in three of the four case studies of the thesis: Libya in Chapter Three, 
both Bahrain and Qatar in Chapter Four and Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco in Chapter 
Five. 
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Like any other monumental historical moment, the story of Islam's birth can be told 
in many ways. For our purposes, appreciating how a narrative is constructed and applied to 
legal argument is far more important than isolating an indisputable rendering of the 
Prophet's life and the revelation of Islam. Why is it important to return to the Prophet's 
life? How can theories of rule and laws emerge out of such an - often idealised - image? 
Allah's message was revealed to his last prophet, Muhammed in Arabian Mecca 
and Medina in the early part of the seventh century. Although the Islamic message was 
intended to be the definitive guide for faith into the future, it was also a product of its 
environment. Thus, Islam draws not only on its Arab, tribal origins, but also on the other 
monotheistic traditions of Judaism and Christianity. The Prophet acted as Allah's deputy on 
earth, combining secular and divine rule over his followers. The community that emerged 
under Muhammed came to be known as al-umma, or the believers, all united in their 
commitment to Allah's message as revealed to his Prophet and later compiled in the 
Qur'an. 
Although Allah's ultimate authority has remained uncontested, controversies 
emerged almost immediately as to the nature of rule on earth. Khadduri points out that 
societies based on religious rule have erroneously been described as theocracies. He argues 
that 
a distinction ... must be made between an authority which is directly derived from 
and exercised by God, and an authority which is derived from a divine code 
endowed by God but enforced by His viceregent (or by a secular ruler) which is 
equally binding upon the latter and the people.41 
Thus, K.hadduri suggests that it is best to understand the society established by Muhammed 
as a divine universal nomocracy, grounded in Allah's revelation, the Qur'an. Foda disputes 
this account, suggesting that sovereignty on earth resided in the umma, and was expressed 
through the relationship between the umma and Allah' s law, or sharf'a.42 
Despite the primacy of the umma in a theoretical sense, it was the theory and 
practice of the Caliphate that reveals the interrelationship between religion and politics best 
and helps explain tensions in Islamic perspectives on authority. Even with over ten wives, 
Muhammed died in 632 leaving only daughters and a controversy over who should succeed 
him. The word khal(fa, or caliph, derives from the Arabic verb khalafa, meaning to follow 
41 M Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1955), at 14. 
42 E Foda, The Projected Arab Court of Justice: A Study in Regional Jurisdiction with Specific Reference to 
the Muslim Law of Nations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957), at 99. 
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or succeed. This was expressed by the first Caliph himself, Abu Bakr, who said: 'I am not a 
successor to God, I am successor to God's Messenger [Muhammed]' .43 There were disputes 
and political differences following the death of the Prophet, but later Muslims sought to 
overcome these early differences by depicting the period of the first four caliphs as one of 
consensus and harmony. Hence it is referred to as the era of al-khulafa ' al-rashidun, or the 
[four] rightly-guided caliphs. 44 On Mu'awiyya's defeat of 'All, the Prophet's son-in-law 
and the figure that would become associated with Shi'ism, the first Muslim empire was 
established in Damascus: the Ummayad Caliphate (661-750). Following on from earlier 
conquests, caliphal rule came to be associated with a ruler's ability to maintain and extend 
the Prophet's message through conquest and empire. Because of its dominance politically 
and theoretically both in an historical sense and for the cases in the thesis, the rest of this 
chapter will only explore the Sunni practice of rule. 
After rapid territorial expansion, Abbasid caliphs (750-1258) in particular had to 
confront a world not only far from universally Muslim, but also a Muslim world 
comprising multiple caliphs and sects.45 It was therefore during this period that rulers and 
scholars explored the relationship between territory and authority under the Caliphate in 
detail. Hourani captures the tension between theory and practice confronting scholars of the 
period, when he writes: 
The caliphate had been one, at least in principle; it had been universal, resting on a 
formal equality of rights and functions as between all believers; its head bad been, 
by bis own claim and general recognition, the successor of the Prophet in his 
political function, and he had exercised his function in accordance with the Shari 'a. 
None of this was true of the sultans who had taken over power. Their rule was 
territorially limited.46 
Scholars of the classical era laid out the requirements for caliphal rule, and despite its 
theoretical ilk, it is clear that such work reflected an increasingly splintered and divided 
43 Contained in Mawardi's al-alJkiim al-su!Oiiniyya, quoted in S Mahmassani, 'The Principles of 
International Law in the Light oflslamic Doctrine' (1966) 117 Recueil des Cours 20 I , at 233. 
44 Abu Bakr (632-634), ' Umar (634-644), 'Uthman (644-656) and 'AIT (656-661). For a general history of the 
Caliphate, see I Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2"d edition, 
2002), at 45-66. 
45 For example, Al-Ghunami illustrates that while the Abassids ruled from Baghdad, the Ummayads in 
Cordoba, Spain also declared a caliphate under 'Abd al-Rahman III in 909 and the Fafimlds in Cairo under 
'Ukayd-allah in 929. Al-Ghunaimi, supra n 18, at 67-68. This is also noted by Onuma in his study oflslam in 
international law, Onuma, supra n 4, at 2 1. 
46 Hourani, Arabic Thought, supra n 25, at 12. 
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system of governance, both geographically and institutionally. 47 Piscatori concedes that 
'much of classical and medieval theory supports the view that Islam is pre-eminently 
concerned with the creation of a universal community and is intolerant of those who are not 
Muslim. ' 48 However, he also suggests that this period contains the gern1 for the later idea of 
the nation-state and that we should not confine ourselves to a formulaic interpretation of a 
universalistic Caliphate. For example, Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) argued that religious 
unity was not synonymous with political unity; separate Muslim entities were permitted. 
Ibn Khaldun's (1332-1406) sociological study of the rise and fall of societies also suggests 
that it was natural for Islamic empires to wax and wane; 49 what should not change, 
however, was faith in the application of Allah 's message through his law, the sharf 'a. 
Muhammed's lifetime had ushered in the two main sources of sharf'a, the Qur 'an 
and the Sunna, or traditions of the Prophet, but it was not until much later that the sharf'a 
was systematised, especially in its international form of the siyar. 50 Although we can 
characterise the siyar as somewhat of an afterthought, it still followed sharf'a practices and 
principles.51 Rules of a codified kind suitable for application to complex societies were 
rarely found in Islamic law's primary sources, the Qur'an and Sunna. In response, U$fil al-
_fiqh (ways of interpretation) were developed, which laid out how to identify rules through 
the interplay of primary as well as secondary sources, namely ijma' (consensus of legal 
scholars) and qiyas (analogical reasoning). Given the relative lack of material found in the 
Qur'an and Sunna on international issues, the siyar was especially dependent on these 
secondary sources and it also reflected the political realities of Abassid rule. In addition, 
because of the gradual shift from ijtihad (innovative reasoning) in the early centuries to 
taqlld (imitation), the evolution of legal norms failed to keep pace with international 
developments. For this reason, the classical siyar as developed by mujtahids, or 
practitioners of ijtihad, must not be portrayed as the sum total of lslamic internationalism. 
Instead, it is necessary to factor in state practice in combination with a flexible approach to 
the evolution of earlier scholarship and sharf'a principles. The importance of state practice 
47 For example, al-Mawardi 's (972-1058) principal work on political theory, al-aOkiim a/-su!Oaniyya (On the 
Ordinances of Government). 
48 Piscatori , Islam in a World of Nation-States, supra n 1, at 44. 
49 lbid, at 47-48. 
50 See generally, W B Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), at chs 5-7. 
51 Kbadduri, War and Peace, supra n 41, at 47. 
66 
Chapter Two: 
Between Faith and Place: Arab-Islamic Approaches to Authority and Territ01y in Theory and Practice 
and adaptation was especially relevant under the Ottomans, and this is explored in the next 
section after a brief overview of the siyar's characteristics. 
What is the siyar and how did it conceptualise the relationship between territory and 
Caliph in a world containing both believers and non-believers? Although Al-Shaybanl 
(748-805) developed the siyar more than any other scholar in the early centuries of Islam,52 
it was not until Al-Sarakhsl ( d. 110 l) that a clear definition emerged: 
The siyar is the plural of sira .. .It describes the conduct of the believers in their 
relations with the unbelievers of enemy territory as well as with the people whom 
the believers had made treaties, who may have been temporarily (mus ta 'mins) or 
permanently (Dhimmis) in Islamic lands; with apostates, who were the worst of the 
unbelievers ... and with rebels . .. 53 
It was understood that the sharz'a applied to Muslims as members of the umma, but a 
different body of law was required for non-Muslim peoples and lands. This bifurcated 
jurisdiction was a product of the prevailing Islamic worldview, which distinguished dar a/-
is/am (land of peace) from dar al-barb (land of war). Many writers have discussed this 
dichotomy and the implications, not only for separation between Muslims but also for 
amicable relations across confessional lines. Because this division suggests perpetual 
conflict, as encapsulated in the concept of jihad, 54 many commentators regard the siyar as 
incapable of adapting to a system of nation-states under the norm of sovereign equality. 
Other authors tend to downplay classical siyar 's exclusionary effects through a series of 
reconciliatory gestures discussed above. 
The failure to achieve worldwide conquest and the inability to wage constant wars 
of conversion had necessitated agreements with non-Muslim powers, for example through 
treaty. Sunni schools of jurisprudence did not develop a uniform position on this, but it was 
generally agreed that treaties of peace could be concluded for a period of up to ten years. 55 
The resulting regime was called dar al-~ulb, the land of reconciliation or treaty. The 
52 For a discussion of these other theorists, especially in relation to j iOiid, see M Khadduri, The Islamic Law 
of Nations: Shaybiinl's Siyar (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), at 38-39; and Mahmassani, supra n 43. 
53 Khadduri , The Islamic Law of Nations, supra n 52, at 40. 
54 Jihad is derived from the Arabic verb, jahada, which connotes an action requiring exertion, strain, effort, 
trouble. Jihad is typically translated as 'holy war', but can refer to any sort of religious struggle, such as a 
personal one of the conscience. The word, ijtihad, or independent legal reasoning, is derived from the same 
root. 
55 A A AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of international Relations (Herndon, VA: The International 
Institute of Islamic Thought, 2"d edition, 1994), a t 20. 
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Prophet himself had entered into treaties, and so at least temporary versions were supported 
in the cenhlries to follow.56 
This practice of temporary truces, however, did not support treaties between 
Muslim powers (both operating in diir al-isliim) or the notion of permanent peace between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Further difficulties arose in relation to treaty relations with 
non-Muslims because of the issue of territorial dominion: which laws were applicable in 
lands under treaty? Were Muslims in the land of war able to enforce the sharf'a? What was 
the stahls of non-Muslims within diir al-isliim?57 Some of these questions are explored in 
relation to Ottoman practice below, and they were also the subject of numerous classical 
treatises. 
Debate continues about the nahlre of Islamic authority over territory as developed in 
the classical period. Parvin and Somner distinguish between legal and territorial rule: 
Dar al-Islam is not. .. inherently a territorial concept. Rather, it is a legal construct 
that has a territorial dimension: a territorial expression of the umma ... which itself 
has a political component. Thus, the dar al-Islam can be considered a political-
territorial expression of that community in which the Islamic religion is practiced 
and where it is protected by a Muslim ruler. Similarly, the dar al-sulh can be 
described as an area in which the practice of Islam is permitted but not under the 
protection of a Muslim ruler. In the dar al-harb, though Islam might be practiced, it 
does not enjoy the protection of the non-Muslim ruler.58 
This passage shows how the relationship between ruler and territory was vital, but many 
contemporary authors are divided as to the nature of a caliph's rule: was it territorial or 
personal? Crone, for example, points out that the word, khalifa, only refers to the caliph's 
office and not his polity or his control over a geographical area.59 The authority of the 
caliph' s office derived from his application of the sharf'a to the umma and not effective 
territorial control per se. However, under classical doctrine this could also mean that 
Islamic law followed a community regardless of political authority: 
since the concept of territorial sovereignty had not yet developed under Muslim law 
and since the Muslims were bound by the law regardless of the country or the 
territory they resided in, it follows, at least in Muslim legal theory, that the 
56 The most famous treaty during the Prophet's lifetime was OullJ al- Oudaybiyya (the Treaty of 
Oudaybiyya), formed between MoDammed and the Meccans in 628. For a general discussion of treaties, see 
Zawati, supra n 24. 
57 Generally, see Khadduri 's translation of Al-Shaybani on such issues: K.hadduri, The Islamic Law of 
Nations, supra n 52. 
58 M Parvin & M Sommer, ' Dar Al-Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and its Implications for 
Conflict Resolution' (1980) 11 Jnternational Journal of Middle East Studies J, at 4-5. 
59 P Crone, God's Rule: Government and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), at 3. 
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jurisdiction of the Islamic state would extend to Muslims, regardless of their place 
of residence. 60 
Other authors are more flexible in their fusion of theory and practice, arguing that territory 
was at least a factor in the development of jurisdiction and authority.61 Perhaps part of the 
difficulty in trying to solve this question of Islam's territorial nature is the way conceptual 
tools and assumptions are not static. The Caliphate cannot simply be aligned with the 
modem state and it does not need to be; it is enough to forge a credible theoretical basis 
between classical scholarship and modem practice as explored in the next section. It is 
possible to show that some appreciation of territorially limited dominion emerged during 
the classical era which could inform later theory and practice. It is also important not to 
superimpose pre-conceptions on this contested terrain. According to Foda, it ' seems that the 
concept of a personal and non-territorial sovereignty of the Muslim State - held by some 
jurists - is mainly derived from the regime of the capitulations which appeared as a 
complete system and the regime in the Islamic world towards the end of the l 81h century. '62 
The institutions of the Caliphate and capitulations continue to elicit controversy in 
the quest for Muslim approaches to territorial authority. We saw above that classical theory 
based on universal personal rule of the caliph increasingly had to accommodate the realities 
of multiple Muslim and non-Muslim entities. Thus, on their rise to predominance eight 
centuries after the Prophet's death, the Ottomans were left a legal legacy far from settled. In 
their control over much of the Arab world, as well as in their relations with Europe, the 
Ottomans substantially developed the rules of siyar, and this forms the subject of 
discussion below. 
60 M Khadduri, ' International Law', M Klrndduri & HJ Liebesny (eds), Law in the Middle East: Origin and 
Development of Islamic Law, vol I (1955) 349-372, at 360. 
61 For example, Parvin and Som.ner argue that ' Muslim jurisdiction, and therefore the dar al-Islam, was 
coextensive with secure, nonoppressed Muslim inhabitation and, while the character of Islamic Jaw had a 
personal rather than territorial cast ... the system was nonetheless binding on groups, which perforce, have a 
territorial distribution, as well as on individuals.' Italics in original, Parvin & Somner, supra n 58, at 3. See 
also, Al-Ghunaimi, supra n 18, at 64. 
62 Foda, supra n 42, at 108. 
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4) Caliphs, Capitulations and Colonialism in Ottoman Lands 
An appreciation of the Ottoman legacy is necessary in exploring the chapter's concerns 
about traditions of territoriality in the Arab-Muslim world and the reasons for recent Arab 
resort to the ICJ. Additionally, three of the thesis' case studies hail from lands at least 
nominally under Ottoman authority: Libya, Palestine and the Gulf states.63 Although there 
is an impressive body of historical research as well as a wealth of untapped archival 
material about Ottoman rule and relations with Europe and management of its Arab 
populations, 64 this knowledge rarely filters down into the field of international law. A 
number of works accounting for the emergence of international law in Europe tend to treat 
the Sublime Porte as an occasional interlocutor in an otherwise Christian world. Yet, 
Faroqhi argues that we must abandon such misunderstandings because ' there was no " iron 
curtain" separating the Ottoman elites and their tax-paying subjects from the world outside 
63 By the sixteenth century, all Arabic-speaking lands were under Ottoman control with the exception of 
Morocco, Sudan and parts of Arabia. However, Faroqhi reminds us that 'Ottoman central control, while 
substantial in certain aspects of life and also in some geographical regions, in no way covered the entire 
surface of the Empire in an even and regular fashion.' S Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around 
it (London: LB. Tauris, 2004), at 48. 
64 See M M ilhan, 'The Ottoman Archives and Their Importance for Historical Studies: With Special 
Reference to Arab Provinces' (1991) C. LY Belleten 41 5. 
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the borders of the Empire. '65 Ottoman-European interaction contributed substantially to the 
law we now know as international law. International legal scholarship has conceded some 
role to the Ottomans in standard accounts of international law's 'birth', but usually in 
historically inaccurate projections of a Power weakened by the late nineteenth century. For 
example, the regime of capitulations and the Sublime Porte's 1856 'entry' into international 
law are regularly invoked to bolster narratives advancing an image of European origin: 
European predominance accounts for Turkish capitulation in both these episodes. 
A closer reading of the historical record destabilises such a narrative and suggests a 
dialogue between multiple cultures and polities. This section 's sketch of Ottoman-
European relations seeks not only to dispel some common misunderstandings, but also to 
link classical Islamic conceptions of territory with Ottoman dominion: for example, I ask, 
were capitulations consistent with the classical siyar and how did they contribute to its 
evolution? Was international society and international law exclusively European? What 
was the nature of Ottoman international. legal personality? The following section considers 
Ottoman membership within international society by interrogating the practice of 
capitulations and the 1856 Treaty of Paris before moving on to the idea of the caliphate and 
Islamic authority in the late Ottoman period. 
We saw above that the nature of Islamic jurisdiction is based on a community of 
belief, and it was for this reason that practices were devised for regulating relations with 
non-believers both within and beyond Muslim lands. Islam always permitted a space for 
peoples of the book, or dhimmfs.66 In exchange for accepting Muslim dominion and the 
imposition of the poll tax or jizya, resident Jewish, Zoroastrian, Sabean and Christian 
communities were able to apply their own laws for communal matters. 
Circumstances, however, were very different for non-residents, such as traders. 
Under classical doctrine, diir al-is/am had to secure itself against threats from diir al-barb, 
including from aliens, or /:liirbls. For /:liirbfs wishing to enter dar al-isliim, it was necessary 
either to convert to Islam or to secure am{m, which was a form of protection.67 Any Muslim 
within dar al-isliim could grant aman, which would transform a biirbf into a musta 'min (or 
bearer of aman; protected person) for the period of one year. With this device, traders, for 
65 Faroqhi, supra n 63, at 2. 
66 Please note that for consistency and lack of confusion, I have chosen to use only Arabic spelling even 
though many words were often rendered differently in Turkish. 
67 For a consideration of amiin, see MC Bassiouni, 'Protection of Diplomats under Islamic Law' (1980) 74 
American Journal of International law 609. 
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example, were able to conduct their business deep into Muslim lands, avoid the jizya and, 
over time, have many legal matters settled extra-territorially. In his study of the origins of 
international law, Ago shows how there emerged a complex web of relations between three 
great powers in the Mediterranean from the ninth century, generating the seeds of modern 
international law, through mechanisms such as inter-state negotiations, treaties and 
customary law.68 Thayer echoes this idea in his study on capitulations when he writes that 
later the 'Arab, Saracen and Christian nations of the Mediterranean seem to have granted 
extraterritoriality freely from an early time, in the paramount interest of commerce.'69 
Particularly with the penetration of merchants from the Italian city-states throughout 
the Mediterranean, it was necessary to assure a conducive climate for commerce, including 
those agreements between Muslim and Christian rulers that later came to be known as 
capitulations.70 Although the word 'capitulation' might suggest to an English speaker the 
idea of concession, it is actually derived from the Latin word for chapter, capitula, because 
these agreements were subdivided into sections, or chapters. 71 The first capitulatory 
agreement was between Morocco and the maritime republic of Pisa in 1133, followed by 
Valencia in 1149, and then a number of Italian city-states seeking to boost Mediterranean 
trade thereafter.72 By the time the Ottomans had engulfed the Byzantines in their capital in 
1453, there was already a well-established Muslim-Ch1istian practice of capitulations. It 
was only under the Sublime Porte, though, that this regime was systematised and fully 
developed in the centuries to follow.73 On their capture of Constantinople, the Ottomans set 
the tone of their relations with non-Muslims by entering into agreements with dhimmzs and 
gradually solidifying earlier trade links with Italian powers. 74 Especially later Ottoman 
68 These three powers were the Frankish-Lombard Empire of Charlemagne, the Byzantine Empire and the 
Muslims from Spain to Syria. R Ago, 'Pluralism and the Origins of the International Community' (1977) 
Italian Yearbook of International law 3, at 13. 
69 L E Thayer, 'The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of their Abrogation as it Affects 
the United States' (1923) 17 American Journal of International Law 207 at 208. 
70 
'Finding their legal basis in the principle of the personality of the law, the capitulations reflected the 
economic need of encouraging commerce between Arab-dominated areas and the states in Italy and the 
Western Mediterranean.' H J Liebesny, 'The Development of Western Judicial Privileges', M Khadduri & H 
J Liebesny (eds), Law in the Middle East: Origin and Development of Islamic Law, vol I (Richmond, VA: 
William Byrd Press, 1955) 309-333, at 314. 
71 Ibid, al 313. 
72 For a list of these early agreements, see ibid, at 312-315. 
73 Ibid, at 315. 
74 For example, in 1453 just after the fall of Constantinople and the birth of istanbul, Meluned signed an 
impe1ial decree, or ahdname. In this document, be granted the Genoese Council and its people in the 
neighbourhood of Galata a degree of political and legal autonomy and trading rights in exchange for a 
surrender of weapons and the muffling of church bells. D Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern 
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siyar indicates that this sizeable part of the umma had abandoned the classical ideal of 
universal Muslim rule advanced through jihad. By the sixteenth century, or even earlier, 
conquest continued, but within a limited framework softened by a growing deference to 
treaties of peace. 75 With the collapse of the Abassid Caliphate in the thirteenth century 
Islamic history first witnessed a number of smaller competing dynasties, out of which 
emerged two dominant powers: the Sunni Turks and Shi'ite Persia. In this period, ' the 
division of Islam ... became permanent and the divisions were consolidated by the trends of 
political development within Islam as well as by its relationships with the Christian world. 
The Islamic universal state became transformed into an Islamic state system. ' 76 Thus, a 
world once divided strictly into dar al-is/am and dar al-barb gave ground to new 
conceptualizations of space: an enlarged dar al-~ulb without, and the umma spread across 
numerous empires and states within. 
Initially, for non-believers on Turkish soil, ahdname or decrees of the sultan were 
unilaterally granted to foreign powers for the protection of their nationals. In keeping with 
classical doctrine, these instruments were limited to ten-year periods or, later, to the life of 
the sultan.77 These capitulatory agreements could be renewed on the accession of a new 
sultan, and so European powers regularly renewed the growing body of treaties to arise 
from this process.78 From the eighteenth century onwards, there also emerged some treaties 
of perpetual peace, indicating the rejection of a future world united under Islam.79 Far from 
being instruments of European domination, however, these treaty regimes can instead be 
seen as Ottoman largesse in dealing with far weaker powers eager to expand their 
commercial opportunities. The Islamic theory informing them, however, was not 
necessarily appreciated by both sides; they 'signified one thing to the Ottoman mind and 
quite another to the alien European one. ,so 
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 172. This is also discussed in Liebesny, supra n 
70, at 315. 
75 For an overview of Ottoman treaties with non-Muslims especially, see V Panaite, 'The Re'ayas of 
Tributary-Protected Principalities (the l 611i-l81h Cenhuy)' (2003) l Romano-Turcica 83 . 
76 Khadduri, The Islamic Law ofNations, supra n 52, at 61 . 
77 Liebesny, supra n 70, at 327. 
78 For a list of such renewals, see Thayer, supra n 69, at 211-2 12. 
79 The first perpetual treaty of peace was between the Porte and Russia in 1711 . However, this practice was 
far from consistent, as Quataert points out that the Treaty of Belgrade between the Turks and Russia and 
Austria was limited to a period of 27 lunar years. D Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2005), at 78. 
80 Goffman, supra n 74, at 175. 
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Over time, perceptions of power started to inform the capitulations regime in new 
ways so that increasing European strength resulted in ever more extensive jurisdictional as 
well as territorial concessions from istanbul. Where once ahdnames had been unilateral 
decrees granted by the sultan, they increasingly took on the shape of bilateral agreements 
between equal and, later, unequal powers.81 As communications between Europe and the 
Porte developed, so too did the number and subject matter of these agreements, which were 
modeled on treaties covering the juridical rights of foreigners signed by France and the 
Porte between 1535 and 1740.82 According to Faroqhi, it was in 'the eighteenth century 
[that] ... the so-called capitulations ... were increasingly turned into a source of privilege 
particularly by French and English consuls or ambassadors. ' 83 
European privilege increased further during the nineteenth century. The gradual loss 
of Ottoman lands, as well as the spread of nationalist movements in Europe, inspired 
Christian powers to 'protect' co-religionists in lands under Muslim rule. Examples of this 
include Russia's many treaties with the Porte regarding its Christian Orthodox populations 
and France's connection with the Maronites of Mount Lebanon, which persists to this 
day.84 With the advantage of historical hindsight, the gradual relinquishment of territorial 
control can be traced across the centuries, but such a method would overlook the 
perspectives of Ottoman rulers during those periods when their power was equal or greater 
to that of their European counterparts. In fact, it 'was not until the middle of the nineteenth 
century that the Sultans seem to have regarded these concessions as a disparagement on 
their sovereignty.' 85 It is ironic then that in an age witness to the consolidation of a 
territorially limited Muslim empire - or Caliphate - that the Ottomans suffered such an 
assault on their jurisdiction. While the Porte gained formal European recognition of its 
sovereignty in the 1856 Treaty dicussed below, jurisdiction within its territorities was 
emasculated more and more by capitulatory agreements. A related anomaly informs the 
familiar narrative of international law's evolution: Europe welcomed the Porte into its 
exclusive club in an era of unprecedented interference and disregard for the Porte's 
81 Cf Menage on the bilateral of certain early Ottoman capitulations: V L Menage, 'The English Capitulation 
of 1580: A Review Article ' ( 1980) 12 international Journal of Middle East Studies 373. 
82 Thayer, supra n 69, at 216. 
83 Faroqhi, supra n 62, at 60-61. 
84 Piscatori discusses some of these agreements: Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States, supra n 1, at 
52-53. 
85 Thayer, supra n 69, at 2 13. 
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territorial integrity. How can we account for these contradictions, and what do they suggest 
about the evolution of the idea of statehood within and beyond Arab-Ottoman lands? 
Although centuries of accelerated Ottoman-European interaction had generated 
greater cultural awareness and familiarity, increasing power disparities forged identities 
ever more in opposition with each other. In the earlier phases of European-Ottoman 
relations, when only a nascent European states-system existed, intermittent links through 
trade or war comprised an emerging body of regional custom. Over time, such practices 
developed, but also conjoined with a European discourse based on cultural superiority and 
the positivist doctrine of recognition. The construction of identity through ' othering' relies 
on enough knowledge to generate caricatures of one's other, and this in tum requires a 
degree of interaction. When we combine this idea with the historical context of increasingly 
intermeshed European-Ottoman relations and European imperialism elsewhere, then the 
imposition of cultural norms on Turkey is more explicable. According to Quataert, on 'each 
side proximity structured a complex identity formation process of repulsion and attraction. 
After all, a people comes to perceive of itself as distinct and separate with particular and 
unique characteristics, often through using the "other" as a means of defining what it is and, 
equally, what it is not. '86 
For many scholars, the highpoint of Ottoman 'othering' occurred in the mid-
nineteenth century with the imposition of the 'Standard of Civilisation' on Turkey's entry 
into ' international' society in 1856. For the thesis, the 1856 episode allows us to consider 
the place of Arab and non-European peoples within the international legal community. For 
example, in Chapter Three, Libya draws on Ottoman membership of international society to 
rebut European control over North Africa. The Ottoman presence is also explored in 
Chapter Four's discussion about imperial rivalries in the Gulf. European powers could only 
dictate boundaries if local Arab and/or Ottoman personality was defeated through 
argument. Thus is it accurate to conceive of an international society populated exclusively 
by European or European-invited states? 87 
86 Quataert, supra n 79, at 6. 
87 Wight captures the typical narrative: 'The orthodox answer, then, Lo the question about the limits of the 
states-system, is that it was originally confined to Western Christendom out of which it grew; that the 
European colonies in North and South America became peripheral members of it when they attained 
independence; that the first non-European state to be admitted was the Ottoman Empire in 1856; that Persia, 
Siam, China and Japan (but not Ethiopia or Liberia) were admitted with different degrees of grudging 
patronage in the later part of the nineteenth century; that this extension of the system beyond Europe and 
America first received legal recognition in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907; and that the 
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The controversy over membership of international society has been especially 
important for raising questions about the universality of international law. Alexandrowicz, 
for example, rejected the narrative of international law's European origins by offering a 
counter-narrative of equality between European and Asian powers before the nineteenth 
century. 88 It was only from the late eighteenth century that the law of nations 'started 
contracting into a regional (purely European) legal system, abandoning a centuries old 
tradition of universality based on the natural law doctrine. ' 89 Many Third World scholars, 
especially in the advent of decolonisation, advanced similar arguments to demonstrate that 
they were not simply citizens of 'new' states;90 independence was only the latest moment in 
re-claimed statehood. 91 Such accounts are based on benign assumptions about pre-
nineteenth century legal custom and thought. 92 Koskenniemi suggests that such 
perspectives place too much emphasis on the 'universalism' of earlier writers, such as 
transformation of the Western European system into a world system was finally performed through the 
League of Nations and the United Nations.' M Wight, Systems of States: Edited with an introduction by 
Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), al 117. 
88 According to Alexandrowicz, 'Though the Europeans had sailed to the East Indies since the end of the 
fifteenth century and though they had at first intended to discover and occupy lands, and where necessary, to 
establish their territorial possessions by conquest, they had in practice to fall back on negotiation and treaty 
making in preference to resorting to war. In fact they found themselves in the middle of a network of States 
and inter-State relations based on traditions which were more ancient than their own and in no way inferior to 
notions of European civilization.' CH Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in 
the East Indies (l 6'h, !7'h, 18'h Centuries) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), at 224. 
89 lbid, at 2. For a similar perspective, see P C Jessup, 'Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations' 
(1964) 58 American Journal of International Law 341. Grewe refutes this position in articulating the 
dominant international law narrative of its origins: what ' happened in the nineteenth century was certainly not 
the narrowing of a universal law of nations to a regional, European law of nations, as Alexandrowicz asserted. 
On the contrary, the European law of nations gradually grew into a global legal order, the members of which 
were, it is true, only the «civilised nations«. This development cannot be interpreted as a «regionalisation« or 
«Europeanisation«. Rather, the dualism of the Christian-European law of nations and the natural law-based 
universal law of nations dissolved into a single, universal legal system, albeit one which had been deprived of 
its natural law foundation by the rise of positivism. This universal legal system introduced a new 
differentiation through the criterion of civilisation, thus laying the foundation of a new, colonial law of 
nations separate from the general one.' W H Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, M Byers (trans) (New 
York; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), at 466. 
90 Alexandrowicz's 'reversion' thesis distinguishes certain Asian states from African ones. In relation to the 
former, he suggests that a 'State can hardly drop out of the Family of Nations because of ideological change 
in the structure of the Law of Nations .. . [Whereas] unlike the case of countries of the East Indies, there is 
generally no room for a claim to their [African] classification as original States. Most of the African entities 
are new Stales in the present-day meaning of the word, and reversion to sovereignty has no application. ' CI-I 
Alexandrowicz, 'New and Original States: The Issue of Reversion to Sovereignty' (1969) 45 international 
Affairs 465, at 47 l; 473. 
91 For a discussion of pre-colonia l African state formation, see C Okafor, 'After Martyrdom: International 
Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa' (2000) 41 Harvard 
international Law Journal 503. 
92 See for example, G Abi-Saab, 'International Law and The International Community: The Long Road to 
Universality', R St J Macdonald (ed), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) 
31-4 1. 
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Grotius and Vattel.93 In his study of Vittoria's thought, Anghie echoes such sentiments by 
showing us that the European natural law tradition shared with positivism a rejection of 
cultural equality.94 Furthermore, in the pre-nineteenth century world, it is difficult to speak 
of an international law at all. Instead, Onuma suggests a world comprising multiple 
regional legal systems only interacting interrnittently.95 One such regional system was that 
comprising the Sublime Porte and European states. 
Given the complexities surrounding questions about the nature of membership in 
international society, I do not intend to settle on historical 'truth' about international law's 
origins. At the very least, however, it is important to recognize that narratives about 
Ottoman 'entry' into 'international' society can help us interrogate and unsettle the 
'European' origins of international law. We have seen that Europe and the Sublime Porte 
forged an extensive network of legal relations, based on treaties relating to peace, trade and 
the protection of Christian populations. We also saw that these treaties spanning centuries 
cannot simply be understood as a product of European domination. 
Narratives emphasising European domination rely particularly on the centrality of 
the 'Standard of Civilisation' in the nineteenth century.96 Although it is possible to view 
the 'Standard of Civilisation' as symbolic of an onerous and racist European (international) 
law, the record is more complex. We must concede some agency to the 'old man of 
Europe', especially at the internal level, where significant domestic pressure contributed to 
93 M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of international Law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 131. 
94 A Anghie, 'Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins oflnternational Law' (1996) 5 Social and Legal 
Studies 321. 
95 Onuma, supra n 4, at 8. 
96 For a general discussion about the 'Standard of Civilisation', see G Gong, The Standard of "Civilization" 
in international Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Fidler's scholarship on capitulations and their links 
with the present stresses the link between European domination, capitulations and the standard: 'Capitulations 
were the primary tool used by the Western countries to implement the standard of civilization, and they were 
the catalysts for reforms in non-Western countries that would bring such countries closer to membership in 
the civilized world'; and 'The economic and legal harmonization stimulated by capitulations were indicators 
of the transformation of non-Western countries into Western clones. Capitulations were the epicenter of a 
radical remaking of the way the world was organized. And international Jaw was a primary instrument in 
setting up capitulatory regimes and placing the standard of civilization at the center of civilizational 
customary international law.' D P Fidler, 'The Return of the Standard of Civilization' (200 I) 2 Chicago 
Journal of international Law 137, at 142, 143. Grewe also discusses the relationship between civilisation and 
capitulations: Grewe, supra n 89, at 457. 
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Ottoman reform efforts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 97 It is also 
problematic to speak of a clearly defined 'Standard of Civilisation'. 98 For Koskenniemi, 
The existence of a 'standard' was a myth in the sense that there was never anything 
to gain. Every concession was a matter of negotiation, every status dependent on 
agreement, quid pro quo. But the existence of a language of a standard still gave 
the appearance of fair treatment and regular administration to what was simply a 
conjectural policy.99 
The 'Standard of Civilisation' was and remains a slippery one, and it is more fruitful to fix 
our gaze on other historical practices in exploring Ottoman membership of international 
society. 
Accounts about the European nature of international society are never complete 
without mentioning the 1856 Treaty of Paris, with its reference to Ottoman 'entry' into 
'international society'. In this section I ask, does the Treaty of Paris mark a momentous 
shift in the political and legal position of the Sublime Porte, or is it better to regard the 
Treaty as only part of the rich fabric of Ottoman-European relations that began many 
centuries before? If we see Ottoman 'entry' as a product of the Treaty, then we also accept 
the positivist doctrine of recognition and, therefore, the 'Standard of Civilisation'. 
Conversely, by seeing the Treaty as simply one of many agreements between the Porte and 
Europe, the narrative of membership becomes more nuanced: perhaps international law was 
always more than European. An appreciation of the Sublime Porte's place in the 
international system is not only useful for an understanding of the status of its Arab 
territories discussed later in the case studies. It is also useful in considering whether 
international law is premised only on European experiences of statehood. 
Authors differ as to whether we should regard 1856 as the moment of membership 
into international society for the Ottoman Empire, and this is a product of their respective 
positions about international law, positivism, the 'Standard of Civilisation' and approaches 
to history. It is easy enough to locate contemporary sources suggesting European rejection 
of Turkish civilisation and culture both before and after 1856. 100 These accounts frame 
97 For an overview of this period, particularly the Tanzimat reforms, see, K H Karpat, 'The Transformation of 
the Ottoman State, 1789-1908' (1972) 3 International Journal of Middle East Studies 243. 
98 For an overview of the linguistic origins of 'civilisation' in Europe, see Grewe, supra n 89, at 446-451. 
99 Emphasis in original, Koskenniemi, supra n 93, at 134-135. 
100 This is argued by Alexandrowicz, 'New and Original States', supra n 90, at 466. It is worth quoting 
Richard Cobden in 1836 about Turkish 'barbarity': 'Turkey cannot enter into the political system of Europe; 
for the Turks are not Europeans. During nearly four centuries that that people have been encamped upon the 
finest soil of the Continent, so far from becoming one of the families of Christendom, they have not adopted 
one European custom. Their habits are still Oriental, as when they first crossed the Bosphorns. They 
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their enquiry around the role of (European) recognition and the 'Standard of Civilisation' : 
here, the Standard is regarded as the gatekeeper, rather than as simply one of many devices 
available to Powers pursuing their interest in the context of an emerging international 
system. 
Within the European states system, threats to the preservation of the balance of 
power were managed through treaties and diplomacy, and so the 1856 Treaty should be 
understood against the backdrop of Russian and Ottoman rivlary over the eastern 
Mediterranean. Russian attempts to gain access to the Mediterranean via the Bosphoros and 
Dardenelles, as well as its moves against the Porte more generally, were the basis of the 
'Eastern Question' .101 This episode from the Russo-Ottoman Wars of the late eighteenth 
scrupulously exclude their females from the society of the other sex; they were the Asiatic dress; sit cross-
legged, or loll upon couches, using neither chair nor bed; they shave their heads, retaining their beards; and 
they use their fingers still, in the place of those civilised substitutes, knives and forks. Equally uninfluenced, 
after nearly four hundred years' contact...is the Osmanli 's [sic] condi tion by the discoveries and 
improvements of modem times. A printing press may be said to be unknown in Turkey; or, if one be found in 
Constantinople, it is in the hands of foreigners ... Literature and science are so far from finding disciples 
amongst the Turks, that that people have been renowned as twice the destroyers of learning: in the splendid 
though com1pt remains of Greek literature at Constantinople; and by extinguishing the dawn of experimental 
philosophy, at the subversion of the Caliphate'. R Cobden, The Political Writings of Richard Cobden, cited in 
Grewe supra n 89, at 453. It is also instructive to quote an excerpt from the later PCIJ Lotus Case. By 1927 
the Ottoman Empire was no more, and on a wave of secular reform Turkey submissively embraced European 
models of law and governance. Before the Court, Mahmout Essat Bey declared, 'Monsieur le President, 
Messieurs de la Cour, la Turquie a voulou faire partie de la grande famille des nations; elle en a reclame et 
obtenu tous Jes droits; mais elle a aussi accepte, de grand coeur, toutes Jes obligations; elle vient de metre en 
vigeur le Code civil suisse, le Code des obligations suisse, le Code penal italien et le Code de commerce 
allemend. Sa legislation modemisee se heurte, des Jes premiers jours, a des obstacles. La Turquie veut bien 
remplir toutes les obligations qui decoulent du droit international; elle ne veut pas qu'on exige d'elle quoi ce 
soil au dela de ces obligations. Yous allez prendre votre decision au nom des principes du droit international, 
au pays de Grotius. Votre sentence sera respectee par la Turquie; elle ne veut pas separer son sort de celui de 
la civilisation europeenne. ' [President of the Court, Turkey wanted lo be part of the grand family of nations; 
she sought il and obtained all her rights, but she also accepted, in good faith, all the obligations [attached to 
her membership]; she implemented the Swiss Civi l Code, the Swiss Code of Agreements, the Italian Criminal 
Code and the German Commercial Code. Yet Turkey's modem legislation has run up against obstacles from 
the very start. Turkey is keen to fulfill all the obligations which flow from international law; but it does not 
want us to ask from it anything beyond these obligations. You will make your decision in the name of the 
principles of international law, in the country of Grotius. Your verdict will be respected by Turkey; [since] 
Turkey does not want to separate its destiny from that of European civilisation.] Quoted in M Shahabuddeen, 
'The World Court at the Tum of the Century', AS Muller, D Raic & JM Thuranszky (eds), The International 
Court of Justice: its Future Role after Fifty Years (The Hague; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) 3-29, at 10. 
101 Quataert summarises the 'Eastern Question' as ' how to solve the problem posed by the continuing 
territorial erosion of the Ottoman empire ... [which] continued to be addressed over the course of the 
nineteenth century. On the one hand, many European leaders came to understand the grave risks that total 
Ottoman collapse posed to the general peace. And so they agreed to seek to maintain its integrity, for 
example, reversing the potentially devastating results of war at the negotiating table and, in 1856, admitting 
the Ottoman state into the "Concert of Europe". Thus, the European consensus that the empire should be 
maintained, tottering but intact, helped preserve the Ottoman state. On the other hand, through their wars and 
support of the separatist goals of rebellious subjects, European states abetted the very process of 
fragmentation that they feared and were seeking to avoid.' Thus the norm of territorial integrity was far from 
clear-cut in this period. Quataert, supra n 79, at 56. 
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century saw other European powers forge various alliances in support of the Porte to deflect 
Russian encroachment and its threat to the balance of power. 102 European intercessions 
confirmed Ottoman sovereignty as a counterweight to Russian aspirations. In the 1841 
Straits Convention, for example, the Great Powers undertook ' to respect this determination 
of the Sultan [regarding Ottoman control of the Straits], and to conform themselves to the 
principle above declared. ' 103 A breach of the territorial status quo would not only violate 
territorial interests of the Porte but European interests as a whole. 104 
A similar undertaking appeared in the Treaty of Paris, which concluded the 1853-
1856 Crimean War between Russia and Turkey and their allies. 105 Scholars in particular 
look to Article 7 for indications of Turkish 'entry' into the fold: 
Sa Majeste la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irelande, Sa 
Majeste l'Empereur d' Autriche, Sa Majeste l'Empereur des Fran~ais, Sa Majeste le 
Roi de Prusse, Sa Majcste l 'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et Sa Majeste le Roi de 
Sardaigne, declarent la Sublime Porte admise a participer aux avantages du droit 
public ct du concert Europeens. Leurs Majestes s'engagent, chacunc de son cote, a 
respecter )'independence et l' integ1;te territoriale de !'Empire Ottoman: 
garantissent en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement: et consideront, en 
consequence, tout act de nature a y porter atteinte cornme une question d'interet 
general. 106 
In his close reading of the Treaty and its wider context, McKinnon Wood argues that this 
provision did not mark a radical break with the past; we cannot retrospectively deem 
Turkey to have been outside of international society and international law before 1856. 
'Throughout the record there is no trace that the participants were conscious that Turkey 
was not already a subject of international law, or that they were proposing to confer that 
102 1768-1774 and 1787-1792. 
103 Treaty between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Turkey respecting the Straits of the 
Dardanelles and Bosphorus, 13 July 184 1, 92 CTS 7. Quoted in D J Bederman, 'The 1871 London 
Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the Law of Nations' (1988) 82 American Journal 
of International Law 1, at 6-7. 
104 Ibid, at 7. 
105 After mounting tensions between Russia and the Sublime Porte as well as Britain, hostilities broke out 
between Russia and Turkey in late 1853. After Russia fai led to back down to their demands, France and 
Britain declared war in March 1854 alongside the Ottoman Empire. 
106 [Her majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of 
Austria, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, and his Majesty the 
King of Sardinia declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of public law and the 
concert of Europe. Their Majesties each commit themselves to respect the independence and territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire: jointly guaranteeing the strict compliance of this agreement: and as a 
consequence, they will consider all acts of such a nature as to undermine it as a question of general interest) 
Italics added, quoted in H McKinnon Wood, 'The Treaty of Paris and Turkey's Status in International Law' 
(1943) 37 American Journal of International Law 262, at 262-263. Treaty Guaranteeing the Independence 
and Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, 15 April 1856, 114 CTS 497. 
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status upon her' .107 He also argues that there was little change in state conduct after the 
Treaty. 108 Finally, in relation to Article 7, he suggests that the provision was not about 
international law at all, but rather it was 'an act of admission to what today might be called 
a regional understanding' 109 - the Concert of Europe. We can understand the Treaty as a 
manifestation of Great Power management more than anything else. 'Done, il est faux de 
dire qu'en 1856 la Porte Ottomane ait ete admise pour la premiere fois au droit 
· . I . E ,110 mternat10na en v1geur en urope. 
There was no radical rupture in 1856; the notion of Ottoman territorial integrity 
remained contested in the face of supportive and subversive European 'allies', and part of 
the international legal custom informing these actions had evolved over centuries of 
Ottoman-European relations. 111 International law of the nineteenth century was more than 
European, but it is difficult to specify this any further given the complex role of culture and 
positivism in an age of burgeoning empires. Ultimately, conclusions about the nature of 
international law in the nineteenth century are indeterminate. The combination of doctrine, 
politics and history cannot produce one law or one account but instead multiple 
perspectives informing later justifications for international law's evolution. 
Before completing our discussion of the contested Ottoman legacy, this section 
comes almost full circle by returning to the idea of the Caliphate and its relevance not in 
classical Islamic thought and practice but in the latter period of Turkish rule. For many 
Muslims, the Mongol's destruction of Abassid Baghdad in 1258 had sounded the 
Caliphate's death knell, or, at the very least, significant confusion as to the location of any 
107 Ibid al 267 
108 
'Th;re see1~s ... to be evidence that governments and political opinion in the contracting countries were 
quite unaware that the Treaty of Paris had effected a fundamental change in Turkey's status in international 
law.' Ibid, at 269. 
109 Ibid, at 274. 
110 [Thus, it is incorrect to say that in 1856 the Ottoman Porte was admitted for the first time to the 
international law in force in Europe] T Toyoda, ' L'aspect univeraliste du droit international europeen du 
l 9eme siecle et le statut juridique de la Turquie avant 1856' (2006) 8 Journal of the History of International 
Law 19, at 33. 
111 According to Moinuddin, 'It could . .. be argued that centuries of peaceful contacts and commercial 
relations between Islamic and non-Islamic states prior to the admittance of the Ottoman Empire to the Concert 
of Europe in 1856 had led to the emergence of a body of 'regional ' or 'Islamic' customary rules which 
provided for the underlying basis of such relations.' Further, in relation to custom, he argues that ' it could still 
be argued that regular peaceful contacts throughout the ages, whether on the basis of unilateralism or 
principles of equality and reciprocity, provided a fertile ground for the eventual development of a consistent 
legal policy applied by Islamic States in their external relations with other States. This legal policy, which was 
reflected in treaty relations between Islamic and non-Islamic States and which was based on principles of 
equality and reciprocity could be said to have become a general and widely accepted practised "customary" 
policy by 1856.' Moinuddin, supra n 22, at 39-40. 
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future, nominally universal, successor. 112 Upon conquering Mamluk Egypt and Syria in 
1516-1517, Selim I inherited the title of khiidim al-l:zaramayn al-sharlfayn, or the servant of 
the two Holy Shrines, and Ottoman control of these sites in Mecca and Medina was 
confirmed by Stileyman the Magnificent' s seizure of Arabia in 1534.113 Ottoman sultans 
were not models of caliphal ideals. They could not trace their lineage back to Muhammed's 
tribe, the Quraysh, and neither could they portray themselves as examplars of the sharf'a 's 
strict application. They could, however, lay some claim to the Caliphate as the dominant 
Sunni power114 (alongside the Mughals in India) with control over the Holy Sites and the 
annual pilgrimage, or /:zajj. 115 The institution of the Caliphate at this time also provided a 
point of contrast with the Turks ' main Muslim and Shi' ite rival, Safavid Persia. 116 
We have seen that Ottoman rulers combined Islamic principles of siyar with 
pragmatism in their relations with Europeans, and such flexibility was underwritten during 
periods of Ottoman strength. Although the Porte's Islamic identity was never questioned, it 
was not until its position came under serious international and internal strain that the 
Caliphate was evoked as a tool of legitimacy and control. According to Deringil, the 
'continuous, indeed almost monotonous, acclamation of the sultan's caliphal title dates 
clearly to the period of decline at the end of the l 81h century.' 117 The late eighteenth century 
did not only witness significant Ottoman international pressures as a result of the Russo-
Ottoman Wars mentioned above. During this period, Ottoman legitimacy was also 
threatened from within, through the efforts of Muhammed ibn ' Abd al-Wahhab (1703-
1792) and his call for a return to ' pure' Islam. 'Both the spiritual claims of the Wahhabi 
reformers as the heirs of true Islam and their early nineteenth-century seizure of Mecca and 
112 Quataert, supra n 79, at 83. 
113 H Kayali , Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and l slamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-
1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), at 17. 
114 For an excellent discussion comparing Moroccan and Turkish competing claims to the Caliphate, see A El-
Moudden, 'The Idea of the Caliphate between Moroccans and Ottomans: Political and Symbolic Stakes in the 
l 61h and 171h Century-Maghrib' ( 1995) 82 Studia Jslamica 103. 
115 Hourani quotes Zabidi ( 1732-1791) on this point, who argued that the sulDan 's claim 'was based not on 
apostolic succession from the Prophet, but on the divine right of those who had established their effective 
power and used it in the interests of Islam. The sultan defended the frontiers against Christians and Shi ' is; he 
protected the Holy Places and organized the Pilgrimage with care; he paid respect to the Shari'a and its 
guardians [the 'ulema].' Emphasis added, Hourani, Arabic Thought, supra n 25, at 27. 
116 According to Faroqhi, ' Whenever treaties were concluded from a position of strength, such as the peace of 
Amasya (1555/962-3), it was usually demanded that the Iranians cease the ritual cursing of the early caliphs 
Abu Bakir, ' Omar and ' Othman, whom the Shi ' ites considered as usurpers and the Sunnis, by contrast, as 
" rightly guided'" . Faroqhi, supra n 63, at 36 (footnotes omitted). 
117 S Deringil, 'Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdi.ilhamid II (1876-1909)' (1991) 
23 International Journal of Middle East Studies 345, at 346. 
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Medina seemed to undermine Ottoman legitimacy.' 118 The Wahhabi threat was felt 
particularly near its power base in the Arabian Peninsula, providing the Ottomans with 
another reason to strengthen their presence in the Gulf, as discussed in Chapter Four. 
The use of the Caliphate as a tool of legitimacy gained even more importance by the 
late nineteenth century when the loss of European territories meant that the majority of 
Ottoman subjects were Muslim and/or Arab. Later on, Arab nationalism's appeal 
threatened the Porte ' s link with its Arab populace, but this was not because of any deficit in 
Islamic credentials; it was more an Arab reaction against the policies of Turkification and 
secularisation instigated especially under the Young Turks administration after 1908.11 9 
Ottoman calls in Arabic for a universal Caliphate were targeted particularly at Arabs across 
the Empire. 12° Certain prominent Arab intellectuals at this time were supportive of Turkish 
rule for the very reason that the Caliphate was seen as uniting Muslims against European 
encroachment. This idea was articulated by the prominent intellectual, Rashid Ric;la, in his 
1919 memo to British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, 121 where he contrasted foreign rule 
unfavourably with Ottoman protection of the Muslim Holy Sites. 122 Even from its earliest 
days, Islam had straddled faith and power, and thus Ottoman stewardship of the umma and 
its lands was preferred over non-Muslim dominion. Perhaps the distinction between dar al-
islam and dar al-barb had given way to modern realities, but it still served as a powerful 
device in linking authority over territory, not only through effective control but also 
through the legitimacy of religious symbolism. After its defeat in the First World War the 
118 Quataert, supra n 79, at 84. 
119 See generally, M Haddad, 'The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered' (1994) 26 International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 201 . 
120 Hourani, Arabic Thought, supra n 25, at 106. 
121 For an overview ofRi Da's thought, see ibid, at ch 9. 
122 
'The great minister should know that his government's declaration which expresses respect for the Islamic 
holy places in the Hijaz, Jerusalem, and Iraq and continued Muslim control of them has no positive effect on 
the Muslims whatsoever. Such a declaration is even painful. .. since it implies that the holy places are under 
foreign sovereignty and consequently worship there depends upon the will of the foreigner. He [the prime 
minister] no doubt knows that contra1y to British expectations, recognizing the independence of the Hijaz and 
proclaiming the amir of Mecca a king did not have a positive effect on the Muslims. That was the case 
because the Hijaz is one of the poorest and weakest Muslim countries. It is not a land of sovereignty and 
temporal authority, but of worship. Muslims were not concerned that their holy places would be demolished 
or access to them denied; their real concern was for Islamic [political] sovereignty without which Islam itself 
and its mosques could not be safe. The preservation of this sovereignty is a desire mixed in the blood of every 
Muslim who regards the survival of his religion as dependent upon the existence of an independent strong 
[Islamic] state subject to no foreign influence. This is why most Muslims in the world passionately cling to 
the Turkish state and consider it as representative of the Caliphate although it lacks al the Caliphate condi tions 
except power and independence.' Rashid Ri u a translated and quoted (italics and additions in translation) in 
M Haddad, 'Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashid Ri Da's Ideas on the 
Caliphate' ( 1997) 1I7 Journal of the American Oriental Society 253, at 271. 
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Ottoman Empire was succeeded by the Turkish Republic and a host of foreign territories 
that would come under Mandate rule. In 1922, the caliphate was stripped of all its temporal 
power, and in 1924 it was abolished altogether.123 Henceforth, it would serve only as an 
ideological counterpoint to the rising forces of nationalism and the nation-state across the 
Arab world. 
Despite the demise of the Caliphate and the Ottoman Empire, Islamic and Arab 
traditions have continued to inform more recent Arab approaches to authority over territory. 
We saw that although Ottoman personality may have been contested, it was still sufficient 
as an idea to inspire arguments about Ottoman authority and the relevance of the Caliphate 
in later ICJ pleadings. We also saw that international law was more than a European 
discourse, but that its exact boundaries are mired in controversies that reflect particular 
agendas of contemporary international legal scholarship. ln the final section, I trace how 
Arab states have made sense of Ottoman and Islamic legacies in constructing practices of 
territoriality and dispute resolution in the region. 
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5) From the Mandate Period to the Present: Independence, the Failure of Regionalism and 
the Place of Adjudication 
123 Ibid, at 272, 276. 
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In contrast to much of the Third World, the majority of Arabs only experienced European 
rule in the twentieth century with the establishment of the Mandates under League of 
Nation auspices in 1922.124 The case studies of Western Sahara and Libya/Chad remained 
under direct colonial rule and the Arab Gulf was nominally under a protective rather than 
colonial regime. Thus although the Mandate period was seminal in the Arab consciousness, 
it only directly touches on one case in the thesis, Palestine as discussed in Chapter Six. 
Rather than explore the period for its direct link with the cases, this section considers its 
symbolic legacy for Arab states on gaining independence. We should see the League of 
Nations era as a transitionary one along a path towards today 's Arab states and their 
borders. We should also recognize, however, that the legacies of the Mandate persist, 
having had lasting effects on the nature of territoriality across the region. 
In this final section, the rise of Arab nation-states is depicted against the backdrop 
of earlier Islamic practice and theory and European colonialism. What legacies of 
territoriality and international law did Arabs draw on after their independence and why has 
the nation-state been such a contested model across the region? Aside from Arab 
experiences under numerous Islamic empires, particularly the Ottomans, it was the 
encounter with European control, either directly in the form of colonialism or indirectly 
with the Mandate, that was seminal in shaping the contours of Arab international legal 
personality. After describing modes of Mandatory rule, this section will explore Arab 
nationalism vis-a-vis territorial notions of authority before considering Arab regional 
responses to territorial disputes and international legal fora more broadly. Given the many, 
interrelated experiences of international legal governance at hand, how have Arab states 
negotiated their place in international society and the international legal system? ls there a 
continuing role for Islamic principles, and how can these be realized in a postcolonial era? 
Like other moments in international law's past, the Mandate period has been singled 
out as a milestone, marking a significant shift for at least some peoples from colonial 
exploitation to international legal protection. Although self-detem1ination was granted to 
European peoples of the former German and Ottoman Empires, other territories came under 
French and British control. These territories were classified into 'A', 'B' and 'C ' Mandates, 
depending on their level of social and political development. In his study which appeared 
124 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, supra n 37, at 318-319. 
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only shortly after the Mandates ' inception, Lauterpacht examined League of Nations 
provisions and concluded that the regime was radically different from colonialism. He 
expressed misgivings about C Mandates, but as for the more 'advanced' A and B Mandates 
it was incorrect to speak of annexation. 125 Sovereignty lay with the League, and 
consequentially Mandate territories could not be subsumed under the territory of the 
Mandatory. 126 Crawford's discussion of the 'received view' reinforces Lauterpacht's 
position. Crawford shows that the dominant narrative distinguished colonial rule from the 
Mandates; France and Britain did not possess sovereignty over these territories.127 Instead, 
sovereignty was held ' in trust' by the League. 128 
This narrative is challenged by Anghie, who, in asking whether we should regard 
the institution as the negation or recreation of colonialism, favours the latter response. 129 
Article 22 of the League Charter is reminiscent of nineteenth century colonialist discourses 
of the 'Standard of Civilisation' when it speaks of a 'sacred trust of civilization '. 130 Under 
this system, peoples were to be guided along a single trajectory of eventual independence; 
diversity was not permitted in this schema as, instead, those 'not yet able to stand by 
themselves' were ushered into a system of seeming sovereign similitude. This paradox of 
enforced 'freedom' is captured by Anghie: 
125 H Lauterpacht, 'The Mandate under International Law in the Covenant of the League of Nations', 
International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, vol 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), 29-84, at 37, 65. 
126 Ibid, at 49. 
127 J Crawford, The Creation of States in international Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2"d 
edition, 2006), at 573. 
128 Generally, see Crawford, ibid, at ch 13. 
129 A Anghie, imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), at 146. 
130 The relevant text of Article 22 reads: 
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the 
sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet 
able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be 
applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of 
civilisation and that securities for the perfonnance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. 
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should 
be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their 
geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that 
this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. 
The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the 
geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. 
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development 
where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering 
of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand 
alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the 
Mandatory. 
Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919, 225 CTS 188. 
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In seeking to liberate the mandate peoples from the 'strenuous conditions of the 
modern world', the system instead entraps the mandate peoples within those 
conditions. The peculiar cycle thus creates a situation whereby international 
institutions present themselves as a solution to a problem of which they are an 
integral part. 131 
For Arabs, two mandate(d) legacies are particularly relevant when considering statehood 
and territoriality. First, it was during the Mandate period that the seeds were sewn for the 
ongoing conflict over Palestine, as discussed in relation to Arab nationalism later in the 
chapter and in Chapter Six. Second, it was under French and British rule that lines on maps 
were drawn, and these borders - despite many challengers - have remained largely 
unchanged. 132 
Although 'the idea of the nation-state has emerged as a veritable Grundnorm in 
modem Muslim [or Arab] political and religious discourse', 133 it has not always been so. 
Why was territorial integrity so difficult to accept for many Arab states and why did it 
ultimately triumph? In trying to answer these questions, context must influence any 
response, because although we can now speak of general Arab acceptance of the bounded 
nation-state, the Arab world still contains many challengers to the status quo of confined 
territoriality.134 Compared with Europe, for example, Arab states are not nearly as secure in 
their statehood. Numerous violations of territorial borders, external interference and non-
state actor violence all occur on a regular basis. 135 These phenomena symbolise a shaky 
system that has been able to survive, thanks largely to modem tools of state repression 136 
along with substantial foreign aid. 
Until European rule, most Arabs were content to live under a fragmentary political 
system; being part of the qawm, or (Arab) people was a belief only carried by a small 
131 Anghie, supra n 129, at 178. 
132 Some other important factors to note from the Mandate period would be its impact on the shape of Arab 
legal systems today, languages of instruction and school curriculum, as well as persisting commercial and 
personal ties. 
133 S A Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Juri.5prudence of Shihiib al-Din a/-Qariifi 
(Leiden: Brill , 1996), al xiii. 
134 M Barnett, 'Sovereignty, nationalism, and regional order in the Arab states system' (1995) 49 
international Organization 479, at 509. 
135 There are simply too many examples to list here, but some deserving attention not discussed below in 
relation to territorial adjudication include: Jordan's occupation of the West Bank between 1949 and 1967; 
Israel's ongoing occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and Sheba'a farms; Israel's former 
occupation of the Sinai and southern Lebanon as well as its 2006 war against Lebanon; Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990; the use of Lebanon as a site of regional conflict during its civil war, 1976-1990; Morocco's 
ongoing occupation of Western Sahara and its confrontations with Algeria as discussed in Chapter Five; the 
US invasion of Iraq in 2003; and the use of non-state violence to destabilise the region. 
136 F G Gause, Ill, 'Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East' (1992) 45 Journal of 
international Affairs 441, at 461. 
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elite.137 We saw above how part of this sense ofpan-Arabism or al- 'arabiyya al-qawmiyya 
was fuelled in opposition to Turkification within the Ottoman Empire. 138 Nascent 
nationalist sentiments were to intensify greatly with the imposition of European rule as well 
as the arbitrary demarcation of much of the Arab world into French and British controlled 
spheres. Ayubi argues that it 'was the colonial encroachment on the Arab East, combined 
with the accelerating demise of the Ottoman state, which contributed more than anything to 
the politicisation of Arab nationalist ideas there.' 139 Although the French and British had 
tried to mollify Arab interests through the local leadership of prominent Hashemites, such 
as King Abdullah in Jordan and King Faisal in Iraq, this was not sufficient to stem the tide 
of growing opposition to European interference. Once independence was gained by most of 
the Arab world after World War II, Arab heads of state nominally ruled their assigned 
states but were expected to work in the interests of the Arab people as a whole and not only 
their citizens.140 According to Barnett, if ' the institution of sovereignty instructed the newly 
independent Arab states to recognize each other's borders and authority over its population, 
the institution of pan-Arabisrn sanctioned just the opposite.' 141 Arab states and Arab leaders 
thus operated in a normative universe pitting visions of state sovereignty against those of 
Arab nationalism. 
The conflict between these competing tendencies up until 1967 highlights how 
weak the territorial norm was in the Arab world, especially compared with other regions of 
the non-European world. For example, although Africa remains embroiled in its own 
struggles over statehood, most of its rulers chose to reject any systematic reevaluation of 
the colonial legacy from as early as 1964 with the Cairo Declaration.142 This was not the 
case with the Arab world, as instead there took place a veritable 'cold war' of ideologies in 
the first few decades of independence over how to order the Arab system.143 ' Sovereignty 
137 E Karsh & L Karsh, Empires in the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), at 352. 
138 N N Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 
1995), at 137. 
139 Ibid, at 138. 
140 M Barnett, ' Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab Stale System' (1993) 37 Jnternational 
Studies Quarterly 271, al 282. 
141 Ibid, at 283. 
142 The Cairo Declaration is discussed more in Part Two's Introduction, at 112. 
143 M Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gama! 'Abd Al-Nasir and his Rivals, 1958- 1970 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 197 1 ). 
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failed to produce stabilizing outcomes in the Middle East as in Africa because pan-Arabism 
assigned to the Arab state a contradictory role and associated behavioral expectations.' 144 
One of the most important events to challenge the territorial status quo in the region 
was the Arab defeat in the 1948 conflict with Zionist forces, who successfully declared the 
state of Israel on 14 May 1948. Immediate effects of 1948 produced many Palestinian 
refugees and the emigration of Sephardic Jews resident in the region for millennia. 
Politically, the fallout took a little longer to materialise, but it was profound. A combination 
of shock arising from Arab defeat as well as a rejection of Europe's legacy of a divided 
Arab world saw a number of regimes fall in revolutions during the fifties. The most 
significant shift occurred with the Egyptian Free Officer revolution of 23 July 1952, which 
after internal struggles saw Na$ir emerge triumphant, not only as Egypt's leader but as 
leader of the Arab people as a whole. This revolution deposed Egypt's King Farouk and 
challenged the region's other conservative regimes, such as those of Jordan, Iraq and the 
Gulf. 
Like Barnett, Nahas suggests that we need to view this moment of 1952 in Arab 
nationalism's development through the prism of normative institutions vying for 
predominance. 'The rise of the Egyptian revolutionary challenge to the dynastic Middle 
Eastern state-system was more a function of stress in the structure of ideas and norms 
governing the system than any dramatic shift in the balance of power in the area.' 145 
Especially with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, Na$ir and his promise of 
Arab nationalism stole the hearts of Arabs far beyond Egypt's borders. Further, in 1958, the 
' apogee of Pan-Arabism', 146 the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown by pan-Arabist officers 
and Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic (UAR), suggesting that the dream of 
Arabs united under one state might be realised. 147 However, this 'success' and other 
attempted unions were bittersweet; rather than indicating that the region's leaders were 
willing to abandon parochial interests, it simply confirmed that even in its heyday Arab 
nationalism was far from the normative default. In bis study of the Arab state system, Owen 
suggests that in fact the territorial state was the main reference point from the colonial 
144 Barnett, 'institutions, Roles, and Disorder', supra n 140, at 290. 
145 M Nahas, ' State-Systems and Revolutionary Challenge: Nasser, Khomeini, and the Middle East' ( 1985) 17 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 507, at 512. 
146 Gause, supra n 136, a t 445. 
147 The UAR only lasted until 1961. 
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period onwards. 148 Further, 'the drive for unity was always more ambivalent than is usually 
presented. Just as important, any scheme for greater interstate co-operation was 
underpinned by a basic Arabism, a sense of kinship between the Arabic-speaking peoples, 
which remained a central fact of Middle Eastern life whatever else might be going on.' 149 It 
is also important to recognise that many Arab states were, and are, not simply a reflection 
of colonially determined borders. Harik argues that significant state formation had occurred 
before the colonial period, and although his suggestion of fifteen precolonial states is 
overdrawn, it does remind us of the need to acknowledge the vital role of local allegiances 
and institutions that bolstered the eventual triumph of the territorial state after 1967.150 
After 1948 Israel's presence in the heart of the Arab world was the most significant 
challenge to pan-Arabism, and with the devastating Arab defeat of 1967 died the dream of a 
united Arab polity. Not only did the Arab world and Na~ir suffer humiliation; geo-strategic 
factors were of great concern now that Egypt had lost the Sinai, Syria the Golan Heights 
and the Palestinians the remainder of their territory to Israeli occupation. Reasons for such 
a loss were sought and 'Arabism quickly became the whipping boy for the defeat' .151 Na~ir 
resigned immediately, and a few months later Arab leaders met in Khartoum to evaluate 
options for regional rule in the future. By September and the summit's conclusion, the 
normative landscape had irrevocably changed: 'wataniya [state-based nationalism] had 
been consecrated as the dominant ideology, regulating inter-Arab relations on the principle 
of state sovereignty.' 152 The region would no longer be caught between contradictions, and 
the 'hitherto destabilizing thrust of pan-Arabism was replaced by a general acceptance of 
the autonomy and legitimacy of the modem state.' 153 The promise of pan-Arabism did not 
simply disappear after 1967, but it is undeniable that never again could it rally such 
support. Arab leaders and their people continued to nurture a shared Arab identity, but 
increasingly this identity was grounded within the confines of separate nation-states, 
148 R Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Routledge, 2"d 
edition, 2000), at 18. 
149 Ibid, at 71. 
150 l Harik, 'The Origins of the Arab State System', G Salame (ed), The Foundations of the Arab State 
(London: Croom Held, 1987) at 22. 
151 M N Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998), at 162. 
152 A Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), at 286. 
153 Y Sayigh, 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed' (1991) 67 International Affairs 476, at 
490. 
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bolstered by repressive tools in the hands of the region's rulers as well as economic 
consolidation. 
Thus, although we have seen that much of the twentieth century was one of reaction 
against European models of statehood, it was also a period of the nation-state's 
consolidation. Arabs had reacted against the colonial and Mandatory legacies of bounded 
states by supporting pan-Arabism. Yet we also saw that the Arab world could draw on its 
own tradition of territoriality that would feed into future models of the nation-state in the 
region. By considering Islam in the post-1967 environment, as well as regional 
organisations, the final section evaluates the options available to Arabs in solidifying their 
selfhood and statehood as well as dispute resolution mechanisms for settling territorial 
matters. 
Once pan-Arabism was tested and defeated in 1967 Islam increasingly became the 
main source of inspiration for alternative visions to the Arab predicament of statehood. 
Like Egypt's revolution in 1952, Iran's very different revolution of 1979 demonstrated the 
fragile appeal of secular nationalism, or wa/aniyya, across the wider Muslim world. 
Although Iran was never part of the Arab system, the impact of Khomeini's success not 
only terrified authoritarian Arab regimes, but it also provided an alternative transnational, 
non-territorial vision: unity not through an Arab state or qawm, but through the umma, free 
from illegitimate, corrupt and 'un-Islamic' rulers. 154 It is simplistic to depict modem 
Islamic movements in monolithic hues as was the case in our historical overview; modem 
Islam is manifested in a startling array of political and non-political forms. Many 
Islamically-inspired groups operate effectively within the postcolonial context of the 
territorial state partly because it has become so entrenched.155 As a result, the vision of an 
umma united under the Caliphate is often tempered with political realities; if we choose to 
speak of a modem siyar, we would glimpse many tensions between theo1y and practice, 
between universalism and bounded territoriality. 
No account of the triumph of Arab statehood would be complete without 
considering the Arab League, which embodied its participants' predilections for territorial 
integrity softened only by pan-Arabist rhetoric and ineffectual responses to regional crises. 
Studying the League provides a deeper appreciation of regional trends regarding statehood 
154 D Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The revolutionary state in international society (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), at 191. 
155 D F Eickelman & J Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), at J 39. 
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as well as mechanisms for dispute resolution. If we cast our gaze back to the League's 
origins during wartime meetings in 1944, the institution that emerged a year later promised 
a great deal. Not only was it older than any other regional institution, 156 it also brought 
together member states culturally and linguistically closer than most other regions. Despite 
pan-Arabism's later appeal, particularly from the fifties onwards, the formation of the 
League took place in a context where state elites could advance their own interests less 
hindered by the appeal of transnationalism. Many models of integration were flagged 
during these years, 157 but only 'Syria was in favour of full-fledged Arab unity, and was 
prepared to surrender her sovereignty, as well as to accept compulsory means for the 
settlement of disputes.' 158 Eventually, the seven founding members of the League adopted 
the Arab League Pact on 22 March 1945, 159 which must be seen as a triumph of sovereignty 
over transnationalism. 
Because the League was formed by states unwilling to concede any sovereignty, the 
institution has contributed little to most of the region's conflicts, especially those over 
territory. In 1957, Foda wrote that '[b]order disputes are of long standing between the 
Asian Arab States by virtue of the unnatural partition of this part of the world after the 
First World War.' 160 Although we have seen that these borders became more secure, the 
twentieth century has witnessed a number of Arab territorial disputes. 161 Many of these 
have since been settled, but very rarely has the Arab League played a decisive role in their 
resolution. 162 This is despite the fact that by 1950 a Draft Statute for an Arab Court of 
156 B Boutros-Ghali, 'The Arab League ( 1945-1970)' ( 1969) 25 Revue egyptienne de droit international 67, at 
68. 
157 Possible models included: 1) the League as a single international person representing all Arab countries; a 
federation based on the partial cession of Arab sovereignty; or a loose confederation based on co-operation 
and consent. Foda, supra n 42, at 6-7. 
158 H A Hassouna, The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of Middle East Conflicts 
(Leiden: Oceana, 1975), at 6. 
159 The full text of the Pact can be found at the League's website: 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/index en.jsp. 
160 Italics added, Foda, supra n 42, at 30. 
161 For an excellent overview of some of these disputes and their adjudication in the colonial and postcolonial 
period, see J Allain, International Law in the Middle East: Closer to Power than Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004), at ch 8. 
162 Some examples include: The Buraimi dispute: J B Kelly, 'The Buraimi Oasis Dispute' (1956) 32 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 3 18; Morocco's 1963 invasion of Algeria as 
discussed in Chapter Five; the Saudi-Yemen border issue: A H Al-Enazy, ' "The International Boundary 
Treaty" (Treaty of Jeddah) Concluded between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Republic on 
June 12, 2000' 96 (2002) American Journal of International Law 161; and the Taba Arbitration between 
Egypt and Israel: Taba Arbitration (Egypt/Israel) ( 1989) 80 ILR 224. For background to this dispute, see M 
EIBaradei, 'The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and Access to the Gulf of Aqaba: A New Legal Regime' 
(1982) 76 American Journal of International Law 532; and R Lapidoth, 'The Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of 
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Justice had been devised by the League, as first suggested by lraq. 163 The importance of 
this Court was a product of the League's own dispute settlement weaknesses, which were 
enshrined in Article 5 of the Pact: 
Should there arise among them a dispute that does not involve the independence of 
a State, its sovereignty or its territorial integrity, and should the two contending 
parties apply to the Council for the settlement of this dispute, the decision of the 
Council shall then be effective and obligatory .164 
The Court's creation was widely supported even though conflict remained over its 
jurisdiction. ' In fact, the creation of this Arab court has been the subject of numerous 
discussions and even more numerous resolutions. ' 165 Foda explains that the League's 
failure to realise the Court was a product of Arab attitudes regarding arbitration; Arab states 
have tended to favour reconciliation over arbitration, even though arbitration is central to 
the Islamic tradition. 166 Yet, ' [ w ]ith the main objective of settling the dispute peacefully, 
we find that in a single verse in the Quran both methods [arbitration and reconciliation] 
occur side by side: "And yet fear a breach between the two (man and wife), then send an 
arbitrator from his people and an arbitrator from her people, if they wish for 
reconciliation; verily, God is knowing and aware."' 167 After over half a century later, the 
Court's inception seems less likely than ever. Thus even though the Arab world could draw 
on planned arbitral institutions, a rich legal tradition as well as at least some support for 
arbitration, it seems that international adjudication bodies have come to serve as the only 
viable option for arbitration in the region. 
Arab League states straddle a number of regional affiliations and many are members 
of other organizations. Multiple regional memberships need not necessarily weaken the 
League, but especially for Arab African states, comparatively greater reliance and success 
underscore the lack of trust held by certain Arab states for the League's capabilities. More 
Aqaba and the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel' ( 1983) 77 American .Journal of International 
Law 84. Some other pertinent disputes, such as the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, are discussed vis-a-vis the 
thesis' case studies. 
163 Foda supra n 42, at 13. 
164 This state-centric theme of the Pact was only reinforced in the I 950 Joint Defence and Economic Co-
Operation Treaty, available from the Arab League's website: 
h ltp :/ /www .arableagueon I ine .org/las/index en. jsp. 
165 Boutros-Ghali, supra n 156, at 82. 
166 Foda, supra n 42, at 49-50. 
167 Qur'an 4:35, quoted in ibid, at 54-55. 
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recently smaller regional groupings have emerged in the Arab world, indicating further 
gaps in the League's capacity to fulfill certain, more parochial, aspirations. 168 
Of greater relevance in our discussion of regional arbitration initiatives is the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and its support for the creation of an Islamic 
International Court of Justice. 169 Although the OIC has a much larger membership than the 
League, both share an institutional framework endorsing the sovereignty norm and no real 
mechanisms for dispute resolution. 170 The OIC was established in Rabat, Morocco, on 25 
September 1969 after a 'Zionist arson attack upon Al-Aqsa mosque complex in occupied 
Jerusalem on 21 August 1969.' 171 The OIC was motivated to defend Islam, its Holy Sites 
and its peoples and so from its inception the OIC was closely associated with the 
Palestinian issue and anti-colonialism in general, as enshrined in its Charter. Although the 
OIC can be characterised as the modern manifestation of the umma, the organisation has 
rejected this radical vision. Thus, 
It is incorrect to identify the OIC as operating within the Islamic concept of 
Ummah . .. The OIC is an international inter-governmental organization composed 
of sovereign states therefore working within the common structure of international 
law where members states are the main subjects.172 
This idea is reflected in the Draft Statute of the Islamic International Court of Justice, 
which seeks to marry the application of sharf'a with optional jurisdiction on the part of its 
member states. 173 Although the Court was first suggested in the eighties, few developments 
have boosted its prospects of realisation more recently. Perhaps like the Arab Court of 
Justice it will remain little more than a dream in the minds of Arab states when seeking the 
168 These include the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Neither of these 
bodies is particularly effective and this is especially so regarding the AMU, which has been paralysed by the 
Algerian-Moroccan stand off over Western Sahara. These organisations are discussed further in Chapter Five 
and Chapter Four respectively. For a comparative analysis of the two bodies, see M Cammett, ' Defensive 
Integration and Late Developers: The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab Maghreb Union' (1999) 5 
Global Governance 379. 
169 For an interesting discussion of arbitration for private law matters in the Islamic world, see C N Brower & 
J K Sharpe, ' International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase' (2003) 97 American Journal 
of International Law 643. 
170 According to Moinuddin, 'The emphasis laid by Member States of the OIC on the principle of sovereignty 
is an unequivocal and emphatic 'no' to supranationalism. Following precedents of the OAS, OAU and the 
Pact of the Arab League, the OIC Charter underlines the dominant role of the principle of sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity in inter-Islamic relations. ' Moinuddin, supra n 22, at 93. See also S 
Akbarzadeh & K Connor, 'The Organization of the Islamic Conference: Sharing an Illusion' (2005) 12 
Middle East Policy 79. 
171 Rehman, supra n 24, at 27. 
172 M Lombardini, 'The International Islamic Court of Justice: Towards an international Islamic Legal 
System?' (2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 665, at 667. 
173 For an overview of the Court's Statute, see, ibid. I could only find a copy of the draft Statute in Arabic: 
http://www. islamonline. net/ Arabic/doc/2000/ I O/article3 2 .shtml. 
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assistance of the ICJ. Territorially bounded states and international, rather than regional, 
forms of adjudication reflect the dominant approach in the region. Yet within this schema, 
it is possible for Arab states to introduce their particular heritage and experience of 
authority over territory, as will be shown in the cases. Is the ICJ a forum capable of 
sustaining such inter-cultural debates? Are the experiences of Arab territoriality 
comprehensible inside the Peace Palace? 
6) Conclusion 
Given the rich and diverse history of the Arab-Islamic world, locating the source of ideas 
and their application has been a difficult task. This chapter has highlighted that Arab states 
inherited a number of legacies that were both supportive and dismissive of the nation-state 
model. We also saw that it is simplistic to elide ' Islamic international law' and 'public 
international law' ; neither should be reified into a body of norms applicable across time and 
continents. This is especially the case for the legal relations that evolved between and 
across Christian Europe and its Ottoman 'other'. Later projections have overshadowed a 
complex interplay between cultures and faiths, particularly during the Sublime Porte's slow 
demise. There can be no definitive historical account of Ottoman international legal 
personality, but a significant body of material allows contemporary scholars to construct 
the story of membership in a number of ways. The story of international law's evolution 
was more complex than the familiar narrative of exclusive European creation suggests. 
Earlier too, despite a classical Islamic theory redolent of faith-based universalism, 
practice instead suggested a growing acceptance of territorially limited and delimited 
entities. Thus it is possible to speak of an Arab-Islamic tradition informing modern 
manifestations of the nation-state in the region. But more importantly for the following case 
studies, it was shown that Arab states hail from a legal and historical tradition sometimes at 
odds with European notions of statehood. It will be shown in the following chapters how 
this heritage has been used as a tool to destabilise as well as reinforce the prevailing 
international legal models on title to territory. 
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Introduction: 
Constituting the Self through Territory: 
The Law and Practice of Territorial Disputes and Boundary Drawing 
W e saw in the previous chapter that the relationship between territory and statehood in the Arab-Islamic tradition is complex, both supporting and 
rejecting European models of authority. Notwithstanding this tradition, the 
nature of international society today is far less variegated; the nation-state is the only model 
of membership available to political entities at the international level. It is therefore no 
surprise that Arab states have largely rejected the alternative of pan-Arabism in preference 
for well-demarcated nationhood and statehood. This is especially so in relation to natural 
resources, because defined borders are an ideal way of preserving national wealth. ICJ 
territorial cases have enabled a variety of Third World states, both Arab and non-Arab, to 
entrench their interests through the certainty provided by boundary delimitations. The 
practice of ICJ argumentation requires these states to construct particular narratives about 
not only their statehood but its relationship with norms relating to international legal 
personality more generally. Thus, territorial adjudication rests on detailed historical 
accounts 1 interwoven with the specific law relating to title to territory. 
To place the two cases studied in Part Two into this context of historical and legal 
argumentation, the following discussion aims to provide the reader with an understanding 
about the nature of ICJ contentious cases as they relate to territory. This introductory 
1 Merrills, for example, argues that 'the historical record is usually the key to applying the law.' J G Merrills, 
'The International Court of Justice and the Adjudication of Territorial and Boundary Disputes' (2000) 13 
Leiden Journal of international Law 873, at 895. 
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section raises themes of relevance for both the contentious and advisory cases explored in 
the thesis. The following section will explore matters relating to history as well as boundary 
delimitation, especially the norm of uti possidetis Juris. The introduction to Part Three, on 
the other hand, will only explore the nature of self-determination vis-a-vis ICJ adjudication 
in Advisory Opinions. This might seem counter-intuitive at a conceptual level; the self 
precedes any relationship grounded in territory. Doctrine and practice, however, have 
tended to reflect this approach as expressed by Brownlie: 
[T]here is a complementarity between uti possidetis and the principle of self-
detcrmination. It is uti possidetis which creates the ambit of the pertinent unit of 
self-determination, and which in that sense has a logical priority over self-
determination.2 
This tension between the self and territory is particularly pronounced across the African 
continent, as highlighted in Chapters Three and Five below. The choices confronting both 
African and Arab states at decolonisation are thus explored below in relation to borders and 
the role of the ICJ in this project. Because territorial adjudication relies on certain legal and 
historical interpretations, this section also overviews the relevant jurisprudence to highlight 
how limited the choices are for postcolonial states seeking selfhood. Before opening up the 
discussion to these broad considerations of history, doctrine and policy, however, the 
following section will first outline the procedural aspects of lCJ contentious adjudication. 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice is based on optional jurisdiction 
only available to states.3 For parties seeking to found a jurisdictional link between their 
particular dispute and the capacity of the Court to exercise its mainline jurisdiction, a 
number of options are available.4 First, states may accede to the Statute through Article 
36(2) or the 'optional clause' ,5 which allows states to issue a unilateral declaration, either 
2 1 Brownlie, 'Boundary Problems and the Formation of New States', D Freestone, S Subedi & S Davidson 
(eds), Contemporary issues in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002), al 191. 
3 Article 34( I) of the Statute reads: 'Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.' 
4 The other main way of conferring jurisdiction not discussed in the text is through a compromissory clause 
contained in both multilateral and bilateral treaties. None of the case studies or the other cases discussed at 
length arise from this practice. 
5 This provision reads: 
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory 
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any state accepting the same obligation, the 
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: 
the interpretation of a treaty; 
any question of international law; 
the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation; 
the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 
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'made unconditionally or subject to reservations which are not incompatible with the 
purposes of the optional clause.' 6 Although the Court recently celebrated its sixtieth 
anniversary, the optional clause is still 'underused' by the bulk of the world's states, 7 
especially Third World states. Even amongst Third World states, Arab states are 
noteworthy for their rejection of the optional clause. To date, Egypt is the only Arab state, 
out of a possible twenty two, to have accepted the Court's jurisdiction. 
This Third World, and particularly Arab, aversion to the optional clause is reflected 
in Part Two's cases, which both stem from a framework agreement or accord cadre. Such 
agreements are an open-ended fonn of compromis, allowing either unilateral application or 
a pair of applications outlining the nature of the dispute. The benefit of such an approach is 
that it allows parties to specify the matters under dispute as well as the law applicable. 
Where framework agreements are vague, however, the Court can step in, framing the scope 
of its enquiry as well as determining whether it should exercise its jurisdiction at all. The 
Qatar/Bahrain dispute m Chapter Four demonstrates that, even with framework 
agreements, consent is far from certain and that a state's eventual participation in 
proceedings should not simply be interpreted as its comprehensive acceptance of the 
Court's functional legitimacy. Once the practice of territorial adjudication is reviewed 
below, this section will conclude by returning to the themes of consent, choice and 
legitimacy for postcolonial parties in a world of nation-states. 
It is one of the paradoxes of globalisation that delimiting the territorial confines of 
the state remains of singular importance - especially for postcolonial states. 8 As more 
recent members of the international system, Third World states are increasingly supportive 
of its dictates, which through the juridical support of territorial boundaries provide some 
protection from increasingly porous economic borders. Challenges to the nation-state are 
still evident, but usually at the sub-state, rather than the national level, and this is because 
territory as defined through law 'constitutes the tangible framework for the manifestation of 
power by the accepted authorities of the State in question.' 9 In a world comprising 
parcelised jurisdiction, territory 'plays not only a definitional role, but a constitutive one 
6 S Rosenne, Rosenne 's The World Court: What it is and how it works, T D Gill ( ed), 6111 edition (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), at 74. 
7 R Y Jennings, 'The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years' (1995) 89 American Journal of 
International law 493, at 495. 
8 MN Shaw, 'The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today' (1997) 67 British Yearbook 
of International Law 75, at 75. 
9 MN Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), at 1. 
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historically as well. It is the link between a people, its identity as a state, and its 
international role.' 10 In the wake of decolonisation, Third World states have struggled with 
this relationship, and adjudication has only been called on occasionally in contests over 
identity, territory and resources. We saw in Chapter One, however, that Third World states 
have increased their participation in ICJ territorial matters, highlighting at the very least 
that other means, such as military conflict, negotiations, or regional institutions, have often 
failed to achieve the desires of many Third World states. 
Recent Third World ICJ territorial litigation forms part of a well-established and 
largely European tradition of adjudication and arbitration. Although adjudication has never 
been the default for settling disputes over territory, it has played an important role in a 
number of contests over boundaries and territorial control. Especially since the nineteenth 
century, a number of arbitrations have taken place between European powers in relation to 
their colonies in the Americas, Asia and Africa. 11 Grewe points out that arbitration during 
this period was typically used for mid-range territorial matters in an institutional setting 
increasingly juridical, compared to earlier practices centring on diplomacy. 12 During the 
early twentieth century this trend continued with a number of arbitrations as well as the 
hearing of many cases - often of a colonial nature - before the Permanent Court of Justice 
(PCIJ).13 
Since its inception in 1946, the ICJ has drawn on this jurisprudential heritage and 
has further developed the law and practice regarding title to territory. There is a clear trend 
arising from this litigation, which began with intra-European disputes and then gradually 
embraced intra-Latin American, intra-Asian and lastly intra-African cases.14 As outlined in 
10 Ibid, at 3. 
11 S Rosenne, ' Decolonisation in the International Court of Justice' {1996) 8 African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 564, at 565. 
12 W H Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, M Byers (trans) (New York; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), at 
519-520. 
13 Rosenne, 'Decolonisation', supra n 11 , at 564-565. 
14 Minquiers & Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom) ( 1953) !CJ Rep 47; Sovereignty over Certain Frontier 
Land (Belgium/Netherlands) (1959) lCJ Rep 209; Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 
1906 (Honduras/Nicaragua) (1960) ICJ Rep 192; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia/Thailand) (1962) !CJ 
Rep 6; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) (1 986) ICJ Rep 554; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening) ( 1992) ICJ Rep 351; Territorial Dispute 
(Libya/Chad) (1994) lCJ Rep.6; Kasikili!Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) (1999) !CJ Rep 1045; Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar/Bahrain) (200 l) ICJ Rep 40; Land 
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening) 
(2002) !CJ Rep 303; Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pu/au Sipadan 
(Indonesia/Malaysia) (2002) ICJ Rep 625; Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) (2005) ICJ 
Rep 90. 
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Chapter One, the 1986 Frontier Dispute marked a watershed for Third World territorial 
adjudication; the caseload of the Court remains heavily tilted in favour of African, Latin 
American and Asian states invoking colonial legacies to secure postcolonial statehood. Yet 
Franck argues that such a quest for certainty is 'illusory' because territorial disputes contain 
competing norms that cannot be resolved by adjudicatory methods. 15 
Perhaps in a bid to obscure such norm conflicts, an elaborate practice has emerged 
in territorial cases, providing the international lawyer with a clear path to pursue when no 
argumentative deviation is desired. For example, Ratner argues that judicial settlement of 
territorial matters advantages those about to invoke certain rules and speak in a highly 
specialised style, or competence. 16 Some of these techniques are showcased later in this 
section, but here we can at least identify the centrality of doctrine over and above wider 
contextual concerns. More broadly, we can categorise typical argumentative techniques as 
perpetuating a ' ]egocentric' approach to history and territory. Such an approach in the 
courtroom is to be expected, but it has substantive effects. Not only does a doctrinal 
preference overlook complexities, but it also tends to suggest that conflicts can be settled 
without resort to 'lesser' legal issues. The difficulty with such an approach, however, is the 
boundary drawing required in defining ' law'. Time and again, ICJ pleadings and judgments 
have centred on usually European treaties,17 thus creating a hierarchy of 'relevant' legal 
evidence and also separating instances of 'hard' law from its 'softer' variants, like 
indigenous occupation of the land. In his study of ICJ territorial cases, Sumner confirms 
this institutional practice - or bias. He points out that the court 'manifests a hierarchical 
preference for treaty law, uti possidetis, and effective control, respectively.' 18 
Another important instance of such discursive boundary-drawing is highlighted by 
references to the modes of acquisition as well as the distinction between territorial 
delimitation and boundary demarcation. Ratner argues that the modes of acquisition, 
namely, conquest, cession, occupation, prescription and accretion, are often invoked in 
treatises on territory, but tend to be overlooked in judgments in preference for 
15 T M Franck, 'Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession' , C Brolrnann et al (eds), Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 1993), at 4. 
16 S R Ratner, ' Land Feuds and their Solutions: Finding International Law beyond the Tribunal Chamber' 
(2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 808, at 814. 
17 In his separate opinion in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case, Judge Kooijmans objects to the majority's 
approach in choosing to prioritise a specific treaty under examination above general rules and principles of 
international law. Kooijmans J (sep. op.) (Botswana/Namibia) ( 1999) ICJ Rep 1045, at I 144-1152. 
18 BT Su11U1er, 'Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice' 53 (2004) Duke Law Journal 1779, 
at 1780. 
101 
Part Two Introduction: 
Constituting the Self through Territory: The Law and Practice of Territorial Disputes and Boundary Drawing 
considerations of effective control and historical consolidation.19 Although it is correct to 
depict an adjudicative style more flexible than a set of limited categories,20 these modes of 
acquisition still provide a powerful framework in guiding and limiting analysis in even the 
most recent cases. Given their contested nature, especially when applied to the colonial 
period, such a legal framework cannot be free from scholarly censure. However, they 
provide both litigants and the bench with a useful and artificial means of clarifying points 
of contention. The Court took up the opportunity most recently in its 2002 judgment about 
control over the Bakassi Peninsula. In contrast to Cameroon's reliance on European treaty 
law, one of Nigeria's claims was based on title supported through historical consolidation.21 
In retaliation, the majority defended itself through doctrine, declaring that ' the theory of 
historical consolidation is highly controversial and cannot replace the established modes of 
acquisition of title under international law' .22 
The Court has been more flexible with issues of delimitation and demarcation, 
suggesting that the line between territorial and boundary disputes is not exact; the 
difference is one of degree rather than kind.23 Again, it would seem that treatises are more 
formulaic, as shown in Merrills' categorisation of territorial disputes.24 When contrasting 
textbook analyses and ICJ judgments, discrepancies soon emerge, suggesting that the Court 
is less emphatic about the need for such a distinction. Ultimately, however, these 
controversies and others are of limited importance in trying to understand the dynamics of 
argumentation in territorial adjudication. Jennings was right in 1963 when he argued that 
international law is concerned not so much with changes in the occupation of territory but 
19 Ratner, supra n 16, at 815. Koskennieimi also makes this point. He argues that it has been difficult to keep 
the modes of acquisition distinct, and so tribunals have tended to favour effective possession and 
consolidation. M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of i nternational Legal Argument 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2"d edition, 2005), at 283. 
20 A clear statement of the preference for effective control is found in the Eastern Greenland Case, which 
defined title as the combination of ' the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or 
display of such authority.' Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark/Norway) ( 1933) P.C.l.J. Series A/B 
No. 53, at 46. 
21 (Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening) (2002) JCJ Rep 303, at 349-352. For discussion on 
this point, see N J Udombana, 'The Ghost of Berlin Still Haunts Africa! The ICJ Judgment on the Land and 
Maritime Boundary Dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria' (2003) African Yearbook of International Law 
13, a t 33-35. 
22 Italics added, (Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening) (2002) ICJ Rep 303, at 352. 
23 (Burkina Faso/Mali) ( 1986) ICJ Rep 554, al 563. 
24 J G Merrills, ' International Boundary Disputes in Theory and Practice: Precedents Established ', J Dahlitz 
( ed), Peaceful Resolution of Major International Disputes (New York: United Nations, 1999), at 99-1 0 l . 
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rather with changes in the right to territorial sovereignty.25 Thus, 'where a new State arises 
the law has looked chiefly at the emergence of the new subject rather than the incidental 
transfer of territory; it has looked to the sovereign, rather than the territorial element of 
territorial sovereignty. ' 26 These observations shift the analysis away from facts or 
definitional debates and remind us that control over territory is ultimately about the 
relationship between international rules and the constitution of international legal 
personality. 
Most postcolonial territorial disputes are rooted in colonial practice of the 
nineteenth century, thus requiring detailed explorations about the link between membership 
of international society and territorial title. Debate about the treatment and personality of 
non-European peoples during this period remains fierce. If we adopt an approach like that 
of Alexandrowicz's and certain TWAIL scholars,27 we can see this period as exceptional; 
as an instance of European disavowal of fundamental international legal principles. Such a 
stance suggests that European states breached established modes of acquisition as well as 
norms about treaty law and coercion. If we take the view that European practice at this time 
was part of international law' s evolution, however, colonialism begins to appear as both 
politically and legally acceptable. This latter perspective is captured by Mieville in his 
discussion of unequal treaties: 
Let us be clear - these unequal treaties were not ostensibly but really legal, they 
created the general principles of international law: they are not fraudulent, but the 
truth of nineteenth-century international law. That is the law we inherited.28 
The following overview of European colonialism thus highlights one of the central themes 
of the thes is: that doctrine must always be understood in relation to scholarly 
reconstructions of the past. We cannot determine a pure past or a pure law, only its 
interpretation and application in ongoing legal controversies. 
25 RY Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1963), at 14. 
26 Ibid, at 8. 
27 I briefly discuss Alexandrowicz's argument about pre-nineteenth century non-European international legal 
personality in Chapter Two, at 77. Also see M A Ajomo, 'International Law, the United Nations and 
Decolonization', E G Bello & B A Ajibola (eds), Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias: vol I 
Contemporary International Law and Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 77-92; and M L 
Sarin, 'The Asian-African States and the Development of lntemational Law', F E Snyder & S Sathirathai 
(eds), Third World Attitudes Toward International Law: An Introduction (Dordrecht: Martin us Nijhoff, 1987) 
33-51. 
28 Italics in original. C Mieville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (London: 
Pluto, 2006 (2005), at 246-247. 
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With the gradual expansion of European control across the globe in the nineteenth 
century, a variety of discourses and practices emerged both to explain and regulate 
territorial aggrandisement. In the preceding centuries expansion had been driven by trading 
companies, because 'European states did not want to take on the burdens of colonial rule. 
There was ... no explicit international law of colonies'29 after the age of ' discovery' and 
before the rise of imperialism. Whereas the European encounter with the 'new world' was 
framed through the discourse of Christianity and jus gentium, nineteenth century 
explanations centred on civilisation, positivism and recognition. Nineteenth century authors 
as well as contemporary commentators have contrasted these regimes in a bid to distinguish 
America's 'discovery' from Africa's through the trajectory of 'progress'. Conquest had 
been the dominant mode of acquisition meted out to the Ameridians. Papal grants in the 
latter part of the fifteenth century had encouraged the spread of Christianity via conquest 
secured through territorial dominion. 30 By the nineteenth century, however, Andrews 
argues that the ' immorality of acquisition of territory by conquest' encouraged either 
cession or occupation of terrae nullius instead. 31 
The problem here, however, is that cession and occupation as modes of acquisition 
relied on understandings of legal personality and therefore the doctrine of recognition. 
Many entities, especially in Africa, were simply not regarded as worthy of recognition; they 
were deemed to be terrae nullius or non-state entities of some sort. This notion is expressed 
by Schwarzenberger in stark terms: 'rights and duties under international Jaw exist only 
between subjects of international law'; whether ' communities outside the pale of 
international law submit peacefully or otherwise is irrelevant. ' 32 Even when non-European 
societies were recognised for the purpose of cession, this was often exclusively for 
European interests; cession was used as a factual antecedent for European inter se 
29 Emphasis in original. Mieville, Ibid, at 232, 248-256. 
30 S Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), al 42-47. 
31 J A Andrews, ' The Concept of Statehood and the Acquisition of Territory in the Nineteenth Century' 
( 1978) 94 Law Quarterly Review 408, at 410. One notable exception in Africa was the conquest of 
Madagascar in 1896 as noted by Korman, supra n 30, al 65. 
32 G Schwarzenberger, 'Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge' 51 (1957) American Journal of 
International Law 308, at 314. Schwarzenberger draws on the PCIJ's Eastern Greenland judgment for the idea 
that conquest is operative between sovereigns and thus in some ways, later practices of colonialism that 
denied the need for conquest can be seen as regressive, rather than progressive: Eastern Greenland Case 
(1933) P.C.l.J., Ser. AIB, No. 53, at 50. 
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agreements delimiting respective spheres of influence.33 Thus these treaties were the tools 
of European powers able to secure their interests without the need for military conquest. In 
the words of Herbst, it 'was boundary creation on the cheap. ' 34 
Some modem authors regard treaties of cession as puzzling: how was it possible 
that European powers could enter into agreements with entities they saw as less than 
sovereign?35 To answer this question, it is essential that strict categories of legality be 
abandoned. It is easy enough to portray European colonial practice today as technically 
illegal or alegal. What is more difficult is to understand the relationship between legal 
categories and their application in a given historical context. Anghie suggests that we read 
this period as one of fluid personality, 36 where non-European powers were sometimes 
afforded the limited capacity to form contracts at the private law level but not at the 
international law level:37 
The non-European states thus existed in a sort of twilight world; lacking 
personality, they were nevertheless capable of entering into certain treaties and 
were to that extent members of international law. 38 
Koskenniemi 's analysis of the period, on the other hand, is free from the conceptual 
constraints imposed by cession. 'Colonial title was always original [as through occupation 
of terrae nullius] and never derivative [as through cession]: it followed from European 
33 J Castellino & S Allen, Title tu Territory in international Law: A Temporal Analysis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2003), at 91. 
34 J Herbst, 'The creation and maintenance of national boundaries in Africa' 43 (1989) International 
Organization 673, at 685. 
35 D W Greig, 'Sovereignty, Territory and the International Lawyer's Dilemma' (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 127, at 151-152. 
36 
'European states adopted different views of native personality, depending on their own interests. The 
problem was that native personality was fluid , as it was created through the encounter with a European state 
which would inevitably 'recognise' the capacity of the non-European entity according to its own needs.' A 
Anghie, imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of international Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), at 79. 
37 According to Grewe, 'the protagonis ts of colonial expansion in the nineteenth century did not deny non-
civilised peoples Lhe dominium civile, but rather only political imperium; not the capacity to hold private, civil 
rights, but rather legal personality as a subject of international law. They did not deny that every human being 
had innate rights which were held independently of the stage of culture and civilisation they had achieved.' 
Grewe, supra n J 2, at 548. 
38 Anghie, supra n 36, at 76. This sense of twilight is captured by Andrews in his observation of a two-tier 
international law of the nineteenth century between members and non-members of international society. Shaw 
further divides the system into three: full members and states in the Concert of Europe, non-European states 
and non-European peoples not recognised as states. Andrews, supra n 3 1, at 419 and Shaw, Title to Territory, 
supra n 9, at 45. 
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law's qualification of the acts of European powers, not from native cession. '39 These views 
as well as others highlight how difficult is the task of settling on 'the law' during the 
colonial period. For Koskenniemi, the 'law of territorial acquisition oscillates between 
basing title on effective possession (and its derivatives) and an external recognition 
(acquiescence).'40 Shifting positions are also evident throughout the cases in the thesis. 
Thus rather than seeking certainty, it is better to recognise the uses of different doctrinal 
evaluations in the cases explored throughout the thesis. 
No account of colonial expansion would be complete without a discussion of the 
Berlin Conference of 1885, and yet,41 as in the case of doctrinal categories, we must see 
this event less as a milestone and more as a crystalisation of imperial practices that 
occurred throughout the long nineteenth century.42 Like Turkey's 'entry' into international 
society in 1856 discussed in Chapter Two,43 a simplistic rendering of the Berlin Conference 
tends to place too much emphasis on this episode, signalling it out for exception. The 
Conference's organisers had high hopes for regulating the acquisition of the rest of Africa, 
free navigation and the status of the Congo, but results were far more modest, and besides, 
most of coastal Africa was already spoken for. 44 For European powers,45 Berlin simply 
required would-be colonisers to inform each other of their intentions. 46 A degree of 
39 M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 128. This position is diametrically opposed by Shaw, who 
suggests that most title in Africa was derivate and resulted from treaties of cession: Shaw, Title to Territory, 
supra n 9, at 39. 
4
° Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra n 19, at 286. 
4 1 General Act of the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden-Norway, Turkey (and the 
United States) respecting the Congo, 26 February I 885, 165 CTS 485. 
42 Mieville, supra n 28, at 253. Further, Koskenniemi argues that it is unclear whether events after Berlin were 
qualitatively different or simply the extension of earlier policies. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, supra n 
39, at 117. 
43 Chapter Two, at 76-83. 
44 Herbst, supra n 34, at 683. 
45 All of the participants at the Conference were from Europe (geographically or ethnically, in the case of the 
United States which ultimately chose not to be a signatory) or were included within the Concert of Europe, 
namely the Ottoman Empire. Although the Sublime Porte had been officially recognised as a member of 
(European) International Society since 1856, it was initially excluded from the list of Berlin participants and 
had to lobby for its inclusion, and this in the face of widespread and enduring Ottoman title over large parts of 
the African continent, supra n 4 1. 
46 The key provisions of the General Act of the Conference on this point were: 
Article 34 - Any power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of the 
African Continent outside of its present possessions, or which, being hitherto without such 
possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the Power which assumes a Protectorate there, shall 
accompany the respective act with a notification thereof: addressed to the other Signatory Powers of 
the present Act, in order to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own. 
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territorial consolidation was also necessary, but often through the most minimal displays of 
effective control that were little more than symbolic. Although Berlin was intended to 
define relations between European states as well as the law applicable to Africa, it only 
served to confirm the exclusively European notion of sovereignty with little detail as to its 
content on the continent.47 It sanctioned a practice which was only to increase after the 
Conference's close: ' allowing a European power to preclude others from contesting a piece 
of territory that was merely under its sphere of influence.'48 
The main territorial entity to emerge out of Berlin-style colonialism was the 
protectorate, which, like treaties of cession, was often based on arbitrary interpretations of 
sovereignty and personality.49 According to Andrews, 'there was an enormous variety in 
the styles of protectorate, some of which were scarcely dissimilar from colonial status in 
the extent of control assumed by the protecting power. ,so Shaw explains the proliferation of 
protectorates through an account of how the classical ideal of protectorates increasingly 
gave way to colonial exigencies. Initially, protectorates were based on bifurcated 
sovereignty: external sovereignty for the protecting power and internal sovereignty for the 
protege.51 This classical notion of protection continued to persist throughout the colonial 
period, particularly in those parts of the non-European world deemed to possess certain 
attributes of 'civilisation ' . For instance, the Trucial states of the Gulf, as discussed in 
Chapter Four, always maintained their internal sovereignty; but we will see how, even in 
such instances, that the line between internal and external sovereignty became blurred. 52 
The institution of 'colonial protectorates' , which were simply colonies by another 
name, was much more common in southern Africa. The ICJ recently revisited the 
controversy over the boundary between 'colonial protectorates' and 'proper' protectorates 
in the di spute between Nigeria and Cameroon mentioned above. In this case, Nigeria relied 
on an 1884 treaty of protection between Britain and the Chiefs of Old Calabar to argue that 
Article 35 - The Signatory Powers of the present Act recognize the obligation to insure the 
establishment of authority in regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African Continent 
sufficient to protect existing rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and transit under the 
conditions agree upon. 
47 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, supra n 39, at 12 1, 126. 
48 Herbst, supra n 34, at 684. 
49 M Koskenniemi, 'International Law and Imperialism ', D Freestone, S Subedi & S Davidson (eds), 
Contemporary Issues in international Law: A Collection of the Josephine Onoh Memorial Lectures (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 2002), 197-218, at 212. 
50 Andrews, supra n 31 , at 420. 
51 Shaw, Title to Territory, supra n 9, at 47. 
52 Generally see Chapter Four. 
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later British alienation of Calabar lands through a treaty with Germany was of no legal 
effect: nemo dat quad non habet.53 Despite strong dissent from some members of the bench 
on this issue, the Court held that the plain words of the treaty were not really about 
'protection' at all, but were simply a policy choice on the part of Britain.54 The indigenous 
peoples in the area lacked international legal personality and so their lands were open to 
colonisation. 55 Judges Ranjeva and Koroma opposed such a finding by relying on the 
law/politics dichotomy. They both regarded the majority judgment as amounting to the 
'recognition of political reality rather than ... an application of the treaty and the relevant 
legal principles. ' 56 Ranjeva characterised the Court's deference to inter-temporality through 
the 'following maxim: "in treaty relations with indigenous chiefs, pacta non servanda 
sunt". ' 57 Judge Al-Khasawneh echoed these thoughts when he argued that the Court had 
erred in considering the general Berlin practice of protectorates and Island of Pa/mas 
notions of inter-temporality58 rather than treaty interpretation.59 Although these three judges 
from the Third World reached different conclusions about Nigeria's modern claim over the 
territory, they all strove to apply a law free from politics in the scramble for Africa. Such a 
53 Treaty with Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, 10 September 1884, 163 CTS 182. Land and Maritime 
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening) (2002) ICJ 
Rep 303, at 404. 
54 Ibid, at 405-406. 
55 Denial of non-European international legal personality also informed Judge Huber's reasoning the Island of 
Pa/mas Award, where he stated: 'As regards contracts between a State or a Company such as the Dutch East 
India Company and native princes or chiefs of people not recognized as members of the community of 
nations, they are not, in the international law sense, treaties or conventions capable of creating rights and 
obligations such as may, in international law, arise out of treaties.' Island of Pa/mas Case 1 RIAA 829; 4 TLR 
3 [1928), at 858. 
56 (Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Koroma J (dis. op.), at 476. 
57 (Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Ranjeva J (sep. op.), at 470. 
58 For example, he argues: 'support for the contention that treaties of protection in sub-Saharan Africa allowed 
generally for the transfer of sovereignty to the colonial/protecting Power cannot be safely established by 
reference to the Island of Palmas Award nor to the alleged practice of the Berlin Conference era, a practice 
from which, at best, no finn inferences can be drawn and which in fact supports retention of a normative 
distinction between colonies and the so-called colonial protectorates and the consequent upholding of the 
maxim nemo dat quod non habet. ' (Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Al-Kbasawneh J 
(sep. op.), at 499. 
59 
'Clearly, the crucial factor is the agreement itself, and whilst it is entirely possible that such agreements 
vested sovereignty in the newcomers it is equally possible that they did not, in which case sovereignty was 
retained by the local ruler under an agreed scheme of protection or administration. These are questions of 
treaty interpretation and of the subsequent practice of the parties and cannot be circumvented by the invention 
of a fictitious sub-category of protectorates termed "colonial protectorates" where title is assumed to pass 
automatically and regardless of the terms of the treaty of protection to the protecting Power, for that would be 
incompatible with the fundamental rule pacta sunt servanda and would lead to what has been termed 
"institutionalized treaty breach", a situation that no rule of intertemporal law has ever excused.' 
(Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Al-Khasawneh J (sep. op.), at 495. 
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stance is common amongst TWAIL I scholars as well, who have tended to find solace in 
law in contrast to 'political' acts of the colonial period. 60 
Difficulties of analysis regarding the colonial era are further compounded once the 
requirement of inter-temporality is factored in, and yet, as in the case of the modes of 
acquisition, dispute persists as to how past events should be interpreted for determining the 
present. The classic articulation of this rule was expressed by Judge Huber in the Island of 
Palmas Award, who considered the competing claims of the Netherlands and the United 
States over a deserted island: 
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive 
periods is to be applied in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a 
distinction must be made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. 
The same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at 
the time the right arises, demands that the existence of the right, in other words its 
continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of 
law.61 
This statement remains seminal for territorial disputes, but it has not always been applied 
uniformly by even the ICJ itself, as shown above in relation to Nigeria and Cameroon, as 
well as in Chapter Four. The rule requires a particular reading of the past and the evolution 
of legal norms and yet such a task is fraught with difficulty when applied to the colonial 
period. Should we regard colonial treaties, for example, as agreements between equal 
sovereigns or something else? Further, how should we approach the problem of coercion in 
the formation of these treaties? Both Shaw and Kaikobad adopt a pragmatic approach when 
they argue that we must accept colonial treaties and the rights they generated because at the 
time it was permissible to impose treaties through force. 62 Kaikobad argues that this 
position has largely been confirmed through the International Law Commission in its 
drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,63 which immunises the rights 
arising from boundary treaties vis-a-vis jus cogens and the rule of rebus sic stantibus.64 
Thus in an era when coercion shaping 
60 The basic attributes ofTWAIL I scholarship are discussed in Chapter One, al 29-33. 
61 Island of Pa/mas Case 1 RIAA 829; 4 ILR 3 [ 1928), at 845. 
62 Shaw, Title to Territory, supra n 9, at 43. 
63 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 11 55 UNTS 33 1. Especially see Articles: 52, 53, 
62, 64, 71 & 72. 
64 Thus, according to Kaikobad, 'a rule of law which does not inhibit the reopening of frontier questions, 
settled in an earlier period of time, on charges of coercion would not only constitute an invitation for fresh 
boundary claims, but would be inconsistent with the general underlying notions of continuity of boundaries 
presented in the context of State succession to boundary treaties and the proviso to the doctrine of rebus sic 
stantibus. The rule, however, in favour of the continuation of boundary treaties concluded in controversial 
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treaties was permitted, the legal ramifications can carry over into postcolonial present.65 
The most important device of temporality for postcolonial, and especially African, 
states has been the doctrine of uti possidetis juris.66 The practice first emerged in nineteenth 
Latin America in the wake of Spanish withdrawal and the creation of independent states. So 
as to preserve stability, these new states succeeded from the municipal lines of Spanish 
administration. More recently, this principle of stability was confirmed in Asia in the 
Temple case as well as the Rann of Kutch Arbitration. 67 On the eve of decolonisation, 
African elites soon grasped the value of supporting such a norm, and it was confirmed in 
the heydays of independence both in the Organisation of African Union's (OAU) Charter as 
well as the 1964 Cairo Declaration.68 Despite increasing African dispute settlement reliant 
on the norm, as epitomised by the Frontier Dispute and the Benin/Niger case,69 numerous 
writers question its validity and long-term value.7° Functionally, the virtues of stability are 
constantly invoked,71 and yet the norm 
creates states by establishing new identities within rigid boundaries, the 
preservation of which are not always feasible, and, as evidenced by modern break-
ups, that it transforms internal boundaries to international ones with disregard for 
circumstances at an earlier period of time emphasizes the view that boundary treaties and regimes have lasting 
effects and underlines again the importance of the doctrine of finality.' K H Kaikobad, 'Some Observations 
on the Doctrine of Continuity and Finality of Borders' (1984) 54 British Yearbook of International Law 119, 
at 136. 
65 Ibid, at 134. 
66 J Castellino, 'Territory and Identity in International Law: The Struggle for Self-Determination in the 
Western Sahara' ( 1999) 28 Millennium: Journal of International Studies 523, at 527. For an extensive study 
of the norm's evolution, see Shaw, 'The Heritage of States', supra n 8. 
67 Brownlie, 'Boundary Problems', supra n 2, at 189. Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear 
(Cambodia/Thailand) ( 1962) I.CJ. Reps., p.6; and Case Concerning the Inda-Pakistan Western Boundary 
(India/Pakistan), Arbitral Award of 19 February 1968, (1968) ILM 633. 
68 Resolution AHG!Res.16(1), on Border Disputes Among African States, adopted by the First Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Cairo, 21 July 1964. See MN Shaw, 'Peoples, 
Territories and Bow1daries' (1997) 8 European Journal of international Law 478, at 494. The principle of uti 
possidetis also appears in Article Ill (3) of the AOU Charter and paragraph 7 of the preamble. T Maluwa, 
'International Law-Making in Post-Colonial Africa: The Role of the Organization of African Unity' (2002) 
Netherlands International law Review 81, at 94-95. All African states supported the uti possidetis doctrine 
except Somalia and Morocco. Somalia called for Greater Somalia at the OAU's opening session in May 1963 
and Morocco 'reserved its position with regard to Article 3(3) of the OAU Charter.' J Klabbers & R Lefeber, 
'Africa: Lost between Self-Determination and uti possidetis', C Brolmann et al. (eds), Peoples and Minorities 
in international Law (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer, 1993), 37-76, at 58. 
69 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) (1986) ICJ Rep. 554; Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute 
(Benin/Niger) (2005) ICJ Rep. 90. 
70 Especially, see Castellino, supra n 66, at 527; Castellino & Allen, supra n 33. 
71 Oduntan argues that ' it would appear that African States are more inclined towards the view that "good 
fences make good neighbours'". G Oduntan, 'The Demarcation of Straddling Villages in Accordance with the 
International Court of Justice Jurisprudence: The Cameroon-Nigeria Experience' (2006) Chinese Journal of 
International Law 79, at 99. 
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any viable interconnection between the internal border and the forging or 
maintenance of national unity.72 
Further, the norm not only gives legitimacy to acts ' purely on the basis that those acts 
occurred during the colonial era';73 in fact, it aids the interests of contemporary domination, 
through the consolidation of the ' territorial state'.74 Colonialism and postcolonialism take 
on unnerving similarities with uti possidetis, because it 'legitimates the action of civil 
officers, typically situated in foreign officers in metropolitan capitals in the middle of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, who have essentially shaped the identities and destinies 
of colonial peoples.'75 Given these problems, it is not surprising that several scholars from 
Africa suggest that 'the time for flogging dead paradigms is long past. ' 76 Mutua further 
asserts that 'these concepts and principles may have trapped Africa in a detrimental time 
capsule; they now seem to be straitjackets with timebombs ready to explode.'77 
Irrespective of these criticisms, it appears that uti possidetis is now firmly grounded 
m the practice of African states, but is this also true of Arab states? Again, discursive 
boundary-drawing is required in answering such a question, and here we return to the 
Introduction of the thesis and its definition of the Arab world. 78 The Arab world 
geographically straddles both the Asian and African continents; the cases reflect this 
division with Chapters Three and Five arising in Africa and Chapters Four and Six from 
Asia. To an extent, Arab states have been able to pick and choose different regional 
affiliations and priorities, as shown by Libya in Chapter Three.79 Although it is simplistic to 
speak of Arab-African and Arab-Asian states, it is nevertheless clear that Arab states on the 
African continent have a much closer connection with the norm of uti possidetis Juris. It is 
now possible to hold that uti possidetis juris is a regional customary norm in both Latin 
72 Castellinio & Allen, supra n 33, at 21. 
73 R McCorquodale & R Pangalangan, 'Pushing Back the Limitations of Territorial Boundaries' (2001) 12 
European Journal of International Law 867, at 876. 
74 Shaw uses the term, ' territorial state' to describe most African states, which were created through territorial 
lines rather than strong social and cultural bonds usually associated with nation-states. Shaw, Title to 
Territory, supra n 9, at 186. 
75 Castellino & Allen, supra n 33, at 22. This idea of control from the city in the colonial and postcolonial 
periods is also noted by Herbst: 'The resemblance between the rule of control of the capitals of the 
Europeans' rule of effective control through protectorates is, of course, not accidental. Indeed, control of the 
capital is today simply the minimal level of government presence that the Europeans first defined at the Berlin 
Congo Conference.' Herbst, supra n 34, at 687. 
76 Udombana, supra n 21 , at 59. 
77 M Mutua, 'Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal 1nquiry' (I 994-1995) 16 Michigan Journal 
o{lnternational Law 1113, at 1114. 
7 Discussed at 7-8. 
79 Discussed at 120-124. 
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America and Africa, whereas the matter is unsettled in the case of Asia. 80 Because of 
African support for the norm, some commentators now argue that it has taken on universal 
relevance, but we need to look carefully at Arab practice.81 The dispute between Qatar and 
Bahrain discussed in Chapter Four explores this issue and suggests that the norm is not 
applicable in the Gulf. Thus, the arguments sustained in Arab territorial disputes need to be 
understood in the context of an emerging, but far from settled deference, to the uti 
possidetis norm. 
Before finishing our overview of contentious territorial adjudication, we need to 
consider the role of equity and the relevance of geography in ICJ jurisprudence. The 
Court's docket has included not only territorial but also maritime matters, and many cases 
actually combine these considerations in adjudication. Through a number of cases, the ICJ 
has developed the role of equity in maritime delimitations. Given that continental shelf and 
territorial cases share many similarities, it is surprising how states have shunned all resort 
to equity in territorial cases. The Award rendered in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration is an 
example of equity's application to mixed maritime and territorial matters,82 but aside from 
cautious application of equity infra legem in the Frontier Di~pute,83 the ICJ remains loathe 
to extend its jurisprudence in such a way.84 The ICJ is limited by the wishes of the Parties, 
80 According to Ratner, ' the repeated assumption by the Court that uti possidetis is a norm of international law 
is probative. Without definitely opining on the issue, one may thus assume some support for regarding uti 
possidetis as a norm ofregional customary law in Latin America and Africa, if not a general norm as well, in 
the context of decolonization.' S R Ratner, 'Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New 
States' ( 1996) 90 American Journal of international Law 590, at 598-599. 
81 For example, see G N Barrie, 'Uti Possidetis versus Self-Determination and Modern International Law: In 
Africa the Chickens are Coming Home to Roost' (1988) Tijoskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 451, at 453. 
Klabbers & Lefeber, supra n 68, at 54, fn 69. Taba Arbitration (Egypt/Israel) (1989) 80 ILR 224. Cf the 
treatment of uti possidetis in the more recent arbitration between Yemen and Eri trea: Award of the Arbitral 
Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute 
(Eritrea/Yemen), 9 October 1998, at paras. 96-99. 
82 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings, Maritime Delimitation 
(Eritrea/Yemen), 17 December 1999. This arbitration is contrasted with the Qatar/Bahrain dispute in Chapter 
Four. Klabbers & Lefeber suggest tha t the norm has now because accepted in the ' Middle East' too and they 
cite the Taha arbitration (especially Arbitrator Lapidoth 's dissent) for this conclusion. 
83 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) (1986) !CJ Rep 554, at 567-568. 
84 It is worth quoting the ICJ in the Frontier Dispute at length on this point: 
[T]he Chamber can resort to that equity infra legem which both Parties have recognized as being 
applicable in this case .. .In this respect the guiding concept is s imply that 'Equity as a legal concept 
is a direct emanation of the idea of justice' (Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), ICJ 
Reps 1982, p. 60, para. 7 1 ). The Chamber would however stress more generally that to resort to the 
concept of equity in order to modify an established frontier would be quite unjustified. Especially in 
the African context, the obvious deficiencies of many frontiers inherited from colonization, from the 
ethnic, geographical or adminis trative standpoint, cannot support an assertion that the modification 
of these frontiers is necessary or justifiable on the ground of considerations of equity. These 
frontiers, however unsatisfactory they may be, possess the authority of the uti possidetis and are thus 
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and so it would seem that both postcolonial states and the Court have favoured the certainty 
and stability assured through devices such as European treaty law, uti possidetis and 
effective occupation. Given that territorial cases often involve the apportionment of land 
with natural resources, there is a compelling argument to raise about the need for shared 
resources, especially in relation to poor, postcolonial states. Despite this, it would seem that 
postcolonial states are willing to take a gamble and stake their claims purely on 'law', 
rather than broader, perhaps 'political', factors invoked ex aequo et bono. 
In territorial disputes, extreme geographical and climactic factors can modify the 
general requirements for effective control, but in its jurisprudence the Court has not been 
willing to stray far from the familiar strictures of the European nation-state. Both in polar 
regions and deserts,85 the Court has acknowledged that evidence of effectivites will not be 
as systematic and widespread as in well-populated, temperate environments. The 
jurisprudence still favours a particular model of state control, however, so that differences 
in ejfectivites can only be of degree and not kind. This will be highlighted in the Western 
Sahara case in Chapter Five, 86 where the Court downplayed cultural and geographical 
factors to hold that instances of Moroccan and Mauritanian control were less than 
sovereign. Similarly, in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case Namibian arguments about the 
presence of indigenous tribes were found to have no bearing on the Caprivi Strip title.87 In 
fully in confonnity with contemporary international law. Apart fonn the case of a decision ex aequo 
et bono reached with the assent of the Parties, it is not a matter of finding simply an equitable 
solution, but an equitable solution derived from the applicable law (Fisheries Jurisdiction, ICJ Reps 
1974, p. 33, para. 78). 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) (1986) ICJ Rep 554, at 633. Cf Koskennieimi, who suggests that 
adjudicative examples illustrate how tribunals are quite open to the equitable balancing of interests. 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra n 19, at 262-266. 
85 For example in relation to Greenland, the PCIJ pointed out: ' It is impossible to read the records of the 
decisions in cases as to territorial sovereignty without observing that in many cases the tribunal has been 
satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State 
could not make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of claims to sovereignty over areas 
in thinly populated or unsettled countries.' Emphasis added, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland 
(Denmark/Norway) [1933] P.C.I.J., Ser. A./B., No. 53, at 46. For a discussion of the impact of harsh 
conditions on proving control over territory also see Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the 
Proceedings, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea/Yemen), 9 October 1998, at paras. 
446-454. 
86 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) ( 1975) ICJ Rep 37. 
87 According to the majority, ' there is nothing that shows ... that this presence was linked to territorial claims 
by the Caprivi authorities. It is, moreover, not uncommon for the inhabitants of border regions in Africa to 
traverse such borders for purposes of agriculture and grazing without raising concern on the part of the 
authorities on ei ther side of the border. .. [75] The Court concludes . . . that the peaceful and public use of 
Kasikil i/Sedudu Island, over a period of many years, by Masubia tribesman from the Eastern Caprivi does not 
constitute "subsequent practice in the application of the [ 1890] treaty" within the meaning of Article 31, 
paragraph 3 (b), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.' Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
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dissent, Judge Weeramantry adopted a contextually sensitive approach to this matter when 
he held that we 
must not look for indicia of occupation in terms of settled housing or ordered 
agriculture ... for the very nature of this terrain prevented settled habitation in the manner 
known to Western jurisprudence and tradition. At best there would have been temporary 
occupation ... from time to time as the rains and the climate determined. ' 88 
Because of these conditions 
Concepts of settled occupation, in default of which a territory is deemed 
unoccupied and even res nullius, which traditional principles of international have 
led us to expect, must consequently be discarded [in this matter).89 
Such sensibilities are invoked in the cases below, yet rarely has the Court modified its legal 
findings to reflect such a perspective. 
Although the Court operates within a well-established jurisprudential and 
institutional framework, there are still a number of ways of determining territorial disputes 
between postcolonial states, especially when the parties introduce experiences contrary to 
the European tradition. Successful contentious adjudication rests on a seamless integration 
of doctrine, history and fact set within the context of ICJ practice and rules. The discussion 
above has highlighted how territorial cases are about much more than well-informed 
doctrinal positions and legocentric perspectives. More importantly, they are about a party's 
ability to present their arguments in ways that preserve a distinction between law and 
politics with sufficient reference and deference to the jurisprudential heritage of the Court. 
This reflects Shalakany's findings on Third World arbitration as discussed in Chapter 
One. 90 We can now test these propositions in relation to the African te1Titorial dispute 
between Libya and Chad in the following chapter. 
(Botswana/Namibia} ( 1999) lCJ Rep I 045, at paras. 74-75. For a TW AIL analysis of the case, see J T Gathii, 
'Geographical Hegelianism in Ten-itorial Disputes Involving Non-European Land Relations: An Analysis of 
the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia)' (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of international 
Law 581. 
88 Kasikili/Sedudu l s/and (Botswana/Namibia) (1999) ICJ Rep 1045, Weeramantry J (diss. op.), at para. 31. 
89 Ibid, at para. 32. 
90 A A Shalakany, 'Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias under the Specter of 
Neoliberalism' (2000) 41 Harvard international Law Journal 419. Discussed at 38-39. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Sanctioning Colonial Legacies in the Sahara? 
The Construction of Postcolonial Seljhood in the Libya/Chad 
Territorial Dispute1 
1) Introduction 
n 3 February 1994 far from the mountainous and sandy expanses of the central 
Sahara, the ICJ brought the protracted conflict between Libya and Chad to an end 
by ruling that the Aouzou Strip separating the two states was part of Chad. 
Responses to the ruling were swift; under UN auspices, Libyan troops withdrew from the 
territory, and aside from occasional flights of rhetoric by Libya's leader, Qadhafi, it would 
seem that the Court has resolved a postcolonial conflict of the most complex kind.2 Many 
other methods of dispute resolution had failed to quieten neighbourly hostilities, prompting 
speculation about how and why international law could succeed where military conflict, 
regional institutions and negotiations had failed. These background factors were overlooked 
by the Court in its judgment, but they will be revisited throughout the chapter to explore 
how the parties as well as the Court drew boundaries, not only in the sand, but more 
importantly, between 'law' and 'politics'. Representations of the relationship between law 
1 Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (1994) ICJ Reps, p. 6, hereinafter 
Libya/Chad. 
2 Under Resolution 915, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer 
Group (UNASOG) and under Resolution 926 in June 1994, UNASOG's mandate was terminated on the 
successful withdrawal of Libyan troops.JG Merrills, 'The International Court of Justice and the Adjudication 
of Territorial and Boundary Disputes' (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of international Law 873, at 900. 
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and politics diverged considerably, and so this Case is an ideal site in which to explore the 
discursive options available to postcolonial states in the courtroom. Given that the thesis is 
concerned with mapping legal grammars at play in ICJ territorial adjudication, the main 
task of this chapter will be to evaluate patterns of argumentation employed by the Court 
and the parties. What does the grammar of international law proscribe for states speaking 
about the relationship between 'law' and 'politics' and which words or lexicon can be used 
in such an endeavour? 
Perhaps more than any other ICJ case, the Territorial Dispute captures the 
postcolonial paradox confronting Third World states in their resort to international law. 
parties in ICJ disputes enter a courtroom where a number of cases about title to territory 
have already been heard. The law applied in such cases is largely a product of European 
experiences of statehood; ideas of effective control, international legal personality and the 
validity of treaties are all framed through the prism of European dominance and 
predominance during the colonial period as discussed in this Part's Introduction. For Third 
World states forged out of the colonial context, a dilemma emerges: to what extent should 
the postcolonial state be constituted through colonial practice and colonial history? Can 
postcolonial states escape the structuring device of colonialism? Libya and Chad answered 
these questions in diametrically opposed ways. On the one hand, Libya sought to subvert 
colonial legacies through an historical survey that characterised Ottoman and indigenous 
occupation as having continuing legal relevance for its title over the Aouzou Strip. Libya 
demonstrated how historical arguments lie at the heart of legal constructions of both 
personality and territory. Chad's presentation, on the other hand, is marked 'par !'absence 
de toute d'arguments d'ordre historique' .3 Instead of offering an account of pre-colonial 
selfhood, Chad relied solely on colonial practice in the hope of succeeding to French title 
through colonial treaties. The Comi fulfilled these Chadian hopes by delivering a judgment 
confined to questions of treaty interpretation. In fact, the language of limitation is regularly 
invoked in the judgment, suggesting a bench at pains to defend itself against the disruptive 
ramifications of Libya's position. 
What were the implications of Libya's position, and why did the Court reject these 
ideas so stridently through its silence? The division between successful and unsuccessful 
3 [by the absence of all mention of historically based arguments] M Koskenniemi, 'L' affaire du differend 
territorial (Jamahiriya Arabe Libyenne c. Tchad) Arret de la Cour Internationale de Justice du 3 fevrier 1994' 
(1994) 40 Annuairefran9ais de droit international 442, at 453. 
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adjudicative strategies suggests that the Court did not understand the language spoken by 
Libya; Libya had transgressed the boundaries of suitable argument and was deemed 
incompetent for this reason. Libya's claims challenged prevailing understandings about 
international law's past by offering alternative approaches to international legal personality 
under colonialism. More disturbingly for proponents of postcolonial stability in Africa, it 
questioned the value of a blind acceptance of uti possidetis. Could Libya have succeeded if 
it had toned down its arguments, or was its failure grammatically pre-determined by a 
language premised on the law/politics dichotomy and postcolonialism's rupture with the 
past? To answer these questions, the chapter will first outline the judgment of the Court and 
then contrast the competing claims of Chad and Libya to determine why the Court took the 
position it did. Although the Court focussed on Chad's claims, the chapter seeks to redress 
this discrepancy by engaging with some of Libya's discursive strategies. Ideas about non-
European legal personality, Islamic authority over territory and the policy implications of 
uti possidetis were at the heart of Libya's case, and these themes are also of central 
importance in Chapters Four and Five. Before exploring the dynamics of discourse at The 
Hague, however, the chapter begins in the Sahara. 
2) Corsairs, Camels and Caliphs: Historical and Geographical Background 
The frontier between Libya and Chad not only separates these two modern states; it has 
also signified divisions between north and ' sub-Saharan' Africa as well as well as between 
Arab north and 'black' southern Africa.4 These boundaries are fluid and contested, but it is 
important to recognise that conceptual lines scar the map of Africa as much as the many 
arbitrary borders that arose out of colonialism.5 Arab states to the north thus face 
4 Chad covers three climactic zones: desert, savannah and sahel. For a fascinating account of the often 
artificial construction of racial boundaries in the Sahara, see B S Hall, 'The Question of "Race" in the Pre-
colonial Southern Sahara' (2005) I 0 .Journal of North African Studies 339. 
5 Lydon attributes the discourse of a divided Africa to colonialism and calls for its end. 'Still a glaring 
knowledge gap currently impedes our understanding of African continental history and its place in world 
history. The African divide, product of division and conquest, is only now be.ing questioned in the context of a 
current rethinking of African history. Ultimately, new meaning-making terminologies are necessary not only 
to bring the Sahara back into African Studies, but also to transcend the colonial legacy of ethnographic labels 
which have divided the continent between "white" or 'North Africa, and "black" or so-called Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It is lamentable that most Africanists, like their Middle East counterparts, remain ill-prepared to 
understand, let alone explain, the so-called 'Arab-Africa dichotomy' in situations such as the violent 
repression of Darfurians in the recent history of the Sudan.' This ongoing division of Africa is evident in 
TW All scholarship as well which tends to overlook Arab experiences altogether and instead, usually studies 
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choices about identity and allegiance and nowhere is this better reflected than in Libya, 
which has supported a number of pan-Arab and pan-African causes.6 ls it best to consider 
the Maghreb states as part of the Arab world, or part of Africa, or is it best to do away with 
such categories altogether? At least in the case of Chad, the answer must be the latter. As 
an exemplar of Shaw's African 'tenitorial state', 7 Chad is very much a product of 
colonialism: comprising over 200 ethnic groups, 8 there is no unified nation to speak of. 
Further, like its neighbour to the north, Arabic is an official language, and yet it would 
seem that other Arab states have drawn the boundary of the Arab world to Chad's north. 
Chad is not a member of the Arab League and is rarely classified along Arab lines.9 Like 
other Third World states, Chad has experienced many teething problems, and its fervent 
support for colonial boundaries in Africa must be understood within the context of regional 
affiliations in the African Union (AU). 
As we saw in this Part's Introduction, uti possidetis is particularly important in 
Africa today, but does this encompass Africa in toto or is it of greater relevance in states 
like Chad which came into existence under colonialism? ls the norm Jess relevant for those 
Arab states, such as Libya, with a history of state formation, or are the porous borders 
common throughout the Arab world as amenable to finality as those in central and southern 
Africa? These answers are useful to consider in the context of Chadian and Libyan identity 
construction but can only be answered after considering the rest of the cases in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six below. 
'Africa', which is mostly southern Africa or the sub-continent. G Lydon, 'Writing Trans-Saharan History: 
Methods, Sources and Interpretations Across the African Divide' (2005) 10 Journal of North African Studies 
293, at 315. 
6 An example is the Tripoli based Community of Saharan and Sahelian States (CEN-SAD), http://www.cen-
sad.org/, G Joffe, 'Libya's Saharan Destiny' (2005) JO Journal of North African Studies 605, at 613. Less 
tangible examples include the many proposals of Libya's leader, Qadhafi, over the years, including the revival 
of a Fallmid state across the Maghreb; and the elimination of borders across Africa, as advocated this year in 
Ghana or earlier efforts at pan-Arab ism. Generally, see the Libyan leader's website: 
http://www.algaU1afi.org/en/index en.btm. 
7 M N Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: international Legal Issues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), at 186. 
8 R W McKeon, Jr, 'The Aouzou Strip: Adjudication of Competing Territorial Claims in Africa by the 
International Court of Justice' (1991) 23 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 147, at 148. 
9 According to Wright, more Chadians speak Arabic than French (the other official language). 'But Chadian 
Arabs have not really become part of the political concept of the "Arab World", or are even generally 
accepted as such in the way that even the superficially Arabised non-Arab peoples of Somalia and Djibouti 
have been since they joined the Arab League in the 1970s. For Chad 's Arabs are, for a national minority, 
perhaps too closely inbred with other, non-Arab neighbours, and at the same time too remote from the 
mainstream of modern Arab culture, society and politics to be able to claim a recognised place in the 
"Nasserist" Arab nation, despite Gadafi's expressed belief in the essential unity of the "Arab" peoples of 
Chad and Libya. ' J Wright, Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara (London: Hurst, 1989), at 137. 
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Historically, the Sahara has served as an important source of division, not only for 
the constitution of 'Arabness' but also for the allocation of international legal personality. 
With its sands criss-crossed by a complex of caravan routes, the Sahara was far from 
unimportant for African trade and culture. Yet, its harsh conditions precluded widespread 
communication between Mediterranean and sub-Saharan communities. In the pre-modern 
era, Europe was more familiar with peoples to the north of the Sahara, and treaties were 
established with the 'Barbary' powers in Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis and Morocco from the 
sixteenth century. 10 The exact status of the Barbary Powers was unclear; these states were 
not part of the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century, but, equally, writers 
distinguished them at the time from southern African entities. For example, in 1801 , 
Admirality judge, Sir Scott, stated: 
Certain it is, that the African states [of the north] ... have long acquired the character 
of established governments, with whom we have regular treaties, acknowledging 
and confirming to them the relations of legal states ... although their notions of 
international justice differ from those which we entertain we do not on that account 
venture to call in question their public acts. 11 
At the very least, this degree of recognition would preclude later European arguments based 
on terra nullius that were applied to other parts of Africa. 
The exact status of northern Africa was further complicated on the eve of the Berlin 
Conference in 1885 because of Ottoman claims to the territories. For example, the 
Ottomans established the Regency of Tripoli in 1551 after defeating the Knights of Malta. 12 
Control of Ottoman Libya gradually fell into the hands of a locally-based monarchy, the 
Qaramanhs, 13 thus becoming a vassal principality of the Ottomans until Europe began to 
challenge Ottoman interests across the continent.14 By the end of the nineteenth century the 
Ottomans had increased their military and administrative presence in the region, and in 
1899 the Sublime Porte also 
10 J A Andrews, ' The Concept of Statehood and the Acquisition of Territory in the Nineteenth Century' 
( I 978) 94 Law Quarterly Review 408, at 413. See also Libya, Memorial, 26 August 1991 , at para. 4.08 
11 The H elena (1801) 4 Rob. 3, 5-6; 165 E.R. 515, quoted in Andrews, ibid, al 4 I 4 . 
12 L Anderson, 'Nineteenth-Century Reform in Ottoman Libya' ( 1984) 16 International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 325, al 326. 
13 See generally A A Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Reisistance, 
1830-1932 (New York: State University of New York, 1994), at 20-41. 
14 For a discussion of the Barbary states' relationship with the Sublime Porte, see S Faroqhi, The Ottoman 
Empire and the World Around ft (London: LB. Tauris, 2004), at 82-84. 
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issued a hinterland claim to Tripolitania in a bid to halt European claims to lands north of 
Lake Chad. Such declarations did not dissuade Italian and French appetites for long, 
though. By 1912, the Sublime Porte signed the Treaty of Ouchy passing its interests on to 
Italy, and it lost all territorial claims on its defeat in First World War, as confirmed by the 
1923 Treaty of Lausanne. 15 
As former Italian and French colonies respectively, Libya and Chad were well 
aware of the colonial rivalries they had inherited as independent states in 1951 and 1960, 
but confrontation over the Aouzou Strip remained latent for the first few decades after 
independence. In a context where new African states were eager to solidify colonial borders 
for the sake of stability, no mention was made of competing claims to the territory; instead, 
both states faced surmountable problems at home. Chad in particular was wracked by 
intermittent civil strife,16 which was often fuelled by Qadhafi-lead Libya after its coup of 
1969. 17 The Libya-Chad borderlands were home to a number of largely autonomous 
Arabic-speaking tribes, and their allegiances and assistance was sought in the various 
factional struggles that tore at the fabric of the Chadian state. 18 Partly in response to the 
instability spilling across these disputed borders, Libyan troops invaded the Aouzou Strip in 
1973, and from 1983 until 1987 'Qadhafi 's regime conducted a broad intervention ranging 
from significant financial and military support for various armed factions within Chad to 
large-scale involvement of Libyan armed forces.' 19 At various moments, Chad had invoked 
the support of the UN, France and the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) against Libyan 
aggression.20 Libya was anxious to retain its position in the African regional context, and so 
it finally ended its 'most significant external involvement'2 1 by withdrawing its forces in 
15 Treaty of Ouchy between the Ottoman Empire and Italy, 15 October 1912, Libya/Chad Case, Libya, 
Memorial, 199 l , International Accords and Agreements Annex, vol 2, no. 1 O; Treaty of Peace with Turkey 
(Treaty of Lausanne), 24 July 1923, no. 701, 28 LNTS 13. 
16 M-J Deeb, Libya's Foreign Policy in North Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), at 83-84; 129-133. 
17 For an overview of the 1969 revolution, see R Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the 
Modern Middle East (London: Routledge, 2"d edition, 2000), at 59-62. 
18 McKeon, supra n 8, at 155. 
19 A Huliaras, 'Qadhafi 's Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan African in the 1990s' (200 l) 100 African Affairs 
5 at 7. 
20 It was not actually until 1977 that Chad raised the issue of Libya's presence in the Aouzou Strip. 'Finally, 
on October 30, 1987, the 0.A.U. convened an ad hoc committee to detem1ine the nationality of the Aouzou 
Strip.' After a failure to resolve the dispute, momentum grew for other options, such as taking the matter to 
the ICJ. McKeon, supra n 8, at l 56-157. For an overview of the OAU peacekeeping role in Chad role, see R 
May & S Massey, 'The OAU Intervention in Chad: Mission Impossible or Mission Evaded?' ( 1998) 5 
international Peacekeeping 46. 
21 Huliaras, supra n 19, at 6. 
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1987. Two years later, Libya and Chad entered into an agreement or Accord-Cadre22 on 31 
August 1989, which built on earlier UN and OAU efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully. 
The avenue of ICJ adjudication was countenanced as a last resort if the matter was not 
successfully resolved in 'approximately one year', and Libya exercised this right by a letter 
to the Court on 31 August 1990.23 Thus, after a century of competing claims by powers 
near and far as well as rich and poor, a determination was sought to settle territorial claims 
in a comprehensive, legal manner. 
Aside from Libya's record of aggression towards its southern and much poorer 
neighbour, other extra-curial factors deserve attention here. As in the case of Qatar v 
Bahrain, 24 mineral wealth lay at the crux of the dispute's modem manifestation, but the 
parties and the Court did not choose to focus their attention on possible uranium deposits25 
and only made passing reference to Libyan intervention in Chad's civil unrest. Another 
significant factor influencing Libyan foreign policy at the time was its pariah-status as a 
result of the Lockerbie incident and UNSC-imposed sanctions, which were only lifted in 
2003.26 On the one hand, it might have seemed strange for Libya to come before the Court 
in the midst of such difficulties with Western powers. Its alleged connection with 
international terrorism and its aggression against Chad must have weighed on the minds of 
22 Available on ICJ website, http://www.ic j-cij.org/docket/fi les/83/6687.pdf. 
23 For a brief sketch of events surrounding Libya's application to the ICJ, see generally, Huliaras, supra n 19, 
at 9-10. 
24 See the following chapter. 
25 Both Huliaras and McKeon discuss the presence of unexploited mineral reserves in the Aouzou Strip, 
including phosphate and uranium: Huliaras, supra n 19, at 7 & McKeon, supra n 8, at 147. Dunoff et al, on 
the other hand, argue that there was no economic potential, suggesting either that they are unaware of these 
uranium deposits (which is possible given that there is such scant mention of this factor in the legal literature) 
or that they do not regard this as an important resource. J L Dunoff et al, International Law Norms, Actors, 
Process: A Problem-Oriented Approach (New York: Aspen, 2002), at 3. It is interesting to note that in its 
opening address to the Court, Libya referred to its participation in other ICJ contentious cases to demonstrate 
how judicial settlement had formed the basis of natural resource exploitation between Libya and Tunisia: 'Not 
only did the Court in that case settle the dispute and restore peace to the region but its decision also opened 
the way to mutually beneficial development ofresources.' Libya/Chad, CR 1993/14, 14 June 1993, Libya, Mr 
El-Obeidi, p. 18. Libya's faith in adjudication over natural resources was in stark contrast to its earlier arbitral 
experiences, as explored by Shalakany: A A Shalakany, 'Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for 
Reassessing Bias under the Specter of Neoliberalism' (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 419; I 
discuss Shalakany's ideas briefly in Chapter One, at 38-39. 
26 After Libya refused to hand over two of its nationals implicated in the 1988 bombing of a Pan-Am airliner 
over the town of Lockerbie, Scotland, the US and UK orchestrated UNSC sanctions: UNSC Resolution 748, 
31 March 1992; UNSC Resolution 883, 11 November 1993. Sanctions were revoked under UNSC Resolution 
I 505, 12 December 2003. For an overview of the sanctions regime through a focus on legitimacy, see I Hurd, 
After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), at ch 6. 
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the ICJ's members in reaching their judgment.27 On the other hand, however, Libya has 
been one of the most active Third World states at the ICJ, and in two earlier cases of 
delimitation the Court had ruled in its favour.28 Perhaps in the Peace Palace, Libya could 
retreat from political pressures and advance its interests not through military means but 
through the arguments of its Western legal team. 
3) The Need for Certainty and Simplicity: The ICJ on Treaty Interpretation and the Finality 
of Borders. 
Unlike its other successes as an ICJ litigant, Libya's arguments were dismissed by the 
Court in preference for Chad's position when it handed down its judgment in 1994. 
Although the judgment carefully constructed a legal edifice based on reliable principles and 
rules, its outcomes and policy motivations extend far beyond the confines of possible legal 
precedent. The judgment unequivocally endorsed the practices of the colonial past and 
reinforced colonial continuities by endorsing the sanctity of borders. The lengthy material 
offered by the parties provided the Court with an excellent opportunity to examine a 
number of controversial and unsettled areas of Jaw.29 Chad in particular opined that 'l'arret 
que rendra la Cour a une importance fondementale, non seulement pour le Tchad et la 
Libye, mais aussi pour la region et !' ensemble de l' Afrique.' 30 The Court was able to 
provide Chad with the ultimate assurance in confirming its claims over Libya's. However, 
the Court failed to respond to many of the issues raised in the pleadings. This section will 
provide a brief overview of the issues relating to jurisdiction, some of the basic claims of 
the parties, as well as treaty interpretation, before discussing the wider ramifications of the 
27 According to Koskenniemi, 'parmi les facteurs qui peuvent avoir influe directement sur le decision de la 
Cour, on trouve aussi le fait que la Libye etait consideree comme un Etat a l'ecart de la societe internationale; 
a joue egalement un role le comportement anterieur de la Li bye dans la bande d 'Aouzou.' [Among the factors 
that could have had a direct influence on the decision of the Court, one also finds that the fact that Libya was 
considered a pariah state by the international community, the earlier behaviour of Libya in the Aouzou Strip 
equally played a role.] Koskenniemi, supra n 3, at 457. 
28 Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (I 982) ICJ Reps p. 18; Case 
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta} ( 1985) ICJ Reps p. 13; and Application for 
Revision and interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case Concerning the Continental 
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) ( 1985) ICJ Reps p. 192. Joffe, 'Libya's Saharan Destiny', supra n 6, 
at 609. 
29 Eight seminal concerns overlooked by the Court are listed in C J Arguello-Gomez, 'Some Procedural and 
Substantive Aspects of the Libya/Chad Case' (1996) 9 Leiden Journal of International Law 167, at I 72. 
30 (The judgment that the Court will issue has a fundamental importance, not only for Chad and Libya, but 
also for the region and Africa as a whole] Chad, Memorial, 26 August 1991, p. 382. 
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judgment. Throughout the discussion primary attention will be placed on the majority 
decision, but the two separate opinions of Judges Shahabuddeen and Ajibola, the 
declaration of Judge Ago, as well as Judge Sette-Camara's dissent (ad hoc for Libya) will 
be used as a point of contrast. 
Despite an unusually straightforward acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, the 
parties were divided over the scope of the Court's enquiry into 'their territorial dispute' .31 
Jurisdiction flowed from the fact that both 'Parties accepted the jurisdiction of the Court on 
the basis of the [1989] Accord-Cadre' .32 The Accord-Cadre, however, was vague enough to 
allow Libya to present the dispute as a territorial one requiring delimitation, 33 whereas 
Chad's reliance on the dispositive effect of the 1955 Treaty resulting in its call for the Court 
to demarcate a boundary already determined;34 attribution of territory was outside of the 
31 The Court quoting Article 2 of the Accord-Cadre, at para 18. 
32 Libya/Chad, para 22. It should be noted that Chad had proposed a subsidiary basis for jurisdiction, claiming 
in its letter to the Court that its jurisdiction 'is also based upon Article 8 of the Franco-Libyan Treaty of 
Friendship and Good Neighbourliness of 10 August 1955, 162 BFSP 470, which provides that: "Any disputes 
arising from the interpretation and application of the present Treaty, and which it has not been possible to 
settle by direct negotiation, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of either Party, 
unless the High Contracting Parties agree on another mode of settlement." Letter from the Minister for 
Foreign Relations of the Republic of Chad to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 1 September 
1990, available from the JCJ website: www.icj-cji.org. On the other hand 'Libya regards the Accord-Cadre as 
the sole basis of jurisdiction.' Libya, Memorial, 26 August 1991 , at 20. 
33 Libya claimed the following: 
That there exists no boundary, east of Townmo, between Libya and Chad by virtue of any existing 
international agreement. 
That in the circumstances, therefore, in deciding upon the attribution of the respective territories as between 
Libya and Chad in accordance with the rules of international law applicable in the matter, the following 
factors are relevant: 
That the territory in question, at all relevant times, was not terra nullius; 
That title to the tenitory, at all relevant times, vested in the peoples inhabiting the tenitory, who were tribes or 
other peoples owing allegiance to the Senoussi Order who had accepted the Senoussi leadership in their fight 
against the encroachments of France and Italy on their lands; 
That these indigenous peoples, were, at all relevant times, religiously, culturally, economically and politically 
part of the Libyan peoples; 
That, on the international plane, there existed a community of title between the title of the indigenous peoples 
and the rights and titles of the Ottoman Empire, passed on to Italy in 191 2 and inherited by Italy in 1951 ; 
That any claim of Chad rests on the claim inherited from France; 
That the French claim to the area in dispute rested on 'actes internationaux' that did not create a territorial 
boundary east of Toummo, and there is no valid alternative basis to support the French claim to the area in 
dispute. 
3. That, in the light of the above facts, Libya has clear title to all the territory north of the line shown on Map 
105 in Libya's Memorial ... that is to say the area bounded by a line that starts at the intersection of the eastern 
boundary of Niger and l 8°N latitude and continues in a strict south-east direction until it reaches l 5°N 
latitude, and then follows this parallel eastwards to its junction with the existing boundary between Chad and 
Sudan. 
Libya, Memorial, 26 August 1991, at 478-479. 
34 Chad's request reads: 
La Republique du Tchad prie respectuesement la Cour internationale de Just ice de dire et juger que sa 
frontierc avec la Jamahiriya arabe libyenee est constituee par la ligne suivante: 
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Court's brief. The Court decided to address this discrepancy through a detailed examination 
of the 1955 Treaty in keeping with the direction of the pleadings themselves: 
It is recognized by both Parties that the 1955 Treaty is the logical starting-point for 
consideration of the issues before the Court. Neither Party questions the validity of 
the 1955 Treaty, nor does Libya question Chad's right to invoke against Libya any 
such provisions thereof as relate to the frontiers of Chad. 35 
By starting and ending with this Treaty, the Court confined itself to the narrowest possible 
examination of the Case and left many issues raised by both Libya and Chad unanswered. 
The key provision invoked throughout the pleadings and the judgment was Article 3 
of the 1955 Treaty between Libya and France: 
The two High Contracting Parties recognize that the frontiers between the 
territories of Tunisia, Algeria, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa 
[comprising Chad at the time] on the one hand, and the territory of Libya on the 
other, are those that result from the international instruments in force on the date of 
the constitution of the United Kingdom of Libya as listed in the attached Exchange 
of Letters (Ann. 1 ). 
This annex listed the following instruments: 
• the Franco-British Convention of 14 June 1898; 
• the Declaration completing the same, of 21 March 1899; 
• the Franco-Italian Agreements of l November 1902; 
• the Convention between the French Republic and the Sublime Porte, of 12 May 
1910 [actually 19 May 1910] 
• the Franco-British Convention of 8 September 1919; 
• the Franco-Italian Arrangement of 12 September 1919.36 
du point d'intersection du 24eme degre de longtitude Est de Greenwich avec le parellele 19030 de latitude 
Nord, la frontiere se dirige jusqu'au point de rencontre du Tropique du Cancer avec le 16eme degre de 
longtitude Est de Greenwich; 
de ce denier point elle suit une ligne se dirgeant vers le puits de Toummo jusqu'au 15eme degre Est de 
Greenwich. [The Republic of Chad respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare that its frontier with 
Libya is constituted by the following line: from the point of intersection of 24°E longitude with the 19°30 
parallel of latitude, the frontier runs to the intersection of the Tropic of Cancer at the l6°E latitude; from this 
last point, it follows a line drawn towards the wells ofToummo as far as l 5°E.] 
Chad, Memorial, 26 August 1991, at 383. 
35 Libya/Chad, at para 36. 
36 The Court determined that out of these treaties the 1898, 1910 and 12 September 1919 agreements did 'not 
directly concern the frontier between Libya and Chad ... [and so found] it unnecessary to take [them] further 
into consideration '. Libya/Chad, at para 58 & 62. For the other treaties, see Franco-British Convention for the 
Delimitation of their Possessions west and east of the Niger, 14 June 1898, 186 CTS 313; Convention 
between France and Great Britain defining the limits of the French zone in Africa, 21 March 1899, 225 CTS 
480; Accords Franco-ltaliens de 1-2 novembre I 902: Echanges de letters entre M. Barrere et M. Prinetti, 
Libya, Memorial, International Accords and Agreements Annex, vol 2, no. 7; Anglo-French Convention, 
Martens, Nouveau receuil general de traites, 3rd series, vol 7, at 91-93; the Franco-British Convention, 8 
September 1919, Chad, Memorial, Annexes, vol II, annex 7, at 23; Bonin-Pichon Agreement, 12 September 
1919, Chad, Memorial, Annexes, vol 11, annex 8/9, at 29. 
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Libya cha11enged the validity of many of these agreements, and it further argued that the 
Court should look to other pre-1955 agreements. 37 Libya also requested the Court to 
consider the unratified 1935 Laval-Mussolini Treaty.38 Libya conceded that the Court could 
not give any binding effect to the Treaty, but it argued that the treaty was illustrative of a 
context in which Italy and France were in agreement that the extension of Libya's 
boundaries was to include the Aouzou Strip.39 Chad conversely emphasised the unratified 
nature of the 1935 Treaty and contrasted this treaty with the 1955 Treaty between France 
and Libya that had definitively determined the boundaries through a complete list of 
relevant international instruments.40 
To respond to these opposing positions, the Court undertook a textual analysis of 
the 1955 Treaty, relying heavily on the customary rules of treaty interpretation laid out in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 31 ( 1) of the 
VCLT was particularly useful for the majority judgment and separate opinion of Judge 
Ajibola: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of their object 
and purpose.41 
In reading Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty, the Court ' had no difficulty either in ascertaining 
the natural and ordinary meaning of the relevant terms ... or in giving effect to them.'42 The 
clear intention of the Article and the Treaty as a whole was not only to determine certain 
boundaries between the parties (as argued by Libya), but all boundaries: 'no relevant 
frontier was to be left undefined and no instrument listed in Annex 1 was superfluous. ' 43 
Judge Ajibola invoked the 'special rule of interpretation of treaties regarding 
boundaries ... that it must, failing contrary evidence, be supposed to have been concluded in 
order to ensure peace, stability and finality. ' 44 The Court considered the relationship 
between Article 3 and the annexed treaties in the 1955 Treaty to be cumulative, and that the 
annex should be 'taken by the parties as exhaustive as regards delimitation of their 
37 Libya, Counter-Memorial, para 3.16; Lihya/Chad, CR 1993/15, 15 June 1993, Libya, Mr Sohier, at 63. 
38 Libya, Memorial, 26 August 1991 , at paras. 5.326-5.342. Treaty of Rome between France and Italy, 7 
January 1935, Libya, Memorial, International Accords and Agreements Annex, vol 2, no. 25. 
39 Libya, Reply, 14 September 1992, at 183-1 84. 
40 For Chad's rebuttal of Libya's thesis on the 1935 Treaty, see Chad, Memorial, 26 August 1991, ch 7, 
especially, at 372-373. 
41 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 11 55 UNTS 331. 
42 Libya/Chad, at para 43. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Libya/Chad (sep. op. Ajibola), at para 53. See also Libya/Chad, at para 51. 
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frontiers';45 not only was it unnecessary to question the validity of these earlier, colonial 
treaties, but second no other treaty, such as the 1935 Treaty, was apposite in this instance. 
Libya and Chad had both discussed whether Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty could be 
regarded as constitutive or declaratory in its reliance on the annexed colonial treaties of 
delimitation. A declaratory position would require determination as to the legal effect of the 
earlier treaties, whereas a constitutive stance would hold that as a consequence of Libyan 
and French volition, earlier treaties would serve simply as the reference point and not as 
pre-existing binding law for delimiting their territories. The key then was not so much 
whether the 1955 Treaty was seen as constitutive or declaratory, but whether one regarded 
the earlier treaties as being legally valid in their own right. For Libya, the Article was 
'purely declaratory of the pre-existing boundaries' 46 that had not been shaped by the 
annexed treaties. ln contrast, Judge Ago argued in his declaration that he regarded the 1955 
Treaty as constitutive because 'at the time of [Libyan] independence ... the southern 
frontier. .. had not yet been the subject of treaty delimitation between the parties then 
directly concerned. '47 The Court decided not to enter into this debate about the constitutive 
or declaratory nature of the 1955 Treaty, and thus the status of the annexed, colonial 
treaties was left unanswered. 
Both the majority judgment and Judge Ajibola found additional support for their 
initial interpretation by reference to good faith and a narrow understanding of the Treaty's 
context. Judge Ajibola discussed good faith in some detail in relation to Libya's 
characterisation of Article 3 as failing to delimit its southern frontier conclusively.48 As 
Judge Ajibola viewed the object and purpose of the Treaty as being to determine all 
boundaries, France (or Chad) and Libya were thus under an 'obligation not to defeat such 
objects and purposes of a treaty';49 '[t]hey may not pick and choose which obligations they 
would comply with and which they would refuse to perform, ignore or disregard. ' 50 Neither 
the majority nor Judge Ajibola resorted to an examination of the travaux51 because the 
45 Libya/Chad, at para. 48. 
46 Libya, Reply, 14 September 1992, at 57. 
47 Libya/Chad (dee. Ago), at 43. 
48 For example: 'As its text clearly states, Article 3 provided that Libya and France recognized 
("reconnaissient") something about certain boundaries; they did not dete1mine or fix anything.' Libya, 
Counter-Memorial, 27 March 1992, at 48. 
49 Libya/Chad (sep. op. Ajibola), at para 82. 
50 Ibid, at para 83. 
51 As per Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
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Treaty was readily cognisable without such assistance.52 Although the Court thus rejected 
Libyan and Chadian discussion about the negotiations between the contracting parties, it 
regarded the 'context' of Article 9 of the 1955 Treaty53 concluded between France and 
Libya as reinforcing its findings about the reach of the 1955 Treaty.54 
It is interesting at this point to interrogate the Court's stance in relation to the 
context of treaty making, for although the Court was eager to incorporate certain contextual 
considerations into its judgment, its silence in relation to French coercion and Libyan 
inexperience surrounding the 1955 Treaty is noteworthy. Customary law on duress as 
reflected in Article 52 of the VCLT seems to be clear: 'A treaty is void if its conclusion has 
been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles embodied in the 
Charter'. In his genealogical study of the development of the norm relating to coercion and 
duress, however, Craven argues that complexities and contradictions continue to plague this 
provision. In an attempt to divorce law from politics, lawyers tend to 'rely upon a 
presumption of validity as a way of insulating themselves against the possibility that 
consent might be all too often found defective. '55 Thus, according to Craven, it is rare to 
consider duress when assessing a treaty's validity, because it 'comes to operate in such a 
context.. .as an independent variable that may (or may not) render an agreement invalid, 
rather than something that goes to an evaluation as to whether or not there has been an 
agreement in the first place. ' 56 
Such an approach appeared to motivate the Court, and yet Arguello-Gomez 
expressed surprise, not so much over the Court's silence, but Libya's. It must be 
remembered that in 1955 France was embroiled in the Algerian civil war and had continued 
52 Libya/Chad, at para 55; Libya/Chad (sep. op. Ajibola), at para 88. 
53 This provision reads: 
The Government of France and the Government of Libya undertake to grant freedom of movement to nomads 
from tribes that traditionally trade on either side of the frontier between Algeria, French West Africa and 
French Equatorial Africa, on the one hand, and Libya, on the other, so as to maintain the traditional caravan 
links between the regions of Tibesti, Ennedi, Borkou, Mourzouk, Oubari, Ghat, Edri and Ghadames, on the 
other. 
Quoted in Libya/Chad, at para 53. 
54 
'This provision [quoted directly above] refers specifically to (inter alia) the frontier between French 
Equatorial Africa and Libya; and it is clear from its terms that, according to the parties to the Treaty, that 
frontier separates the French-ruled regions of Tibesti, Ennedi and Borkou ... which are sometimes referred to 
as "the BET", on the one hand, and the Libyan regions of Koufra, Mourzouk, etc. on the other.' Libya/Chad, 
at para 53. 
55 M Craven, 'What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The Continuities of Informal Empire' (2005) 74 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 335, at 3 77. 
56 Ibid. See also, J Crawford, 'The General Assembly, the International Court and Self-Determination', V 
Lowe & M Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir 
Robert Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 585-605, at 602. 
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to maintain its troops in Libyan Fezzan, much to Libya's chagrin. Libya conceded in its 
Memorial that 'the sine qua non of any treaty with France was the withdrawal of French 
forces ', 57 and yet it never expressed the conviction that this French duress vitiated the 1955 
Treaty; indeed Chad provided more information on this in its oral pleadings.58 At best, 
Libya was providing some context to the Treaty's inception.59 We can only hypothesise as 
to Libya's motives for abstaining from a more detailed discussion of the 1955 context, but 
given the difficulties it faced over the Lockerbie incident during the proceedings, as well as 
its record of aggression towards Chad, it is possible to suggest that it was wary of bringing 
attention to the use of force.60 
Despite the reluctance of Libya and the Court to confront the implications of the 
presence of foreign troops in the shadows of treaty agreements, Libya was more 
comfortable in discussing inequalities of legal skill and representation vis-a-vis France and 
Libya in 1955. As was the case for much of Libya's pleadings, the Court did not engage 
with this particular idea of Libya's, but it is useful to appreciate the Libyan position, as it 
tried to represent the challenges faced by newly independent states in an increasingly 
postcolonial world. Libya regarded Chad's assertion that Libya was well-advised and thus 
on an equal footing with France in 1955, as 'a preposterous suggestion.'61 Libya instead 
highlighted that at the time it was 'one of the poorest nations in the world'62 and that the 
'Libyan [negotiating] team were hopelessly outclassed by their French counterparts' 63 , 
whose 'tactic was to trick' them.64 To conjure up the image of two parties able to discuss 
their grievances on an even-handed basis in the context of the threat of force rang hollow. 
The challenge of informal inequalities in treaty-making persists and has not necessarily 
57 Libya, Memorial, at p. 365. Also see Libya, Counter-Memorial, at 83. 
58 For example: 'L'objection de M. Ben Halim [for Libya] ace moment la, ne porte pas sur la delimitation des 
frontieres, mais sur sa concomitance avec !'evacuation des troupes fran9aises du Fezzan.' [The objection 
raised by M. Ben Halim of Libya at this point does not have a bearing on the determination of the boundary 
lines, but on its coincidence of this determination with the evacuation of French troops from Fezzan] 
Libya/Chad, CR 1993/32, 14 July 1993, Chad, Professor Cot, p. 42. 
59 According to Koskenniemi, 'Bien que la Libya n'ait pas deduit de ces elements la conclusion que la validite 
de Traite de 1955 pouvait etre mise en cause, elle a neanmoins soutenu que, pour !'interpretation de cet 
instrument, ii y avait lieu de tenir compte de cet ensemble de facteurs.' [Even though Libya did not infer from 
these elements the conclusion that the validity of the 1955 Treaty could be put into question, it nevertheless 
maintained that to interpret this instrument [the 1955 Treaty] there was reason to take into account these 
factors together.] Koskenniemi, supra n 3, at 449. 
60 See also Arguello-Gomez, supra, n 29, at 179. 
61 Libya, Counter-Memorial, at 55. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid, at 56. 
M Libya/Chad, CR 1993/14, 14 June 1993, Libya, Professor Bowett, at 25. 
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eased in an era free from acknowledged forms of colonial rule. The Court chose not to 
explore this conundrum, reflecting international legal doctrine, which has tended to ignore 
instances of duress save in extreme and glaring cases. It is not surprising that the Court was 
unwilling to accept Libya's rather radical argument, but even when presented with the 
opportunity to offer some guidance about the law on unequal treaties it remained mute.65 
The majority judgment as well as the opinion of Judge Ajibola sought to consider 
'the subsequent attitudes of the Parties to the question of frontiers' ,66 as per Article 31 (3) 
of the Vienna Convention.67 The Court examined a number of treaties and concluded that 
'there is support for the proposition that after 1955, the existence of a determined frontier 
was accepted and acted upon by the Parties. '68 Indeed, a number of provisions contained 
within treaties signed in 1966, 69 1972, 70 1974, 71 1980 72 and 1981 73 indicate 'that both 
Parties are perfectly aware of the location and establishment of their common boundary. ' 74 
On the flipside, although there were many opportunities after Chad's independence in 1960, 
'Libya did not challenge the territorial dimensions of Chad as set out by France.'75 Thus, 
Judge Ajibola invoked the principle of estoppel to hold that as 'an acquiescent State, Libya 
is precluded from denying or challenging the validity of the boundary established by the 
1955 Treaty.'76 It is undeniable that Libya's position was weakened by its failure to act 
within a reasonable time after the 1955 Treaty, but once again, the Court's oversight in 
65 J Castellino & S Allen, Title to Territory in International Law: A Temporal Analysis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2003), at 11 6. 
66 Libya/Chad, at para 66. 
67 This provision reads as follows: There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of 
its provisions; any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation; any relevant rules of international Jaw applicable in the relations between 
the parties. 
Cited in Libya/Chad (sep. op. Ajibola), at para 89. 
68 Libya/Chad, at para 66. 
69 The Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendship between the Republic of Chad and the United 
Kingdom of Libya, 2 March 1966, Libya, Memorial, International Accords and Agreements Annex, vol 2, no. 
33. 
70 The Agreement on Friendship and Co-operation, 23 December 1972, Libya, Memorial, International 
Accords and Agreements Annex, vol 2, no. 34. 
71 Agreement between the Libyan Arab Republic and the Republic of Chad, Tripoli, 12 August 1974, Libya, 
Memorial, International Accords and Agreements Annex, vol 2, no. 35. 
72 The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the 
Republic of Chad, 15 June 1980, Libya, Memorial, International Accords and Agreements Annex, vol. 2, no. 
37. 
73 Accord between Libya and Chad, 6 January 1981 , Libya, Memorial , International Accords and Agreements 
Annex, vol. 2, no. 38. 
74 Libya/Chad (sep. op. Ajibola), at para 93. 
75 Libya. Chad, at para 68. 
76 Libya/Chad (sep. op. Ajibola), at para 98. 
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relation to Chad's inaction is no less puzzling. As was briefly discussed above, the Aouzou 
Strip was occupied intermittently by Libyan troops from the 1970s, and yet, afforded with 
the ideal opportunity to set the record straight amidst treaty negotiations, Chad did not even 
attempt to question Libya's presence within its borders: 
Il faut alors que nos honorables contradicteurs nous expliqucnt comment est-ce 
possible - puisque d'apres eux le traite de 1955 delimitait la frontiere sud entre la 
Libye et le Tchad - qu'en decembre 1972, lors de la visite et des discussions des 
Tchadiens a Tripoli: 1) les Tchadiens n'aient pas proteste contre la presence 
libyenne dans la bande d'Aouzou; 2) qu'ils aient signe un traite d'amite, de 
cooperation et d'assistance mutuelle avec un Etat qui occupait leur tcrritoire?77 
Argilello-Gomez also acknowledges this discrepancy and 'found it astounding that the 
Court ... should have ignored the implications of the attitudes' as reflected in Chad's 
apparent acquiescence in Libya's presence in the Aouzou Strip.78 
Thus, in a judgment 'caracterise par une tonalite positiviste' and 'une approche 
purement textuelle ',79 the Court examined the specifications of the various annexed treaties 
in Article 3 of the 1955 treaty to determine the boundary. In its disposit!f, the Court held 
By 16 votes to 1, 
(1 ) ... that the boundary between ... [Libya and Chad] is defined by the Treaty of 
Friendship and Good Neighbourliness concluded on August 10 1955 between the 
French Republic and the United Kingdom of Libya; 
(2) ... that the course of the boundary is as ... indicated ... on sketch-map No. 4 
[please find attached]. so 
77 [Our opponents should then explain to us how it is possible - since according to them the 1955 treaty, 
delimited the southern border between Libya and Chad - that in December 1972, at the time of the visit and 
discussions of the Chadians at Tripoli: 1) the Chadians did not protest against the Libyan presence in the 
Aouzou Strip; 2) that they signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with a state that 
was occupying their territory?] Libya/Chad, CR 1993/18, 18 June 1993, Libya, Mr Cahier, at 32. 
78 This was also echoed in Libya's oral submission: 'Non seulement ii ya eu silence de sa part mais ii ya eu 
un comportement qui est en totale contradiction avec ce qu'il soutient aujourd'hui: aucun Etat ne signe quatre 
traites d'amite avec un Etat qui est cense occuper une partie de votre territoire et je ne mentionne meme pas 
Jes remerciements d 'hommes politiques tchadiens a la Libya.' [Not only was there a silence on its part, but 
also a conduct that is in total contradiction with what it maintains today: no state signs four treaties of 
friendship with a state that is meant to be occupying a part of your territory, not to mention all the [friendly] 
acknowledgments to Libya made by Chadian political figures.] Libya/Chad, CR 1993/28, 7 July 1993, Libya, 
Professor Cahier, at 62. Argi.iello-Gomez also discusses the puzzling attitude taken to the Court in relation to 
the subsequent conduct of France (on Chad's request) in failing to register the 1955 Treaty until after 'the 
initiation of proceedings' on Chad's request. As in the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain, discussed in 
Chapter Four, the Court decided not to draw any inferences from this conduct. Arguello-Gomez strongly 
states that this behaviour reflects negatively on the fundamental requirement of good faith in treaty formation. 
Arguello-Gomez, supra, n 29, at 181-183. 
79 [characterised by a positivist one and a purely textual approach] Koskenniemi, supra n 3, at 443. 
80 Libya/Chad, at para 77. 
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In contrast to the majority's detached engagement with the past, Judge Ajibola 
acknowledged some of the Case's broader themes, even if he chose to cast his vote with the 
majority. It is worthwhile quoting his poetic opinion at length: 
For about a century, perhaps since 1885 when it was partitioned, Africa has been 
ruefully nursing the wounds 
inflicted on it by its colonial past. Remnants of this unenviable colonial heritage 
intermittently erupt into discordant social, political and even economic upheavals 
which, some may say, are better forgotten than remembered. But this ' heritage' is 
difficult, if not impossible to forget; aspects of it continue, like apparitions, to rear 
their heads, and haunt the entire continent in various jarring and sterile 
manifestations: how do you forget unhealed wounds? One aspect of this 
unfortunate legacy is to be seen in the incessant boundary disputes between African 
States.81 
Perhaps overwhelmed in the face of such challenges, the Court decided it was best to take 
solace in the comforts provided by a dose of strict (if somewhat selective) treaty 
interpretation coupled with its endorsement of the stability of borders. In deeming it 
'unnecessary to consider the history of the "Borderlands'", 82 the Court effectively turned 
away from some of the Case's most intriguing elements. The evolving arguments of both 
Libya and Chad, however, offered their own appreciation of the relationship between the 
past and the present in international law for postcolonial states. Some of these arguments 
are considered below. 
81 Libya/Chad (sep. op. Ajibola), at para 7. 
82 Libya/Chad, at para 75. 
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As is the case in any contentious case before the ICJ, the primary concern of each Party is 
to mount as strong a claim 
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as possible by rallying all of the 'legal' materials at its disposal. Thus the arguments 
themselves, especially in the hands of foreign lawyers, cannot be regarded as embodying 
the sentiments of states directly, and it is questionable whether such an endeavour would 
even be possible. The historical experience and the contemporary positions of the parties 
simply provide a framework from which to gamer the most robust of propositions. Thus, 
while two states may find their positions diametrically opposed in the Case itself, in many 
areas of state practice away from the Peace Palace they may often work in concert. To a 
large extent the participants operate in a tightly circumscribed scenario of storytelling 
where many of the rules are pre-ordained, and this is especially the case for postcolonial 
states, which only contributed occasionally to the development of international rules as 
subjects before their independence. Both Libya and Chad wished to walk away from this 
matter victorious in their opposing territorial claims. Their pleadings, however, were 
already framed by their historical experiences of statehood during the colonial period. 
Parties will always choose certain points to emphasise or obscure. But when states, such as 
Chad, were constituted with little thought for indigenous patterns of authority and rule, it is 
understandable that such a state should accept the realities of colonially-determined borders 
instead of instability and uncertainty. According to Libya, '[a]ll Chad had to do was to 
piece together the already fully prepared, well-articulated French case', 83 relying on 'an 
extreme pro-colonial view of international law. '84 Libya, on the other hand, was in a much 
better position to draw on its rich heritage of documented control over the territories. 
Thus, out of the practice of European colonialism, Libya and Chad had significantly 
different experiences of statehood, and consequently advanced contrasting arguments 
before the ICJ. In this section, some of the discursive strategies used by the parties are 
explored to try and understand why the Court was so dismissive of Libya's claims. What 
was it about Libya's case that was so unconvincing for the Court and why were Chadian 
arguments preferred? 
a) Discourses on Non-Western Sovereign Control in the Central Sahara 
Libya had acknowledged that the 1955 Treaty was of central importance for the Court in 
determining title over the Aouzou Strip. If the 1955 Treaty were definitive in marking the 
83 Libya/Chad, CR 1993114, 14 June 1993, Libya, Mr Maghur, at 57 . 
84 Libya/Chad, CR 1993/19, 21 June 1993, Libya, Professor Crawford, at 29. 
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Chad/Libya southern border, then there would be no need to examine an account of earlier 
ejfectivites. Libya was willing to concede some effect to the 1955 Treaty, but only in 
demarcating certain parts of its borders, excluding its southern sector.85 Libya argued that 
the Treaty was unclear about the status of the Aouzou Strip, and because of this deficit, 
other arguments had to be explored by the Court. It pointed out that 
Determining the territorial extent of these claims, it is evident that effectivites - the 
situation on the ground and the related conduct of the various participants: the 
indigenous peoples, the Senoussi Order, the Ottoman Empire, France, Italy, and 
Great Britain - considered in their broadest aspect will have an important role to 
play.86 
Here, Libya was asking the Court to reflect on the historical dimensions of the Case and 
move beyond the confines of the 1955 Treaty. 
One of the central pillars of Libya's case rested on the idea of indigenous-Ottoman 
rule over the disputed territories. Libya argued that this precolonial title would defeat any 
subsequent French or Italian claims where indigenous-Ottoman effectiveness could be 
proven. Thus not only would the treaties annexed in the 1955 Treaty be invalid, but Libya 
also characterised its sovereign title over the Aouzou Strip as founded on a direct line from 
this indigenous-Ottoman or Senusi-Ottoman title and subsequent Italian succession after 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 87 As Ricciardi argues in his magisterial study 
published on the eve of proceedings, this Case raises some perplexing questions about 
existing understandings of sovereignty's interrelationship with the contours of the 
postcolonial state. For although the 
[p ]resent system has produced stability in African boundaries ... [i]t has 
failed ... to satisfy genuine beliefs of title, such as Libya's, that rest on 
notions of sovereignty that Western law traditionally has not appreciated or 
accommodated. Consequently, the manner in which the Court resolves this 
conflict will have potentially far-reaching implications for Africa and for 
boundary law in general.88 
85 Libya, Counter-Memorial, at para. 3.105. 
86 Libya Counter-Memorial, at para. 5.10. 
87 
'L'ltalie succeda a I'Empire ottoman dans le droit souverainete sur la totalite du territoire libyen, tel que la 
Porte le contr6lait precedemment, y compris done la zone qui fonne l'objet du present differend. ' [Italy 
succeeded to the Ottoman Empire in its right of sovereignty over the totality of the Libyan territory, as it was 
previously controlled by the Porte, including therefore the zone that forms the object of the present conflict.) 
Libya/Chad, CR I 993/16, 16 June 1993, Libya, Professor Condorelli, at 50. For an overview about Ottoman/ 
Sem1sI relations, see Ahmida, supra n 13, at ch 2. 
88 MM Ricciardi, 'Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis' (1992) 17 Yale Journal of 
International Law 301, 308. 
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Even though the Court found it 'unnecessary' 89 to respond to Libya's arguments, the very 
act of articulation opens up the possibility of an international law informed by much more 
than the Western experience of state formation. 
Libya sought to ground its title within the tradition of Islamic political thought and 
state practice. Perhaps concerned that the Court was unfamiliar with the lexicon it was 
using to describe principles about authority over territory within Islam,90 Libya began its 
presentation by reminding the Court that the 'Islamic world was not primarily concerned 
with concepts such as boundaries or territorial sovereignty.'91 We saw in Chapter Two that 
Islamic authority theoretically is grounded in allegiance between a ruler and the umma, 
rather than territorial control per se. In Sunni practice after the death of the Prophet, the 
Caliphate became the central institution of rule in the Islamic community, representing God 
on earth. Although Ottoman sultans failed to fulfil some of the required attributes of the 
Caliphate, the Sublime Porte gained significant legitimacy through the idea of the 
Caliphate. Even in lands not under its direct rule, the office of the Caliph still generated 
respect for Ottoman rule, and this was especially so during the colonial period when Islam 
was threatened by Christian powers. Thus, when Chad tried to portray Libya's predecessor, 
the Seniisi Order, as purely religious, such an argument somewhat missed the point of 
Libya's thesis, which relied on the interplay between Sem1sl and Ottoman rule and the 
territorial effects of religious authority.92 
As has also been argued in cases such as Western Sahara, Dubai/Sharjah, Qatar v 
Bahrain and particularly, Eritrea/Yemen, 93 authority in Islamic societies (and in most 
African societies as a whole) 94 was often the product of personal allegiances based on 
religious affiliations. According to Lambton, who was quoted by Libya: 
89 Libya/Chad, at para. 75. 
90 It should be noted that one of the Court's members during the case, Judge Weeramantry, is an authority on 
the subject of Islam and international law. See his book: C G Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An 
international Perspective (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2001 ). 
91 Libya, Memorial, at 31. 
92 
' [L]a confrerie [i.e. the Senoussi Brotherhood or ikhwan] est, sans aucun doute, sortie du role purement 
religieux que lui avail imparti son fondateur. 11 n'en resulte cepedent pas qu'elle ait exerce un pouvoir 
souverain sur le territoire et Jes populations des regions [of the borderlands]'. [There is no doubt that the 
Brotherhood went beyond the religious role that its founder intended. This does not however mean that it 
exercised sovereign control over the territory and the populations of the region.] Chad, Counter-Memorial, 27 
March 1992, at 28. 
93 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) (1975) I.CJ .Reps., p. 12; Dubai/Sharjah Border Arbitration, Arbitral 
Award, 19 October 1981, (1993) 91 ILR 543; Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the 
Proceedings, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea/ Yemen), 9 October 1998. 
94 
'[P]olitical power in precolonial Africa was exercised not over land but over people.' J Herbst, 'The 
creation and maintenance of national boundaries in Africa ' 43 ( 1989) International Organization 673, al 679. 
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The basis of the Islamic state was ideological, not political, territorial or ethnical 
and the primary purpose of government was to defend and protect the faith, not the 
state ... Political boundaries were unknown to Islam except those that separated the 
dar al-islam, the area inhabited by Muslims from the dar al-harb,95 the abode of war 
inhabited by unbelievers. '96 
The Western Sahara Case was acknowledged by both Libya and Chad in this regard and 
will be discussed in the following section's discussion of occupation and terra nullius. 
Although territories comprising the Libya-Chad borderlands and beyond were far 
from the centres of Islamic power, they were still subject to the many - often Islamic -
influences that shaped nascent states in North Africa from the sixteenth century onwards. 
Territories on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire were only ever under its indirect rule, 
but its influence was significant for this Case through the examples of the nearby 
'Regencies ' of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli as well as Egypt. 97 Also, prior to European 
colonialism, Libya asserted that ' there existed in both the Sahara and the Sudan regions of 
North Africa politically organized societies, closely linked by transaharian trade and 
cultural contacts. '98 Libya invoked this history not only to highlight its rich and esteemed 
lineage in contrast to Chad's, but also to illustrate how indirect Ottoman authority and its 
international legal personality was an essential ingredient in this process of sovereign 
consolidation.99 In relation to the above entities, Libya admitted that 
All four States enjoyed a wide degree of independence from the Porte; but 
they accepted the religious supremacy of the Sultan-Caliph in 
Constantinople as well as Ottoman sovereignty. In fact these states had 
entered into treaties and consular relations with other Powers and had even 
made war and peace with the sovereign 'Christian' Powers as far back as the 
161h Century, clearly evidencing their status as subjects of international 
law. 100 
Here, Libya was referring to the concept of dual, or shared, sovereignty that lay at the heart 
of its case in relation to the Aouzou Strip. 
95 These concepts are discussed further in Chapter Two at 68-69. 
96 A K S Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political 
Theory: The Jurists ( 198 1 ), cited in Libya, Memorial, Documentary Annexes, vol 1, Exhibit 12. 
97 The Barbary Powers are discussed in Chapter Two, at 122. 
98 Libya, Memorial, at 70. 
99 
' ... in the early 1800s, questions of nationality and boundaries had little meaning in the Muslim regions of 
North Africa. What mattered was the common sharing of Islamic beliefs and loyalty to the Caliph.' 
Libya/Chad, CR 1993/19, 21June 1993, Libya, Mr Maghur, at 18. 
100 Libya, Memorial, at 73. 
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Libya conceded that the Ottoman presence to the south of Tripoli at the tum of the 
twentieth century was not enough in and of itself to found title in international law; the 
SenusI Order's stewardship of desert tribes provided the vital local link for Libyan claims 
deep into the Sahara. Conscious of this desert context, Libya pointed out that it was 
necessary to establish a lower threshold of effective Senus1 control over 'such barren 
areas' 
101 
as per well-developed case law on the subject. 102 Although the Senfis1 Order is 
best characterised as a revivalist religious movement established in the 1830s to bring 
education and purity of faith to Muslims in north and central Africa, its development was 
intimately connected with the concurrent expansion of European colonialism in Africa. 103 
Thus, despite the Order's disdain for all things non-Muslim, its direct and indirect 
confrontation with Christian powers provided a coherent raison d'etre: resistance against 
the impending threat to Islam's presence in the Sahara's expanses.104 It was the opinion of 
the Ottomans by the late nineteenth century that the ' people of this land are mostly the 
followers of his Holiness the Sheikh Senusi, there being a large Senusi lodge [or zawiyya] 
venerated by many. ' 105 These Seniisl 
lodges built at tribal centres, or at watering places and junctions on the trade and 
pilgrim routes, served as monasteries, schools, hostels, sources of advice and 
mediation and, in due course, as administrative centres. 106 
Thus, in the face of a French 'crusade against the Orient in general and Islam in particular 
under the pretext of spreading civilisation', the Senfisl sought to 'spread true civilisation 
101 Libya went on to add that ' [t]he nature of the Sahara Desert must be understood in the context of colonial 
times; only its oases were places to inhabit; it was a region to pass through' . Libya, Memorial, at 8. 
102 See especially, Island of Pa/mas Case 1 RlAA 829; 4 !LR 3 [1928] The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case 
(France/United Kingdom) ( 1953) ICJ Reps, p.47; Status of Eastern Carelia (Advisory Opinion) 1923, P.C.IJ. , 
Series B, No. 5; Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) (1975) !CJ Rep 12. Later in its Memorial, Libya 
discusses perceived European double standards on this very point: 'It was a bit naive and certainly self-
serving of the French to maintain that, because evidence of Ottoman sovereignty was· sparse by European 
standards at the time, it did not exist - and to ignore the fact that it had long pre-existed France's attempt at 
colonisation. At the time, only sparse control was necessary or possible in such a desert environment; but 
under Islamic concepts of sovereignty and boundaries it was nonetheless a very real assertion of sovereignty.' 
Libya, Memorial, at 32. 
103 Al Faruqi argues that the Senousi Order can be understood as an offshoot of the Arabian Wahhabi 
movement, as discussed briefly in Chapter Two, at 84. I R Al Faruqi, 'The Ideal Social Order in the Arab 
World' (1969) 11 Journal of Church & State 239, at 243. 
104 G Joffe, 'The Role of the Sanusi in the Central Sahara', Libya, Reply, 14 September 1992, vol 2, at 8. 
105 The Report of Muhammad Basala, Ottoman Emissary to sub-Sahran Africa, Ottoman Archives, 11 April 
1894, Libya, Memorial, Documentary Annex, vol 6. 
106 J Wright, Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara (London: Hurst, 1989), at 84, quoted in Libya, Memorial, at 
44. 
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and true knowledge' by instructing the 'savages' of the Central Sahara.107 Africa was the 
object of more than one civilising mission, and it was not surprising that Europeans were 
wary of this threat to their expansion: primary sources cited by Libya engender a deep 
distrust and demonisation of the Order. 108 Libya's reference to this historical period can 
thus be appreciated as an attempt to challenge not only dominant legal doctrines but the 
historical assumptions informing the law as well. 
Through a combination of such Senusf control on the ground and the institution of 
the Ottoman Caliphate, Libya argued that territories extending even beyond Lake Chad 
were precluded from European occupation because of the presence of dual sovereignty.109 
Essentially, Libya characterised sovereignty as comprising a local and an international 
dimension: 
[I]t was the Senoussi and the Senoussi peoples who held title to these regions and 
bore allegiance to the Caliph. The territorial rights of the Senoussi peoples were, in 
tum, represented on the international level by the Caliph to whom they paid 
allegiance. 110 
Libya tried to prove this title by presenting numerous instances where the Ottoman Empire 
had publicly rejected French and Italian claims while increasing its own presence in the 
areas either directly or through its proxy, the Senusl Order.11 1 Thus, around the period when 
spheres of influence were being declared by European states, Libya was at pains to show 
107 Letter from the Senoussi Leader, Sayyid Ahmed Sherif Senoussi, published in JI Giornale d'ltalia, 6 
August 1911, Libya, Memorial, Documentary Annex, vol 6, exhibit 47. The Senusl 'civilising mission' was 
strongly supported by the Porte as well: 'The Senusi Shaikbs have rendered undeniable services for mitigating 
the savagery of the local peoples and for improving their morals.' Letter signed by the Grand Vizier, 11 April 
1884, Libya, Reply, Documentary Annexes, vol 3, Exhibit 8.2. 
108 Libya, Memorial, at 53-55. See also Libya's discussion of European representations of the Ottomans in 
North Africa in ibid, at 103-104. 
109 For a good defence of the concept, see Libya/Chad, CR 1993/19, 21 June 1993, Libya, Professor 
Crawford, at 50-53; and Libya, Reply, at 223-224. 
110 Libya/Chad, CR 1993/20, 22 June, Libya, Mr Dolzer, at 29. In his dissent, Judge Sette-Camara as ad hoc 
judge for Libya, was in complete agreement with the Libyan line: ' historic title over the region belonged fust 
to the indigenous peoples, tribes, confederations of tribes, sometimes organized under the Senoussiya, and 
eventually passed to the Ottoman Empire before the colonial Powers set foot in the area.' Libya/Chad ( diss. 
op. Sette-Camara), at 94. 
111 It must be pointed out here that the nature of Ottoman- Seniisl cooperation is contested. In its pleadings, 
for example, Libya relied on the thesis of Evans-Pritchard, who coined the expression, 'Turco-Sanusi 
Condominium'. This idea remains dominant within the literature and is supported by some studies that point, 
for example, to Ottoman tax exemptions for the Senoussi. However, in his reappraisal of the evidence 
available, Le Gall questions such a simple account of mutual agreement and highlights ongoing tensions 
between the Senoussi Order and the Ottomans. Libya chose to overlook these discrepancies in the historical 
record, and it is no surprise; co-sovereignty would be harder to argue when its co-holders were in dissension. 
See G Joffe, 'Qadhafi 's Islam in Local Historical Perspective', D Vandewalle (ed), Qadhafi 's Libya, 1969-
1994 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), 139-154, at 143; M Le Gall, 'The Ottoman Government and the 
Sanusiyya: A Reappraisal' (1989) 2 1 International Journal of Middle East Studies 91; and Ahmida, supra n 
13,at 89. 
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that such statements could have no legal effect erga omnes; they were 'purely bilateral' 
undertakings by European powers. 112 For example: ' the Ottoman presence in the 
borderlands ... was a substantial presence and it was continuous between 1908 and the end 
of 1912, and it was in direct implementation of a claim of sovereignty. It was also carried 
on at the invitation of and in conjunction with the Seniisf tribes and . .. Order.' 113 Although 
the Italians ultimately overran the Ottomans, Libya argued that their title passed to Italy as 
a consequence of the 1912 Treaty of Ouchy 11 4 and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. 115 Sen us I 
rights remained, with Italy acting as the area's international overlord. 116 Thus, Libya 
somewhat anachronistically sought to demonstrate a direct link between its colonial and 
postcolonial manifestations: ' The Senoussi were Libyan: they were the very core of the 
new State.' 117 
Although Chad's pleadings were primarily concerned with the operation of the 1955 
Treaty, 11 8 it still devoted considerable energy to rebutting both the factual and legal claims 
of Libya's Senusl sovereignty thesis. Factually, Chad disputed the existence of a solid 
SenusI-Ottoman alliance, 119 and it regarded their respective displays of effective control as 
112 Libya/Chad, CR 1993/ 19, 21 June 1993, Libya, Professor Crawford, at 42. 
113 Libya/Chad, CR 1993/20, 22 June 1993, Libya, Mr Dolzer, at 22. 
114 
'[G]race ace traite de cession territoriale, l' Italie acquit le droit d'exercer sa souverainete sur l 'ensemble 
du territoire libyen que !'Empire ottoman lui cedait' Libya/Chad, CR 1993116, 16 June 1993, Libya, Professor 
Condorelli , p. 45. [thanks to this treaty of teITitorial cession, Italy acquired the right of sovereignty over all of 
Libyan territory that the Ottoman Empire had ceded to it.] Treaty of Ouchy between the Ottoman Empire and 
Italy, 15 October 1912, Libya, Memorial, International Accords and Agreements Annex, vol 2, no. 10. 
115 Chad vehemently disputed this interpretation of the treaties, arguing instead that the treaties were simply 
concerned wi th the Porte's renunciation of its territorial interests, rather than about the transfer of such rights 
to Italy. Libya/Chad, CR 1993/23, 29 June 1993, Chad, Professor Cassese, at 47. 
116 For a good summary of these arguments, see Libya/Chad, CR 1993/20, 22 June 1993, Libya, Mr Dolzer, at 
26-27. Examples of treaties forged between the Senusl Order and Italy recognising ongoing Seniisl rights 
include: Libya, Memorial, Documentary Annex, vol 2, Exhibit 16 &19. 
117 Libya/Chad, CR 1993/20, 22 June 1993, Professor Bowett, at 48. 
118 
'Pour le Tchad, le traite du 10 aoGt 1955 est la cle du differend.' Libya/Chad, CR 1993/21, 25 June 1993, 
Chad, Mr Dadi, at 13. [For Chad, the Treaty of 10 August 1955 is the key to the dispute] 
119 According to the French in 1934: the Ottomans 'were .. . in reality prisoners of the Senussi on whom they 
were entirely dependent, both for their supplies, their mail and their communications.' Letter from the French 
Minister for the Colonies to the French Foreign Affairs', 30 January 1934, Chad, Counter-Memorial, 
Documentary Annex, vol 3, Exhibit 74, at 212; and see Letter from Mr Rais, Head of the Consulate-General 
at Tripoli to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 5 September 1899, Chad, Reply, Documentary Annexes, vol 2, 
Exhibit 9, at 16. This questioning of the alliance in Chad 's pleadings has much merit, since by the time Libya 
presented its Seniisl sovereignty thesis in oral form it had abandoned any sense of historical contingency and 
characterised Seniisl and Ottoman relations in crude terms, e.g. see Libya/Chad, CR 1993/19, 21 June 1993, 
Libya, Mr Maghur, at 23. There may have been a degree of collaboration between the Senusl and the Porte, 
but it was also historically evident that the Seniisl Order regarded the Ottomans themselves as corrupt 
Muslims who had fallen from the true path of Islam; colonialism forced the two forces to compromise at 
times, but it is simplistic to speak in terms of a two-headed entity per se. See Ricciardi, supra n 88, at 342. 
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inadequate for the international law of the time. 120 It also characterised Libya's hypothesis 
of divided sovereignty between the Ottoman Empire and the Sern1sI Order as 
'invente ... pour servir le but irredentiste actuellement poursuivi par la Libye'. 121 Their 
summarised argument ran as follows in the oral pleadings: 
First that the Ottoman Empire never had title to the B.E.T., neither on the basis of 
effective control nor on any other basis. Second, that the Senoussi Order was never 
more than an intermittent source of religious influence, and to some extent political 
influence, ranging across northern and central Africa. This influence ... was weak in 
the B.E.T. Third, that the failure of the Ottomans and the Senoussi Order to 
establish an independent source of title is not retrieved by seeking to combine the 
two into one form of claimed joint sovereignty. Fourth, that the indigenous peoples, 
whose nature has been misrepresented by the Libyans, were the bearers of rights 
over the territory but were insufficiently organized to possess territorial sovereignty 
under international law.122 
Finally, Chad also rejected Libya's penchant for anachronism: it was 'misleading' to argue 
that modem Libya was a direct successor of the Sern1sI even its first ruler was of SenusI 
lineage. 123 
It is not necessary here to weigh up the competing historical assessments offered by 
Chad's rebuttal to Libya's case,124 but it is significant that Chad's underlying assumptions 
about title to territory were radically different from those of its counterpart. Chad's position 
12° For Chad's rebuttal of the Senusl thesis, see Chad, Counter-Memorial, 27 March 1992, at 199-238. 
121 [Invented to serve the irredentist goal pursued in reality by Libya] Chad, Counter-Memorial, 27 March 
1992, p. 174. Its remarks on divided sovereignty include: 'Mais meme en faisant abstraction d' un eventuel 
accord entre les deux parties, le Memoire libyen est mal fonde a un autre egard. Si l'on veut parler de 
"souverainete partagee" entre deux sujets de droit international, ii faut indiquer de quelle maniere cette 
souverainete etait partage: Jes deux parties avaient-elles le droit d'exercer les memes attributs souverains? 
Dans !' affirmative, pouvaient-elles les exercer d'une maniere concurrente, ou devaient-elles les exercer de 
fai;:on alternative? Si, en revanche, ii y avait une distinction de competences, quels pouvoirs souverains 
pouvaient etre exerces par une des parties, et quels autres pouvaient etre exerces par l'autre?', [But even apart 
from a possible agreement between the two parties, the Libyan Memorial is ill-founded in another respect. If 
we wish to speak of ' shared sovereignty' between two subjects of international law, we should indicate the 
manner in which this sovereignty is shared: did the two parties have the right to exercise the same sovereign 
characteristics/features? If it's in the affirmative, were they able to exercise them concurrently, or did they 
have to exercise them in an alternative manner? If, on the other hand, there was a distinction in the concurrent 
jurisdiction of competencies, which kind of sovereign powers were exercised by which of the parties?] Ibid, at 
173. 
122 Libya/Chad, CR 1993/23, 29 June 1993, Chad, Professor Shaw, at 63. 
123 Libya/Chad, CR 1993/24, 30 June 1993, Chad, Professor Shaw, at 18. See also Libya/Chad, CR 1993/21, 
25 June, Chad, Professor Pelllet, at 21. 
124 To summarise: Libya argued that SeniisI-Ottoman was effective until this title was then taken up by Italy. 
Libya was the later recipient of this title, and France was never successful in the requisite degree of effective 
control, especially in the face of persistent Senusi revolt and Ottoman statement to the contrary. Chad, 
conversely demonstrated that France successfully established its control over the region. In his detailed study 
of the history, Ricciardi holds that the French second occupation of the B.E. T. in 1929- 1930 secured title over 
the territory. Ricciardi, supra n 88, at 467. 
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suggested that the grammar of international law could not support arguments about shared 
sovereignty or indigenous people endowed with legal personality during the epoch of 
European colonialism. Such a stance can be understood as illustrative of a more traditional, 
or realist, discourse about the implications of colonialism's past, for as Chad reminds us: 
' on ne gomme pas l'histoire; le colonialisme ne peut pas etre mis entre parantheses, les 
peoples de les Etats d'Afrique ont pris acte de !'heritage.' 125 Thus, faced with the 
postcolonial paradox, Chad chose to use arguments typical of the coloniser to rebut Libyan 
links with the land. Through its arguments based on European notions of effective control 
and the characterisation of SenilsI -Ottoman rule as being purely religious, Chad employed 
grammars of argument familiar to the Court. International law is discursively flexible, but 
only to a degree, and when arguments are grounded in the 'hard' law of treaties, such as the 
1955 Treaty, it is not surprising that the Court was convinced by the Chadian perspective. 
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125 [One cannot erase history; colonialism cannot be bracketed, the peoples of the States of Africa are part of 
this heritage] Libya/Chad, CR 1993/21 , 25 June 1993, Chad, Professor Pellet, at 21. 
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b) International Legal Personality for Indigenous Africans during Colonialism? 
Libya and Chad Compared 
In Part H's Introduction, we saw how colonialism occurred within the discursive context of 
positivism, recognition, and the 'Standard of Civilisation'. Despite positivism's fixation on 
certainty and stability, its underlying assumptions about sovereign capacity and an 
international legal system based on recognition precluded entities that did not fulfil pre-
ordained standards of European civilisation.126 Thus, rules governing title to territory at the 
international level only applied to the subjects of international law as perceived at the time. 
Given that Libya asserted in this Case that the Senusl Order attained legal personality either 
directly or through the support of Ottoman oversight, both Libya and Chad spent significant 
time debating not only whether the Senilsl Order was factually able to fulfil standards of 
effective control, but whether international law at the time had recognised it as a subject 
rather than an object of its jurisdiction. Instead of trying to assess the relative cogency of 
the two arguments, this section sketches some of the different images of international law 
presented in the pleadings. 
In the absence of a treaty of cession, the crucial factor for determining whether the 
acquisition of territory was lawful rests on the status of the particular territory itself. The 
question that divided Libya and Chad was, 'Who was a subject of international law at the 
time?' Throughout the development of its submissions, Libya relied on the Court's decision 
in the Western Sahara Case to claim that the existence of analogous tribal structures in its 
borderlands prevented French occupation; occupation was only possible in terra nullius, 
and as in the Court's earlier decision, Libya argued that at no time had the disputed 
territories been terrae nul/ius.127 Although there is significant scholarly agreement on the 
nexus between occupation and terra nullius, 128 there is far less consensus on the definition 
of terra nullius. 129 This was especially so during the height of European colonialism, when 
sovereignty was interwoven with the requirements of civilisation; (European) state practice 
126 For a general discussion of this phenomenon, see A Anghie, 'Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and 
Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law' ( 1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1. 
127 Libya, Memorial, at para. 4.50-4.51. 
128 G Simpson, 'Mabo, International Law, Terra Nullius and the Stories of Settlement: An Unresolved 
Jurisprudence' 19 ( 1993-1994) Melbourne University Law Review 195, at 203-204. 
129 Ricciardi, supra n 88, at 394. 
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often denied the personality of peoples in Africa 130 except to imbue them with the capacity 
to cede their territory through highly questionable European-imposed agreements. 
Libya championed the rights of indigenous peoples before the Court, holding that 
international law could now retrospectively deem various non-European peoples the 
subjects of international law. 131 Chad contested Libya's hypothesis by arguing that past 
norms relating to conquest, as well as terra nullius, could not be rewritten: 
Jntertemporal law does not allow us to pretend that later, more palatable laws 
applied in the years before these more acceptable notions had evolved. Libya insists 
that this must mean that 'colonial aggression' remained lawful. But as Libya well 
knows, this simply begs the question of what was regarded as 'aggression' at the 
time. And, palatable or not, colonial conquest and 
occupation was not regarded as 'aggression' in 1913, nor in 1919.132 
Chad argued that state practice from the time was clear: European occupation of lands 
inhabited by non-European peoples was permitted in a context of unsettled law over the 
definition of terra nullius. Further, with the demise of the Ottoman presence - irrespective 
of its effectiveness - the borderlands were open to the claims of any European state willing 
to substantiate a declaration of its desires with effective control. Once again, Chad chose to 
rely on the discourse of colonialism to defeat Libya's expansive approach to legal 
personality at the end of the nineteenth century. 
c) 'Closet Colonialism 'before the Court? 133Chad's Successful Defence ofUti 
Possidetis Juris 
We saw m Part Two's Introduction that the norm of uti possidetis has received strong 
support from most African states since independence, and Chad and Libya are no 
exception; both states signed the Cairo Declaration of 1964.134 The resort to this norm in 
130 Shaw, Title to Territory, supra n 7, at 32-33. 
131 Libya/Chad, 93124, 30 June 1993, Chad, Professor Higgins, at 33. 
132 Libya/Chad, 93124, 30 June 1993, Chad, Professor Higgins, al 32. The importance of 191 3 was that it 
followed Ottoman withdrawal from the territory. On the other hand, for 1919 Libya sought to argue that as a 
result of Article I 0 of the Covenant of the League of Nations the international community had outlawed 
conquest as a mode of acquisition. Such an argument is controversial, however, as other opinions (including 
those of Chad) point to the wording of the provision which was only concerned with preserving the territorial 
inviolability of League members; it was possible that non-state entities fell outside of its protection. Article 10 
reads: 'The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.', cited in Libya/Chad, 
CR 1993/ 19, 2 1 .June 1993, Libya, Professor Crawford, at 54. 
133 Libya/Chad, CR 1993/ 19, 21 June 1993, Libya, Professor Crawford, at 44. 
134 Only Somalia and Morocco rejected the Declaration's call for the sanctity of territorial borders. McKeon, 
supra n 8, at 155. 
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legal argumentation is intriguing because its discursive practices tend to obscure highly 
political arguments behind the veil of doctrine; its use aids in the perpetuation of a 
restricted -international legal lexicon. By accepting colonial borders, both the ICJ and 
postcolonial states can avoid complex considerations of history and geography by focusing 
exclusively on the contours of colonial administration. Yet, reliance on uti possidetis is also 
a policy choice, and time and again its use is justified through familiar arguments based on 
'stability' and 'certainty' in the face of threatened anarchy and chaos. 135 These prefences 
can be understood as part of a grammar generative of speech acts producing a conservative 
worldview, and an international law free from unpleasant memories of the past. In his 
separate opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen acknowledged the importance of the finality of 
borders but cautioned against pre-empting boundaries; the policy of uti possidetis Juris can 
only be followed when a clear boundary exists. 136 Here, Judge Shahabuddeen is perhaps 
suggesting that more caution is required in the application of uti possidetis. The norm (or 
policy) can only do so much. Also, the norm is a policy choice often hidden behind the 
rhetoric of law. Libya's rejection of uti possidetis was just as 'legal' as Chad's, but in 
failing to reflect the dominant discourse employed in postcolonial territorial disputes some 
of its arguments fa iled to convince a bench content with established practice. 
Chad was an exemplar of uti possidetis not only in regard to the 1955 Treaty, but 
also the various annexed treaties. Through a three-pronged argument, Chad sought to 
demonstrate that the borders flowing from the 1955 Treaty were permanent, but that even 
supposing the Treaty's invalidity, the earlier treaties would be sufficient in their own right 
to establish French and then Chadian sovereignty 
over the Aouzou Strip. In the words of Libya, 'Chad now seeks to derive full benefit from 
the voracious appeti te of the Colonial Power.' 137 Chad characterised its support for the 
stability of boundaries in very different terms: Libya was 'seeking to promote anarchy,' 138 
and its claims constituted a threat to its very existence: 'il s'agit de son integrite territoriale, 
de son unite et de son developement economique.' 139 Further, Libya's attempt at boundary 
revision had implications beyond the immediate Case; Chad saw itself as a defender of 
135 Libya/Chad, at para 73. Chad Counter-Memorial, at para. l .O I . 
136 Libya/Chad (sep. op. Shahabuddeen), at 45. 
137 Libya, Reply, at 8. 
138 Libya, Reply, at 7. 
139 Libya/Chad, CR 1993/21, 25 June 1993, Chad, Mr Dadi, at 14. 
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African stability, 140 and such sentiments resonated with the Court. It is unsurprising that 
Chad invoked the policy of uti possidetis juris; it was an invaluable resource against the 
Libyan requests for a complete overview of competing indigenous and European interests 
in the area. Libya's claim that no boundary was in existence meant that the application of 
the uti possidetis principle was irrelevant for its argument; 141 the doctrine can only apply to 
boundaries reasonably settled at the time of decolonisation.142 It is likely that if Libya had 
access to a treaty favourable to its interests it too would have invoked uti possidetis juris. 
When we view Libya's wider approach to the litigation, however, it is clear that at 
least in this instance, its case was fundamentally sceptical about the extent to which 
Africa's borders should remain a product of their colonial past in the face of non-European 
claims to title. The norm's entrenched position especially in Africa may well confinn its 
borders and stave off possible conflicts, but uti possidetis' complicit relationship with 
European conceptions of authority highlights the effects of colonialism in a 'postcoloniaJ' 
era. In the face of such tensions, Castellino and Allen point to a ' continuing reluctance of 
the existing international regime to provide an effective means of redress against the 
international boundaries forged by the powers in disregard of pre-colonial territorial and 
ethnographic parameters.' 143 
5) An Historical Afterthought: The Implications of the Colonial Legacy in a 'Postcolonial' 
World 
140 
' l'affaire d' Aouzou est un enjeu au-dela du Tchad, puisque la Libye conteste radicalement le principe du 
respect des frontiers beritees de la colonisation que Jes Etats africains considerent, a la quasi-unanimite, 
comme une regle sacro-sainte et un rempart contre des revendications en cha!ne. ' [The dispute over the 
Aouzou (Strip] goes beyond Chad, since Libya is radically contesting the principle respecting inherited 
borders drawn by colonization that the African states consider, almost unanimously, as a sacred rule and a 
bulwark against any chain of claims.] Libya/Chad, CR 1993/21 , 25 June 1993, Chad, Mr Dadi, at 18. 
141 
'Libya's position is very clear: Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty confirmed the parties' acceptance of the status 
quo on the critical date based on the application of the principle of uti possidetis juris in accordance with the 
Article's criteria: "acts intemationaux en vigeur" on the critical date. It was not intended to modify the status 
quo. ' 'Article 3 ... achieved only a partial settlement of Libya's boundary problems.' Libya, Reply, at 48 & 54. 
142 The 'principle cannot be taken to mean that either an unsettled or a contested boundary can be converted 
into an agreed line simply by way of succession, nor may it preclude subsequent alteration with the consent of 
the parties concerned. However, it does mean that an agreed boundary established or confirmed in a treaty 
cannot be challenged simply on the grounds of a succession, and it does in reality and in practice reinforce the 
principle of territorial stability.' M N Shaw, 'The Heritage of Stales: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris 
Today' (1997) 67 British Yearbook of international Law 75, at 91 -92. See also Case Concerning the Frontier 
Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) ( 1986) ICJ Reps, p. 554, at 568. 
143 Castellino & Allen, supra n 65, at 11 7. 
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The Libya/Chad Case was never about pure historical enquiry since proceedings were 
played out within the confines of available international legal rules and strategies. 
However, all participants in the matter - the bench as well as the parties - could not ignore 
the historical record and more importantly, the political implications of historical 
interpretation. This chapter' findings endorse those of Simpson, who posits that 
one can see all the cases on acquisition as an attempt to reconcile the imperatives of 
law, history and politics. Each of these reconciliations has required the utilization 
of a number of interpretive techniques in law, and a variety of often conflicting 
constructions of historical truth. 144 
We cannot expect the Court to have adjudicated over the historical evidence of the parties 
per se; its mandate was to pronounce on the law, not the facts. However, territorial disputes 
in particular require the Court to engage in an intimate journey with the past to make sense 
of the legal present. Despite the possibility for a serious examination of many unsettled 
areas of law, the Court's judgment instead obscured these historical complexities. 'Une 
chose para1t claire en tout cas: la Cour repugne a attribuer un poids decisif a des faits 
historiques eloignes.' 145 Thus, in failing to question the colonial record while in relying on 
colonial agreements and their consequent boundaries, the Court can be seen as a champion 
of colonialism's continuing hold over international law. Judge Shahabuddeen articulated 
the majority's view of the past as well as its relationship to the dispute: 
The case at bar recalls a world now left behind. In telling fl ashes, it illuminates an 
age when international law tended to develop as a legal construct supportive of the 
global projection of the power of a single region; when in important respects it was 
both fashioned and administered by leading members of a select conununity; when 
that community, by itself called the international community, bore little 
resemblance to the world as it then stood, and even less to the world as it stands 
today. 146 
Libya's case can be seen as an attempt to reveal how the past portrayed by Judge 
Shahabuddeen can and should be acknowledged in the present; the Court's construction of 
a radical separation between past and present reinforced their inseparable bond more than 
ever. 
6) Conclusion 
144 Simpson, supra n 128, at 210. 
145 [One thing emerges clearly in any case: the Court refused to give decisive weight to distant historical 
events] Koskenniemi, supra n 3, at 457. 
146 Libya/Chad (sep. op. Shahabuddecn), ICJ Reps, at 44. 
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This Case could have been decided in a more expansive manner. The arguments of Chad 
and Libya could also have been different from those contained in the oral and written 
pleadings. Although the possibility of creative licence existed, Libya, Chad and the Court 
had to operate within the confines of international law's particular grammar and lexicon. In 
the case of the parties, they were also compelled to combine their presentation of legal 
doctrines with a particular interpretation of the colonial experience in the Aouzou Strip. For 
its part, Libya not only questioned the power relations behind colonial treaty formation but 
also challenged traditional conceptions of statehood by trying to endow the Senusf Order 
with international legal personality at a time when the 'Standard of Civilisation' ruled 
supreme. Libya attempted to convince the Court that the grammar of international law 
could support more expansive notions of indigenous sovereignty argued on the basis of an 
Islamically-inspired lexicon. Chad, on the other hand, chose to thwart Libya's line through 
the help of a far more traditional set of utterances framed by a grammar supportive of 
strictly positivist treaty interpretation and the disavowal of historical context. Perhaps as a 
result of its haphazard and arbitrary experience of state formation, it was more difficult for 
Chad to construct arguments based on precolonial forms of authority over territory. Even if 
Chad's legal team had entertained such an approach though, it was unnecessary. Traditional 
international legal principles furnished Chad with more than adequate ammunition to stifle 
Libya's alternative position, and the Court's subsequent silence in relation to many of the 
substantive issues raised testifies to the strength of Chad's litigation strategy. 
Through the devices of non-European legal personality, historical reinterpretation 
and a challenge to uti possidetis, Libya invited the Court to evaluate the relationship 
between the colonial past and the postcolonial present. The legal grammars employed on 
the Libyan side were more expansive in their nature as they sought to show that law should 
acknowledge historical and political considerations more overtly. The Case raised issues of 
great importance for international law as a tool of European and non-European nation-
states. Koskenniemi suggests that the question asked by Libya, yet overlooked by the Court 
was 
Le droit international doit-il servir a effacer les consequences negatives de 
colonialisme sur !'ensemble des structures sociales et politiques de l' Afrique? Ou 
bien doit-il etre considere comme un instrnment destine a renforcer la stabilite des 
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Structures existantes, de fayOll a prevenir, OU a tout le moins a retarder, «des luttes 
fratricides». 147 
The Court chose to disavow international law's colonial complicity. Through faith in the 
mechanisms of strict legalism haunted by the threat of an 'anarchic' and borderless Africa, 
the Court indicated that the scope of legal discourse was a very narrow one. Perhaps the 
ramifications of Libya's position were too hard to contain, and so instead the Court 
barricaded itself behind the law/politics dichotomy through excessive reliance on treaty 
interpretation that was deaf to the colonial context. Chad's adjudicative strategy, which 
typified the postcolonial paradox for Third World states intent on securing their selfhood, 
served its interests well. In the Case described in the following chapter, the Court was 
confronted with two parties closer in historical experience than Libya and Chad. Thus it 
will be instructive to compare Libya's and Chad's strategies with those of Bahrain and 
Qatar. 
147 [Should international law be used to erase the negative consequences of colonialism on the many social 
and political structures of Africa? Or should it be considered as an instrument destined to reinforce the 
stability of existing structures, so as to prevent, or at least delay, 'fratricidal strife'?] Koskenniemi, supra n 3, 
at 456. Here, Koskenniemi is quoting the Chamber in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) ICJ Rep, p. 
565, at para. 20. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
(De) Limiting the Past for Future Gain: 
The Relationship between Statehood, Colonialism and Oil in the Qatar v Bahrain 
Territorial Dispute 
1) Introduction 
A s in the case of the African continent, the Arab Gulf1 is home to a number of long-standing border disputes that have only rarely been settled through 
adjudicative methods.2 In contrast with much of Africa, however, the Gulf was 
able to sustain a significant degree of independence during the colonial period, but many of 
its states continue to confront difficulties in defining their borders in a region particularly 
unfamiliar with territorial demarcation. The discovery and exploitation of oil encouraged 
both foreign and local powers to construct regimes of territoriality, but how were such 
borders determined, and what role have legal arguments played in this endeavour? Three 
cases are available to answer this question: the two arbitrations between Dubai and Sharjah 
1 Until relatively recently, it was conventional in the West to refer to the body of water surrounded by the 
Eastern side of the Arabian peninsula, and southern Iraq and Iran as the 'Persian Gulf'. However, it is 
common for Arabs to refer to it as the Arabian Gulf, and as things stand no resolution has been reached. Thus, 
I will use neither adjective when referring to the area in general. When explicitly considering Arab states in 
the Gulf, I will refer to it as the Arab Gulf. This is hardly a ' final solution' in Amin's opinion, but a 
compromise for the time being: S H Amin, international and Legal Problems of the Gulf (London: Middle 
East and North African Studies Press, 1981), at 32. 
2 For a discussion of territorial disputes in the Gulf region, see R Schofield, 'Borders and Territoriality in the 
Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century', R Schofield (ed), Territorial Foundations of 
the Gulf States (London: UCL Press, 1994), at 1-77. 
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and Eritrea and Yemen and the ICJ dispute between Bahrain and Qatar. 3 The last case 
forms the subject of this chapter, but the other two cases serve as useful reference points, in 
exploring both local approaches to sovereign control and the link between European 
domination and treaty law. The Qatar/Bahrain dispute was similar to these other cases, and 
yet in its judgment the Court overlooked this jurisprudence altogether. As in the case of 
Libya and Chad, the Court was content to adopt a narrow approach to the problems 
presented, but we should still ask why the Court neglected these more expansive arbitral 
awards and what this highlights about the discursive avenues available to states seeking 
redress before the ICJ. 
Despite the Court's truncated response, the proceedings between Qatar and Bahrain 
was one of the most complex matters on the Court's docket. Indeed, this Case was 
procedurally one of the most protracted in the Court's history,4 the length of the material 
presented was unprecedented and it was only the second case to consider both territorial 
and maritime claims at the merits stage.5 After the Court rejected Bahraini opposition to the 
Court's jurisdiction in two preliminary judgments, 6 the scope of the Case was defined 
broadly to encompass all matters of contention between Qatar and Bahrain. The main 
territorial elements in dispute related to the states' a titre de souverain over the Hawar 
Islands7 and Janan Island as well as the region of Zubarah on the western side of the Qatari 
peninsula. Following the legal principle that the land dominates the sea,8 the Court used its 
territorial determination to oblige the parties' request for it to draw their maritime boundary 
according to general principles of international law. 
3 Dubai/Sharjah Border Arbitration, Arbitral Award, 19 October 1981, ( 1993) 9 1 ILR 543; Case Concerning 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar/Bahrain) (Merits) 
(2001) JCJ Reps, p. 40, hereinafter Qatar/Bahrain (Merits); Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute 
Award (Phase I), 9 October 1998, available from the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration: 
http://pca-cpa.org/ENGLlSH/RPC/#Eritrea. 
4 G Plant, ' Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain' 96 (2002) American 
Journal of International Law 198, at 198. 
5 Ibid, at 204. 
6 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar/Bahrain) (Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility) (1994) ICJ Rep 112; and Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar 
and Bahrain (Qatar/Bahrain) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (1995) ICJ Rep 6. 
7 The Hawar Islands are a series of islands off the Western coast of Qatar. The largest island is simply called 
Hawar and can be understood as representing the group as a whole. This point was one of some dispute in the 
case, but for the purposes of this chapter, Hawar and Hawar Islands are synonymous in meaning except where 
indicated. Please consult the map as we11, at 168. 
8 This is the maxim that especially grew out of the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of 
Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) ( 1969) ICJ Reps, p.3. 
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Given the scope of the Case, it is not possible to examine the pleadings and the 
judgments with due regard to all of their discursive elements. This chapter confines itself to 
aspects of the Case's territorial controversies,9 in keeping with the focus of the thesis on 
territorial disputes and their presentation of the legal grammars employed, for three reasons. 
First, territorial matters involving issues of local authority are the best avenue through 
which to explore the underlying interest of the thesis in Arab ideas about sovereignty and 
colonialism. Comparisons between Arab particularism and the ' universalism' embodied by 
the Court will also help us in answering the thesis ' second central question about 
international law's universality. Second, of the three main territorial issues, the chapter will 
limit its focus to two: the Hawar Islands and Zubarah. Janan does not raise distinct issues 
and was the least discussed in both the pleadings and the judgment. Third, the pleadings 
themselves went through many mutations, and so the chapter concentrates on the oral 
pleadings as expressions of the parties' final positions. 10 A particularly difficult and novel 
element of the Case was the matter of 82 disputed Qatari documents. Bahrain first 
'challenged the authenticity of 81 documents' 11 on 25 September 1996 after memorials had 
been submitted and shortly before counter-memorials were required. After many deta~led 
reports by Bahrain, as well as an interim report by Qatar, it was agreed that Qatar would 
withdraw the documents and no longer rely on them in its reply or oral pleadings.12 Despite 
this, Bahrain not only argued that Qatar's arguments did not reflect this change adequately, 
but that the affair fundamentally tainted the entire legal process. This example of evolving 
arguments highlights why the chapter has focused on the most recent material, namely the 
oral pleadings. 
Finally and most importantly, rather than survey all of the claims and findings over 
Hawar and Zubarah, this chapter emphasises those (sometimes central) arguments 
9 Both the Court and the Parties themselves acknowledged the primary role that the territorial claims played in 
the dispute, and so it is much more important to appreciate this aspect of the Case over and above maritime 
claims. Scholarly attention has also focused on the maritime aspects of the Case, see, 8 Kwiatkowska, 'The 
Qatar v. Bahrain Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Case' (2002) 33 Ocean Development and 
International Law 227; and Y Tanaka, 'Reflections on Maritime Delimitation in the Qatar/Bahrain Case' 52 
(2003) International and Comparative law Quarterly 53. 
10 Each Party presented weighty memorials, counter memorials and replies as well as voluminous documents 
at the written pleadings stage amounting to over ten thousand pages. Hearings before the Court accounted for 
five weeks of testimony, which often differed in emphasis from the earlier written memorials and were 
sometimes wholly new. 
11 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (200 I), al para 15. 
12 For a detailed overview of the forgeries affair written by Bahrain's Agent to the Qatar/Bahrain case, see J 
S Al-Arayed, A Line in the Sea: The Qatar v. Bahrain Border Dispute in the World Court (Berkeley, CA: 
North Atlantic Books, 2003), at 355-393. 
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concerned with either the special attributes of Arab sovereignty or the colonial legacy. Both 
Qatar and Bahrain fell under British ' protection' throughout much of the twentieth century, 
and since they are only relatively recent 'independent' entities, it is important to understand 
their own accounts of this process. Competing narratives over colonial histories and Arab 
practices will not in themselves generate a conclusive record of the past, especially since 
this Case was contentious. Further, given that strategic interests fuelled much of the 
argument, led by a largely Western legal team, it is not possible to distil any reified Arab 
perspective on international law. 
Nevertheless, what this Case does provide is a site where two Arab states were able 
to exchange ideas about their intertwined colonial histories through the prism of 
international law. Perhaps because of similar colonial lineages and far less pronounced 
disparities in wealth, the parties played more nuanced roles than the example of Libya and 
Chad in Chapter Three. Bahrain and Qatar manipulated the colonial record in subtle ways, 
sometimes favouring and sometimes rejecting the typical 'colonial' perspective. How these 
arguments were received and thus legitimised by the Court will be relevant in assessing the 
extent to which international adjudication was able to grapple with and be shaped by non-
European approaches to authority. What scope was there for dialogue about non-European 
modes of authority over territory? Further, how was the relationship between universalism 
and particularism within international legal discourse resolved? 
Although the Case raised many extra-legal and historical issues directly affecting 
the dispute, both the majority judgment as well as most academic responses overlooked 
these broader considerations. As the minority judgment argued, the complicated and long-
contested dispute warranted a careful examination of the interrelationship between history 
and law to satisfy both Qatar and Bahrain. The Court, however, fell short of offering a 
comprehensive decision. Why did the Court fail to confront this 'sordid' 13 colonial14 past, 
as revealed especially by Qatar, and did it give adequate attention to the specific regional 
aspects of authority? More broadly, we can also ask whether the option of international 
dispute settlement can adequately embrace experiences and perspectives at odds with 
international law's largely European origins. The main themes to emerge from this chapter 
13 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/7, 31 May 2000, Qatar, Sir Ian Sinclair, at para. 3. 
14 For convenience, I employ the terms 'colonial ' and ' colonialism ' in a very loose way because technically 
the relations between Britain and the Gulf sheikhdoms were neither equal nor colonial. In using the word 
colonial, though, I am deliberately wishing to emphasise that relations were based on a dynamic of British 
domination. 
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are the context of coercion informing ' colonial ' agreements, the legal implications of 
indigenous sovereignty and the uses of historical argument. These themes are similar to 
those explored in Chapter Three, but methods of argument and presentation produced quite 
different results for the parties. 
The chapter begins with an account of the general history of the dispute and the 
proceedings as well as the ruling itself. After an overview of the respective positions of the 
Court and the parties, three separate sections discuss the colonial legacy, the status of 
Hawar and then the status of Zubarah. The chapter concludes by assessing the implications 
of the Case for international law in the Gulf as well as the ICJ itself. 
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Map #7: The Gulf, source: J S Al-Arayed, A Line in the Sea: The Qatar v. Bahrain Border Dispute in the 
World Court (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2003), at 4. 
2) Background to the Dispute 
Although the historical backdrop to this dispute spans almost two and a half centuries, it is 
possible to identify some themes, including the persistence of tribal allegiances under 
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Ottoman and British control, the creation of special treaty relations and the discovery of oil. 
Bahrain, and particularly Qatar, endeavoured to depict this historical record by inundating 
the Court with collections of documentary evidence. This material was useful in detailing 
each party's claims, but its value was not wholly positive. First, documents were often 
haphazardly organised, illegible and repeated throughout the course of the three merits 
stages. Second, documents are never proof per se of an argument, and this is attested by the 
same documents being relied upon to advance conflicting claims. Second, the rationale for 
the inclusion of so many documents was often avoided in preference for the tendency to 
include anything and everything of even the most tangential relevance to the Case.15 Third, 
although this dispute concerned contested territorial and maritime claims by two Arab 
states, there was very little material available from the states themselves. This was 
explained in the oral pleadings as resulting from the parties' hailing from an 'Arab oral 
culture' .16 The unfortunate result of this, however, was an excessive deference towards the 
imperial records of both Britain and the Sublime Porte that arguably - and inevitably - have 
shaped the pleadings in a particular way. As in the dispute between Libya, and especially 
Chad, the parties did not acknowledge the problematic aspect of using colonial materials in 
the assertion of postcolonial personality. 
The geographical characteristics of Bahrain and Qatar have served as a curse and a 
blessing over the last few centuries of regional and international relations. Bahrain's 
strategic location along the trade routes between Europe and 'the Far East' meant that it 
was favoured by many foreign powers, including the Portuguese, the Persians, the 
Ottomans and the British. 17 Fresh water reserves 18 enhanced its desirability in the eyes of 
neighbouring tribes from the Qatari peninsula and the coastal mainland of modern day 
Saudi Arabia. To this day, Bahrain traces its roots to the Al-Khalifah tribe, which moved 
from Kuwait in 1762 to settle on the Western coast of Qatar in 1762. Later, in 1783, a 
group of Qataris along with the Al-Khalifahs drove out the Persians from Bahrain. This 
15 Or in the words of Bahrain, 'Some generalization is called for at the present stage of a case [oral pleadings] 
that has seen the introduction of so much documentary material. Qatar, in particular, has produced four times 
more pages of annexes than has Bahrain (even though Qatar has only used about 50 per cent of the documents 
submitted) .' Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/1 1, 8 June 2000, Bahrain, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, at para. 16. 
16 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 200015, 29 May 2000, Qatar, Ms Pilkington, at para. 9. 
17 G Joffe, 'Concepts of Sovereignty in the Gulf Region', R Schofield (ed), Territorial Foundations of the 
Gulf States (London: UCL Press, 1994), 78-93, at 84. 
18 This characteristic of natural underground springs account for Bahrain 's Arabic name (Ll!Y-!), which means 
two seas. 
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group of islands became the Al-Khalifah 'capital' in 1796, when rule was shifted from 
Zubarah to Bahrain, but with a continued presence in Zubarah. Despite this Al-Khalifah 
presence, Bahrain was constantly assailed by foreign and tribal powers. 
Britain had first secured a foothold in the region in 1783 with the establishment of 
the Bushire Regency in Persia as a new commercial outpost of the East India Company. 19 
In the interests of mutual British and Bahraini trade relations, a General Treaty was forged 
between the East India Company and Oman and Bahrain in 1820.20 Another general treaty 
with other Gulf powers soon followed.21 War was not altogether eradicated by this effort 
and so another treaty was established in 1853 between Britain and what came to be known 
as the Trucial coast.22 The independent ruler of Bahrain himself signed 'a perpetual treaty 
of peace and friendship' with Britain in 1861,23 where Bahraini assurances against piracy 
were balanced by British security. This relationship was enhanced by the 1892 Exclusive 
Protection Agreement between the Chief of Bahrain and the British Political Resident of 
the Gulf in Bushire.24 The treaty stipulated that neither the Chief nor his heirs were to enter 
into agreement or communication 'with any Power other than the British Government' . 
Also, agents from other powers were denied entry into Bahrain without British 
permission. 25 
Largely as a result of Qatar's inhospitable terrain and small population, it was not 
regarded with as much interest as its Bahraini neighbour from the perspective of the British. 
Treaty relations were first established in 1868, and as in the case of other Trucial 
agreements, maritime peace was to be observed.26 Under this agreement Qatar continued to 
pay tribute to Bahrain, which in tum passed these monies onto the WahhabI forces of the 
mainland. Partly in response to this Wahhabi threat from the Muslim heartland, the 
19 Joffe, supra n 17, at 88. 
20 General Treaty between the East India Company and the Friendly Arabs (Oman/Bahrain), 8 January 1820, 
70 CTS 463. Also see Preliminary Treaty between the East India Company and Bahrain, 5 February 1820, 70 
CTS 48 1. 
21 Preliminary Treaties between the East India Company and Shargah, Ras Al-Khaimeh, Dibai, Abu Dhabi & 
Zyah, 8-15 January 1820, 70 CTS 471. 
22 Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity between the Arab Chiefs of the Arabian Coast, 4 May 1853, 110 CTS 269. 
23 Qatar/Bahrain (2001), at para. 39. Convention between Great Britain and Bahrein, 31 May 1861 , 124 CTS 
163. 
24 Great Britain-Trucial Sheikbdoms, Exclusive Agreements, 6/8 March 1892, 176 CTS 457. 
25 Qatar/Bahrain (2001), at para. 44. 
26 Agreements between Great Britain and Qatar and Abu Dhabi (Trucial Sheikhdoms of Oman), 12, 16 
September 1868, 138 CTS 56. 
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Ottoman Empire, as the self-proclaimed protector of Islam's Holy Sites,27 had reasserted 
itself in the region from 1871, as was discussed more generally in Chapter Two. 28 A 
Turkish garrison was established at Doha on the Eastern side of Qatar, but it seems from 
many accounts that the ruling Al-Than! family simply flew the Ottoman flag at convenient 
moments and were only supportive of the Turks so as to repel the other foreign powers.29 
While the Ottoman Empire retained its largely land-based presence, Britain 
deepened its relations with the coastal sheikhs by establishing protection regimes.30 With 
the decline of Ottoman influence in the region, Qatar entered into a treaty of protection in 
1916, only three years after the Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1913 had guaranteed Qatari 
independence and with a consequent ban on Bahraini interference in its affairs. 31 The 
motivations behind protection agreements and their exact legal status will be considered 
below, but they at least set the backdrop to Britain's involvement in the parties' disputes 
over Zubarah and Hawar, which occurred frequently throughout the twentieth century. In 
the context of the growing demand for oil,32 the need for clearly defined borders became 
acute, especially for the British ' protectors' as well as British and American oil companies -
this in a region where tribes paid little heed to territorial boundaries and the notion of the 
nation-state had yet to take root.33 
Independence from Britain in 1971 did not bring about any fundamental change for 
Bahrain and Qatar regarding their territorial disputes. In the past, Britain had been the sole 
arbiter in these affairs, but after 1971 regional Arab powers filled this vacuum. Due to 
turbulence created in the region over the affair, Saudi Arabia offered its good offices from 
1976 onwards, and such efforts have continued with varying intensity through to the 
present. 34 In the course of Saudi-facilitated letter exchanges and meetings, the idea of 
27 Of Islam' s three most holy sites, two are in present-day Saudi Arabia: Mecca and Medina. 
28 
'By 1795 the Wahhabis had taken control of Central Arabia and reached the Hasa coast, and were preparing 
for further expansion ... In 1802 the holy city of Mecca fell to the Wahhabis, and from at least 1803 until 181 l 
both Bahrain and Qatar were subject to the influence of. .. the Wahhabi Amir. The extent of this power was an 
embarrassment to the Ottoman Sultan, who claimed to be the titular overlord of the Hijaz and the leading 
Muslim sovereign with the right to control the Holy Places.' Qatar, Memorial, Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), 30 
September 1996, at para. 3.1 I. Also see pages 85 & 141 of the thesis. 
29 F F Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), at 32. 
30 Qatar, Memorial, (Qatar/Bahrain) (Merits), 30 September 1996, at para. 3.11 , at 20. 
31 Schofield, supra n 2, at 32. 
32 Oil was first discovered in commercial quantities on Bahrain in 1932. Al-Arayed, supra n 12, at 161. 
33 For an overview of approaches to territory and borders in the Gulf generally, see Schofield, supra n 2, at 1-
77. 
34 Qatar/Bahrain, !CJ Reps (2001 ), at para. 66. 
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resolving the dispute before the ICJ grew in vigour, and after drawing up a mooted 
framework for the hearing in 1988, Qatar accepted this 'Bahraini formula' in 1990. 
3) The Jurisdictional Stage of the Case35 
Although Bahrain had designed the terms for which the parties would bring their claim to 
the Court, it strongly resisted Qatar's unilateral application to the Court in 1991, thus 
creating a complex ' interlocutory ' phase of the Case,36 which considered possible bases of 
the Court' s jurisdiction.37 Qatar grounded its jurisdictional claim on an exchange of letters 
between Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and itself in 1987, which included the following points: 
And 
All issues of dispute between the two countries, relating to sovereignty over the 
islands, maritime boundaries and territorial waters, are to be considered as 
complementary, indivisible issues, to be solved comprehensively together. 
In case that the negot1at1ons provided for in the fourth principle fail to reach 
agreement on the solution of one or more of the aforesaid disputed matters, the 
Governments of the two countries shall undertake, in consultation with the 
Government of Saudi Arabia, to determine the best means of resolving that matter 
or matters, on the basis of the provisions of international law. The ruling of the 
authority agreed upon for this purpose shall be final and binding. 
Aside from some disagreement over Zubarah, it was decided throughout the course of 
discussions that the dispute would be based on the Bahraini Formula. Later in 1990 at a 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting the Foreign Ministers from Bahrain and Qatar 
signed Minutes, whose translation was of central importance in the resulting jurisdictional 
hearings: 
(1 ) to reaffinn what was agreed previously between the two Parties; 
(2) to continue the good offices of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King 
Fahd Ben Abdul Aziz, between the two countries till the month of Shawwal, 1411 
H, corresponding to May of the next year 1991. After the end of this period, the 
Parties may submit the matter to the International Court of Justice in accordance 
35 For some general overviews of this stage of the case, see A M Campbell, 'International Law - Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Dispute - Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994 I.CJ. 11 2 (July I)' (1996) 19 Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review 573; and C Reichel, 'Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between 
Qatar and Bahrain' ( 1998) 26 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 725. 
36 J Klabbers, 'Qata r v. Bahrain: the concept of " treaty" in international Jaw' ( 1995) 33 Arch iv des 
Vdlkerrechts 361, at 375. 
37 For a good overview of the jurisdictional stage of the dispute, see M D Evans, 'Case Concerning Maritime 
Delimitation and Territoria l Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility' ( 1995) 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 691 . 
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with the Bahraini formula, which has been accepted by Qatar, and the proceedings 
arising therefrom. Saudi Arabia's good offices will continue during the submission 
of the matter to arbitration; 
(3) should a brotherly solution acceptable to the two Parties be reached, the case 
will be withdrawn from arbitration.38 
The translation of al-tarafan (<Jlu)=JI), variously rendered as ' the Parties' or ' both Parties', 
was particularly contested as its meaning directly affected whether it was possible for Qatar 
to show that unilateral seisen had been contemplated in earlier agreements. 39 The Court 
chose not to confuse itself with this debate in any substantive way and confined itself 
instead to the terms of the agreements. 
In its July 1994 judgment, the Court held by fifteen votes to one (Judge Oda 
dissenting on all four operative paragraphs)40 first, that 
the exchanges of letters between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Qatar 
dated 19 and 21 December 1987, and between the King of Saudi and the Amir of 
Bahrain dated 19 and 26 December 1987, and the document headed 'Minutes' and 
signed at Doha on 25 December 1990 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are international agreements creating rights and 
obligations for the Partics.41 
Second, that 
by the terms of those agreements the Parties have undertaken to submit to the Court 
the whole of the dispute between them, as circumscribed by the text proposed by 
Bahrain to Qatar on 26 October 1988, and accepted by Qatar in December 1990, 
referred to in the 1990 Doha M inutes as the 'Bahraini formula '.42 
38 This translation was submitted by Qatar. Bahrain 's translation is slightly different: 
I. To reaffirm what was previously agreed between the two Parties. 
2. The good offices of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd b. Abdul Aziz will 
continue between the two countries until the month of Shawwal 1411 A.H., corresponding to May 
1991. The two Parties may, at the end of this period, submit the matter to the International Court of 
Justice in accordance with the Bahraini formula, which the State of Qatar has accepted, and with the 
procedures consequent on it. The good offices of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will continue during 
the period when the matter is under arbi tration. 
3. If a brotherly solution acceptable to the two Parties is reached, the case will be withdrawn from 
arbitration. 
39 For a discussion of these translation difficulties, see J McHugo, 'The Judgment of the International Court of 
Justice in the Jurisdiction and Admissibi lity Phase of Qatar v. Bahrain: An Example of the Continuing Need 
for "Fact-Scepticism''' (1997) 28 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 171. 
40 See his separate judgment, International Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar/Bahrain) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (1994), (diss. op. Oda), p. 133. 
41 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar /Bahrain) 
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (1994) ICJ Rep 112, at para. 4 1 (1). 
42 Qatar/Bahrain (1994) !CJ Rep 112, at para. 41(2). 
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Third, that the parties could submit 'the whole of the dispute' to the Court within fixed (and 
very short) time limits, with the possibility of subsequent matters arising for its 
determination.43 Essentially, 'the Court decided that there was a special agreement, and this 
special agreement was sufficient for the Court to be seised, at least preliminarily. '44 
Although Bahrain was afforded the opportunity to frame the matter after the July 
1994 Judgment, it persisted in rejecting the Court's jurisdiction and so in its second 
judgment the Court settled on Qatar's application for defining the dispute. Thus by ten 
votes to five, the Court firstly found that 
it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute submitted to it between the State of 
Qatar and Bahrain 
and second 
that the application of the State of Qatar as formulated on 30 November 1994 is 
admissible.45 
The merits phase would be based on the following matters: 
1. The Hawar Islands, including the island of Janan; 
2. Fasht al Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah; 
3. The archipelagic baselines; 
4. Zubarah; 
5. The areas for fishing for pearls and for fishing for swimming fish and any other 
matters connected with maritime boundaries.46 
Despite Bahraini unease at this outcome, it decided to participate in the merits phase of 
proceedings so as not to prejudice its interests over the contested sites. Earlier agreements 
between Qatar and Bahrain had called for preservation of the status quo.47 In spite of such 
undertakings, there were a number of alleged breaches of the status quo in relation to the 
Hawar Islands throughout the nineties.48 
43 Qatar/Bahrain ( 1994) lCJ Rep, at para. 41 (3-5). 
44 Klabbers, supra n 36, at 362. Here, Klabbers is relying on Judge Oda's dissenting opinion, supra n 40. 
45 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar/Bahrain) (Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility) (1995) lCJ Rep 6, at para. 50(1-2). 
46 Qatar/Bahrain ( 1995) ICJ Rep 6, at para. 47. 
47 For example, the Agreement of December 1987 included the following provision: 
Until a final settlement for the disputed matter is reached ... : 
Each party shall undertake from to-date to refrain from any action that would strengthen its legal 
position, weaken the legal position of the other party, or change the status quo with regard to the 
disputed matters. Any such action shall be regarded null and void and shall have no legal effect. .. 
Qatar, Memorial, (Qatar/Bahrain) (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility), I 0 February 1992, at para. 
3.27. 
48 For a collection of notes verbales detailing these breaches, see Qatar, Counter-Memorial, vol 5; and Qatar, 
Reply, vol 5. 
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Before reviewing the Court's decision on the merits, it is necessary to comment on 
the ramifications of its 1994 and 1995 judgments relating to jurisdiction. The Court's 
determination that two informal agreements constituted the grounds for consent disturbed a 
number of commentators, who have suggested that it marked the end of clearly defined 
parameters of consent.49 'The creation of commitments [even if only informal], according 
to the Court, by necessity implies the creation of legal rights and obligations'. 5° Chinkin 
points out that this ruling could induce great uncertainty on the part of many states no 
longer willing to enter into informal agreements, such as the minutes at the centre of the 
present dispute. 51 For legal doctrine more broadly, she asks 'whether the ruling ... has 
undermined certainty in differentiating binding and non-binding agreements'. 52 On the 
other hand, Rosenne views the jurisdictional outcome in more positive terms: 
The framework agreement as it has developed - spasmodically - does not have the 
characteristics of the classic special agreement, by which the dispute is defined and 
the jurisdiction of the Court is established by a single event, the notification of the 
special agreement to the Court. The framework agreement, a form of agreement 
covering disagreement, has developed in response to the requirements of diplomacy 
which has recognized that a dispute should not be permitted to smoulder 
indefinitely, but which at the same time, for reasons particular to the states 
concerned, cannot be defined jointly and notified jointly to the Court.53 
It is probably too early to tell whether states have altered their behaviour as a result of this 
ruling, but it sends a clear signal to Arab states in the Gulf to be mindful of what 
agreements they enter into. Although Bahrain participated in the merits phase, some of its 
actions outside of the Peace Palace suggest that its faith in the Court was tentative. It also 
remains to be seen whether the Court' s less than detailed treatment of the substantive 
territorial claims has assuaged scepticism in the Gulf or the wider Arab world. 
4) The Court's Determination on the Merits 
49 Generally see also Klabbers supra n 36; and McHugo, supra n 39. 
5° Klabbers, supra n 36, at 370. 
51 C Chinkin, 'A Mirage in the Sand? Distinguishing Binding and Non-Binding Relations Between States' 
(1997) 10 Leiden Journal of international Law 223, at 224. 
52 Ibid, at 225. 
53 S Rosenne, 'The Qatar/Bahrain Case: What is a Treaty? A Framework Agreement and the Seising of the 
Court' (I 995) 8 Leiden Journal of international Law 161, at 18 l. 
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After a series of lengthy pleadings, complicated by the controversy over Qatar' s 
allegedly forged documents, the Court handed down its decision on 16 March 2001. Qatar 
had withdrawn the 82 disputed documents and had not relied on them in its later pleadings, 
and both Qatar and Bahrain submitted new versions of Qatar's Memorial and Counter-
Memorial where they crossed out all discussion based on the disputed evidence. 54 The 
details of the judgment will be analysed in the next section, so here it is only necessary to 
acquaint ourselves with the central requests of the parties and the Court's determination. 
Bahrain claimed sovereignty over all the areas in dispute, whereas Qatar requested the 
Court to declare the absence of such sovereignty rather than positively find for Qatar in the 
matter. Thus, Qatar's application was a negation of Bahrain's, quoted below: 
Bahrain is sovereign over Zubarah. 
Bahrain is sovereign over the Hawar Islands, including Janan and Hadd Janan. 
In view of Bahrain's sovereignty over all the insular and other features, including 
Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah, comprising the Bahraini archipelago, the 
maritime boundary between Bahrain and Qatar is as described in Part Two of 
Bahrain's Memorial. 55 
After giving fairly equal consideration to the territorial and maritime questions m a 
relatively brief judgment, the Court: 
1) Unanimously . .. Finds that the State of Qatar has sovereignty over Zubarah; 
(2) (a) By twelve votes to five ... Finds that the State of Bahrain has sovereignty 
over the Hawar Islands; 
(b) Unanimously ... Recalls that vessels of the State of Qatar enjoy in the 
territorial sea of Bahrain separating the Hawar Islands from the other 
Bahraini islands the right of innocent passage accorded by customary 
international law; 
(3) By thirteen votes to four. .. Finds that the State of Qatar has sovereignty over 
Janan Island, including Hadd Janan; 
4) By twelve votes to five ... Finds that the State of Bahrain has sovereignty over the 
island of Qit'at Jaradah; 
(5) Unanimously ... Finds that the low-tide elevation of Fasht ad Dibal falls under 
the sovereignty of the State of Qatar; 
(6) By thirteen votes to four. . . Decides that the single maritime boundary that 
divides the various maritime zones of the State of Qatar and the State of Bahrain 
shall be drawn as indicated in paragraph 250 of the present Judgment. 56 
Aside from the majority judgment, a joint dissenting opinion was rendered by Judges 
Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma as well as a separate dissenting opinion by Judge ad hoc 
54 lt has been very difficult to determine which versions of Qatar's memorials are best to read. In the course of 
researching this chapter I decided to rely on Bahrain's highlighted version which still allowed me to read 
Qatar's crossed out claims. On general impression, the most commonly deleted material centred on regional 
consensus over the extent of Qatar's authority over Zubarah and the Hawar Islands. 
55 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) , CR 2000/25, 29 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Al-Arayed, at paras. 19-20. 
56 Qatar/Bahrain (2001 ), at para. 252. 
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Torres Hernadez (appointed by Qatar). Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Al-
Khasawneh and Judge ad hoc Fortier (appointed by Bahrain) offered separate Opinions. 
Judges Vereshchetin, Higgins and Herczegh also issued declarations. 
In relation to territorial matters, Evans argues that ' the Court took what might be 
thought of as the line of least resistance. '57 The Court avoided engagement with many of 
the substantive arguments raised by Bahrain and Qatar in relation to title to territory, the 
status of various effectivites and the nature of consent for 'protected' states. This failure ' to 
give a complete ruling', in the dissenting opinion of Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma 
signaled 'that the Court has ... taken the risk not only of rendering an incorrect judgment but 
also of failing to give a complete ruling. ' 58 The ramifications of such an outcome may well 
be felt beyond the courtroom in the Arab and non-Arab worlds. When the Court handed 
down its decision, President Guillaume stated, 'This judgment is binding, final and without 
appeal. It brings to an end a long-standing dispute between these two sister-States, thereby 
inaugurating a new stage in their relations. '59 Whether this statement is correct can only be 
answered with time. However, it is possible to assess whether the criticisms rendered in the 
dissenting opinion were warranted. Did the Court confront all of the central issues as they 
related to territory, and what are the possible reasons to explain its reluctance to do so? 
These questions will serve as a window into our discussion in the following section. 
57 MD Evans, 'Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar v Bahrain)' (2002) 51 International and Comparative law Quarterly 709, at 712. 
58 Qatar/Bahrain (2001) Bedjaoui, Ranjeva & Koroma JJ (diss. op.), at para. 14. 
59 Quoted in Kwiatkowska, supra, n 9, at 232. 
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5) Competing Narratives on Statehood and Colonialism in the Gulf 
This section engages directly with the reasoning contained in the parties' submissions as 
well as the various decisions of the Court itself. It will focus firstly on depictions of the 
colonial experience to problematise the historical record. It will then take up the claims 
advanced over the Hawar Islands and Zubarah respectively, focusing on issues relating to 
tribal affiliations, the status of protection, communal property rights, the nature of uti 
possidetis Juris in the Gulf and the relevance of Islamic norms for international law in such 
disputes. All of these ideas appeared in the pleadings, but often in radically different ways. 
A comparison will enable us to draw conclusions about the extent to which international 
law can be shaped and broadened by the experiences and arguments of Arab states. Harking 
back to the thesis 's central research question about the scope for international law as a 
universalising discourse, we can ask here: Is international law open to particular 
experiences of non-European control over territory? Further, how did Qatar and Bahrain 
draw the boundaries of international law in their account of colonial practices? 
a) Historical Narratives on the Legacy of Colonialism 
An understanding of the complex Case between Qatar and Bahrain cannot avoid ' a long 
tramp through the sands of history' .60 The centrality of the historical record was recognised 
not only by Qatar and Bahrain but also by the Court in its 'brief account of the complex 
history' .61 Despite such recognition, historical facts were usually treated out of context and 
accepted at face value. This was especially so in relation to the nature of former foreign 
control in the Gulf. Chapter Three's discussion about the colonial histories of Chad and 
Libya demonstrated how there is never one historical record or one interpretation. How did 
the parties use historical arguments, and how did the Court respond to these accounts? Does 
the grammar of international law allow for historical complexity or not? This section will 
sketch out some contrasting historical images to show how history and international law are 
interdependent, but not through any pre-determined relationship. Instead, the dialectic 
between the two is shaped by extra-historical and extra-legal perspectives rarely averred to 
60 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/5, 29 May 2000, Qatar, Mr Salmon, at para. 9. 
61 Qatar/Bahrain (2001), at para. 36. 
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in the judgment or the pleadings. Yet in drawing boundaries between law and its 'others', 
the centrality of history, politics and culture becomes more apparent than ever. 
All historical narratives recognised the influence of the British presence in the Gulf. 
British motivations, however, were usually described as being simply based on a 
' commercial interest in protecting maritime trade routes to India.'62 A purported increase in 
piracy in what came to be known as the 'Pirate Coast' 'led to the first major change in the 
British role in ... [this] area' of 'great strategic importance'. 63 No interrogation of this 
British justification between the illegality of piracy and intervention was carried out by 
Bahrain or Qatar. Instead, the historical narratives of both Bahrain and Qatar are often 
uncritical in their reliance on British imperial sources, such as the reports of James 
Lorimer.64 
Conversely, in The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, the Arab historian, Al-Qasimf 
clearly states his scholarly agenda: the notion that piracy warranted Britain 's intimate and 
'protective' involvement in the Gulf is contestable. Al-Qasimf refutes the claims of certain 
colonial and contemporary historians, such as Lorimer and Kelly, both of whom were relied 
upon in the memorials of Qatar and Bahrain. Al-Qasimf's argument is forceful but was 
overlooked by the two states in their submissions: 
The indigenous people of the Gulf were normal people with normal human 
ambitions. Although poor, they were skilful. They were people practicing normal 
human activities, in particular trade, in which they had been involved for millennia. 
The only abnormal factor was the introduction of a foreign power whose aim was 
to dominate and exploit. The intruders were the forces of British imperialism, who 
knew very well and often testified that the indigenous people of the Gulf were only 
interested in the peaceful pursuits of pearl diving and trade. 65 
Through an unquestioning acceptance of British imperial material, Bahrain and Qatar failed 
to appreciate the colonial desires shaping events as well as their later depiction in the Gulf. 
62 Bahrain, Memorial, (Qatar/ Bahrain) (Merits), 30 September 1996, para. 136. Anghie discusses how norms 
developed in international law that gave support to the European desire for commercial expansion through 
trading companies. Initial justifications based on the right of free trade later gave way to fully-fledged 
colonial administrations. This was not the case so much in the Gulf as it was a relative latecomer to this trend, 
but Anghie's point does reveal the interrelationship that existed between international law, European trade 
and later modes of colonial rule. T Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge, UK; New York, US: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 67-69. 
63 Qatar, Memorial, (Qatar /Bahrain) (Merits), 30 September 1996, at para. 3.3. 
64 For example: J G Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia (Calcutta: 
Superintendent Government Printing, 1908-19 15), 2 vols. For a discussion of Lorimer's racist tendencies, see 
S N Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International 
Law (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), at 70-73. 
65 SM Al-Qasiml, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Guif(London: Routledge, 1986), at xiv. 
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Al-Qasimi's insights are confirmed in some of the Ottoman sources included in the 
voluminous documentary annexes of Qatar's Reply. Such inconsistent use of evidence was 
not only sloppy, but indicates the tendency of the parties to include as much material as 
possible even where it was discordant. The Ottomans were only too aware of British 
ambitions in the Gulf and it was partly in reaction to such a threat that they had reasserted 
their control over certain Gulf territories in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The 
Sublime Porte's Ministry of the Interior surmised the situation in 1910 in the following 
terms: 'The objective of Britain is to incite the local muslims to take up arms against each 
other, to impose a status quo on the region and occupy the coastline, claiming that her 
economic commercial interests are suffering. '66 
Such British motivations are not only unsurprising; they are to be expected. Some 
of the implications of colonial policy, however, were overlooked by the parties and the 
Court when formulating general accounts of British-Gulf relations. Britain was not simply 
concerned with 'protecting' its trade and Trucial partners from other powers, such as the 
Wahhabfs, Persians and Ottomans. This is clear when we consider the way in which treaty 
terms between Britain and the Arab sheikhs took on increasingly restrictive qualities, 
preventing any interaction between local sheikhs and non-British powers.67 
Britain had maintained that the independence of entities such as Qatar and Bahrain 
was never compromised. Qatar and Bahrain advanced diametrically opposed positions on 
this very point and the Court struggled to formulate a clear position on the matter. It is 
difficult to define the international legal personality of such entities. 68 For example, the 
pleadings and the judgment differ as to when Qatar became an independent entity, and even 
then this was under the shadow of either Ottoman69 or British control. In relation to Qatar, it 
66 Qatar, Reply, (Qatar/Bahrain} (Merits), Annexes, vol 2, at 297. Another example of such sentiments from 
1900 reads: ' it is important to establish an administration which will show the Ottomans to be in complete 
control; it will prevent the English making their claims elsewhere, interfering on the pretext of a few minor 
incidents between the sheikl1s'. 'Report on Bahrain' from Council Chamber, 22 April 1900, Bahrain, 
Memorial, vol 2, Annex 64(a), at 274. 
67 This is detailed in another Ottoman report: ' Despite Britain 's recognition of the Bahrain Islands' 
independence, she considers herself privileged as regards the agreements she has made and continually 
repeats that she will not let any other government interfere in Bahrain's internal policy.' Report of the Foreign 
Minister, 27 January 1909, Bahrain, Memorial, vol 3, Annex 75(a), at 40 l. 
68 See J Crawford, The Creation of States in International law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2"d, 
edition, 2006), at 291-292. 
69 For example, in 1898, Qatar's ruler pledged his services to the Ottomans: 'I am not a rebel and have no 
intention of acting against the Sultan's will. Until now I have been in the service of the Ottoman state, both 
with my person and my possessions, without having an ulterior motive.' Telegram from Bushire by Jassim 
Al-Thani, Kaimakam of Qatar, 23 January 1898 to the Office of the Grand Vizier, Qatar, Reply, vol 2, at 165. 
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was common to elide Qatari identity with its imperial master,70 but the necessary corollary 
of state succession after Ottoman rule is not developed. The line between Ottoman and 
Qatari personality is thus very hard to discern. 
Despite this confusion, what remained indisputable was the impact of underlying 
British interests and the significant imbalance of power between such a hegemon compared 
to the sparsely populated sheikhdoms of the Gulf. This power dynamic influenced the 
possibility for freely given Arab consent. Like Libya's discussion of its relations with 
France in the Libya/Chad Case, Qatar questioned the applicability of the notion of 
sovereign equality in a context of quasi-colonial domination. The law/politics dichotomy 
upholds the notion of legal relations free from coercion and influence, but Qatar's 
argumentative strategy sought to break this schema down. For Qatar, Britain was never a 
neutral arbiter, administrator or policy advisor in the Gulf, and documentation from the 
annexes attests to this. For example, internal memos mooting the ownership of contested 
territories between Qatar and Bahrain do not rely on a rigorous categorisation of title and 
effectivites. Instead, the future control of various islands or regions was dependent on 
British strategic concerns,71 and this was particularly pronounced with the advent of oil 
when Britain was keen to thwart American penetration in the region.72 The exploitation of 
oil made it necessary to establish clear and precise boundaries between the Sheikhdoms. 
However, the desirability of borders was a recent phenomenon, as previously both the 
Although this is only a statement and does not represent the legal stahts of Qatar per se, it suggests that 
Qatar's independence was less than complete at the tum of the twentieth century. 
7° For example, in its pleadings, Qatar argued, 'The fact remains that Sheikh Jassim al-Thani ruled the entire 
province of Qatar, and that he governed the territory both in his own right and as surrogate for the Ottoman 
Empire.' Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), 2000/17, 20 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Bundy, at para. 24. 
71 An excellent example of this is some correspondence between two British officials in 1905: 'Captain 
Prideaux's [the author of the letter] studies have brought him to the conclusion that our record places us in a 
position to modify the attitude hitherto adopted in regard to this part of the Arab Coast, and that in making the 
change there are three alternative policies to choose from ... : 
That the suzerainty of the Ruler of Bahrein should be reasserted over the whole of the Katr 
peninsula, except the Al Bidaa [Doha, modem-day capital of Qatar] Chiefship, the limits of which 
should be reduced to the narrowest possible limits. 
That for reasons stated we should declare the complete independence of the Maritime Arab tribes 
and maintain a post and Native Agent on the Katr Coast so Jong as the Turks remain at Al Bidaa. 
That we should agree to recognise the sovereignty of the Turks over the whole of the Katr peninsula 
on certain conditions ... 
Captain Prideaux favours the last. ' 
This extract reveals that Britain was willing to create or annihilate the legal ti tles of states at will. Letter from 
Capt. Prideaux to Maj. Cox, 16 July 1905, Bahrain, Memorial, vol 3, Annex 71, at 355. 
72 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/7, 31 May 2000, Qatar, Mr. Shankardass, at para. I 0. 
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Ottomans and the British asserted that to 'try and sort out boundaries at this point [at end of 
the nineteenth century] would not be appropriate, but would raise new problems.' 73 
Concerns about future oil concessions were vital in explaining British policy 
towards its protectorates in the Gulf, including Bahrain and Qatar. If these decisions had 
had no legal effect, there would have been little need to consider them here. However, the 
Court's judgment relied on British decisions without acknowledging the underlying 
motivations at play. In so doing, the judgment rendered the decisions of a quasi-colonial 
power valid under international law today. Instead of adopting a critical approach to the 
historical record, which could have facilitated recognition of the competing interests at 
play, the Court, and sometimes the parties themselves, overlooked the consequences of 
quasi-colonialism. 
b) Determining Sovereignty over the Hawar Islands 
i) The 1939 Decision 
The international legal effects of British control were demonstrated most clearly in the 
Court's ruling on the Hawar Islands, which were ' the greatest bone of contention between 
the two Parties'. 74 Although the Court focused on the 1939 British award of Hawar to 
Bahrain, both parties based their competing claims on a number of grounds in addition to 
the award. Thus treatment of and reliance on the 1939 award will be reviewed first and then 
compared with some of the parties' other claims to demonstrate how the Court's reasoning 
prioritised colonial practices above evidence of local authority. 
In a context framed around the urgent need for demarcated boundaries to facilitate 
oil exploitation, Britain issued an award in 1939, whereby it determined that Bahrain held 
title over the Hawar Islands. This finding was beneficial to Bahrain, and so Bahrain relied 
heavily on certain elements and legal principles relating to the award in its pleadings. 
Tensions between Qatar and Bahrain over the islands had escalated from 1937 when 
Bahrain occupied them and asserted its title. These events coincided with Britain's 
73 Ottoman Report on the Zubarah affair, 3 May 1897, Bahrain, Memorial, vol 2, Annex 63(a), at 269. The 
British echo these sentiments : 'The question of sovereign and feudal rights over places and tribes on the 
mainland of Arabia, opposite the island of Bahrain, is a complicated one, and probably the Government 
would not deem it practicable or expedient to enter into its merits.' Letter from Lt. Col. Ross, British Political 
Resident, to Secretary to Govt. of India, 4 September 1873, Bahrain, Memorial, vol 2, Annex 20, at 174. 
74 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/J 7, 20 June 2000, Qatar, Mr Salmon, at para. I. 
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admission that 'the ownership of the Hawar Group is of great importance because it is 
directly in ... the oil "line". '75 In anticipation of competing claims to this resource-rich area, 
the British had issued a 'provisional decision' in 1936 which acknowledged that ' it 
might. .. suit us politically to have as large an area of possible included under Bahrain' for 
oil concession purposes.76 The details of this 'preliminary ' decision by the British were 
never relayed to Qatar, and, furthermore, Qatar was never given the chance to rebut claims 
made by Bahrain, which had become the presumptive beneficiary of the decision. 
Notwithstanding this clandestine event, Qatar sought a settlement of the situation 
and entrusted that the British would confirm its sovereignty over the Hawar Islands. Thus, 
between 1938 and 1939, both Bahrain and Qatar submitted a series of letters to British 
agents outlining their respective eflectivites and purported title over the islands. Although 
Qatar had participated in the process, it tried to show the Court how its involvement at the 
time was flawed because it had not consented to Britain alienating the territory. Qatar also 
went into detail about British partiality in rendering its decision in the 1939 award. Here, 
Qatar was trying to uphold its former status as a protected, but still independent state, and 
so in some ways the law/politics dichotomy was useful. By pointing to the treaty provisions 
between Britian and the Trucial states, legally the Gulf sheikhdoms were independent. On 
the other hand, Qatar was trying to show how in the example of the 1939 'arbitral award' 
that law was inherently linked with politics; the Court had to consider background agendas 
and not simply take the decision at face value.77 
Despite such arguments, both the majority judgment and Bahrain characterised 
Qatar's consent at the time as unproblematic: the judgment fai led to acknowledge the wider 
context of British oil interests or its undertakings towards Bahrain. Throughout its 
pleadings, however, Qatar was at pains to show how this episode of British 'arbih·ation' 
was tainted by self-interest and should not result in permanent consequences for two 
independent states. This attempt to thwart Britain's legacy was not simply a product of ICJ 
litigation, either: Qatar showed the Court instead how it had challenged the British decision 
75 Letter from Captain T. Hickinbotham, British Political Agent (officiating), to the British Political Resident, 
9 May I 936, Bahrain, Counter-Memorial, vol 2, Annex 73, at 236. This was also the opinion of Loch: 
' [Hawar] may have considerable value now that oil has been found in Bahrain and is hoped for in Qatar', 
Letter from Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, 6 May 1936, 
Bahrain, Memorial, voJ 5, Annex 247, at 1074. 
76 Quoted in Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001) ( diss. op. Bernadez), at para. 31 l. 
77 Qatar/Bahrain (200 l ), a t para. 105. 
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on a number of occasions.78 Bahrain tried to undermine Qatar's later protests by explaining 
them away as an instance of disappointment from an unfavourable decision. After hearing 
these arguments as well as summarising them in its judgment,79 the Court chose not to 
engage with Qatar' s challenge to consent and British authority. Although it did concede 
that the 1939 decision was not an arbitral award per se, the Court was still comfortable in 
affirming its 'legal effect':80 the 1939 decision was a valid and fair reflection of Bahrain's 
ancient title and ~ffectivites.8 1 
Bahrain82 sought to bolster 'the powerful legal position it enjoyed by virtue of the 
1939 decision' 83 by relying on the principles of uti possidetis and res judicata. Bahrain had 
portrayed the 1939 award as an 'arbitral', or 'legal', one, and in the absence of Bahraini 
consent for its reconsideration by the ICJ, the principle of res judicata precluded 
reconsideration of the matter; its legal effect was irreproachable.84 Such a gesture illustrates 
the use of the law/politics dichotomy well: Bahrain sought to shield British 'political ' 
decision-making from scrutiny though resort to legal niceties. Further, in advancing this 
argument, Bahrain seems to have opted for international legal personality given that the 
concept of arbitration rests on neutral adjudication between independent entities. This was 
confirmed when Bahrain argued that any consideration of the matter would seem to bestow 
on the Court 'an appellate jurisdiction over the award' 85 for the first time in the ICJ's 
history. Thus, at least in relation to the nature of the 1939 Award, Bahrain claimed that 
before formal independence both Bahrain and Qatar had been independent, but 'protected' , 
states under British care. 
In contrast to notions of independence, Bahrain also invoked the idea of uti 
possidetis Juris. 86 Throughout the Case, Bahrain was trying to offer as many arguments as 
possible even though they were incompatible: res judicata assumes legal independence 
whereas uti possidetis is necessarily the result of colonial administrative boundaries. In 
78 This is noted by the Court: Qatar/Bahrain (2001), at para. 106. 
79 Qatar/Bahrain (2001), at paras. 98-109. 
80 Qatar/Bahrain (200 I), at para. 139. 
81 Qatar/Bahrain (2001 ), at paras. 142-147. 
82 For Bahrain's presentation of the 1939 decision, see generally Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/1 2, 9 June 
2000, Mr Paulsson, at paras. 138-205. 
83 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000112, 9 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Paulsson, para. 201. 
84 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/12, 9 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Reisman, paras. 1-14. 
85 Ibid, at para. 14. 
86 This inherent contradiction in Bahrain's 'a la carte menu' of possible grounds for claiming the Hawar 
Islands is discussed by Judge ad hoc Bemadez in his Dissenting Opinion, Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001 ), at 
paras. 292, 298. 
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invoking the latter norm, Bahrain characterised the status of both Qatar and itself as being 
one of 'former British protectorates . . . [until] their independence in 1971.' 87 From an 
examination of the treaty provisions, Bahrain asserted that neither sheikhdom was able 
'fully to exercise their sovereignty in domestic and foreign affairs. ' 88 Perhaps aware of its 
inconsistent reliance on colonial dividends - was Bahrain independent or not before 1971? 
- Bahrain tried to smooth over its deference to British control by recognising the injustices 
of colonialism. 89 A critical approach to the past expressed in emotive language was 
fleeting, however, because Bahrain's reliance on the legality of the 1939 Award required its 
general acceptance of British domination. Thus, Bahrain claimed that 'the 1939 decision is 
indisputably an integral part of the colonial legacy .. .facts are facts! ' 90 There was no room 
for any critical interrogation of colonial practices or the legal results of such 'facts' . As in 
the case of Chad in Chapter Three, Bahrain confronted the postcolonial paradox by 
profiting from a particular, European, reading of the past. 
Apart from the contestable characterisation of its colonial status, Bahrain launched a 
campaign in favour of the application of the uti possidetis norm throughout the postcolonial 
world. It first pointed to the Court's 1986 decision in the Frontier Dispute, which had 
characterised uti possidetis as a 'general principle ... logically connected with the 
phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs.' 91 From this basis, 
Bahrain went on to argue that uti possidetis is a 'universal rule' of 'customary law'92 and 
'should be the alpha and omega'93 in the present matter.94 Because of its 'general scope', 
geographical or cultural considerations are irrelevant: 'The Arab world is no exception. '95 
87 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/13, 13 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Kemicha, para. 20. Cf. Qatar/Bahrain 
(Merits), CR 2000117, 20 June 2000, Qatar, Mr Salmon, at para. 7. 
88 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits}, CR 2000/21, 27 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Kemicha, at para. 33. 
89 
' Tens of thousands of miles of grotesque international borders in the developing world were drawn up by 
powerful intrusive foreigners whose entire attention was on their own political and commercial interests, with 
very little regard to indigenous populations. Yet these borders survive, not because they appeal to our sense of 
fair play, but because continued respect for such borders has avoided war.' Qatar/Bahrain (Merit.s) , CR 
2000112, 9 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Paulsson, at para. 144. 
90 Emphasis in original, Qatar/Bahrain (Merit.1), CR 2000/21, 27 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Kemicha, at para. 
75. 
9 1 Burkina Faso/Mali (ICJ Reps) ( 1986) 565, para. 20, cited in Qatar/Bahrain (Merit.1), CR 2000/13, 13 June 
2000, Bahrain, Mr Kemicha, at para. 4. 
92 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000113, 13 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Kemicha, at para. 16. 
93 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits}, CR 2000/21, 27 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Paulsson, at para. 8. 
94 In his separate opinion, Judge Kooijmans accepts that in those particular instances where it is applicable uti 
possidetis is a relevant consideration, but it should not outweigh other factors: 'Generally speaking, to yield 
too readily to its applicability would be inimical to other legally protected rights, e.g., the right of self-
determination (although there is no danger of this in the present case) as well as to the very function of 
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As an Arab state itself, not only did Qatar question the general application of uti 
possidetis in the region,96 but specifically, it challenged Bahrain's use of the norm through 
its portrayal of the 1939 award. Although Qatar conceded that both sheikhdoms lacked full 
independence before 1971, it denied that former treaty relations constituted 'a colonial-type 
protectorate' .97 We saw in Part Two's Introduction that it was common during the scramble 
for Africa to describe colonies as ' colonial protectorates ' .98 These regimes of 'protection' 
rarely recognised local sovereignty and were qualitatively distinct from ' real' protectorates 
that preserved at least internal independence for local powers. 'Colonial protectorates' were 
common in Africa, but not in the Gulf, and Bahrain's position of asserting colonial 
protection in the region was rejected by Qatar. The Court confinned Qatar's position and 
held that the uti possidetis norm was inapplicable in the present dispute;99 the norm was 
only relevant in instances of former colonial administrative decisions or explicit consent by 
non-colonial entities. More generally, Plant points out that the norm is only applicable in 
postcolonial, and not post-protectorate, situations.100 Although doctrinal boundaries were 
clearly definied in this instance, Qatar's presentation demonstrated that the line between 
protection and colonialism in the Gulf was a blurry one. 
Arguments based on the absence of consent of a protected state still possessing 
nominal independence was at the heart of Qatar's refutation of Bahrain's claim to the 
Hawar Islands. As entities that had never assented to Britain's demarcating of boundaries, 
or alienating territory more generally, 101 Bahrain and Qatar had to prove their consent 
before any decision could be binding. This was the sine qua non irrespective of the 
decision' s qualities. Through analogy, Qatar relied on the 1981 Arbitral Award between 
Dubai and Sharjah for its examination of consent. That case had also considered a British 
decision delimiting the parties' borders in the Gulf. The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
international courts which is not to declare, in the interests of preventing conflicts, pre-exis ting de facto 
territorial s ituations legal without regard to title and other relevant criterion, but to uphold justice by 
correcting illegalities where they occur. ', Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), at para. 8. 
95 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/ 13, 13 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Kemicha, at para. 81. 
96 This lack of conviction about the norm's relevance to the Arab world is echoed by Judge Al-Khasawneh: ' it 
is still very doubtful whether even now it [uti possidetis] has any applicability in the Middle East. ', 
Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), at para. 10. Also see Part Two Introduction, at 114. 
97 Emphasis omitted, Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 200011 7, 20 June 2000, Qatar, Mr Salmon, at para. 5. 
98 Discussed at l JO. 
99 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), at para. 148. 
100 Plant, supra n 4 , at footnote 79, 206. 
101 This was also the case in the Dubai/Sharjah Arbitration, see Judge Al-Khasawneh, Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) 
(200 l ), at para. 9. 
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came 'to the conclusion that the consent of the Rulers concerned was necessary before any 
such delimitation could have been undertaken.' 102 
Qatar challenged the existence of its consent m the context of what it termed 
Britain's 'complex manoeuvring' over 'petroleum policy interests'. 103 First, Qatar stated 
that there was no agreement signed between itself and Britain authorising such authority on 
the part of its 'protector'. In their dissenting opinion, Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and 
Koroma argued that any instances of Qatari deference to British actions should have been 
construed in the light of marked power asymmetries, rather than Qatari authorization for 
such wide powers. 104 Further, for Judge Al-Khasawneh, although Qatar was definitely not a 
colony, the 'British Government in fact exercised overwhelming control over the two 
Sheikhdoms' in both domestic and foreign affairs. 105 The Court overlooked such arguments 
to determine that consent had been established on 27 May 1938 in an exchange of letters 
between Qatar and Britain. 106 
We saw that the Court agreed with Qatar that the 1939 decision could not be 
construed as 'arbitral' between non-colonial entities, but it nevertheless held that it had 
'legal effect' 107 and was binding on the parties. 108 For many members of the Court in 
separate opinions, as well as Qatar, however, any type of award was incapable of effect due 
to Qatari consent being 'vitiated by the existence of fraud' .109 The Court failed to regard 
Qatar's in-depth consideration of the pressures faced from Britain vis-a-vis oil 
concessions. 110 Once again, the Court relied on the legal qualities of the award to avoid a 
more complex and contentious consideration of the past. 
102 Dubai/Sharjah Arbitration, 19 October 1981, (1993) 91 ILR 543, at 567. 
103 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 200017, 31 May 2000, Qatar, Sir Ian Sinclair, at para. 16. 
104 
'In political terms, the nature of the relationship between the protecting Power and the protected State did 
not permit the use of any language other than the deferential terms in which the local rulers expressed 
themselves; thus to interpret that language as evidence of consent to the renunciation of territorial jurisdiction 
is in reality to give the opposite sense to the natural meaning of the words and conduct in 1939. ' 
Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma JJ (diss. op.), at para. 38. 
105 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001) (sep. op. Al-Khasawneh), at para. 9. 
106 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), at para. 137. 
107 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (200 l ), at para. 11 7. 
108 Qatar/Bahrain {Merits) (2001), at para. 146. 
109 Qatar/Bahrain {Merits) (2001), Bedjaoui, Ranjeva & Koroma JJ (di ss. op.), at para. 19. 
110 
'[T]he Court has largely disregarded the political context which, in view of what had already been 
occurring, gave the Ruler of Qatar hardly any choice but to request the Protecting Power to comply with its 
treaty-based commitments "in light of equity and justice".' Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), (Kooijmans sep. 
op.), a t para. 57. 
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Qatar's request for Britain's assistance in settling the affair over the Hawar Islands 
had coincided with a very different request made by BAPCO 111 and PCL 112 - both oil 
companies seeking greater access to the Gulfs natural resources. 113 Much of Bahrain had 
already been allotted and companies were eager to secure unassigned areas, including the 
Hawar Islands. As the provisional decision of 1936 suggests, Britain was mindful of the 
stakes involved in its decision and was unable to remove itself from the pressures exerted 
by both Bahrain and the oil companies, who wanted the matter to be resolved with 'extreme 
haste'. 114 In its pleadings, Qatar had presented a significant amount of material to support 
its account of this 'flagrant miscarriage of justice committed by the British' 115 and it 
thought that the Court would agree: 
The Court will no doubt conclude that the British authorities in the Gulf had by this 
time become so caught up in a spider's web of their own making that they simply 
could not render an objective and impartial decision on the issue of title to Hawar. 
In effect this meant that the provisional decision of 1936 had become a final 
decision even before the so-called 'enquiry' into the question of title had begun.116 
Compelling evidence aside, the Court, in what the dissenting Judges describe as a 
'surreal' 117 gesture, chose to disregard all other arguments offered by the parties (such as 
proximity, maps, 118 a titre de souverain and effectivites) to hold that the 1939 award was 
based on consent and constituted a binding ' administrative' decision on the parties. 
Despite the confusing nature of the legal and historical arguments presented above, 
it is clear that the Court's approach to the 1939 Award was simplistic and lacked critical 
engagement with prevailing conditions in the Gulf. Furthermore, the Judgment's 
unquestioning acceptance of the Award in the face of disputed consent displayed an 
inability to confront the reality of at least quasi-colonial domination, as well as a 
predilection for preserving the law/politics dichotomy. Conceding the centrality of 
111 Bahrain Petrnlewn Company, an American company. 
112 Petroleum Concessions Ltd., a largely British-owned subsidiary of the APOC (Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company). 
113 In the words of Sir Ian Sinclair, oil was at the root of the whole affair: 'The problem - the real problem -
was the coincidence in time of the pursuit of the oil concession negotiations from 1936 onwards with the 
beginning of the "enquiry" into the appurtenance of Hawar.' Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 200011 9, 22 June 
2000, Qatar, at para. 25. 
114 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) , CR 2000/7, 31 May, Qatar, Sir Ian Sinclair, at para. I 5. 
115 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/8, 5 June 2000, Qatar, Sir Ian Sinclair, at para. 15. 
116 Ib'd 9 1 , at para. . 
117 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (200 I), Bedjaoui, Ranjeva & Koroma JJ (diss. op.), at para. 42. 
11 8 Qatar in par1icular discussed map evidence at length, e.g. see Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 200017, 31 May 
2000, Mr Bundy, at paras.1-78. 
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'political' motivations in arbitral decisions would render the Court' s deference to such 
practices suspect and open to question. Instead, the Court ignored the political subtext 
through a textual and legalised reading of the 1939 arbitration which was similar to its 
handling of the 1955 Treaty in the dispute between Libya and Chad. Judges Kooijmans and 
Al-Khasawneh, both of whom voted in favour of Bahraini sovereignty over Hawar, still 
questioned the Court's 'excessively restrictive' 119 approach. The Bahrain Formula had 
provided the Court with the mandate to explore all legally relevant matters relating to 
control over Hawar, and yet the majority judgment confined itself to a narrow enquiry. In 
the opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, 'the only way to dispose of the question of 
sovereignty over the Ha wars is to embark on an enquiry into the Sheikhdoms' diplomatic 
history'; 120 but this did not happen. Instead, 'the Judgment seems to give more weight to 
the position taken by that Protecting Power than to considerations of substantive law, in 
particular those on the acquisition of territory.' 12 1 In so doing, the Judgment indicated that 
international law remains wedded to a past premised on Jess than equal political, and thus 
legal, capacity between European and non-European peoples. 
ii) Regional Factors at Play in the Parties' Claims over the Hawar Islands: 
Communal Property Regimes and Tribal Allegiances 
Unlike the truncated decision of the ICJ, both Qatar and Bahrain offered exhaustive - even 
if not always convincing - accounts of their sovereign links with the Hawar Islands. 
Bahrain discounted Qatar's reliance on the norm of contiguity with reference to the Island 
of Pa/mas Case. 122 Some of the separate opinions found Bahrain's depiction of original 
title and continuing control convincing in itself. 123 Other judgments tended to favour 
Qatar's arguments based on a combination of the notion of proximity (with reference to the 
1998 Eritrea/Yemen Award) 124 and confirmatory map evidence on the one hand with a 
119 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), (sep. op. Al-Khasawneh), at para. 4; see also (sep. op. Kooijmans), at para. 
4. 
120 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001 ), (sep. op. Al-Khasawneh), at para. 12. 
121 Qatar/Bahrain (Merit~) (2001), (sep. op. Kooijmans), at para. 1. 
122 (1928) 1 RlAA 829 (Arbitrator Huber) 4 ILR 3. 'In the Palmas case, Qatar leans heavily on Judge Huber's 
mention of islands in the territorial sea. Bahrain, on the other hand, points to those passages which stress the 
need for occupation or the performance of acts of authority as well as the need to maintain continuity of title.' 
Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/22, 28 June 2000, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, at para. 62. 
123 Such as Judges Kooijmans and Al-Khasawneh. 
124 Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute Award (Phase I), 9 October 1998, available from the 
website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration: http: //pca-cpa.org/ENGUSH/RPC/#Eritrea. It should be noted 
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corresponding lack of a better title by Bahrain on the other. Such general arguments 
presented few difficulties for traditional principles of title to territory in international law 
and need not be reviewed here. 
Discussion about the relationship between tribal allegiances and statehood, as well 
as the impact of communal property rights on the ability to establish exclusive control, 
however, was different. These ideas required much greater exploration of the particular 
conditions of Arab/Muslim authority in the Gulf. Despite their common heritage, Bahrain 
and Qatar exploited the legal significance of cultural factors in radically different ways, 
thus highlighting the extent to which local traditions can be invoked for different 
argumentative purposes. In the following section, this dialogue about the role of legal 
particularism within the context of international legal universalism will be assessed through 
the prism of arguments about the nature of authority over the Ha war Islands. 
Some effectivites relied upon by Bahrain were historical accounts of fishing 
activities, as well as judicial intervention in disputes between individuals residing on 
Hawar. Bahrain discussed these events within the broader context of tribal connections 
between Bahrain, the Hawar Islands and Zubarah. As outlined above, the Al-Khalifah tribe 
that hailed from Zubarah (and ultimately Kuwait) ruled Bahrain. It was alleged that a 
branch of the Dowasir tribe based in the Arabian mainland had petitioned the Qiu;lI of 
Zubarah for permission to settle on Hawar and this request was granted c.1800.125 From this 
time onwards, the Dowasir resided in Hawar at least intermittently for the purpose of 
fishing and Bahrain argued that they were Bahraini subjects. Thus, ' [a]lthough the Bahraini 
Dowasir were proud and independent-minded, they lived under the authority of the Rulers 
of Bahrain.' 126 
Before considering whether the tribe was under Al-Khalifah authority, it is essential 
to consider the legal status of fishing for semi-nomadic, Muslim groups both in the Gulf 
and the Red Sea. Qatar argued that fishing activities could only be construed as the actions 
of private individuals exploiting a common resource. Bahrain, on the other hand, tried to 
that Bahrain also relied on this case, but on different grounds: ' In Eritrea/Yemen Bahrain points to the cri teria 
of exercise of jurisdiction on a continuous and peaceful basis, while Qatar points to the lesser degree of 
activity pennitted in the case of islands that lay uninhabited and ungoverned.' Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 
2000/22, 28 June 2000, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, at para. 62. 
125 Al-Arayed, supra n 12, at 226. This historical fact is cow1tered by Qatar, e.g. CR 2000/8, 5 June 2000, Mr 
Shankardass, at para. 6. 
126 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/ 13, 13 June 2000, Mr Volterra, at para. 33. 
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downplay the regional institutions of communal property rights to advance that its direct 
connection with the Dowasir along with sustained and constant occupation of the area 
confirmed its sovereignty over the Islands in contention. 
Qatar's case about communal fishing rights rested on a combination of general 
historical research as well as strikingly similar analogies from the 1998 Eritrea/Yemen 
Award. Amin's treatise on law in the Gulf is particularly pertinent here, and was invoked 
by Qatar throughout its written and oral pleadings: 127 
The fishing activities in the Gulf have been traditionally governed by the 
Shariab/Islamic Law . .. [it] does not have a comprehensive theory in respect of 
fishery . .. all raw material, whether in land or in the sea or space . . . belong, 
exclusively, to God and are not, in any way, subject to exclusive rights of persons, 
individually or collectively.128 
The international legal effect of such a similar regime was discussed in the Eritrea/Yemen 
Award, where it was argued that historical, cultural and geographical particularities did 
have legal implications. Rather than apply modern, European norms of private property or 
sovereign control, it was necessary to view the natural resources of the Red Sea lying 
between the claimant states as a res communis.129 From this, Qatar argued that ' in the 
absence of any State control of licensing or enforcement activities, the fishing practices of 
individuals [would] not amount to effectivites as they were not acts a titre de souverain.' 130 
Not only did Qatar rely on local customs in relation to fishing but it also 
distinguished Islamic jurisdiction from Western legal norms to argue that the Bahraini 
resolution of disputes between 'Hawari ' individuals was not an act of sovereignty over the 
Islands. In its pleadings, Bahrain had furnished the Court with decisions rendered by qac;lis 
in Bahrain relating to property disputes about fish traps on the islands. The question for the 
two parties then was how to characterise the legal effect of such decisions on Bahrain's 
claim to effective control over Hawar. Qatar argued that, as in the case of communal 
fishing rights, it was essential to distinguish qac;II-based jurisdiction from typical, European 
127 Whereas Bahrain overlooked these arguments altogether, instead claiming that it was the predominant and 
recognised pearling power in its vicinity, including the Hawar Islands. 
128 Emphasis in the original, Amin, supra n 1, at I 93, cited in Qatar, Reply, (Qatar/Bahrain) (Merits) , 30 May 
1999, a t para. 4.18 1. 
129 Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute Award (Phase I) (Eritrea/Yemen) 9 October 1998, at para. 
126, at 38. 
130 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/17, 20 June 2000, Qatar, Mr. Shankardass, para. 27, This statement 
echoes the Arbitral Award between Eritrea and Yemen: '[such fishing activities] do not constitute evidence of 
effectivites for the simple reason that none of these functions are acts a titre de souverain.' Eritrea/Yemen 
Award, at para. 3 15. 
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international legal norms. '[l]t was common for Qadis in one Moslem country to settle 
disputes of Moslem subjects of another country or in regard to property located in another 
country.' 131 As long as none of the litigants involved 'objects to pleading before him', a 
qac;ll may be deemed competent and he can then rule on matters of property outside of the 
territory of the decision. 132 Thus it was Qatar's submission that it is inappropriate to apply 
Western concepts to the authority exercised by a qac;il, whose jurisdiction was only 
exercised in personam over Muslim individuals. 133 Qatar was appealing to the Court's 
universalist credentials by offering a particular approach to legal authority outside of the 
European tradition. 
While Qatar's arguments relied on the effect of non- European norms in the Gulf, 
they established a binary opposition between European practices of sovereignty and local 
practices seemingly devoid of such significance. Bahrain, on the other hand, presented a 
long list of (often less than disposi tive) effectivites that were reliant on the relationship of 
sovereign and subject - Bahrain and the Dowasir tribe in Hawar. The respective positions 
of the two parties over Hawar were summarised in the eyes of Bahrain as being a contest 
between physical geography (Qatar's proximity argument) versus human history (Bahrain's 
sovereign links with the Dowasir). 134 The parties' treatment of the Dowasir tribe's status 
and the implications of its fishing practices could be conceived as being a contest over the 
relevance of local versus international or Arab-Muslim versus European legal nom1s. 
To begin with, almost none of the facts detailed by either Party remained 
unchallenged. On Bahrain's side, Qatar recognised that the Dowasir did visit the islands, 
but only sporadically and seasonally. 135 Irrespective of their length of stay, Qatar argued 
that the tribe was independent from Bahrain. Qatar also pointed out that although the 
Court's Western Sahara Advisory Opinion136 had acknowledged tribal allegiances, a claim 
of sovereignty still requires these allegiances to be 'real' , supported by 'acts manifesting 
131 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), Qatar, Reply, 30 May 1999, al para. 4. 186. 
132 
'Legal Opinion', Judge Wassel Alaa El Din Ahmed Ibrahim, 27 April 1999, Qatar, Reply, Qatar/Bahrain 
(Merits), 30 May 1999, Annex 111.98, at 603-605. 
133 Qatar then concludes: 'Accordingly, a Qadi sitting somewhere in Bahrain and deciding private or 
inheritance related disputes between Dowasir Sunni fishermen who seasonally visited the Hawar Islands, 
though nonnally resident in Bahrain, is in no sense an example of 'exercise of authority' by the Ruler of 
Bahrain in the Hawar Islands and such practice therefore offers no support whatsoever to Bahrain's claim of 
sovereignty over these islands.' Qalar!Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/8, 5 June 2000, Qatar, Mr Shankardass, at 
paras. 33 & 36. 
134 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/13, 13 June 2000, Bahrain, Mr Yolten-a, at paras. 3-4. 
135 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/8, 5 June 2000, Qatar, Mr Shankardass, al para. 15. 
136 Western Sahara (Advis01y Opinion) (1975) ICJ Reps, p.12. 
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acceptance of political authority.' 137 Thus in this instance Qatar was relying on the Court's 
inflexible approach to sovereign ties in the Sahara to defeat similar arguments of statehood 
by Bahrain. Particularist arguments were useful for defeating the legal validity of Bahrain's 
position. 
It is not possible to assess the legal validity of the Bahraini and Qatari perspectives 
on tribal authority and communal property because the Court did not consider these 
arguments. What can be pointed out from the discussion above, however, is that both 
Bahrain and Qatar relied on either local or general international legal standards when it was 
convenient. It is also significant that the parties chose to present these accounts in the first 
place, and such a move suggests that despite its European beginnings the Court can be a 
forum for the discussion about non-European legal traditions. Discussions about control of 
Zubarah presented similar difficulties and will be considered below before this chapter's 
conclusion. 
c) The Case ofZubarah 
Unlike its treatment of the Hawar Islands, the Court entered into a more general, even if 
somewhat brief, consideration of Bahrain's and Qatar's competing claims to sovereignty 
over this sparsely populated region in the west of the Qatari pensinsula, Zubarah. Of 
interest for the thesis is the way in which sovereignty over Zubarah raised matters of 
tribalism and private property rights, as in the case of Hawar. The Court chose to focus its 
attention less on these factors in favour of the effect of certain treaties, purported Bahraini 
acquiescence to British prohibitions on its rights over the region, as well as instances of 
more recent Qatari effectivites. First, despite undeniable Al-Khalifah links with Zubarah 
from its settlement in 1762, the 1868 treaty between Britain and the Sheikh of Bahrain 
altered any possible pretensions of Al-Khalifah hegemony in the peninsula. 138 The 1868 
treaty reflected earlier agreements regarding maritime peace in the Gulf between Britain 
and local sheikhdoms. After repeated 'acts and other irregularities at sea' by the Bahraini 
ruler's brothers, Britain imposed a number of restrictions on Al-Khalifah endeavours 
137 Qatar, Reply, Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), 30 May 1999, at para 4.160. 
138 Agreements between Great Britain and Qatar and Abu Dhabi (Trucial Sheikhdoms of Oman), 12, 16 
September 1868, 138 CTS 56. 
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beyond Bahraini shores. 139 According to the Court, ' the terms of the 1868 Agreement show 
that any attempt by Bahrain to pursue its claims to Zubarah through military actions would 
not be tolerated by the British' and that thereafter 'the rulers of Bahrain were never in a 
position to engage in direct authority in Zubarah. ' 140 
Because of these restrictions on Bahrain, Qatar, along with its Ottoman overlord, 
was able to extend its control over the whole of the peninsula, as evidenced by various 
maps and treaties from the early twentieth century. The Court paid particular attention to 
the unratified Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1913, 141 which demonstrated the clear position of 
its signatories, 'Britain and the Ottoman Empire, [which] did not recognize Bahrain's 
sovereignty over the peninsula, including Zubarah.' 142 Although the Court did not 
acknowledge any source for its ability to rely on an unratified treaty, it is probable that its 
reasoning was founded on Qatar's use of the Eritrea/Yemen Award. In that case, the 
Arbitral Tribunal also dealt with an unratified agreement, which it deemed to be of 
'diplomatic evidence . .. [and] of undoubted interest because it reflects what was recorded by 
both parties as that which they had agreed to.' 143 It should be evident at this point that the 
Eritrea/Yemen Award shared many similarities with the present Case, and it was relied 
upon especially by Qatar.144 Despite these parallels both in relation to the territorial and 
maritime issues, the Award was not cited at all in the Court's judgment. This omission is 
particularly surprising given that the Award was considered in many of the dissenting and 
separate opinions and gave support to Qatar's case for Hawar.145 
139 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), at para. 83. 
140 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), at para. 84. 
141 The Court's reasoning was as follows: 
Jn view of the role played by Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire in the region in that period, it is 
significant to note Article 11 of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention signed on 29 July 1913 (see 
paragraph 45 above). This article described the course of the line agreed to separate the Sanjak of 
Nejd 'from the peninsula of Al-Qatar', and then went on to state: 
The Imperial Ottoman Government having renounced all its claims to the peninsula of al-Qatar, it is 
agreed between the two Governments that the said peninsula will, as in the past, be governed by the 
Sheikh Jasim-bin-Sani and his successors. The Government of His Britannic Majesty declares that it 
will not permit the Sheikh of Bahrain to interfere in the internal affairs of Qatar, to violate the 
autonomy of that country or to annex it. 
Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), at para. 87. 
142 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (200 I), at para. 90. 
143 Eritrea/Yemen Award, at para. 172, cited in Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/8, 5 June 2000, Qatar, Mr 
Bundy, at para. 42. 
144 It is also interesting to contrast Libya's arguments in Chapter Three with the Eritrea/Yemen Award. Libya 
invoked the unratified Laval-Mussolini Treaty of 1935 to support its claims, but unlike the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, the !CJ dismissed this argument through its total reliance on the later, ratified 1955 Treaty. 
145 Plant, supra, n 4, at 205. 
180 
Chapter Four: 
(De)Limiting the Past for Future Gain: The Relationship between Statehood. Colonialism and Oil in the Qatar v Bahrain 
Territorial Dispute 
Due to the Court's reliance on the above grounds, it did not consider the arguments 
advanced by Qatar and Bahrain about tribal loyalties in Zubarah. It is useful to examine 
such arguments here, however, as they can serve as a point of comparison with the 
preceding discussion on Hawar. Both Bahrain and Qatar depicted the Gulf before the 
advent of oil exploration as being a region where borders and their supporting norms of 
sovereignty were culturally and legally irrelevant. For example, in the words of Bahrain: 
'Until well into the 20th Century, the ecology of the Arabian peninsula inhibited the 
emergence of States or rulers whose territory could be defined by reference to specific 
borders ... Sovereignty over te1Titory did not arise from a meaningless assertion of lordship 
of the desert. ' 146 Qatar also spoke of nomadic practices, but for opposite reasons: 'The 
concept of a boundary, which dictates a precise separation of areas where separate 
sedentary populations are settled . . .is alien to the southern coast of the Gulf . . . The 
boundaries of State entities are not affected by the movement of tribes, who show a haughty 
disregard for them in their wanderings. ' 147 
As in the case of Hawar, Bahrain wanted to show that its allegiances with the Nairn 
tribe in Zubarah demonstrated an ongoing connection of personal authority that established 
sovereignty in the region. It was not possible or necessary to demarcate the exact 
boundaries of control; continuous settlement by the Nairn with its intermittent pledges of 
allegiance was enough. Qatar's reference to the reality of tribal movements sought to 
counter Bahraini arguments by showing that, despite possible Nairn allegiances and 
movements, these did not alter the basic sovereign title of Qatar over the peninsula, 148 
which had been recognised by other states. 149 Also, Qatar sought to characterise Bahraini 
arguments as being overly dependent on events in the distant past, arguing that ' if certain 
ghosts do linger in the [Zubarah] desert, they remain ghosts, surviving only in the minds of 
146 Bahrain, Memorial, Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), 30 September 1996, at para. 64. 
147 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 2000/5, 29 May 2000, Qatar, Mr Salmon, para. 23. It should be noted that in 
contrast to this general line of argument, Bahrain included testimony from Nairn tribespeople confirming 
Bahraini control within circumscribed borders in 1937: 'we [the Nairn] are within your (the Ruler of Bahrain) 
boundaries and we will not let them take your terri tory.' Letter from Chief of Nai rn tribe to Ruler of Bahrain, 
25 April 1937, Bahrain, Memorial, vol 3, Annex 12 1, at 645. 
148 
'[T]ribes moved freely within a sheikh 's territory without this entai ling the tribe's submission to that 
sheikh or, inversely, transfer of the sheikh's territory to that tribe. All else being equal, it could hardly be 
argued that the Naim's frequenting of the Zubarah area constin1ted a loss of the Ruler of Qatar's sovereignty 
over this area.' Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), CR 200019, 5 June 2000, Qatar, Mr David, at para. 47. 
149 Ibid, at paras. 28-38. 
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those who believe in ghosts.' 150 Qatar's gesture here was to use international law's typical 
disregard for indigenous title to boost its case of sovereignty over the peninsula. Such an 
adjudicative manoeuvre was a wise one, and we can also see it as another instance of the 
postcolonial paradox at play in the courtroom: where preferable to their argument, Third 
World states will readily speak in the language of their former colonisers, or 'protectors'. 
In the more immediate past, while Qatar entrenched its rule over the entire 
peninsula throughout the mid-twentieth century, Bahrain's al-Khalifah rulers continued to 
petition their British 'protectors' 151 in pursuit of their 'honour' vis-a-vis Zubarah. 152 Since 
the 1868 treaty Britain had sought to separate Al-Khalifah and Al-ThanI/Ottoman claims 
over Zubarah by stating repeatedly that Bahrain could not challenge Qatar in this matter. 153 
Despite these clear barriers towards any recognition of its sovereignty, Bahrain continued 
to seek a solution that would encompass its claims at least in relation to private property 
rights. For example, in 1961, Bahrain's Ruler suggested to Britain that Qatar could retain 
sovereign title in exchange for Al-Khalifah rights over immovable property, freedom of 
movement for its followers and jurisdiction over cases involving its followers in 
Zubarah.154 The British could appreciate the basis of these claims, but could not find a 
solution that encompassed such competing rights. 155 Britain's inability to distinguish 
private law rights from rights of sovereignty in the context of a sovereign's personal rule 
was recognised by Bahrain in its Memorial.156 Bahrain suggested that Britain's handling of 
the whole affair not only displayed confusion over the relevant facts relating to the claims 
of Qatar and Bahrain, more disturbingly, it arose from a belief that 'such rights had no 
150 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) , CR 200019, 5 June 2000, Qatar, Mr David, at para. 55. 
151 For example: Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Maj. Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, 3 February 
1945, Bahrain, Memorial, vol 4, Annex 177, al 780. 
152 The pursuit of honour and a corresponding fear about 'loss of face' was central to Bahrain's ongoing claim 
to Zubarah. In the words of the British Political Resident in 1946: 'If I understood him rightly he stated that 
he did not claim sovereignty over Zubarab but only wanted his grass and waler. When I remarked that there 
was no profit for him in Zubarah he replied that it was not a matter of profit as he knew that there was nothing 
of value in Zubarah but one of prestige.' Cited in Qatar/Bahrain (Merit.1), CR 200019, 5 June 2000, Qatar, Mr 
Shankardass, para. 11. Also see Ibid paras. 21. 25; Foreign Office minutes by M Man, British Political 
Resident, 'Zubarah' , 1 June 1960, Bahrain, Memorial, vol 4, Annex 2 14, at para.7. 
153 
'I emphasised that Her Majesty's Government had never recognised any claim by Bahrain to territorial 
sovereignty over Zubarah.' Transcript ofletter from B Burrows, British Political Resident to Foreign Office, 2 
May 1954, Bahrain, Memorial, vol 4, Annex 208(b), at 879. 
154 Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Sir George Middleton, British Political Resident, 8 February 1961 , 
Bahrain, Memorial, vol 4, Annex 218, at 912. 
155 Foreign Office Minutes by M Man, British Political Resident, entitled 'Zubarah', l June 1960, Bahrain, 
Memorial, vol 4, Annex 214, at 900. 
156 Bahrain, Memorial, Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), 30 September 1996, at para. 314. 
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place in the [sic] modem western notions of absolute territorial sovereignty that Britain had 
been trying to impose on the Middle East.' 157 
The Court's silence regarding these nuances of Arab territorial control confirmed 
Britain's approach to patterns of indigenous authority throughout the Trucial Coast. It is 
possible that the points raised by Bahrain would have had little effect even if the Court had 
considered them directly. However, this oversight represents a more general limitation 
faced by international lawyers when they seek to accommodate and balance multiple 
interests in territorial regions less than wholly reliant on strictly demarcated borders. In his 
separate opinion, Judge Kooijmans acknowledged this limitation, but could not offer any 
real solution: 
It is difficult to characterize the dispute concerning sovereignty over Zubarah as a 
dispute over territory or over the location of territorial boundaries. Even in the 
beginning of the twenty-first century it still carries the nature of contested 
hegemonic spheres or disputed entitlements to ties of allegiance rather than that of 
conflicting claims to exclusive spatial authority over a certain piece of land. That 
peculiar character of this part of the dispute is even today illustrated by the fact that 
Bahrain neither in the written nor in the oral pleadings defined the extent of the area 
over which it claimed sovereignty, but simply referred to the Zubarah region.158 
Despite these misgivings, the Court was able to delimit Zubarah's border through a 
Judgment devoid of doubt; international law had brought the parties certainty and finality. 
6) Conclusion 
Although this chapter has confined itself to an overview of the legal relations between 
Bahrain and Qatar, it must be remembered that the latter part of the dispute occurred within 
the context of two important regional events. The GCC's 159 formation in 1981 ushered in a 
new era in Gulf relations. 160 The protracted Bahraini/Qatari disagreement served as the 
157 Ibid, at para. 326. 
158 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001) (Kooijmans sep. op.), at para. 33. 
159 The Organisation's website contains some useful, general information: http://www.gcc-sg.org/. 
160 It was hoped in particular that the Council could play a role in resolving disputes between its member-
states: 'The Council stressed that the formation of the Cooperation Council has provided the constitutional 
framework for settling disputes between member states when their Majesties and Highnesses approved the 
formation of the Authority for the settlement of disputes.' Gulf Cooperation Council, Minutes, 8 March 1982, 
Qatar, Counter-Memorial, Qatar/Bahrain (Merits), Annexes, vol 4, at 205. 
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GCC's 'test case' in 'resolving internal conflicts' .161 Further, in the midst of discussion 
over the Bahrain Formula for ICJ adjudication, Iraq invaded one of the GCC's six member 
states, Kuwait. In neither example did the GCC's participation in these events contribute in 
any significant way to their resolution. Regarding Qatar and Bahrain, there was muted 
support from within the GCC for the adjudicative process. As for the two GCC members 
participating in the dispute directly, the outcome was less than ideal. Qatar's ruler described 
the Court's 2001 judgment on the merits as 'painful', but conceded that it would contribute 
'to the stability of the region' .162 Bahrain had already anticipated this potential pain and had 
taken steps before the ruling. Throughout the proceedings it proposed extra-curial options, 
such as negotiations, and did not arrest its commercial development of the Hawar Islands in 
the nineties even though it had entered into agreements pledging preservation of the status 
quo pending final settlement. As for the other four GCC members, the ICJ ruling was 
welcomed. Heard-Bey muses that the reasons for this support for third party adjudication 
stemmed from GCC members being too connected with both of the parties to resolve the 
dispute definitively. 'Other constraints such as ties based on the traditional affinities of the 
ruling families and on centuries-old tribal relationships' 163 explain this preference for a 
seemingly more neutral approach. 
For Qatar and Bahrain, the matter before the ICJ was not the first occasion where a 
third party had sought to detennine territorial and maritime issues of the utmost importance. 
Further, although it may seem tendentious to equate the earlier motives of Britain in the 
Gulf with those of the ICJ, the outcomes were similar: an occasion where 'consent' was 
established in the face of significant protest and lingering doubt. Also, the Court's 
judgment closely followed the earlier position of Britain in relation both to Hawar and 
Zubarah. At least in contrast to the flawed and unsatisfying decisions of Britain over its 
protectorates, some of which were considered above, it was hoped that the ICJ would be 
able to settle the affair 'once and for all'.164 To further this goal, both Bahrain and Qatar 
issued extensive (even if not always accurate) historical accounts of their connections with 
the territories in question. Indeed, the proceedings should be appreciated as much for their 
historical narratives as for their legal exposition. 
161 F Heard-Bey, ' Conflict Resolution and Regional Co-operation: The Role of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
1970-2002' (2006) 42 Middle Eastern Studies 199, at 2 10. 
162 lbid, at 212-213. 
163 Ibid, at 213. 
164 Qatar/Bahrain (Merits) (2001), Bedjaoui, Ranjeva & Koroma JJ (diss. op.), at para. 2. 
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Some of the arguments reconstructed from the annals of history, as well as their 
corresponding acceptance or rejection by the Court, have illustrated broader themes about 
how to approach international law's relationship with a less than palatable colonial past. In 
assessing the Court's failure to render a socially acceptable judgment, Judges Bedjaoui, 
Ranjeva and Koroma asked, 'Why ... should anyone be surprised that the taste in the mouths 
of the crowd, both in Bahrain and in Qatar, is a sour one?' 165 Particularly in relation to the 
Court's denial of underlying British motives and ongoing concerns about natural resources, 
it is to be expected that this judgment will be viewed partly as an endorsement of European 
domination over non-Europeans in the Gulf. Moreover, the majority's 'curtailed' 166 
treatment of the parties' various legal grounds and historical arguments indicates 
unwillingness or even an inability on the part of the ICJ to embrace the legal heritage of 
non-European litigants. Although there was some scope for discussion about Arab 
approaches to authority over territory, the silence of the Court suggests that the grammars 
of international Jaw are inadequate for the task of expressing such ideas. This judgment 
necessarily (de )limited territorial and maritime boundaries between two small, oil-rich Arab 
states. On the other hand, the process of legal argumentation between Qatar and Bahrain, as 
well as the heated dissent from the Bench, shows that the scope of international law need 
not always be so limited. 
Although notions of Arab/Muslim authority were unfamiliar to the Court, the case 
of Western Sahara had provided an alternative framework for conceptualising international 
legal personality in cultural and geographical locations far from the cooler climes of the 
Hague. Arguments about non-European forms of authority over territory received much 
greater consideration by the ICJ in its Western Sahara Opinion and this case forms the 
subject of Chapter Five after Part Three's introductory discussion below. 
165 ibid, at para. 7. 
166 Qatar/Bahrain (Merit!>) (2001), (Kooijmans sep. op), at para. 4. 
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Introduction: 
Determining the Self through the ICJ's Advisory Jurisdiction: Procedures and Principles 
We saw in Part Two that the ICJ has heard a number of territorial disputes for Third World 
states through its contentious jurisdiction. The Court has also deliberated on a number of 
advisory cases, which have often dealt with the relationship between self-determination and 
territory. 1 Because of the more flexible and open-ended nature of the Court's advisory 
jurisdiction and its non-binding outcomes, such self-determination cases should not simply 
be equated with territorial delimitation. Like their contentious counterparts, however, 
advisory cases about self-determination are an exercise in delimiting the self (and the state) 
through law. Further, how the self is grounded territorially is of central importance in 
determining whether a people can gain international legal personality. In the case of former 
colonial entities, a tension arises as to whether the contours of the territory or the identity of 
the people form the framework for emerging legal entities. In the following introductory 
section, an overview of the nature of the Court's advisory jurisdiction precedes a summary 
of the interrelationship between self-determination, decolonisation and territory. 
Advisory Opinions enable the world community to seek expert legal opm10ns 
beyond the Court's limits on locus standi for states in contentious cases. 2 According to 
Article 96 of the UN Charter: 
1 These include: international Status of South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) ( 1950) ICJ Reps, p. 128; 
Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) (1956) 
ICJ Reps, p. 23; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) (1971) ICJ Reps, p. 
12; Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) (1975) ICJ Reps, p.12 ; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) (2004) ICJ Reps, p. 136. 
2 S Rosenne, Rosenne 's The World Court: What it is and how it workv, T D Gi ll ( ed), (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2003, 61h ed) , at 86. 
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1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of 
Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. 
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so 
authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on 
the legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. 
This language is also used in Article 65 of the Court's Statute. Although parties disputing 
the Court's jurisdiction in particular cases have focused on the discretionary nature of these 
provisions, the ICJ has never refused a request for these reasons. Only in the earlier PCIJ 
matter of Eastern Carelia did the Court choose not to hear the matter on the grounds that it 
would subvert state consent.3 Some advisory requests, including the Western Sahara Case, 
have included inter-state disputes, but the Court has tended to overlook such an issue as an 
obstacle in exercising its jurisdiction. According to Koskenniemi, ' giving advisory opinions 
is a form ... of peaceful settlement of disputes, whether between the UN and its member 
States or between States inter se.'4 The Court's consciousness of its 'duty-to-cooperate' in 
the UN system has meant that advisory opinions have become an important way for UN 
organs, particularly the General Assembly, to seek the Court's assistance and expertise in 
resolving matters of concern.5 
The nature of the Court' s advisory jurisdiction has elicited criticism for a number of 
reasons. Of interest for the thesis is the way commentators have tried to define and limit the 
role of the Court vis-a-vis 'political' controversies. We saw in Chapter One that ICJ 
scholarship is characterised by ongoing negotiations over the influence and place of politics 
in ICJ matters. A desire to demarcate the boundaries between legal and political concerns is 
particularly pronounced in advisory cases for two reasons. First, under the Charter and its 
Statute, the Court 'may give an advisory opinion on any legal question'. This provision's 
inclusion of the adjective 'legal' has prompted lengthy, but often repetitive, definitions of 
legal in contrast to political disputes in both cases and commentaries. On entering the 
Peace Palace, it has become obligatory to justify adjudication in contradistinction to 
political partiality. Despite such conventions, we have seen that the Court readily embraces 
3 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark/Norway) (1933) P.C.I.J. Series A/B No. 53. 
4 M Koskenniemi, 'Advisory Opinions of the International Court Justice as an Instrument of Preventive 
Diplomacy', N Nauimi & R Meese (eds), International l egal Issues Arising under the United Nations Decade 
of International Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 1995), 599-6 I 9, at 604. 
5 M Pomerance, 'The Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice and its "Judicial" Character: Past 
and Future Prisms', A S Muller et al. (eds), The International Court of Justice (The Hague: Kluwer, l 997), 
27 J-323, at 290. Further, in relation to the UNGA nature of advisory requests, Pomerance reminds us that the 
UNSC only sought the Court's opinion once, in 1970 over Namibia. Ibid, at 291. The UN function of the ICJ 
is also discussed briefly in Chapter One, especially see footnote 15, at 19. 
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advisory requests, indicating that debates over the law/politics dichotomy serve as mere lip-
service to the preservation of the ICJ's legitimacy within the international system. 
Some commentators regard the Court's acceptance of advisory requests as 
problematic.6 Pomerance, for example, bemoans how the Court is 'frequently turned to not 
for the purpose of genuine law-clarification and problem-solving but for propaganda 
advantages and judicial legitimation of positions already firmly taken by political organs. ' 7 
On the flip-side, there is a strong theme in ICJ scholarship lamenting the untapped potential 
of the Court' s advisory function as discussed in Chapter One.8 The caseload of the JCJ is 
lighter than that of the PCIJ, and this is especially so in relation to advisory opinions. 
The Court has developed jurisprudence on self-determination in its contentious, and 
particularly its advisory, capacity. Given that only states can bring contentious matters to 
the Court, Advisory Opinions are the better option for considering issues about nascent 
state entities and questions of international legal personality. Such considerations became 
vital for the UNGA in the fifties, sixties and seventies when increasing Third World 
membership meant that decolonisation was central to its work. 
Although the law and practice on self-determination has grown enormously as a 
result of decolonisation, a framework of earlier norms and principles helped shape the 
postcolonial character of self-determination.9 The idea can be traced back to the French 
Revolution and was championed- at least for European peoples - by the League of Nations 
after the First World War.10 Later in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter self-determination was 
6 For an overview of the literature dealing wi th advisory opm10ns and what changes to make, see 
Koskenniemi, supra n 4; and R Higgins, 'A comment on the current health of Advisory Opinions', V Lowe & 
M Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert 
Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi ty Press, 1996), 567-581. 
7 Emphasis added, Pomerance, supra n 5, at 294. For a strident defence of ' legalism' in the face of 'politics' 
vis-a-vis the South West Africa cases, see M Pomerance, 'The ICJ and South West Africa (Namibia): A 
Retrospective Legal/Political Assessment' ( 1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 425. 
8 See Chapter One, at 51. Also see Koskenniemi, supra n 4, at 602. 
9 This section does not pretend to do justice to the extensive literature on self-determination, but it does note 
some useful sources: D Z Cass, ' Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current 
International Law Theories' (1992) 18 Syracuse Journal of International Law 21; J Crawford, 'The Right of 
Self-Detennination in International Law: Its Development and Future', P Alston ( ed), Peoples ' Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7-67; F L Kirgis, Jr. , 'The Degrees of Self-Determination in the 
United Nations Era' ( 1994) 88 American Journal of International Law 304; M Koskenniemi, 'National Self-
Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice' 43 (1994) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 24 l ; K Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); G J Simpson, 'The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Postcolonial 
Age' 32 ( 1996) Stanford Journal of international Law 255 
1° For a general overview of the history of the development of self-determination, see A Cassese, Self-
Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), at ch 2. 
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enshrined, but only as a principle and not a right. 11 ' It is only later on in both human rights 
and decolonization settings that official UN terminology confirms that peoples enjoy a right 
of self-determination.' 12 The UNGA issued a series of declarations linking self-
determination and decolonisation. One of the most important of these was Resolution 1514 
(XV), which can be read as an endorsement of self-determination within former colonial 
territories. 13 The provision declared that '[a]ll peoples have the right to self-
determination',14 but it then went on to state that '[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.' 15 Later in Resolution 
1541 (XV), the UNGA set out the procedure for non-self governing territories as covered 
under Chapter XI of the Charter. This Resolution was relied upon in the Western Sahara 
Case because it specified the avenues available for non-self governing territories m 
fulfilling the right to self-determination. Under Principle VI, options included: 
(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; 
(b) Free association with an independent State; or 
(c) Integration with an independent State. 
Principle VII went on to require the 'free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the 
territory' in settling on one of these outcomes. 16 
For a system based on membership of states, the phenomena of self-determination 
and decolonisation have presented a challenge to international law. Berman captures this 
idea in his study of the norm's evolution, describing it as 'exceptional', because it requires 
'a limited suspension of the usual legal norms.' 17 We have seen above that international 
11 Article 1(2) reads, 'The purposes of the United Nations are ... 2. To develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace.' 
12 Italics in original, R Falk, 'Self-Determination under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine versus 
the Incoherence of Experience', W Danspeckgruber (ed), The Self-Determination of Peoples: Community, 
Nation and State in an Interdependent World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 31-66, at 41. 
13 The right was confirmed a decade later in UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), 'Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations', 24 October 1970. 
14 Paragraph 2. 
15 Paragraph 6, UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), ' Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial 
countries and peoples', 14 Dec 1960. For a general discussion of the Declaration, see S KN Blay, 'Self-
Deterrnination versus Territorial Integrity in Decolonization ' 25 (1985) Indian Journal of International Law 
386. 
16 UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV), ' Principle which should guide Members in determining whether or not an 
obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter', I 5 December 1960. 
17 Emphasis in original, N Bennan, 'Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law ' 
( l 988-1989) 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal 51, at 58. 
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legal personality attaches to states, but what about peoples? Berman suggests that the law 
sometimes becomes more flexible when it recognises the legal status of a people before 
they have achieved statehood. This is 'the paradox of self-determination - the assertion of a 
right to become a right-holder' .18 Procedurally, such a right is difficult to fulfil within the 
confines of ICJ adjudication. The Court's contentious jurisdiction only allows other states 
to pursue the rights of would-be states.19 Advisory opinions are also restrictive, because we 
will see that, at least in the first case study, the people seeking their self-determination, the 
Sabrawis, were prevented from presenting their case before the Court. 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle in realising self-determination, however, has been 
definitional, rather than procedural. What constitutes a valid self-determination unit, or 
people? Further, what is the relationship between definitions of selfhood and territory? Part 
Two's Introduction touched on these ideas through the prism of the uti possidetis juris 
norm or policy.20 There we saw that colonialism's legacy has been enduring because of the 
way in which former administrative boundaries have often been transformed into 
international borders. Thus, when trying to balance uti possidetis and self-determination, 
the most fundamental question to ask is: what should come first, the territory or the people? 
In his well-known statement in the Western Sahara Case, Judge Dillard declared, 'It is for 
the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the 
people.' 2 1 Despite this sentiment, many examples from the Court's docket as well as 
UNGA declarations suggest that the 'static principle' of uti possidetis has trumped its 
'dynamic' counterpart of self-determination.22 Further, although the Court has implicitly 
favoured uti possidetis, it has failed to acknowledge the inevitable conflict between these 
two norms. Yet Cassese reminds us that these two approaches are irreconcilable: 'they can 
coexist only if self-determination makes way for the political need to respect existing 
boundaries. ' 23 The quest for stability through colonial legacies has resulted in an approach 
to self-determination limited and limiting to those wishing to achieve postcolonial 
18 Ibid, al 78. 
19 For example: South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia/South Africa; Liberia/South Africa) (Preliminary 
Objections) (1962) ICJ Reps, p. 319; South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia/South Africa; Liberia/South Africa) 
(Second Phase) (1966) ICJ Reps, p. 6; East Timor (Australia v. Portugal) (Merits) ( 1995) ICJ Reps, p. 102. 
20 See Part Two's Introduction, at 112-115. 
21 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) ( 1975) (sep. op. Dillard) ICJ Reps, at 122. 
22 T M Franck, 'Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession', C Brolmann et al (eds), Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 1993), 3-27, at 4. 
23 A Cassese, 'The International Court of Justice and the right of peoples to self-determination', V Lowe & M 
Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the international Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 351-363, at 362. 
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personality. Two examples of the struggle for self-determination form the subject of the 
following discussion. 
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Determining the Limits of Law in the Western Sahara Case 1 
1) Introduction 
he ICJ's Western Sahara Advisory Opinion handed down in 19752 has retained a 
prominent place within international legal scholarship because of its confirmation 
of the right to self-determination at least within colonial boundaries.3 It is ironic 
then that the territory along with its people, the Sal).rawis, still lack statehood and 
international legal personality.4 In spite of jurisprudential notoriety, Moroccan occupation 
of the territory has rendered the Sal).rawis unable to exercise the right to choose their own 
form of government as guaranteed by the ICJ over three decades ago.5 For Castellino, the 
1 The name ' Western Sahara' is derived from the great central African desert stretching from the Red Sea to 
the Atlantic Ocean and covering much of the northern and central parts of Africa. Sahara is derived from the 
Arabic word for desert, J aOra' (~1~) and DaDrawl is the relative adjective used to describe a person from 
the place. Arabic is broadly divided into colloquial and Modern Standard (fuO [ a) forms and some of the 
wordis in this chapter reflect this diversity. Spelling discrepancies are compounded by the fact that there are 
many differences between French and English transliteration. Wherever possible, the meaning of Arabic 
words or their English transliteration is given in the fu D Ua/English form except in French quotations. 
2 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) (1975) ICJ Reps, p. 12; hereinafter, ICJ Reps (1975). 
3 Knop points out though that the judgment is much more than a useful account of self-determination: ' the 
court engaged not only the specific challenges made to the account of self-determination as free choice, but 
also the more general problems of interpretation of a historically Eurocentric international law and the 
appropriate international legal remedy for colonialism.' K Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 116. 
4 Technically, the territory is still under the gaze of international legal regulation, but at least in relation to 
self-determination, the territory 's legal status remains unfulfilled. As a result of Moroccan occupation, the 
J a[ rawis fall under the international law of occupation as well as human rights law. The ICJ considered how 
these two bodies of law applied to an occupied territory in the case discussed in the next chapter on the Wall 
Advisory Opinion. For an excellent historical study of the Western Saharan struggle incorporating political 
and legal perspectives, see T Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport: L. Hill, 1983). 
5 The case of Palestine could also be classi fied as a non-self governing territory and shares many similarities 
with the present Case. The legal status of the current state of Palestine and unfulfilled right to self-
detcrmination as discussed in Chapter Six. 
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'relevance of this case to general international law of self-determination is enormous since 
it is one that falls between the two categories of "salt-water" colonialism, and the issue of 
possibly neo-colonialism. ' 6 
Although it is typical to look beyond the ICJ in understanding this denial of $al:,lrawI 
statehood, this chapter turns to a textual analysis of the proceedings to interrogate 
international law's constitutive role in the impasse. Many of the reasons for the Opinion's 
limited effect cannot be blamed on ' political ' problems outside the Peace Palace; they lie 
embedded within the framework of the proceedings and the Court itself. Especially once the 
reader's gaze strays from the familiar confines of self-determination rhetoric, it becomes 
clear that the pleadings and the Opinion represent a debate over what role international law 
should play in the wake of colonialism. On such considerations no dispositif was rendered; 
these contested ideas, however, lie at the heart of the various positions taken both at the bar 
and the bench. Confusion about international law's purpose in supporting the claims of 
non-European peoples and cultures pulled the Court between particularism and 
universalism: should the Court have embraced instances of local Moroccan and 
Mauritanian rule, or should the ICJ have defeated such claims by upholding the right to 
SabrawI self-determination? Although the Court ultimately remained faithful to the 
principle of self-determination, we should not see the Opinion simply as an endorsement of 
$al)rawI rights. Rather, it was an ambivalent compromise that employed Western 
approaches of territoriality to silence the claims ofregional powers.7 
In the various pleadings and judicial opinions8 competing narratives and strategies 
vied for credibility within the crucible of legal contestation about (post)colonial 
possibilities for the territory of Western Sahara. All arguments were structured by both 
general institutional biases of the Court as well as the nature of the matter at hand, 
6 J Castellino, International Law and Self Determination: The Interplay of the Politics of Territorial 
Possession with Formulations of Post-Colonial 'National Identity (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000), at 
211. Elias is less circumspect describing both Morocco and Mauritania as modern day colonisers. T 0 Elias, 
The International Court of Justice and some contemporary problems: Essays on international law (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), at 330. 
7 Okere argues that the language used by the Court was more diplomatic than legal because of the way it 
supported the various States simultaneously. B 0 Okere, 'The Western Sahara Case' (I 979) 28 International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly 296, at 310. 
8 Although there is a large literature devoted to the Western Sahara Opinion, few of these studies have 
examined the pleadings. Notable exceptions include: M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The 
Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2"d edition, 2005), at 
297-300; Knop, supra n 3, M M Ricciardi, 'Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis' 
(1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law 301 and especially M N Shaw, 'The Western Sahara Case' 
( 1978) British Yearbook of International Law 119. 
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especially through the questions raised by the UNGA in its request for the Opinion. Each 
doctrinal account was much more than an exposition of legal rules, though; strategies 
employed and the substance invoked were both illustrative of the range of argumentative 
possibilities within the Courtroom. The success of certain claims helps us map out the legal 
grammars or competencies of argument in the Case, highlighting those representations of 
law that are most suited and suitable to their Peace Palace context. Such a focus allows us 
to explore my concern in the thesis to map the grammars of argument in ICJ territorial 
disputes. Further, we can also begin to approach the deeper focus of the thesis on 
universalism, because the Case provides a rich array of material about the harmonies and 
dissonances between European and non-European approaches to authority over territory. 
The chapter discusses a number of themes that have already emerged in Part Two, 
especially the themes of historical retelling, international legal personality under 
colonialism and different cultural traditions towards territorial order. Perhaps because of its 
advisory nature, the Case is richer than those explored in Chapters Three and Four. The 
larger number of parties allows greater comparison not only along substantive Jines, but 
strategic lines namely, those strategies of discursive delivery employed by the parties. After 
setting the scene and summarising the Opinion itself, the chapter is divided into two halves. 
First, through the structuring device of the law/politics dichotomy, argumentative strategies 
employed by the parties and the Court are reviewed. Ever mindful of the political backdrop 
of the Case, all speakers constructed differing accounts oflaw's relationship with politics to 
support their respective opinions about the role expected of international law in the matter. 
Second, the chapter considers some matters of substance pertinent to the thesis' concern 
about universalism: patterns of non-Western statehood and the construction of selfhood 
through international law. In a case renowned for embracing the rights of colonised people, 
it is easy to overlook how the Court developed such a position. Faced with the competing 
claims by a number of parties and policies, the Court confirmed the $al)rawl self through a 
broader denial of non-European statehood. What patterns of discourse influenced the Court 
in its decision and how did the Court resolve the tension between law and politics as well as 
particularism and universalism in its Opinion? 
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Map #9: Western Sahara and Surrounding States, source: J B Allcock et al, Border and Territorial Disputes 
(Harlow, Essex: Longman, 3rd ed, 1992), at 296 
2) Confusion over the Fate of Western Sahara and the Request for an Advisory Opinion 
a) Historical Background 
The territory now known as Western Sahara is bordered by Morocco to its North, Algeria to 
its North East, Mauritania to its East and South and the Atlantic Ocean (along with the 
Canary Islands) to the West.9 As a result of the Spanish presence, the northern segment, 
comprising roughly one third of the territory, is known as Saqiyyat al-J:Iamra' (or red canal, 
in Arabic) and the bottom two-thirds as Rio de Oro (or river of gold, in Spanish). Much of 
the land is incredibly dry, receiving very low rainfall throughout the year, except for its thin 
coastal strip, thus encouraging nomadic as opposed to pastoral habitation.'0 Western Sahara 
is blessed with rich fishing resources and phosphate was also discovered in abundance by 
Spain in 1947. 11 
9 Generally, see I Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (London: C Hurst, 
1979). 
10 ICJ Reps (1975), at 88. 
11 A Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), at 214-215. Spain only started full-scale extraction in 1973 and by 1975 in 'the last full year of 
operations', production reached 2.8 million tons annually. J Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western 
Sahara Dispute (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1983), at 12-13. Foreign control of Western Sahara's 
phosphate reserves continues to this day. 
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Western Sahara has nourished and been nourished by numerous empires m its 
history, including the Islamic dynasties of the Alawites (1666-present), the Almohads 
(1145-1269), the Almoravids (1056-1147), the Idrisids (788-974), the Merinids (1244-
1465) and the Saadians ( 1554-1659). It is incorrect to conceive of the entity of Western 
Sahara subsisting in its cmTent form before the colonial era; this also applies to the $al)rawI 
people themselves. Nevertheless, it is possible at least to point out that the territory was an 
integral part in the extensive trade networks spanning the Sahara in the region and broadly 
fell within the zone of Islamic civilisation of North-West Africa. Largely because of its 
desert topography, social organisation was tribally based, with numerous independent 
groups forging intersecting alliances across the territory and beyond. Religiously the 
SaJ:lrawis are Sunni Muslims and their speech of the I:Iassaniyya12 dialect of Arabic reflects 
this, but ethnically it is simplistic to define them as Arabs, comprising as they do a rich mix 
of indigenous peoples as well. 13 It is common, however, to include Western Sahara within 
the confines of the Arab World by reason of its language and its religion. Thus, the 
Sal:irawis can be regarded as African, Muslim, largely Arabo-Berber nomadic tribes with 
close cultural links to the neighbouring States of Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania - all of 
which are members of the Arab League. 
While the region was well-known within the historical and cultural traditions of the 
Muslim world with the spread of Islam in the wake of the Prophet's death in 632 CE, 
Europe remained largely ignorant of the territory and its people until the Spanish Age of 
'Discovery' and later, the scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century. Spain and 
Portugal were the main European powers to penetrate the region, and Riedel classifies 
Spanish contact with Western Sahara into three historical periods: between 1385 and 1884 
when relations were sporadic and focussed on Spain's fishing and trade interests in the 
Canary Islands; 14 Spain's declaration of a protectorate over Rio de Oro, along with its 
consolidation in the wake of the Berlin Conference of 1884; and finally, complete Spanish 
12 Damis attributes this dialect to the gradual infiltration of Maqil Bedouin Arabs, originally hailing from the 
Arabian Peninsula in the fourteenth century. This tribe was joined by other North African migrations so that 
by the end of tJ1e seventeenth century, after intennarriage with Berber tribes and conversions to Islam, local 
Berber tribes claimed Arab descent and spoke Oassaniyya Arabic. Ibid , at 5-6. 
13 Mauritania briefly discussed the shift to Arabic in the Shinq!OI entity: Mauri tania, Oral Pleadings, 
International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, al 361-362. 
14 in its written memorials, Spain offered a detailed account of the various agreements created to preserve 
Spain's fishing interests off the coast, as well as to protect its sailors in the wake of shipwrecks. See 
especially, Spain, Written Submission, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, 
Western Sahara, vol l, at 73-425. 
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occupation of the inhospitable terrain from 1934. 15 During the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, the Spanish and French along with their British and 
German counterparts sought to consolidate their territorial claims in the region. Since its 
invasion of Algeria in 1830, and given its interests in West Africa and Morocco, France 
was the dominant African partner during this period. 16 Because of Spain's earlier 
connections with the territory of Western Sahara, however, the two European powers 
entered into a series of relatively amicable treaties, in particular those of 1900, 1904 and 
1912, which sought to delineate their respective interests in North West Africa. 17 
Although France and Spain were both eager to ignore and override the indigenous 
systems of rule extant in the territory, indigenous tribes, as well as neighbouring powers, 
maintained connections with Western Sahara. Morocco in particular propounded a policy of 
'Greater Morocco' after its independence in 1956, 18 and its most well-known spokesperson 
was All al al-Fassi. 19 This ideological perspective not only justified the inclusion of Western 
Sahara into Morocco but also laid claim to large parts of Algeria and the whole of 
Mauritania. In fact, 1963 had witnessed a border conflict between Morocco and Algeria.20 
Furthe1more until 1969, Morocco refused to acknowledge Mauritania's right to exist as a 
separate State even in the face of significant regional opposition to such posturing.21 
15 EH Riedel, 'Confrontation in the Western Sahara in the Light of the Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice of 16 October 1975: A Critical Appraisal' ( 1976) 19 German Yearbook of International Law 
405 at 408-410. Even in relation to the post- 1934 period, it is difficult to characterise Spain's presence in the 
area as amounting to comprehensive occupation. Shaw cites Gretton on this point, who argues that the 
Spanish only established complete administrative and military control in the 1960s. Shaw, supra n 8, at 121. 
This situation was similar to that discussed in Chapter Three, where we saw that Italian occupation of Libya 
was paltry for decades after the fonnal creation of the colony. 
16 In fact, Spain's limited and essentially insignificant presence in Africa compared with its European 
neighbour, France, is not dissimilar to Italy's own position in North Africa and particularly Libya. Like Spain, 
Italy was anxious to stake a claim over a part of the continent for national glory, and Libya is perhaps the 
prime example of such ambitions. The nature of Italy's presence in North Africa during the same period is 
touched on in Chapter Three. 
17 Agreement or Protocol between Morocco and Spain, concerning the cession of Ifni, 27 June 1900, 188 CTS 
457; Convention between France and Spain concerning Morocco, 3 October l 904, 196 CTS 353; Convention 
between France and Spain respecting relations in Morocco, 27 November 1912, 217 CTS 288. 
18 For an overview of Morocco's regional ambitions, see Hodges, supra n 4, ch 8, 'Greater Morocco', 85-98. 
19 Damis, supra n 11 , al 15. Judge De Castro is the only member of the Court to discuss al-Fassi and the 
ideology of 'Greater Morocco'. It must be noted that this concept along with its most prominent defender did 
not figure in the pleadings themselves. ICJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. De Castro), at 127-128. 
20 See P B Wild, 'The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict: A Study of 
New Machinery for Peacekeeping and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among African States' (1966) 20 
international Organization 18. 
21 Z 0 A Salem, 'Mauritania: A Saharan Frontier-state' (2005) 10 Journal of North African Studies 491, at 
498. 
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Despite the development of the self-determination norm explored in the first few 
decades of the UN as explored in Part Three's Introduction, the norm's application to 
Western Sahara was complicated by Spanish intransigence22 and competing regional claims 
and interpretations of its application. Spain had delayed its withdrawal from the territory for 
some time, thus allowing Morocco and Mauritania to develop stronger claims to the 
territory on its 'independence'. According to Shaw, the 'early Spanish dilatoriness was not 
in the context of colonial behaviour exceptional, but the claims maintained by neighbouring 
States were.'23 This situation contributed significantly to the UNGA 's policy difficulties; 
although the Assembly had placed the situation of Sahara's decolonisation on its agenda 
back in 1963, its stance was far from clear on the eve of the Advisory Opinion in 1974. 
Such ambivalence was indicated by its choice of seeking the ICJ's assistance in the first 
place; it was unusual to involve the Court in decolonisation issues, and in this instance the 
UNGA was partly swayed by the lobbying of Morocco and its supporters. Morocco, Spain, 
Algeria and Mauritania all had to operate within the context of the UN's decolonisation 
policy, but beyond this they all pursued their own agendas. Their positions regarding a 
mooted referendum and the UN ' s role all shifted substantially over the course of the sixties 
up until 1975.24 Dynamics of diplomacy within the UN, the Arab League and the OAU all 
influenced the fo1mulation of policies sometimes supporting or sometimes stalling the 
chance for a UN-led referendum for the territory. 
The impetus for the Advisory Opinion request came m the wake of intense 
Moroccan and Mauritanian lobbying after Spain's announcement in 1974 supporting a 
referendum which would have seen the Sal)raw1s determining their future in the wake of 
Spanish withdrawal. Keen to avoid the political fallout from a military invasion and yet 
mindful of time constraints in securing his hold over the territory, Morocco's King ijassan 
supported the Court's involvement as a stalling tactic. Thus, he 'would have the Western 
Saharan dispute submitted to the International Court of Justice at The Hague and thereby 
persuade the UN to postpone the referendum while the territory's legal status was under the 
22 Mauritania argues that Spain did not comply for a number of years with UNGA requests about Western 
Sahara's move towards self-determination. Written Statement, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IJJ, p. 7. See also Slaoui, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, International 
Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents : Western Sahara, vol lV, p. 120. 
23 Shaw, supra n 8, at 122. 
24 T M Franck, 'The Stealing of the Sahara ' 70 ( 1976) American Journal of International Law 694, at 701 -
707. 
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court's laborious and time-consuming scrutiny.'25 Initially Morocco attempted to bring a 
case against Spain under the Court's contentious jurisdiction, but Spain rejected such a 
move.
26 The UNGA was then called on by Morocco and some other Arab states to invoke 
the Court's advisory jurisdiction.27 Moroccan motivations for such a strategy were easy to 
determine from statements made at the time and military action that continued both during 
and after the judgment.28 For example, Hodges cites King I:Iassan as declaring: ' If peaceful 
means do not produce results, only armed struggle will remain for the Moroccan 
people ... [and in relation to the ICJ Opinion] ... whatever the result Morocco will recover its 
rights over its despoiled provinces no later than the end of [1975]. ' 29 
This deferment of the Assembly's decolonisation duties in favour of the Court was 
unusual: typically the Assembly assessed the situation on the ground without the assistance 
of the ICJ and without reference to historical considerations.30 It was even more unusual to 
block planned referenda.31 Because of widespread misgivings over such an approach, it was 
difficult to garner sufficient support for resolution 3292 (XXIX) seeking the Court's 
assistance. Many Arab States were supportive of Moroccan and Mauritanian claims over 
the territory, but other non-Arab African States in particular resisted any watering down of 
the $abraw1 right to self-determination. For example, a Kenyan delegate to the UN stated, 
'The people of Spanish Sahara should be the court' .32 With Moroccan troops never far from 
the borders of Western Sahara before and during the Case, it would have been difficult to 
suspend belief and uphold a clear separation between law and politics.33 Could the Court be 
25 Hodges, supra n 4, 183. 
26 ICJ Reps ( 1975), at para. 29. 
27 Franck, supra n 24, at 706; Hodges, supra n 4, at 185. 
28 See Mundy for some discussion of Morocco's military exercises on the border of Western Sahara during 
the hearings of the Advisory Opinion: J Mundy, 'Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 
Moroccan Takeover of the Spanish Sahara' (2006) 11 Journal of North African Studies 275, at 284. 
29 Quoted in Hodges, supra n 4, at 207. 
30 G Joffe, 'The International Court of Justice. And the Western Sahara Dispute' R Lawless & L Monahan 
(eds), War and Refugees: The Western Sahara Conflict (London; New York: Pinter, 1987) 16-30, al 16. 
31 Franck, supra n 24, at 700-701. 
32 Ibid, at 706. 
33 During oral pleadings, Spain expressed its misgivings to this effect, but missed the irony that it had carried 
out such policies for almost a century in the same territory: 'Je dois done, ace stade, exprimer I' apprehension 
avec laquelle nous avons entendu la tenue generale de certaines interventions devant la Cour, qui n 'ont pas 
cache leur conviction qu'un eventual avis de la Cour aurait une influence decisive dans la resolution de ce qui, 
sous le masque d ' un litige juridique avec l'Espagne, constitute en realile le but de s'intaller souverainement 
sur ce territoire africain, quelle que soit la volonte de sa population autochtone.' [At this stage, I must express 
the apprehension with which we have heard the general tenor of certain interventions before the Court which 
did not hide their conviction that an eventual opinion from the Court will have a decisive influence in the 
resolution of this matter which, in the guise of legal dispute wi th Spain, in fact constitutes the goal of its 
sovereignty over this African territory, whatever the will of its indigenous population.] Sedo, Spain, Oral 
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insulated from the broader context through legal argument alone? Through its request for 
an Advisory Opinion of an unusually historical nature, perhaps this is what the Assembly 
was trying to do: maintaining faith in law as separate and distinct from politics. This tactic 
was also vital for the main participants in the case itself, as will be shown below. 
One of the ICJ's exemplary self-determination cases was initiated in the face of 
widespread Third World unease about the need for adjudication, and the focus of its 
consideration, the Sal:irawI people, were silenced through the process. 34 We mentioned 
above that such silencing of non-Europeans as objects of adjudication was common to the 
case law of nineteenth century and PCIJ jurisprudence. 35 However, with the process of 
decolonisation all but finished, the Opinion reminds us of continuities, rather than ruptures, 
with former instances of colonial adjudication and silencing. A number of states would seek 
to speak for the Sal)rawis, but the nature of the Court's jurisdiction permitted no standing or 
rights to the people themselves.36 Such a tum of events was a blow to the aspirations of the 
recently formed Polisario Front,37 which expressed its disbelief over a judgment that would 
' convey the destiny of peoples before the Court of The Hague in our total absence. '38 In the 
words of a prominent Sal)rawI, 'the Sahrawis will not accept the whole world speaking for 
them as if they were cattle. '39 
b) A Summary of the Pleadings and the Opinion 
Partly because of Mauritanian and Moroccan claims to the Spanish territory in the pre-
colonial period, the advice sought by the UNGA from the Court centred on the legal status 
of Western Sahara on the eve of Spanish colonisation and the nature of any pre-existing 
legal ties with neighbouring powers. Thus as per Articles 31 and 68 of the ICJ Statute and 
Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 
62. 
34 Joffe, supra n 30, at 16. 
35 For example, see Part Two's Introduction, at 102. 
36 W M Reisman, 'Protecting Indigenous Rights in International Adjudication' (I 995) 89 American Journal of 
International l aw 350, at 354. 
37 POLISARIO, or Frente Popular de Liberaci6n de Saguia el Hanrra y Rio de Oro (Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro) was officially established on IO May 1973 in pursuit of 
independence from Spain. Once Spain left the territory, it was replaced by Morocco and Mauritania until 
1979 and now only Morocco as the occupier. Polisario continues to strnggle against the occupation. For 
general information on the origins of nationalism and Polisario, see Hodges, supra n 4, at chs 14 & 15. 
38 Ibid, a t 186. 
39 Ibid. 
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Articles 3, 87 and 89 of the Court's Rules, the UNGA asked the following questions of the 
Court: 
1) Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain 
a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? 
2) If the answer to the first question is in the negative, what were the legal ties between this 
territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?40 
The same resolution 3292 (XXV) acknowledged the UNGA's work m relation to 
decolonisation, but did not explicitly ask the Court to consider decolonisation or self-
determination.41 Perhaps it was assumed that this would be understood by the Court and 
other participants and in fact it was: all positions contained some exploration of this 
relationship. According to the Court, ' The object of the request is ... to obtain from the 
Court an opinion which the General Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper 
exercise of its functions concerning the decolonization of the territory.'42 
Some procedural aspects of the Case relating to participating states should be noted. 
Under resolution 3292, Spain as the 'administering power' and Mauritania and Morocco as 
'interested parties' were called on to submit to the International Court infonnation and 
documents that would be needed to clarify the two questions. These States all presented 
lengthy written and oral submission to the Court. Algeria also made an important 
contribution through its eloquent advocate, Mohammad Bedjaoui, and Zai"re made a brief 
but highly unconventional appearance during the oral pleadings. The Court was furnished 
with a dossier compiled under the auspices of the Secretary-General as per Article 65(2) of 
the Court's Statute, 43 but this document was insufficient for providing the necessary 
background, and the Court was forced to rely heavily on the materials submitted by the 
participating States. Finally, a number of mostly Latin American States submitted brief 
letters to the Court as per Article 66(2) of the Statute, generally urging the Court to be 
cognisant of the overriding importance of self-determination in the Case.44 
40 It should be noted that Mauritania was called the Mauritanian Entity, Bilad ShinqlD"l [meaning 'country of 
the Shinq!JI ' in Arabic] or the Shinguitti entity. 
41 The text of the resolution is reproduced in the Opinion: ICJ Reps (1975), at 13-14. 
42 ICJ Reps (1975), at 27. In his separate opinion, Judge Dillard was relieved Urnt the Court had chosen to 
place potentially non-legal questions within the context of contemporary decolonisation practice. ICJ Reps 
( 1975) (sep. op. Dillard), at 117. 
43 International Court of Justice, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol 1, pp. 24-60. 
44 These States included: France, Panama, Nicaragua, Chile, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Costa Rica, Colombia. Ibid, at 63-72. 
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The contentious nature of the Case was deepened during preliminary hearings about 
the appointment of ad hoc judges. The bench already included the Spanish judge Frederico 
de Castro y Bravo, and so the question arose regarding the rights of Mauritania and 
Morocco to appoint their own judges.45 In seeking such a right,46 Morocco invoked Article 
68 of the Statute, which states, ' In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall 
further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases 
to the extent to which it recognises them to be applicable. ' As Morocco had attempted to 
bring contentious pleadings before the Court in 1974, it argued that there was 'une question 
juridique actuellement pendante'47 and that it could rely on Article 31 (2) of the Statute.48 
Mauritania could not rely on the technicalities of the Statute, and instead made reference to 
the UNGA's recognition of its status as an interested State in various resolutions.49 
It is interesting to contrast these two perspectives supportive of the Case's 
contentious nature with the views held by Spain and Algeria. Perhaps because its own 
judge was a member of the Court, Spain tried to dissociate the proceedings from any 
contentious connotations and reminded the Court of its advisory attributes.50 Algeria also 
sought to steer Mauritania and Morocco from the battle lines by stressing the common ties 
uniting the Maghreb above particular interests. Bedjaoui declared: 
dans cette affaire qui conccme une population arabe et musulmane, je suis sur que 
le Maroc, la Mauritanie et I' Algerie trouveront dans leur fraternelles relations, dans 
leur solidarite et dans leur genie propre, le moyen de transcender la difficulte 
actuelle et de degager une solution commune, l'essentiel etant et demeurant pour 
tous et pour chacun la decolonisation et la liberation du Sahara.51 
45 This issue is briefly discussed in H Charlesworth, 'Judge ad hoc of the International Court of Justice', T 
McCormack & C Saunders (eds), Sir Ninian Stephen: A Tribute (Carleton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 
2007) 176-189,at 185. 
46 Generally, see Dupuy, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 9-30. 
47 (A legal question currently pending] 
48 Dupuy, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol IV, at 17. 
49 Salmon, Mauritania, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol IV, at 32-57. 
50 Generally, see Sedo & Lacleta, Spain, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 61 ff. 
51 [In this matter concerning an Arab and a Muslim population, 1 am sure that Morocco, Mauritania and 
Algeria will find in their fraternal relations, in their solidarity and in their own character, the means to 
transcend the present difficulties and to find a mutual solution, its basis being and remaining for all and for 
each country the decolonisation and liberation of Sahara.) Bedjaoui, Algeria, Oral Pleadings, International 
Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents : Western Sahara, vol IV, p. 60. Spain took up this 
rhetoric of Arab solidarity itself immediately after Bedjaoui 's statement, declaring 'Permettez-moi aussi de 
manifester notre satisfaction devant la presence de representants de gouvernements de pays auxquels 
l'Espagne est reliee par des liens d'affection, ces memes liens qui nous rattachent traditionnellement a tous les 
pays arabes.' [Permit me also to demonstrate my satisfaction before the presence of the representatives of 
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Ultimately, the contentious nature of the pleadings was acknowledged only up to a point: 
the Court granted Morocco's request for a judge ad hoc by ten votes to five to balance 
Spain's judge, whereas Mauritania's claim was narrowly defeated with an eight to seven 
vote split. 52 
In contrast to these issues of procedure and jurisdiction, it is harder to identify 
common themes in argument in relation to the two questions asked by the UNGA. Because 
of the pleadings' length, as well as some divergences bet.ween the oral and written stages of 
submission, arguments on the merits were not always clear. However, at least in relation to 
the first question about terra nullius, most participants and all judges stated that Western 
Sahara was not a territory sans maftre [without a ruler, terra nullius]. It is unfortunate that 
the Court did not go further in its Opinion and offer its interpretation as to who the 
territory 's ruler might have been on the eve of Spanish 'protection' .53 Its support for the 
self-determination of the territory's people nearly a century later indicated its recognition 
for contemporary selfbood, but did the peoples of Western Sahara possess an identifiable 
legal personality before Spanish colonisation? The Court retroactively imposed the 
territorial boundaries of the Spanish territory onto the region before its colonisation, but 
what was the exact status of its people?54 These questions were left unanswered by the 
Court, but are further examined below in the Chapter's final section. 
In trying to answer the first question, Spain's position on the status of the territory 
was slippery and somewhat contradictory. Although it held itself up as a benevolent 
colonial power intent on self-determination of the Western Saharan people and dismissive 
of its neighbours' irredentist claims, it also displayed a degree of contempt for the 
capacities of the local population, and thus its exact position on the doctrine of terra nullius 
governments of countries to which Spain is linked by ties of affection, these same ties which have 
traditionally attached us to all Arab countries] Sedo, Spain, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: 
Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 61. 
52 ICJ Reps (1975), at 8. 
53 M A Smith, 'Sovereignty over Unoccupied Territories - The Western Saharan Decision' (1977) 9 Case 
Western Journal of international Law 135, 140; Knop, supra n 3, at 126-127. 
54 Knop also argues that although ' the court treated the population of Western Sahara as the legal "self", it is 
significant that it did not validate any such sociological finding. While the court did not accept Morocco's 
appeal to the salience of an ethnic, cultural and religious self that united Western Sahara with Morocco, 
neither did it endorse Spain's view that the Sahrawi . ... formed a coherent and distinct self at the time of 
colonization ... As far as the court was concerned, the self effectively took its identity from the referendum and 
not vice versa.' Footnotes omitted, Knop, supra n 3, at 118. 
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was unclear.ss In its historical overview of the pre-colonial period, for example, there was 
very little recognition of an identifiable Western Saharan people constituting a separate 
entity. Like the Court, Spain seemed to impose boundaries onto its territory, thereby 
artificially cutting off Saharan tribes from regional connections. As in Chapter Four's 
discussion of the Bahrain/Qatar Case in the Gulf, the Opinion highlights the difficulties of 
applying concepts of bounded territoriality to cultures and places based on nomadic 
migrations. 
Morocco's answer to the first question was in contrast to Spain's arguments and the 
colonial power's purported actions. In its pleadings, Morocco did not need to explore the 
doctrine of terra nullius as it applied specifically to the Western Saharan territory, because 
its entire case rested instead on its ability to prove Moroccan sovereignty; terra nullius was 
a non sequitur. A degree of compromise between the Moroccan and Mauritanian arguments 
is evident:56 Morocco accommodated Mauritanian claims over the south of the territory in 
what must have been a bid for the two powers to effect a neat division of Western Sahara 
upon Spanish withdrawal. Events after the pleadings reflected this closely. Thus for 
Morocco, 'ii n 'en reste pas moins qu'aux yeux du Gouvemement marocain il n'existe pas 
de no man's land entre la souverainete marocaine et I 'ensemble mauritanien. ' 57 
Partly because Mauritania's historical record was so much weaker, it explored the 
doctrinal implications of terra nullius in some detail and the various opinions of the Court 
were most sympathetic to this line of argument. Algeria offered an even more rigorous and 
critical account of the doctrine, but the implications for international law were perhaps too 
radical, and the Court rejected them out of hand; in fact, the Opinion did not refer at all to 
the perspective offered by Algeria's counsel, Bedjaoui. 58 Mauritania conceded that the 
doctrine of terra nullius was difficult to characterise because of the many interpretations 
55 Generally see Written Submission of Spain, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents: Western Sahara, vol I. 
56 Morocco recognised this complementarity of argumenL<> explicitly: 'Les memoires mauritanien et marocain 
ont ete redigcs independamment l'un d 'autre ... Mais ... le point de vue marocain et le point de vue 
mauritanien ... sont en realite complementaires.' [The Mauritanian and Moroccan memorials were drawn up 
independently of one another ... but ... the Moroccan point of view and the Mauritanian point of view are 
actually complementary] Morocco, Slaoui, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: 
Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 11 8. 
57 [It is out of the question as far as the Morrocan government is concerned that there existed a no man's land 
between the Moroccan sovereignty and the Mauritanian Entity.] Morocco, Written Statement, International 
Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol Ill, at 204. 
58 Judge Ammoun, however, cited Bedjaoui with approval: ICJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. Ammoun), at 85-86. 
205 
Chapter Five: 
Determining the limits of law in the Western Sahara Case 
given to it m theory and practice. 59 Although Mauritania noted that some European 
perspectives classified many non-European entities as terra nullius, it rejected this by 
showing that state practice had largely supported treaties of cession with local rulers instead 
of occupation. Mauritania limited the application of terra nullius strictly to lands which 
were uninhabited or without any political coordination. Western Sahara was contrasted with 
this because it was 'tres structurees avec une organisation politique complexe meme si elles 
etaient non etatiques. '60 Thus, Mauritania tried to argue that the concept of terra nullius in 
the nineteenth century was only applicable to unorganised societies. What was less clear, 
however, was whether the complex structures of Saharan society had been endowed with 
international legal personality as discussed in Part Two's Introduction. This conundrum is 
explored at length in the chapter's final section. 
Through the application of inter-temporal law, the Court found by thirteen votes to 
three that Western Sahara was not terra nullius because European state practice during the 
late nineteenth century had preferred cession over occupation.61 The Court acknowledged 
the fierce debate that this concept continues to elicit, but ultimately was convinced that the 
'Standard of Civilisation ' was not the applicable law per se at the time. ' Whatever 
differences of opinion there may have been among jurists, the State practice of the relevant 
period indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political 
organization were not regarded as terra nullius. ' 62 Crawford argues that this stance was 
consistent with the Court's jurisprudence: earlier cases had recognised the legal personality 
of entities beyond Europe. 63 Although the Court may have been following its own 
59 Generally, Mauritania, Written Statement, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents: Western Sahara, vol III, at 28-51. 
60 [Very structured with a complex political organisation even if it were not a state.] Ibid, at 53. 
61 Contrast this position with that ofKoskennieimi's as discussed in Part Two's Introduction, where he argued 
that it is best to consider European territorial control in the period as a result of occupation rather than 
cession. This suggests that many non-European peoples were not recognised as having any international legal 
personality at the time, at l 08. 
62 !CJ Reps (1975), at 39. 
63 For example, the US Nationals in Morocco Case and the Rights of Passage Case, J Crawford, 'The General 
Assembly, the International Court and self-determination', V Lowe & M Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the 
international Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), at 597, footnote 52. Roussellier counters this with the PCIJ's Eastern Greenland Case. 
According to Roussellier, 'The PCIJ's definition implies that terrae nullius are lands not claimed by any 
states, which again is an approach consistent with the Court's understanding of sovereignty over a disputed 
land as being derived from international treaties expressing consistent recognition by other states of a state 's 
claim over a given land.' Thus, perhaps it was consistent here for the Court to recognise the international legal 
personality of Morocco, as it has entered into treaties with European powers at the time. However, the status 
of Saharan tribes was more questionable. J E Roussellier, 'Elusive Sovereignty - People, Land and the 
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jurisprudence, compelling evidence was brought before the Court indicating that territories 
such as Western Sahara were not regarded as legal entities at the time of Spanish 
colonisation, and the Court's gloss over such an uncomfortable period of international 
law' s history is troubling.64 Some of the dissenting positions were uncomfortable with the 
overly historical and academic nature of the first question on terra nullius. Judges Dillard 
and Gros regarded the question as 'loaded' (read 'politica1')65 and Petren as 'pointless and 
consequently inappropriate '. 66 Despite this, most of the bench seized the opportunity 
presented to them to define the doctrine of terra nullius in palatable terms for the 
international community. 
The second question about legal ties was even more difficult to determine and it 
stimulated a whole range of competing perspectives about the extent to which international 
law can recognise non-European forms of rule over territory. Both Mauritania and Morocco 
asked the Court to step beyond the borders of traditional international law in trying to 
imagine the climatic, social, political and religious situation extant in North West Africa on 
the eve of purported Spanish colonisation. The Court appeared disposed to these 
perspectives by recognising the presence of legal ties between Morocco (fourteen votes to 
two) and Mauritania (fifteen votes to one) with the territory. However, as in the words of 
Judge Gros, the majority's ultimate decision was 'enigmatic ';67 these legal ties were less 
than sover~ign and had no direct bearing on the prevailing legal situation. Roussellier 
suggests that the basis for the Court's difficulties stemmed from its failure to articulate 
'what should be considered [as] acts defining the effective exercise of sovereignty. '68 The 
Court was aware that its primary function was to assist in the UNGA decolonisation 
Frontiers of the Desert: The Case of the Western Sahara and the International Court of Justice' (2007) 12 
Journal of North African Studies 55, at 7 1. 
64 See especially Bedjaoui's detailed exposition of the idea that terra nullius has developed in three phases: its 
Roman period where all lands non-Roman were nullius; the era of ' discovery' in the fifteenth and s ixteenth 
centuries when all non-Christian entities were deemed as nullius and finally, the age in question, which 
regarded all the lands inhabited by non-'civilised' peoples as nullius. Bedjaoui, Algeria, Oral Pleadings, 
International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol 1V, at 455-456. 
See Shaw's rebuttal of Bedjaoui 's arguments: Shaw, supra n 8, at 129-130. Okere points out that the 
jurisprudence of the nineteenth century was heavily supportive of a finding of Western Sahara as terra 
nullius. Furthermore, this intellectual influence has continued in the writings of such prominent figures as 
Hall, Oppenheim, Schwarzenberger and Jennings. Okere, supra n 7, at 305. 
65 ICJ Reps (1975) (dee. Gros), at 74; ICJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. Dillard), at 124. Some judges also regarded 
the second question about legal ties as 'loaded': ICJ Reps (1975) (dee. Ignacio-Pinto), at 78. 
66 ICJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. Peten), at l l 4. 
67 ICJ Reps (1975) (dee. Gros), at 75. 
68 Roussellier, supra n 63 , at 61. Further, for a very useful t<lbulation of the respective arguments of the 
Parties and the bench regarding e.ffectivites, see Ibid, at 62. 
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process, and the legal ties it had recognised did not affect this.69 Thus the Case can best be 
characterised as a latent conflict between territorial integtity and self-determination. Yet 
again, however, the Court refused to enter the dispute directly and never ruled on how to 
resolve this norm conflict: 70 instead, the Court tried to accommodate many perspectives and 
thus failed to offer a clear position on these issues. There was no determinate position 
provided by doctrine, but this was just as well for the goal of the Court in affirming self-
determination at all costs - even a confirmation of European approaches to authority over 
territory. 
3) Playing with the Rules: Strategies of Argument before the Court 
At the heart of all positions presented in the Western Sahara Case was an exploration of the 
relationship between law and politics as set out in Chapter One. Some substantive examples 
of this dichotomy are explored below in relation to colonialism and non-European modes of 
authority over territory. These substantive positions about the place of colonialism within 
international law, however, can only ever succeed by speaking the language of their context 
with competence: how arguments are presented is as important as their substance. Because 
the substance of law is itself indeterminate and requires constant redefinition vis-a-vis 
politics, a crucial device in advancing substantive claims is the ability to construct a 
legitimate and authentic account about the relationship between law and its perceived 
antitheses, such as morality, history, emotion, fact and especially, politics. Although these 
dichotomies are often inconsistent or are transposed throughout any one narrative, they at 
least highlight the strategies employed by the various participants. This in tum indicates 
competing characterisations of law, raising questions such as: can law speak the same 
language as the social sciences, and what is the role of emotion? This section will evaluate 
some of the strategies - or legal grammars - employed at the bench and the bar in staking 
an authentic characterisation of the relationship between law and politics. Such strategies 
include, but are not limited to, recognition of the institutional rules of the Court; attempts to 
make law distinct from other forms of social enquiry, especially history; problems of 
69 Shaw, supra n 8, at 149. 
7
° Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra n 8, at 300. 
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interpretation and language; and the use of European comparisons as a way of making 
sense of Arab-Islamic culture. 
Debate devoted to preliminary questions about ad hoc judges, the Court's 
jurisdiction and the procedural differences between contentious and advisory proceedings 
all displayed different perspectives on the relationship between law and politics in the 
courtroom. International law as embodied in the practice of the Court rests on a paradox: it 
is separate from politics, but requires the consent of international society's pre-eminent 
political entities, states. The structure of the provisions of the ICJ Statute initiating 
proceedings is based on a Lotus-esque vision of international law, 71 which is then 
substantially watered down once States choose to submit to its jurisdiction.72 Typically, 
significant energy and time is spent disputing and/or justifying the Court's jurisdiction vis-
a-vis consent. Often these parts of the pleadings and judgments are heavily formulaic and 
discussions about the Court's jurisdiction vary very little across the cases. This was 
acknowledged by Morocco in the Peace Palace: ' ii est certaines questions specifiques que 
l'on doit aborder et que la Cour, normalement, se pose a !'occasion de !' interpretation 
qu'elle doit faire de la demande qui lui est addressee.'73 Morocco applied this assessment of 
the etiquette of exposition in support of the Court's jurisdiction.74 
In the Opinion a number of judges tried to confine the Case within the perceived 
limits of its advisory jurisdiction so that the issue of consent could be put to the side, but in 
fact many remarks indicate that the Court's jurisdiction was difficult to define. Spain 
identified the contentious nature of the pleadings perhaps in a bid to boost its arguments 
against jurisdiction. Spain characterised the contentious quality of Morocco's case 'non 
seulement par les theses qui ont ete soutenues, mais aussi [more importantly for this 
section's focus] par l' emploi de certaines expressions de la procedure contentieuse, car on a 
parle du «memoire marocain», piece ecrite qui, selon !'article 44 du Reglement, est 
71 The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France!I'urkey) ( 1927) P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10. 
72 See Part Two's Introduction, at 100-1 01. 
73 [There are certain specific questions which one should address and that the Court usually asks itself in the 
course of the interpretation it should adopt of the questions addressed to it.] Dupuy, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, 
International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 140. 
74 These rules are identified as: 'On se trouve la un domaine juridique tres circonscrit car, semble-t-il , deux 
principes se degagent de !'examen de votre jurisprudence: les questions, d' une part, doivent avoir ete redigees 
dans des termes precis et, d' autre part, !' interpretation qui doit evidemment etre menee par la Cour ne doit pas 
aboutir a la formu lation de nouvelles questions.' [This is a very limited legal sphere because it would seem 
that two principles emanate from the examination of your jurisprudence: the questions, on the one hand, 
should have been formulated in specific terms and, on the other hand, the interpretation that should self-
evidently be guided by the Cour1 should not lead to the formulation of new questions.] Ibid. 
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presentee par les demandeurs dans la procedure en matiere contentieuse; on a parle de 
«l'agent» de ce gouvemement'.75 Morocco's response drew attention to similar postures 
on the part of Spain, and argued that the Statute does not establish such a neat separation of 
the Court's jurisdiction. 76 Judge Petren disagreed on this point by stating that the 
presentation of evidence was significantly different in the two types of proceedings.77 Judge 
De Castro agreed by pointing out that the states in the present Case should have acted as 
amici curiae in an advisory capacity, and because they did not stricter rules of evidence 
should have been applied. 78 Thus the Court uncomfortably straddled its advisory and 
contentious capacities: 
we had three States submitting to the Court abundant historical and cartographical 
documentation the significance of which was the subject of much dispute. The 
same events, the same treaties, the same legislative and administrative acts, and the 
same religious, cultural and linguistic phenomena were represented in a variety of 
ways, which were often contradictory. On many a point the Court was invited to 
choose between differing contentions.79 
Judge De Castro regarded this as repugnant to the Court's advisory role: the bench was not 
sufficiently empowered to verify the evidence presented and the impact of its ruling was 
erga omnes rather than applicable only to the participating States. 80 
75 [Not only by the arguments which have been raised, but also by the use of certain expressions of 
contentious procedure one has spoken of the 'Moroccan memorial ' [memorial being a term for] a document 
which, according to Article 44 of the Rules, is presented by the applicants in the course of the proceedings in 
a contentious matter, one has spoken of ' the agent' of this government.] Arias-Salgado, Spain, Oral Pleadings, 
International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol V, at 46. 
76 
' .. .le conseil du Gouvemement espagnol tire cette conclusion des termes memoire, agent, que nous avons 
utilises parfois dans nos ecrits OU dans nos declarations orales ... !'article 44 du Reglement... lequel enumere 
Jes actes de la procedure contentieuse, sans pour autant leur conferer un sens exclusif, opposer Jes articles 68 
du Statut, 87 du Reglement, qui posent le principe general d'une assimilation des procedures contentieuse et 
consultative .. . On pourrait tout aussi bien invoquer le lapsus, assez nature! devant une jurisdiction, d'autant 
plus qu ' il serait tout aussi possible d'en citer des exemples dans la bouche des conseils espagnols, qui ont 
egalement parle notamment de memo ire.' [The counsel of the Spanish government draws this conclusion from 
the terms 'memorial ', 'agent ', which we have sometimes used in our written submissions and our oral 
pleadings. Article 44 of the Rules sets out the elements of contentious procedure without giving them an 
exclusive meaning in contrast to Articles 68 of the Statute and Article 87 of the Rules, which pose the general 
principle of contentious and advisory procedures ... One could as easily invoke the slippage - natural enough 
before a court - as it could also be possible to cite examples in the words of the Spanish counsel who have 
equally spoken notably of'memorial ' .] 
Dupuy, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol V, at 187. 
77 ICJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. Petren), at 112. 
78 ICJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. De Castro), at 142. 
79 ICJ Reps ( 1975) (sep. op. Petrea), at 112. 
80 De Castro noted that under Article 50 of its Statute, the Court may seek external material: 'The Court may, 
at any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with 
the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion. ' He also recognised its general powers under 
Article 48, which states: 'The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall decide the form and 
time in which each party must conclude its arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking 
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A number of members of the Court as well as Spain not only queried the advisory 
parameters of the Case but also asserted that the questions formulated by the UNGA were 
outside the Court's mandate; the questions were too academic or 'un-legal'. 81 These 
perspectives indicate a division between Jaw and non-law through the medium of the Court: 
the Court was not fashioned to hear 'purely academic'82 or historical arguments and was 
not competent to do so.83 From the various statements about the historical evidence, it is 
also clear that the Court did not feel competent or confident to handle much of the material. 
Conclusions, however, should not be formulated solely on the historical nature of the 
material. Perhaps the Court was also deeply ambivalent about its ability to assess and even 
redress the wrongs of the past. 
Unease about international law's boundaries is an enduring theme throughout the 
Case and efforts to allay this sensation by constantly restating dichotomies only entrenched 
the impossibility of quarantining the Opinion from its political context. Aside from the 
dichotomies of law/politics and legal enqiry/academic enquiry mentioned above, the extent 
to which morality should inform law was a prominent consideration among the non-
European participants as well as the Lebanese judge, Fouad Ammoun. Because so much of 
the submissions centred on the colonial record, there was a desire on the part of these 
speakers to refashion the law by acknowledging and moving beyond the past. For example, 
in his discussion of secret treaties carving out spheres of influence for European appetites, 
Judge Ammoun asserted that ' international morality has always condemned them; and it is 
the precepts of morality that have justly received the consecration of positive law in this 
case as in so many others. '84 For Herman, Judge Ammoun delivered his opinion 'somewhat 
emotionally' and it is clear that this is something to be avoided.85 Spain conversely prided 
itself on its dispassionate and 'neutral' presentation of 'pure law' because such a claim 
would appear to add to the Spanish position's authenticity: ' perspective politique ... n'a sa 
of evidence.' !CJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. De Castro), at 138. Castellino & Allen also agree that the evidence 
presented by the various parties was compelling, J Castellino & S Allen, Title to Territory in i nternational 
Law: A Temporal Analysis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), at 152. 
81 For example, Spain, Written Submission, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents: Western Sahara, vol I, at 222. 
82 ICJ Reps (I 975) (dee. Gros), at 74. 
83 ICJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. De Castro), at 141-142. 
84 lCJ Reps ( 1975) (sep. op. Ammoun), at 90. 
85 L L Herman, 'An Analysis of the World Court Judgment in the Western Sahara Case' (1 976-1977) 41 
Saskatchkewan Law Review 133, at 138. 
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place devant une cour de justice.86 In contrast, Moroccan representatives were comfortable 
with 'd'une certaine emotion', 87 and Mauritania even conceded that '[l]a delegation 
mauritanienne a ete amenee par la force des choses a s'addresser a l'Espagne avec une 
certain passion. ' 88 
Despite occasional concessions to emotion, however, most of the parties (with the 
notable exception of Zaire and occasionally Algeria)89 were keen to limit their passions; it 
was important to preserve at least a veneer of objectivity. Morocco's representative, 
Benjelloun, was acutely aware of this requirement: 
je l'ai fait avec le desir sincere de retablir la verite, avec le seule volonte de rappeler 
Jes faits avec clarte et de demonstrer l'echelonnement des evenements avec une 
totale objectivite. En aucun cas, je n'ai voulu accuser ou emettre des reproches, 
moo but etant avant tout d'exposer sans passion les mobiles de notre action et les 
motifs de nos pretensions et de nos reclamations.90 
Members of the Court were also anxious to preserve law's objectivity. For example, Judge 
Gros championed the positivist position, declaring 'It is the duty of a court to establish 
facts 91 . •. [t]he Court cannot attribute a legal nature to facts which do not intrinsically 
possess it; a court does not create law, it establishes it. ' 92 Judge Gros, however, failed to 
86 [a political perspective has no place before a court of justice] Gonzalez Campos, Spain, Oral Pleadings, 
International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol V, p. 95. 
87 [a certain [degree] of emotion] Benjelloun, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: 
Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, al 189. 
88 [Mauritania was compelled by the nature of the case to address Spain with a degree of passion] El Hassen, 
Mauritania, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western 
Sahara, vol V, al 300. 
89 Zaire's brief appearance before the Court in its oral proceedings was both shocking and refreshing: ICJ 
convention of delivery and subject were thrown to the winds in a radical attempt to upset the framework of 
the nation-stale and private ownership in Africa with an 'authentic' language based on nature. Although the 
Court did not respond to these arguments, they are worth extracting here: 'le souci constant de garder contact 
avec la terre est la seule cle qui pennette de comprendre la philosophie proper a I' Afrique au subj et de la 
tenure fonciere. Partout en Afrique authentique la terre n'a jamais fait l'objet d 'appropriation individuelle. La 
propriete fonciere etait toujours et est toujours collective etjamais la terre ne pouvait faire l'objet d'alienation 
car, vendre la terre equivaudrait a vendre son rune, ses forces propres, ses forces cosmiques.' [The constant 
concern for preserving a connection with the land is the only key allowing us to comprehend the essence of 
African philosophy regarding the subject of intrinsic tenure. Nowhere in Africa was the land made an object 
of individual appropriation. Intrinsic ownership was and is always collective and it is never possible to 
alienate the land, because to sell the earth would be tantamount to selling one's soul, one's strength, one's 
cosmic power.] Bayona-Ba-Meya, Za'ire, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 444. 
90 Emphasis added. [I did it in the sincere desire to re-establish the truth, with the sole wish of recalling the 
facts with clarity and to show the unfolding of events with total objectivity. ln any case, I did not want to 
accuse or make criticisms, my goal being above all to outline objectively the motives of our pretensions and 
the grounds of our claims.] Benjelloun, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, 
Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 243. 
91 !CJ Reps (I 975) (dee. Gros), at 76. 
92 Ibid, at 77. 
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explain how one could establish such a neutral law, especially in the context of dissension 
over even the most basic information. Judge De Castro was more alive to these difficulties 
and pointed out that interpretation of the materials was vital in reaching a decision.93 
Different constructions of the law/politics divide are particularly pronounced in an 
examination of language as a tool of argumentation. Language here refers not only to the 
type of language employed, such as 'French' or ' emotive ', but also an understanding about 
the process of how expressions and words within any language are never a priori or pre-
discursive; 94 instead, we saw in Chapter One that international law as language is 
constituted by the process of argument within the Peace Palace. The Court was confronted 
with definitional difficulties almost immediately because the concept of ' legal ties,' 95 
contained in the UNGA's second question, was regarded as a 'non-legal' expression 
requiring legal 'translation'; it was outside international law's lexicon. The ICJ was also 
uncomfortable with the concept of ' entity'96 in describing Mauritania, because such an 
expression was not common in legal discourse and its qualities were largely unknown 
compared with more familiar concepts such as 'state' or ' nation'. These two small 
examples of interpretative - or rather, constitutive - speech acts serve to highlight the ways 
in which language is limited and controlled in the continuous process of constructing the 
Jaw/politics dichotomy. International law's lexicon is a limited one and it has often been 
forged out of the European experience of statehood. 
93 ICJ Reps ( 1975), (sep. op. De Castro), at 141. 
94 See Nesiah on this point in relation to the constitu tion of territory in the Western Sahara case and the 
Frontier Dispute. V Nesiah, 'Placing International Law: White Spaces on a Map' (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of 
International Law I, at 8. 
95 De Castro recognises that it is necessary to define this term within the context of the case and interprets it to 
mean ties of a sovereign quality. ICJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. De Castro), at 135. Blaydes contrasts the absence 
of definition for the expression ' legal ties' with the clearly known one of terra nullius. However, as 
Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria and Zaire have demonstrated, terra nul/ius, like other legal tenns, is open to 
widespread controversy as well. L E Blaydes, Jr., ' International Court of Justice does not find "legal ties" of 
such a nature to affect self-determination in the decolonization process of Western Sahara' (1976) 11 Texas 
International Law Journal 354, at 362-363. 
96 ICJ Reps (1 975), at 63. Bedjaoui also conceded that ' Le terme «ensemble mauritanian» n'est certainement 
pas usuel dans le terminologie du droit international. Sans doute !es debats a l 'Assemblee generate des 
Nations Unies doivent-ils permettre d 'eclairer la portee et d' indiquer queHe realite sociologique et quelle 
structure politique ce terme recouvre.' [The term 'Mauritanian entity' is certainly unusual in the terminology 
of international law. Without doubt the debates in the UNGA should permit us to clarify the scope and to 
indicate which sociological reality and political structure are encompassed in this term.] Bedjaoui, Algeria, 
Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol 
IV, p. 485. Shaw further holds that although Mauritania's use of 'entity ' represented an attempt to move from 
' the sociological to the legal field and thus establish the existence of a political community ... [he regarded] the 
facts ... [as showing] that no such entity d id exist in this sense. ' Shaw, supra n 8, at 138. 
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Under Article 39 of the Statute, parties are permitted to work in French or English 
or another language at their request. All parties chose to speak in French, including the 
former French colonial, Arabic-speaking countries of Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania as 
well as Zafre. Of course, there was no recognition of the colonial legacy by the parties in 
their choice of language and perhaps this is a moot point, because the Court's rules are 
reflective of the international power dynamics extant at the time of the Court's formation. 
Divergences in linguistic frameworks, however, became clearer when various Arab 
parties attempted to describe the particularities of non-European rule on the eve of 
colonialism. Many of the agents were native French speakers without Arabic themselves, 
but Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania also struggled to translate and render intelligible 
concepts not necessarily analogous to the European experience. This linguistic barrier was 
evident in occasional differences in Arabic translation97 or Arabic terms, such as 'umma' 
and 'sultan', which remained untranslated in the text of the written and oral pleadings. 
More substantively, European terminology such as 'state' and ' border' with its particular 
connotations was necessarily used despite narrative dissonance with local differences. In 
fact, this resort to European terminology entailed a cooption of Arab experience into the 
more familiar confines of Western statehood. Especially when trying to explain the concept 
of overlapping authority in nomadic societies under Islam, the parties evoked European 
models from feudalism for comparison. Further, Mauritania acknowledged the difficulties 
of conceptualising the 'Shinqiti Entity' (the rough pre-colonial equivalent to modern day 
Mauritania), and so it assisted the Court through comparison between the territory's many 
autonomous tribes and the league of city-states in Classical Greece.98 There was a sense 
that the particularist discourse of international law could only respond to, and comprehend, 
non-European experiences through analogy, suggesting a discourse weak in its 
universalising tendencies. 
Of greater significance was the heavy reliance placed on materials from the social 
sciences, such as ethnography, sociology and cartography. The inclusion of such material in 
turn required interpretations about the extent to which law as a discipline could 
accommodate the arguments and assumptions of other conceptual frameworks. Does the 
grammar of law enable speakers to draw on tools of argument beyond the confines of 
97 For example, see !CJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. Ammoun), at 88. 
98 Salmon, Mauritania, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol IV, at 431. 
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doctrine? Disagreement over the relative value and compatibility of such 'non-legal' 
evidence reinforces the argument of this section, highlighting the need for constant 
redefinition of allegiances in the law/politics contest. 
The example of cartographic evidence exemplifies the central role of perspective 
and interpretation in the submission of material. For Spain, more than another other party, 
the maintenance of law as objective, and thus in contrast with politics, was vital. It 
chastised other States (especially Mauritania) for their misguided use of subjective or 'non-
legal' sociological and ethnographic data.99 Mauritania in turn challenged such a distinction 
between law and non-law by arguing that le 'droit est fait pour servir le social. Le droit 
n 'est qu'une superstructure qui s'adapte au social. Vouloir renverser les termes, c ' est vivre 
dans le formalisme et !'illusion.' 100 Despite such ideas, Spain continued to embrace 
formalism by arguing that maps were more objective than the social scientific material 
employed by Morocco and especially Mauritania. Spain conceded that cartographic 
material 'n'est pas le droit', 101 but it nevertheless regarded maps as the sine qua non in any 
territorial matter and it never doubted their objective nature. In fact, Spain argued that the 
maps ' objectivity was irreproachable because, rather than coming from the hands of 
Spanish geographers, they instead were creations of other Europeans. 102 Spain failed to 
99 
' la methode qui inspire les arguments de la Mauritanie tout au long de ses exposes pourrait etre caracterisee 
comme I' em prise absolue de la sociologe sur le droit. ' [The method inspiring the Mauritanian arguments 
throughout its pleadings can be characterised as the total domination of law by sociology.] Lacleta, Spain, 
Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol 
Y,atl l 4. 
100 [Law should serve the social. Law is not a superstructure which adapts itself to the social. To reverse these 
terms would be to live in formalism and illusion.] Salmon, Mauritania, Oral Pleadings, International Court of 
Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol V, at 293. Salmon also argues that in 
relation to 'quel niveau doit s' exercer le droit des peoples a disposer d'eux-memes reste une probleme pour 
lequel le droit est pratiquement impotent: de fait, c'est une question d 'une histoire, c'est une question de 
politique, c'est une question de force ... Ces reflexions montrent, des l'abord, la complexite du probleme, son 
opacite, ]' importance des donnees, de fait: culturelles, economiques et politiques, la primaute du politique. Le 
juriste doit faire preuve de discretion et d 'humilite.' [At what level the right to self-determination must be 
exercised remains a problem which the law is incapable of answering: it is a question of history, it is a 
question of politics, it is a question of might... These reflections show, first, the complexity of the problem, its 
opaqueness, the importance of facts: of cultural, economic and political facts, the primacy of politics. Thus, 
the jurist must demonstrate discretion and humility with respect to questions of self-determination.] Salmon, 
Mauritania, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western 
Sahara, vol IV, at 3 l2. Morocco also accuses Spain of formalism: Dupuy, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, 
International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol V, at 186. 
101 [is not law] 
102 
' Jes cartes presentees par l'Espagne ne sont pas l'reuvre de geographes espagnols, mais elles ont ete 
etablies par des geographes reputes de nationalite anglaise, franr;:aise, allemande OU autre. De ce fait, nous 
sommes en face d ' un point important et plusiers fois releve dans les decisions arbitrales ou judiciaries, a 
savoir l'objectivite des donnees geographiques et les caries elles-memes nous indiquent les references d 'apres 
lesquelles elles ont ete etablies.' [The maps presented by Spain are not the work of Spanish geographers, but 
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recognise that the nationalities it cited in support of its argument hailed from most of the 
main colonial powers at the Conference of Berlin; for Spain, there was no possibility of 
colonial designs tainting the drawing of maps in Africa.103 Nesiah reminds us, however, 
that the development of geography as a scholarly discipline in Europe directly coincided 
with the colonisation of Western Sahara. 104 Moroccan scepticism about such colonially-
crafted cartography reflects this fact: 'Toute la cartographie anterieure presentee par le 
Gouvernement espagnol repose sur des renseignements fantaisistes, voire legendaries. ' 105 
Maps were used in an attempt to illustrate the nature of territorial control in Western 
Sahara, but history was an even more useful tool of argument. The flexible uses of history 
are evident by the way in which each narrative position contained often radically different 
emphases, nuances and evidence. In the eyes of Spain, history, like maps or law itself, 
could carry an objective truth through 'une analyse scientifique ' in contrast with disciplines 
like sociology and ethnography. 106 History was vital for the Spanish case, and Spain 
devoted more energy than any other party in reviewing its own record in the territory of 
Western Sahara. Detailed examination was offered about the period preceding colonisation 
when Spanish mariners, pursuing the rich fishing resources off the coast, would enter into 
agreements with local powers. The colonial 
period was also surveyed, and the impression that this account produces is one of 
benevolent interaction between relative equals. 107 
Although Spain was largely incapable of appreciating the inevitably biased flavour 
of historical enquiry, 108 for those states that had lived under European historical 'realities' 
they are the work of reputable geographers of English, French, German and other nationalities. ln this regard, 
we confront an important point raised many times in arbitral and judicial decisions, namely the objectivity of 
geographical facts and the maps themselves reveal to us the basis on which they were established] Arias-
Salgado, Spain, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol V, at 52. 
103 De Castro also has faith in such maps, but seeks to reinforce his argument by relying on other colonial 
evidence from the period, such as contemporary written testimony. lCJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. De Castro), at 
152-153. 
104 Nesiah, supra n 94, at 10. 
105 [All the previous maps presented by the Spanish government are based on fanciful information, or even 
myths.] lsoart, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 257-258. 
106 Arias-Salgado, Spain, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents: Western Sahara, vol V, at 43. 
107 This narrative runs lhroughout Spains's written pleadings: Written Pleadings, International Court of 
Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol I. 
108 In an historical study about the region, Lydon details how French colonial administrators in West Africa 
discounted valuable Arabic sources, choosing to confiscate some of them. G Lydon, 'Writing Trans-Saharan 
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the desire to decolonise and rewrite the historical record was palpable.109 According to 
Morocco, it was not enough to rely on European models whether in the past or present 
because 
La portee des titres marocains sur le Sahara occidental doit s'apprecier en tenant 
compte de l'environnement social et economique maghrebin. S'il est vrai quc 
!'imitation des modelcs europeen et nord-americain ne permct pas necessairement 
au x_xe siecle de resoudre les problemes du tiers monde, a plus forte raison une 
approche juridique Coupee des realites locales risque de fausser l'interpretation des 
faits survenus au siecle precedent. 11 0 
In their written and oral submissions, Algeria and especially Mauritania and Morocco gave 
their own interpretation not only of European international law during colonialism but, 
more importantly, the nature of European control and domination in North West Africa. 
Colonialism in all its brutality was revealed before the Court, and international law was 
either contrasted with European avarice (in continuation of the law/politics divide) or 
shown to be complicit in the scramble for the Sahara. 
European historical evidence was critiqued m the pleadings for its failure to 
appreciate the complex societies of Arab North Africa, and Mauritania and Morocco 
especially used the forum of the Court to present a richer and more informed account. 
Greater historical understanding of the region assisted the presentation of their shared 
central claim: that at the time of Spanish colonisation, Western Sahara was controlled by 
the Moroccan Sharifi.an Empire to the North and the ShinqI!I entity to the South. 111 In 
contrast with Spain's thesis, both Mauritania and Morocco claimed that Western Sahara 
History: Methods, Sources and Interpretations Across the African Divide' (2005) l 0 Journal of North African 
Studies 293, at 299. 
109 Koskenniemi advances this idea of the decolonisation of the past in his exploration of post-communist East 
European States looking 'backwards into a mythical past.' M Koskenniemi, 'National Self-Determination 
Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice' (I 994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 24 1, 
at 258. Spain also attributes the idea of ' decoloniser l'histoire' to the historian, A. Laraoui: Gonzalez-Campos, 
Spain, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western 
Sahara, vol V, at 95. 
110 [The scope of Moroccan title over Western Sahara must be appreciated in light of the Maghreb social and 
economic context. If it is true that the imitation of European and North American models does not necessarily 
permit (us) in the 201h century to resolve the problems of the Third World, then there is even more reason to 
believe that a legal approach removed from local realities runs the risk of distorting the interpretation of facts 
arising in the past century.) Morocco, Written Submission, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol Ill, at 170. Also see Benjelloun, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, 
International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 213. 
11 1 It is interesting to note that in parts of its historical overview Mauritania uses the chronology of the 
Hegiran Calendar, a common practice throughout the Muslim world, but unusual before the ICJ: Mauritania, 
Written Submission, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, 
vol lll, at 67. 
2 17 
Chapter Five: 
Determining the limits of law in the Western Sahara Case 
had no separate identity: 112 nomadic tribal life meant that overlapping allegiances were 
formed across the territory and beyond. 
Spanish, Mauritanian and Moroccan characterisations of the historical record were 
necessarily simplified, but the reliance on anachronism is startling. Morocco and 
Mauritania depicted themselves one hundred years earlier as nearly identical to their 
present form. Morocco even described the people inhabiting Western Sahara in the 
nineteenth century as Moroccan. 11 3 Spain countered such claims with an equally ill-
conceived construction of the Sal;iraw1 nation as much more distinct and fully formed than 
the historical record suggests. 
Mauritanian and Moroccan historical accounts of Arab rule and the onslaught of 
colonialism are supported by Judge Ammoun, who devoted attention to this obscured past. 
For example, Judge Ammoun supported Moroccan arguments about the sovereign nature of 
the Sultan's rule extending across western parts of the Sahara and argued that colonialism's 
aim was to cut off the territory from these ties of allegiance, religion and rule. Berman 
characterises Judge Ammoun's opinion as yet another attempt at narrative authenticity: 
'certain phases of history are valorized as authentic parts of the national heritage, others as 
mutations by a foreign, specifically European, invader. ' 114 Judge Ammoun regarded 
colonialism as disruptive to the historical evolution of the territory's 'genuine' 
development. 11 5 Instead of embracing foreign influences, such as self-determination, it was 
possible with such an historical understanding to regard the Opinion's natural resolution as 
resulting in Western Sahara's re/integration with two of its territorial neighbours. 
Although all States and judges were aware of the many conventions of competency 
required of them at the Peace Palace, this did not entail the consistent use of one legal 
grammar. Competency through language had to evolve in the particular forum; all speakers 
realised the relevance of distinguishing law from its many others, but they each articulated 
this boundary-drawing in slightly different ways. All narratives struggled with maintaining 
a clear line between law and politics: at times emotion and interpretation were vital, but it 
was difficult to gauge the line, given institutional biases. At the very least, it is clear that the 
112 For a general rebuttal of Spanish Sahara's separate identity, see Morocco, Written Submission, 
International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol III, a t 161. 
113 Morocco, Written Submission, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol Ill, at 183. 
11 4 N Berman, 'Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law' (1988-1989) 7 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 5 l , at I 0 I. 
11 5 Ibid, at l 02. 
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Court required a semblance of separation between law and politics: facts could not simply 
speak for themselves, but had to be translated through the medium of relatively 
dispassionate discourse that displayed a respect for the primacy of the Court and the 
discipline of international law; pure historical and social scientific arguments were largely 
feared and ignored by the Court. 
4) Constituting Selfhood before the Court: Legal Personality, Identity Politics and the 
Multicultural Limits of International law 
A diversity of argumentative strategies was also mirrored by the substantive positions of 
the parties. Spain 's motivations centred on its desire for apology and absolution: it wanted 
to show that its policies in the Sahara had always reflected its overriding sympathy and 
support for the territory's indigenous, regionally autonomous inhabitants, the $al;rrawls. 
Spain characterised neighbouring States' authority as weak and devoid of legal value. 
Spain's wholly European vision of international legal doctrine discounted and denied the 
validity of non-European modes of governance over the territory. Spain embodied a pure, 
positivist version of international law, which at times became a caricature of the worst 
aspects of a narrowly defined European consciousness. 
Both Morocco and Mauritania directly challenged the continuing application of 
exclusively European norms when they asked, 'Est-ce a dire que seules les theories 
europeennes de l'Etat, tant pour le passe que pour le present et pour le futur, soient les 
seules valables?' 116 Morocco countered the European state model with the Shanfian system 
of rule, which exhibited a much closer relationship between secular and religious affairs. 
Mauritania also acknowledged the importance of its membership within dar al-is/am as 
discussed in Chapter Two, but because it could not characterise the Shinqltl entity as a state 
in the pre-colonial period, it instead tried to endow this nomadic community with 
international legal personality directly. 117 Although the Moroccan and Mauritanian 
positions diverged on legal and factual points, they both championed the cause of 
particularism: their experiences required specific, European international legal tenets to be 
116 [Are we to say that only European theories of the state - for past, present and future - are alone valid?] 
Isoart, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol l V, at 261. 
117 Shaw, supra n 8, at 136-137. 
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relaxed and expanded so as to become more universal. In invoking the particular, these 
States were implicitly questioning the universal basis of contemporary international law. 
Mauritania and Morocco used the forum of the ICJ simultaneously to rewrite the 
historical record and to construct a self-image not beholden to colonialism. As in the case 
of narrative strategies explored above, however, narrative substance was also structured by 
the inescapable imprint of international law's past and present. Some of the Moroccan and 
Mauritanian perspectives on this past as well as their references to non-European law tried 
to push the boundaries of traditional international law. The bench recognised this call to 
universalism, but ultimately could do little more than effect an uneasy and legally 
dissatisfying compromise between these competing approaches to territorial control. In this 
last section we will explore the Moroccan and Mauritanian reliance on and critique of 
public international law and concurrently consider the success of such arguments in the 
eyes of Spain, Algeria and the Court. 
a) Allegiances of the Faithful: The Moroccan Sul/an and Islamic Rule in the 
Sahara 
Morocco presented the most sustained discussion of Arab-Islamic rule in the pre-colonial 
and colonial era to support its case of control over Western Sahara both before and duiing 
much of Spain's colonial presence. In advancing such a narrative, Morocco offered an 
alternative historical account to that of the dominant, colonial version, which saw Africa as 
open to occupation, or at best, cession. Morocco's pleadings offer one of the most well 
developed accounts of Islamic siyar before the TCJ, 118 reminding the Court of Islam's 
sophisticated legal tradition. Morocco, however, did not simply invoke Islamic legal 
principles in contradistinction to dominant international legal narratives. Instead, Morocco, 
like Mauritania in its discussion of terra nullius, also relied on various international law 
doctrines relating to the acquisition of territory to offer further support for its claims of 
immemorial possession. Morocco was covering all bases by trying to expand the cultural 
boundaries of international law while also applying 'pure' rules to the past. 119 For example, 
Morocco invoked the norm of territorial integrity and a number of treaties between itself 
118 W S D Cravens, 'The Future of Islamic Arguments in International Boundary Disputes between Islamic 
States' (1998) 55 Washington & Lee Law Review 529, at 530. 
119 Knop also argues that while 'Morocco relied on the universal rules for the acquisition of sovereignty, it 
also sought to persuade the International Court of Justice that the interpretation of the rules should be 
particularized so as to take account of the special structure of the Sherifian state.' Knop, supra n 3, at 137. 
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and European powers. 12° Conversely, it also relied on international law to deny Spanish 
rights because of ineffective control, the invalidity of secret treaties as well as the 
inapplicability of the hinterland rule. 121 Morocco's construction of its statehood through a 
combination of European and non-European legal norms and the Court's assessment of the 
latter is visited after a brief summary of Moroccan depictions of Islamic approaches to 
authority. 
Morocco discounted the first question about terra nullius, because its entire case 
rested on a demonstration of legal ties of a sovereign nature between the international legal 
subject of the Sharffian Empire and the tribes of Western Sahara. At the most basic level, 
Morocco was conscious of reminding the Court of its multicultural mandate; international 
law can and should abandon its predilection for the European nation-state: 
Pour apprecier la nature et la valeur des liens juridiques existant entre le Maroc et le 
Sahara occidental, ii est done essential d'abandonner le schema constitutionncl de 
l'Etat europeen du XIXe siecle, car il est le produit d'unc situation economique et 
sociale localisee qui ne trouve pas application sur le territoirc du Maghreb 
extrcmc.122 
The argument was that because of its desert environment, political relations in Western 
Sahara were different from the temperate climes north of the Mediterranean; 123 tribal 
organisation was the norm. 124 Aridity, low inhabitation rates and nomadic movements 
across large swathes of land throughout much of the Sultan's domains further produced a 
bifurcated system of authority, where relatively centralised control over the bled makhzen 
120 Treaties discussed in Morocco, Written Statement, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol lll, at 194-195. For a useful overview of Moroccan-European 
relations of equality in the eighteenth century, see C R Pennell, 'Accommodation between European and 
Islamic Law in the Western Mediterranean in the Early Nineteenth Century' (1994) 21 British Journal of 
Middle East Studies 159. 
121 Morocco, Written Statement, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol Ill, at 142-169. 
122 [To appreciate the nature and the value of legal ties existing between Morocco and Western Sahara, it is 
therefore essential to abandon the constitutional schema of the I 91h century European state, because it is the 
product of a localised economic and social situation which cannot be applied to the territory of (outer) 
Morroco.] lsoart, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 256-257. 
123 
'Les donnees geographiques, physiques et climatiques detenninent l'etat des relations politiques.' [The 
geographical, physical and climactic conditions determined the nature of political relations] Ibid. 
124 Again, Morocco was mindful of the contrast between North West Africa and Europe in producing 
tribalism: 'Les liens existant entre les tribus et le souverain marocain ne sont pas, bien s(ir, comparables aux 
modeles europeens, ils sont en revanche parfaitement adaptes aux realites tribales.' [The ties existing between 
the tribes and the Moroccan sovereign are not, of course, comparable to European models, instead they were 
perfectly adaptable to tribal realities.] Morocco, Written Statement, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, 
Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol III, at 182. 
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(land of the storehouse, or governance)125 contrasted with more tenuous connections with 
the bled siba (the land of dissidence). 126 Although familiar attributes of sovereignty may 
have been scanty in bled siba, which according to Morocco corresponded with southern 
Morocco and northern Western Sahara, Morocco argued that this was a secondary detail 
because of the way in which Islam and its overseer, the Sul!an or Khalifa, united the 
faithful in a fusion of divine and human rule as was discussed in Chapter Two.127 All the 
Saharan tribes mentioned the Sul!an in their prayers and he was largely responsible for the 
appointment of leadership positions, such as qiitjfs or leaders/judges for the tribes. During 
the period of heightened European interference in the nineteenth century, Morocco 
conceded that it 'etait certainement affaibli par les menees etrangeres et par des lacunes 
intemes de structures ',128 but it remained a united society; resistance to colonialism further 
supported its thesis. 129 
The Court was willing to embrace Morocco's emphasis on personal and religious 
ties of allegiance, but only up to a point; the familiar concepts of European relations with 
territory as well as ' sovereignty' were hard to displace for long. The nature of the Advisory 
Opinion question about legal ties was vague enough to elicit a wide range of possible 
interpretations and a number of judges spent time conflating or distinguishing legal ties vis-
a-vis ties of 'sovereignty'. The Court seemed to embrace the particularity of Morocco by 
125 It is useful to conceive of storehouse here as the state's repository of taxes, because the ability to collect 
taxes was the main distinguishing feature between the bled makhzen from the bled siba. J Castellino, 
'Territory and Identity in International Law: The Struggle for Self-Determination in the Western Sahara' 
(1999) 28 Millennium: Journal ofl nternational Studies 523, at 533. 
126 Morocco, Written Statement, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol lll, at 179-180. 
127 Morocco summaries the nature of the Sulan's authority in the following terms: ' des le debut de l'Etat 
musulman, s'etablit un equilibre entre !es autorites tribales qui sont !'expression d'une opinion publique 
embryonnaire rnais qui sont tout de meme !'expression d 'une opinion publique de base et l'authorite 
charisrnatique du prophete. Naissant alors Jes deux grandes traditions politiques musulmanes: l'authorite 
theocratique fondee sur l'obeissance a la parole de Dieu [via the Qur 'an); l'authorite politique fondee sur 
!'approbation de la communaute, approbation consignee dans un acte d'allegeance personelle, d 'abord au 
prophete, puis a son successeur le calife.' [From the beginning of the Muslim state, a balance was established 
between the tribal authorities who formed the expression of a nascent public opinion but who were also the 
expression of basic public opinion alongside the Prophet's charismatic authority. Thus marking the birth of 
the two great Muslim political traditions: theocratic authority based on submission to the word of God; 
political authority based on the approval of the community, approval given in an act of personal allegiance, 
initially towards the Prophet and then lo his successor, the Caliph.] lsoarl, Morocco, Oral Pleadings, 
International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol JV, al 259. Also, 
see Chapter Two, at 66, 69-70. 
128 [was certainly weakened by foreign attacks and by internal structural gaps] Morocco, Written Statement, 
Jnternational Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol lll, at 177. 
129 Ibid, at 187-194. 
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acknowledging its own mode of rule. Judge Forster regarded these differences as allowing a 
degree ofleeway in a finding of legal ties that could be understood as sovereign. 130 
The Court, however, adopted a narrower definition that still tried to remam 
concessionary and culturally aware: Morocco had established some legal ties, but not of a 
sufficiently sovereign nature. What would have been sufficient in this case? Further, what 
did the Court mean by 'sovereignty'? Roussellier compares the ICJ's position here with 
some of its earlier jurisprudence, where Moroccan personality had been recognised. rn If 
the basis of Moroccan sovereignty in the earlier case had been its connections with tribes 
that often inhabited at least the northern parts of Western Sahara, it would seem that the ICJ 
in its 1975 Advisory Opinion was drawing an artificial and inconsistent line across 
Moroccan territory. 132 Roussellier then asks why could not the Court 'declare some parts of 
the Territory of Western Sahara ... parts of Bled Siba, instead of a mere projection or 
extension of the limited display of the Moroccan sultan's authority'?133 The Court wanted 
to stress its support for Western Sahara's self-determination. However, it also did not want 
to be seen as disregarding the cultural traditions of Morocco and Mauritania. Indeterminate 
references to sovereignty aided the Court in its task of effecting a compromise of sorts that 
in reality gave very little ground: Western standards of the state prevailed so as to support 
the silenced and still stateless $al)rawls. Or in the words of Nesiah, ' the discussion of self-
determination is expressive of the Court's desire to lay out its own normative commitments 
by pulling Western Sahara into the normative and jurisprudential framework of 
international law, a statist or administrative framework ofterritory.' 134 
In a similar territorial focus, Judge Ammoun explored the Islamic arguments of 
Morocco in some detail to hold that there had existed legal ties of a sovereign nature over 
130 lCJ Reps ( 1975) (sep. op. Forster), at 95. 
131 Namely, Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France/United 
States) ( 1952) lCJ Reps, p. I 76. The same argument would apply in relation to the Nationalities Decrees 
Case, where the PCIJ regarded Morocco as under protection, rather than as a colony per se: Nationally 
Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (Advisory Opinion) (I 923) PCIJ, Series B, No. 4. For an excellent 
reading of the pleadings and their ambiguity about the nature of protection and selthood, see N Berman, 'The 
Nationality Decrees Case, or, Of Intimacy and Consent' (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 265. 
Also see, J Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2"d edition, 2006), at 510. 
132 
'[t]he Court is caught in an apparent contradiction. On the one band, it acknowledged Morocco' s 
sovereignty as then French Protectorate - including and in particular over the Bled Siba - but, on the other 
hand, it rejected Morocco's claim of territorial sovereignty on Western Sahara though it has ascertained that 
some Telma tribes from southern Morocco, a [sic] Bled Siba as well, have migrated into the Western Sahara 
Territory.' Roussellier, supra n 63, at 63. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Nesiah, supra n 94, at 15. 
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Western Sahara. Judge Amrnoun was able to agree with the majority Opinion up to a point 
in its recognition of legal ties, but '[w]ithout sufficiently convincing reasons .. .it minimizes 
the nature of those ties by maintaining that they consisted in an allegiance of the Saharan 
population to the Sultan of Morocco.' 135 In contrast, Judge Ammoun saw these ties as much 
more significant because the sultan 'personified the State' in its legislative, executive and 
religious aspects. 136 Judge Ammoun largely agreed with Morocco's use of treaty evidence 
and the testimony of geographers from the time to support its case for ' legal ties of a 
political character between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of 
Morocco.' 137 Throughout his separate opinion, although Judge Ammoun stressed the 
particular nature of authority in dar al-is/am, he also noted its territorial qualities, thus 
linking the particular with the ' universal' given of territory. Accordingly, the Court should 
not have discounted the importance of territorial control within the sultan's domain, 
because ' [t]hose people did not live suspended between the sky and the ground.' 138 
Nesiah depicts Ammoun as trapped in the 'double bind' of a colonialised 
international law. His opinion 'offers an exemplary instance where statist representations of 
territory continue to be visited and revisited, repeated and transformed, as an ongoing 
problematic of postcolonial nationhood.' 139 Although Judge Ammoun tried to expand the 
narrow confines of a European-based law, he ultimately ended up applying ' the criteria of 
statist territory' for Morocco's relationship with Western Sahara. 140 Thus Ammoun's 
separate opinion as well the Advisory Opinion itself ' illustrates the ICJ's adherence to the 
traditional Western legal concept of territorial sovereignty and its unwillingness to give real 
consideration to arguments based on principles of Islamic international Jaw.' 141 
b) Nomadic Co-sovereignty in the Bi/ad Shinqf!f 142 
135 ICJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. Ammoun), at 83. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid, at 102. 
138 lbid at 101 
139 Nesiah, sup~a n 94, at 20. 
140 Ibid, at 19. 
141 Cravens, supra n 11 8, at 531 . 
142 
'La these mauritanienne distingue la partie nord du Sahara occidental de sa partie sud. Le Nord releve du 
bled siba marocain, c'est domain de mouvance des Tekna marocains, le Sud fait parte integrante du pays de 
Chinguiti.' [The Moroccan position distinguishes the northern part of Western Sahara from its southern part. 
The North is part of Moroccan bled siba, it is the area of Tekna Moroccan migration, the South is an integral 
part of the country of Shinql"L.: I.] Salmon, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 425. 
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Like Morocco, Mauritania invoked the particular conditions of the desert as well as Islamic 
notions of authority in its attempt to provide a broader definition of international legal 
personality for the two Advisory Opinion questions regarding terra nullius and legal ties. 143 
Mauritania, however, was not able to rely on a pre-colonial political entity such as its 
Sharlfian counterpart, because there 'existait a l'epoque dans la region du Sahara 
occidental, ensemble qui, comme chacun le sait, n'avait pas la qualite d'Etat et dans lequel 
allait se creer plus tard la Republique islamique de Mauritanie.' 144 The absence of a state 
did not necessarily undermine the Mauritanian case based on overlapping nomadic co-
sovereignty across modern-day Mauritania and Western Sahara. Nevertheless, Mauritania 
was aware of the conceptual difficulties that the Court would encounter in abandoning 
statist and legal preconceptions for its preference for social research: 
les situations que constatent lcs historiens, Jes geographes, les ethnologues, les 
sociologies et politologues et qui traduisent dans les termes de bled siba et Bilad 
Chinguiti sont ccrtainement difficiles a apprehendrer pour le juriste qui est habitue 
a des notions tranchees comme cellcs d'Etat, de frontiere, etc.'145 
The challenges of Mauritania's unconventional material and arguments were exacerbated 
by the proceedings' inevitable inter-temporal law focus: not only was Mauritania (as well 
as Morocco) trying to expand international law in the postcolonial era, but it was inviting 
the Court to revisit a past little known for its respect for tribal personality. As in the case of 
Morocco's exploration of territorial titles, Mauritania presented a number of innovative 
arguments from this area of law, but the Court's silence on such matters left their cogency 
untested.146 
143 For an overview of Mauritanian state/society structures, see Salem, supra n 21. 
144 [Existed at the time in the region of Western Sahara, an entity which, as everyone knows, never had the 
quality of a state and in which was later created the Islamic Republic of Mauritania] Mauritania, Written 
Statement, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol III, at 
58. 
145 [The situations which the historians, geographers, sthnologists, sociologists and political scientists note 
and which are translated in the terms of 'bled siba' and 'Bilad ShinqllJJ' are certainly difficult to understand 
for the jurist who is used to clear-cut notions such as those of the state, frontier etc.] Yedali Ould Cheikh, 
Mauritania, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western 
Sahara, vol IV, at 423. 
1460ne of the most interesting ideas raised by Mauritania was its characterisation of European domination 
over tribal peoples. Classical international law detennines the mode of territorial acquisition through a 
combination of legal personality, treaty and the physical act of conquest. Thus for example, where a territory 
is populated by an internationally recognised people, only cession via treaty or conquest is possible. Many 
protectorates in Africa were the product of 'trinket treaties' that resulted in cession, but the mixture of force as 
well as the ambiguous status of various signatories blurred the lines between cession, occupation and 
conquest as was discussed in Part Two's lntroduction. Mauritania adds to this a subtler form of domination, 
language: 'Aucune pressure militaire quelconque n 'accompagne les negociations. Les explorateurs qui 
s'aventurent dans Jes regions sous la domination des tribus font figure de heros temeraires. C'est par la 
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The heart of Mauritania' s case in proving its legal ties over a non-terra nullius 
entity combined a detailed examination of its former social structure with a call for 
international Jaw to move beyond its statist assumptions. Mauritania acknowledged that 
many jurists and other writers in the colonial period had operated within a linear framework 
of human history, where tribal, Muslim societies were seen as behind those of the West. 147 
However, Mauritania was at pains to demonstrate that ' [l]'absence d ' institution etatique ne 
signifait pas anarchie, puisqu 'on a vu les liens multiples et, en particular, les liens de droit 
saharien qui repondaient parfaitement aux necessites de la vie nomade dans une societe 
preetatique.' 148 Mauritania devoted considerable energy to an examination of non-legal 
material supporting its claim to an independent, unified and sophisticated model of rule 
based on the overlapping nomadic movements of interdependent tribes.149 Studies of wells, 
cemeteries and the position of women all reinforced the argument that the prevailing model 
of social organisation was the only sustainable option in the Saharan context. 150 
Furthermore, even with its sophistication established, Mauritania claimed that international 
law's mandate did not rest on the internal aspects of a territory's political system. On the 
eve of Western Sahara 's and Mauritania's colonisation, jurists could appreciate the primacy 
of people above the state in recognising legal personality: 'vers 1880 la notion de people est 
une notionjuridique indeniable. ' 151 
Membership in diir al-islam was not only a useful tool for Morocco; Mauritania as 
well as Algeria invoked the concept to appeal to the universalism of international law. For 
diplomatie et !'argumentation qu ' ils convainquent leurs interlocuteurs a signer de telles conventions. ' [No 
military pressure whatsoever influenced the negotiations. The explorers who braved regions under tribal 
domination were foolhardy heroes. It was by diplomacy and argumentation that they convinced their tribal 
interlocutors to sign such agreements.] Mauritania, Written Statement, International Court of Justice: 
Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol Ill, at 55. Shaw also argues that the shape of the 
Opinion 's argument placed far too much reliance on the legal effects of trinket treaties, Shaw, supra n 8, at 
133. 
147 
' [E]n ignorant la realite socio-culturelle, des penseurs europeens ont purement et simplement nie l'Etat 
musulman et ont pretendu que la notion de souverainete n'y avait jamais depasse le stade de la tribu.' [Jn 
ignoring the social-cultural reality, European thinkers denied purely and simply [the existence ofJ the Muslim 
state and they claimed that the idea of sovereignty had never exceeded the tribal stage of development.] 
Salmon, Mauritania, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol Y, at 296. 
148 [The absence of a state apparatus does not signify anarchy, since one has seen multiple ties, and in 
particular, ties of Saharan law, which responded perfectly to the requirements of nomadic life in a pre-state 
society.] Ibid. 
149 Generally, see Mauritania, Written Statement, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents: Western Sahara, vol 111, at 58-87. 
150 Mauritania, Written Statement, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: 
Western Sahara, vol Ill, at 63-83. 
151 [By 1880 the idea of a people was an undeniable legal idea.] Salmon, Mauritania, Oral Pleadings, 
International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol V, p. 297. 
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Mauritania, an absence of defined borders was of secondary importance because the Bilad 
Shinqiti 'est reconnu dans tousles pays arabes comme une expression precise.' 152 Within 
the confines of dar al-is/am, the Bilad Shinqiti retained an independent status, 153 especially 
vis-a-vis its stronger neighbour, the Sharifian Empire. Algeria's counsel, Bedjaoui, also 
considered the impact of membership in dar al-is/am as an alternative approach to 
European conceptions of terra nullius. According to Bedjaoui, inclusion in diir al-is/am 
ipso facto entailed the presence of defined authority and the corresponding impossibility of 
terra nullius: 
On peut fonnuler done la reponse ainsi: «Non le Sahara n 'ctait pas un territoire 
sans ma'itre parce qu' il appartenait a Dar el Islam.» En utilisant une telle approche, 
non seulement votre haute juridiction accepterait de reconna'ftre qu'elle est la haute 
Cour de toutes les nations et de tous les systemes juridiques qui doivent coexister 
en bonne entente sur cette terre, mais elle redrait justice a toutes les societes 
bafouees par la colonisation. 154 
For Bedjaoui, the Court could move beyond its colonial past even within the strictures of 
inter-temporal law by considering legal systems other than the European version of the late 
nineteenth century. 
The Opinion never explicitly acknowledged Bedjaoui 's suggestion, but the Court's 
treatment of Morocco 's and especially Mauritania's claims suggests that this cal1 for a 
cosmopolitan international law was ultimately rejected. Indeed, the Court found it even 
more difficult to appreciate the legal nature of Mauritanian rule than its Moroccan 
counterpart. Like Spain, the Court was hard-pressed in conceptualising the factual and legal 
reality of the Shinqiti entity and its congruity with modem day Mauritania. The Opinion 
included a discussion of the legal requirements for legal personality as expounded in the 
Reparations Case and applied by Mauritania in the pleadings. As per Mauritania's central 
152 [was recognised in all Arab countries as a precise term.] Mauritania, Written Statement, International 
Couti of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol Ill, at 67. 
153 
'[L]a culture chinguitienne fait partie de forrnes similaires du monde arabo-musulman. Mais ce qui est 
significatif, c'est qu'elle est le fait d'un peuple pasteurs et le seul peuple de pasteurs de la zone aride a etre 
dans ce cas. C'est ce qui lui confrere vigeur interne et rayonnement exterieur.' [The ShinqIJ I culture is a part 
of similar cultures in the Arab-Muslim world. But it is noteworthy that the culture comprised pastoral people, 
who were the only farmers in the arid zone. This fact conferred internal strength on them as well as being an 
external influence.] Ouk! Maouloud, Mauritania, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, 
Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 367. 
154 [Thus, it is possible to formulate the following response: 'Western Sahara was nol terra nullius because it 
was a part of diir al-isliim.' In using such an argument, your high jurisdiction will not only agree to recognise 
that it is the high court of all nations and all the legal systems which ought to coexist amicably on this earth, 
but it will also render justice to all those societies ridiculed by colonialism.] Bedjaoui, Algeria, Oral 
Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol IV, at 
489. 
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thesis, the ICJ in its 1949 Opinion had observed that the 'subjects of international law in 
any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights 
and their nature depends upon the needs of the community.' 155 After an examination of the 
evidence, however, the 1975 bench could not find any basis 'for considering the emirates 
and the tribes which existed in the region to have constituted, in another phrase used by the 
Court in the Reparations Case, "an entity capable of availing itself of obligations 
incumbent upon its Members".' 156 
Perhaps in a bid to appear less dismissive of Mauritania's tribal thesis and its faith 
in the universal ramifications of its particular experience, the Court's negation of sovereign 
ties gave way at least to recognition of some lesser legal rights. 157 In a tribute to Spain's 
own dichotomisation of law and fact, Judge De Castro was even more strident in his 
rejection of Mauritania's legal existence: 'To endeavour to deduce from the existence of 
ethnic, cultural and geographical analogies, the existence of legal ties is like leaping into an 
abyss.' 158 
The Court's dispositive statement for the second question can now be quoted in full 
to appreciate the dilemma the Court faced in balancing the Sal)raw1s' right to self-
determination with Mauritanian and Moroccan calls to universalism and multiculturalism of 
(neo)colonial desires: 
The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the 
time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of 
Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Wes tern Sahara. They 
equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to land, which 
constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, 
and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other band, the Court's conclusion is 
that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tic of 
territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of 
Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such 
a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the 
decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-
determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of 
the Territory. 159 
155 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (1949) ICJ Reps, p. 178, quoted in 
ICJ Reps ( 1975), at 64. 
156 Ibid. 
157 
'To confine the question to ties of sovereignty would, moreover, be to ignore the special characteristics of 
the Saharan reg ion and peoples .. . and also to disregard U1e possib le relevance of other legal ties to the various 
procedures concerned in the decolonization process.' ICJ Reps (1975), at 64. For a similar perspective, see 
ICJ Reps (1975) (sep. op. Dillard), at 125-126. 
158 ICJ Reps (J 975) (sep. op. De Castro), at 165. 
159 ICJ Reps (1975), at 68. 
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This passage with its twists and turns belies the Court's confusion over its role in balancing 
competing claims of particularism. 
5) Conclusion 
The Western Sahara Case fell under the Court's advisory jurisdiction, but through a 
combination of its subject matter, its participants and its institutional parameters, the 
arguments delivered at the bar and the bench were in constant contention. The most 
fundamental point of dispute was not about how to demarcate territorial boundaries or legal 
personality, but rather the location of law in contrast to politics. Both the strategies used 
and the narratives evoked all suggested slightly different and shifting interpretations of this 
relationship at the heart of international law. It has been shown above that this desire for 
demarcating the law/politics dichotomy structured each judge's, as well as each state's, 
discursive delivery: emotion, language and the use of the social sciences and history were 
all interpreted differently in quests for authenticity and legitimacy. This observation 
supports my assumption that the law/politics dichotomy is one of the main structuring 
devices - or grammars - of international law. A certain flexibility of narrative delivery was 
also reflected in doctrinal diversity where Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria all attempted to 
expand the experiential and cultural foundations of international law by inviting the Court 
to recognise Arab-Islamic systems of governance. 
Although mindful of its consultative role in the UNGA's decolonisation thrust, the 
Court was also aware of the need to appear receptive to non-European legal traditions. The 
bench was caught between inclinations to respect self-determination on the one hand, with 
a desire to embrace Islamic legal traditions on the other. Which vision of the self should 
triumph in the Peace Palace? The Court's difficulties were exacerbated not only by the 
unacknowledged context of colonial and neo-colonial aggression towards Western Sahara 
but even more so by the indeterminate nature of international law itself. In particular, the 
bench's elastic interpretation and application of 'sovereignty' destabilised the boundaries of 
international law. Spain had called on the Court to guarantee the sanctity of a state-based 
notion of legal personality lest such ill-defined examples of the Shinqi"tl entity lead 
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historical and present realities into chaos. 160 Ultimately, the Court responded to such a 
request in its findings that the 'legal ties' of Mauritania and Morocco were less than 
'sovereign' because they lacked a sufficiently territorial basis. The Court thus prioritised 
the norm of self-determination for Western Sahara's people over and above the claims of 
regional powers. The Court, however, never acknowledged the existence of this norm 
conflict between self-determination and ' legal ties' ; it was easier to revert to a policy choice 
rather than offer a detailed analysis of how international law would offer the tools for such 
conflict resolution. 
By failing to settle the conflict between self-determination of non-European legal 
ties the Court reinforced broader themes at work throughout the hearings, including the 
relationship between particularism and the universalism as well as European and non-
European approaches to rule. These themes, and the underlying tension between law and 
politics, point to the continuing relevance of exclusion and cultural particularism m 
international law. Attempts to ignore, rewrite or move beyond unpalatable aspects of 
international law's past, present and future were all canvassed, but European colonialism 
remained one of the only narrative constants for each participant. International law was 
drawn on as a resource for liberation both by Mauritania and Morocco vis-a-vis their 
colonial repression, as well as by Spain and the Comt for Western Sahara's liberation. By 
invoking international law for this purpose, however, it was inevitable that histories of 
European control and international legal predilection for the state form should also emerge. 
As was the case in Chapters Three and Four, North African states confronted the 
postcolonial paradox: could international law be used to advance their interests in a way 
that did not entail an endorsement of a narrative sympathetic to European colonialism? It 
was both ironic and yet predictable that the Court sought to grant selfhood and statehood to 
a people whose territory it never defined and whose legal personality remained elusive and 
unspoken. 161 The Peace Palace may well be far from the Sahara, but the Court still 
managed to dream of sandcastles for the silenced and still-stateless Sal)rawls. 
16
° For example, see Arias-Salgado, Spain, Oral Pleadings, International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents: Western Sahara, vol V, at 58. 
161 Knop captures some of these themes in her work on the case, when she argues that the 'court throughout 
used a broad concept of legality to domesticate the exotic relationships of the Sahara, bringing them inside 
international law by recognizing them as legal. Simultaneously, its narrow concept of sovereignty denied 
these relationships equal status with the European master's by refusing to consider them as sovereign. This 
double movement of acceptance and rejection, legality and sovereignty, was characte1istic of the court's 
interpretation of legal ties and legal entity, just as it had been of its interpretation of terra nullius. The court's 
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6) Postscript 
Morocco and Mauritania presented an impressive range of arguments before the ICJ in their 
bid to distract world attention from political developments in the Sahara. Both States 
contributed to producing an Opinion supportive of Western Saharan independence and yet 
also cognisant of their respective 'legal ties'. In contrast with the Court's concessionary 
tones, Moroccan action during and after the proceedings indicated its unabashed designs of 
re/claiming Western Sahara: it did not need the endorsement of the Court for its eventual 
occupation of the entire territory, after Mauritania's withdrawal from the south in 1979. 
Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that Morocco's King ijassan recognised the utility of 
international legal rhetoric and appreciated the way in which he could use the Opinion's 
ambiguity to his advantage. Once the Opinion was handed down, the King did not reject the 
Court's finding per se. Instead, he distorted its primary support for self-determination: 
the opinion of the Court can only mean one thing: the so-called Western Sahara 
was part of Moroccan territory over which the sovereignty was exercised by the 
Kings of Morocco and that the population of this territory considered themselves 
and were considered to be Moroccans . . . To-day Moroccan demands have been 
recognized by the legal advisory organ of the United Nations. 162 
After this speech, the fate of Western Sahara was sealed: Moroccan occupation has brought 
mass flight by the bulk of Western Sahara's population, Moroccan settlers and concerted 
phosphate extraction. Further, in a reflection of Chapter Six's theme, Morocco's occupation 
has also brought the construction of a wall (or berm) dividing the territory between 
Moroccan control of the coast and its mineral wealth on one side, and Western Sahara's 
impoverished people in the desert as well as western Algeria, on the other. After a number 
of years of UN neglect, numerous policies, including various international and regional 
diplomatic initiatives and a UN peacekeeping effort, have thus far failed to achieve 
Sal).rawis self-detennination. 163 
treatment of terra nullius recognized the the legal existence of the tribes that inhabited Western Sahara, but 
was silent on their sovereignty.' Knop, supra n 3, at 157. 
162 Press Release of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations on 16 October 1975, quoted in UN Doc. 
S/PV.1849, 11 (1975), in Franck, supra n 28, at 711. 
163 For studies of post-Opinion policies regarding Western Sahara, see C Dunbar, 'Saharan Stasis: Status and 
Future Prospects of the Western Sahara Conflict' (2000) 4 Middle East Journal 522; Franck, supra n 24; P S 
Martin, 'Nationalism, Identity and Citizenship in The Western Sahara' (2005) 10 Journal of North '1frican 
Studies 565; J Mundy, 'Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of the 
Spanish Sahara' (2006) 11 Journal of North African Studies 275; L E Smith, 'The Struggle for Western 
Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony?' (2005) I 0 Journal of North African Studies 545; International 
Crisis Group, Report N.65, 'Western Sahara: The Cost of the Conflict', I 1 June 2007; International Crisis 
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One of international law's best-known articulations of the self-determination norm 
has achieved very little beyond the confines of the courtroom. It remains to be seen in the 
next chapter how the Court has managed more recently to guarantee self-determination in 
the face of equally complex and competing arguments on law and politics in its Wall 
Opinion. 
Group, Report N.66, ' Western Sahara: Out of the Impasse', 11 June 2007. The latest UN Security Council 
initiatives are outlined in Resolution 1754, 30 April 2007: SIRES/I 754 (2007). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Discourses of Division? 
Law, Politics and the !CJ Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
1) Introduction 
T he situations of Western Sahara and Palestine have much in common. Both remain territories under foreign rule in the face of widespread support for their peoples' 
self-determination. It is also significant that out of a small list of ICJ Advisory 
Opinions about self-determination, these two hail from the Arab world. As suggested in the 
previous chapter, Advisory Opinions are especially useful for exploring the range of legal 
grammars used in I CJ disputes because of the increased number of participating states. This 
was particularly so in the 2004 Wall Case. Several states presented either written 
submissions or oral presentations both supportive and dismissive of the Court's role in 
adjudicating Israel's construction of a wall in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (OPT) 
and its legal effects. Like Western Sahara, participants expressed their support or 
opposition towards the exercise of ICJ jurisdiction through the grammar of the law/politics 
dichotomy. States opposing the ICJ's jurisdiction characterised the United Nations General 
Assembly Request (UNGA) for an opinion as politically driven. The Court could not fulfil 
its role in such a context, and, further, it would hamper other initiatives. Supporters of the 
Court, on the other hand, were seemingly required to leave their politics at the courtroom 
door. Once the Court granted jurisdiction, however, many states showed how politics was 
an integral part of proceedings. The Court itself was also conscious of the political 
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significance of the matter, and thus this Case is a valuable site for exploring different 
characterisations of international law and its relationship with politics. 
Unlike the other cases discussed in the thesis, the Wall Opinion is not a classic 
territorial dispute. The UNGA requested the Court to comment on the legal implications of 
the wall ' s construction for Israel and third states. Boundaries remained ill-defined 
throughout the dispute, allowing participating states to discuss the legal regime created by 
the wall in broader terms. Like other cases discussed in the thesis, however, the centrality 
of territory underlay much of the discussion. The UNGA Advisory Opinion request was 
circumscribed, but both states and members of the Court touched on broader, 'political' 
considerations of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In particular, the importance of selfhood and 
territory informed many positions. Thus, the Wall Opinion can be seen as a classic 
(post)colonial contest over international legal personality: in a world of nation-states, 
securing territory is vital. This was also seen in the Western Sahara Case where the central 
characters of the Case, the Sal)rawl people, existed in a legal limbo. Because of their 
unfilfiled claim over territory as well as their unsecured international legal status, the 
$abraw1 were not able to speak in the Peace Palace. In the present Case, however, the Court 
welcomed Palestine's legal team along with delegations from some inter-governmental 
organisations (IGOs). 
The Chapter is not concerned with most of the substantive aspects of the Case, 
because doctrinal issues relating to occupation and state responsibility fall outside the scope 
of the thesis, with its focus on territory. The Opinion did, however, raise some reflections 
on the relationship between self-determination and territory, and these areas are explored 
briefly. Of greater significance for the thesis is the way the Case allows us to understand 
how the law/politics dichotomy, one of international law's fundamental conceptual 
structures, functions in adjudication. What relationship was there between the construction 
of arguments and their portrayal of law and politics? Further, debates about word usage 
provide us with an opportunity of assessing some of the parameters of the international law 
lexicon. Which words, expressions, and especially, concepts and feelings are capable of 
expression within an international legal forum? After surveying the disputc's background 
and proceedings, the chapter will map some of these legal grammars along with its lexicon 
and then appraise the success of such strategies. 
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Map #10: The UNGA 
Pai1i ti on Plan, 194 7. 
2) Background to the Opinion 
i:.;·> .. ~r .,_, ~: ,_ 
Map #11: Palestine after 1967, source for both maps: I 
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After four wars, 1 two peace treaties, 2 innumerable diplomatic initiatives and the Israeli 
occupation of the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as parts of Syria, Egypt and 
Lebanon, 3 the Arab-Israeli conflict remains far from resolved. Its complexity and the 
passions it arouses have prevented international law from playing a central role, and yet the 
conflict spans a number of seminal international legal issues, many of which were explored 
in the Wall Advisory Opinion. 4 
Despite the fact that Palestine has been under Israeli occupation for forty years, its 
fortunes have always been linked not only with its occupier but also with international 
institutions and international law. Further, the narrative of Palestine contains many central 
themes in postcolonial accounts of international law during the modem period. Although 
the end of World War I had ushered in a powerful discourse supportive of 
self-determination, this was only applicable to European peoples. We saw in Chapter Two 
how 'Ottoman military defeat by the British and French during the First World War 
produced a radical change throughout the whole Middle East.' 5 Secret treaties signed 
during the war assured French and British interests.6 The realisation of these agreements 
did not produce typical colonial administrations, however, but the League of Nations 
Mandate, which 'was used to legitimise British and French government of their Middle 
East possessions.'7 During the war, Britain also assured the interests of its national Zionist 
lobby. Through the efforts of the Zionist Federation in Britain, the Cabinet endorsed a 
statement drafted by the Federation's leaders.8 This document, which came to be known as 
1 Namely, the 1948 War, the Suez Canal Crisis 1956, the Six Day War of 1967 and the Yorn Kippur War of 
1973. 
2 Between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and between Jordan and Israel in 1994. 
3 The West Bank and Gaza in Palestine, Syria's Golan Heights and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula were occupied 
after the Six Day War of 1967 and all but the Sinai remain under Israeli occupation. Southern Lebanon was 
occupied by Israel between 1982 and 2000. 
4 Crawford argues that the bulk of international law literature on the conflict has been partisan. For an 
overview of some of this material and a thorough consideration of the legal aspects of statehood for Palestine 
and Israel, see J Crawford, 'Israel (1948-1949) and Palestine (1998-1999): Two Studies in the Creation of 
States', G S Goodwin-Gill, & S Talmon, (eds), The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian 
Brownlie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) at 95-124; and J Crawford, The Creation of States in International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2"d edition, 2006), at 421-448. 
5 R Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Routledge, 211d 
edition, 2000), at 9. See Chapter Two, at 87. 
6 Namely, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916: Exchange of Letters between France and Great Britain 
respecting the Recognition and Protection of an Arab State in Syria, 9/6 May 1916, 22 I CTS 323; Exchange 
of Notes between France and Great Britain modifying the Agreement of 9/6 May 1916, 25/30 May 1916, 222 
CTS 13. 
7 Owen, supra n 5, at 8. 
8 J Quigley, The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective (Durham; London: Duke University 
Press, revised, 2005), at 8. 
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the 1917 Balfour Declaration, noted that Britain 'viewed with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing 
should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine.' 9 Crawford argues that it remains unclear whether Britain's 
responsibilities under the League Covenant should have precluded its support of Jewish 
interests and whether it really was possible to juggle such competing interests.10 What at 
least is clear is that Britain was unable to resolve this tension and that the seeds of conflict 
can be traced to the fundamental incompatibility between Mandate responsibilities 
contained in Article 22 of the League Covenant and the Balfour Declaration. 11 
Up until Britain's withdrawal from Palestine in 1948, relations between Jewish and 
Arab populations had produced not only serious local tensions but also international 
attention from the newly formed UN. As the Arab League remarked in its oral statement in 
the Wall Advisory Opinion, the ' issue of Palestine is the longest-lived problem on the 
agenda of the United Nations.' 12 Despite the formation of dedicated committees about 
Palestine's future as a well as the General Assembly-endorsed Partition Plan, 13 
disagreement was so pronounced that war broke out between Zionist and Arab forces soon 
after Britain's flight from Mandatory responsibility. The international consequences of this 
war included the creation of the state of Israel; 14 agreement on the 1949 Armistice Line 
(often referred to as the Green Line) dividing Israel from the Jordanian-administered West 
Bank; a large mass of Arab refugees 15 who would come to rest their hopes increasingly on 
the promise of self-determination rather than the luke-warm reception offered by Arab 
9 Quoted in Quigley, ibid. 
1
° Crawford, ' Israel ( 1948-1949) and Palestine (1998-1999)', supra n 4, at 104-106. 
11 Article 22 of the Covenant is discussed in Chapter Two at 88. For an overview of Britain's difficulties 
faced in honouring the Balfour Declaration under the Mandate, see I Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: 
One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at ch 3. 
12 Mr Bothe, Oral Statement of the League of Arab States, 25 February 2004, CR 2004/5, at 22. Available at: 
hltp://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ l 3 l/ l 52 l .pdf 
13 The Partition Plan was included within Resolution 181(11), 29 November 1947. For a general overview of 
the events precipitating the 1948 war, see J Quigley, 'Sovereignty in Jerusalem' 45 Catholic University Law 
Review (1996) 765, al 769-771. Also see Map #10, at 243. 
14 Israel also became a member of the United Nations on 11 May 1949 as a result of General Assembly 
Resolution 273 (Ill). The territory comprising the new state of Israel was much larger than that envisaged 
under the UN 1947 Partition Plan and so some Arab states in their Wall Case submissions still regarded 
Israel's UN membership as based on its compliance with the territorial plans of the partition. However, UN 
membership is not conditional and Crawford points out ('Israel (1948-1949) and Palestine (1998-1 999) supra 
n 4, at I 08- l 10) that the best explanation for Israel's formation was as an act of force leading to secession 
(requiring stable and effective government). Israel would have been able to demonstrate this capacity by 
January 1949. 
15 Halliday suggests that the figure was around 1.4 million. F Halliday, The Middle East in International 
Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 94. 
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states; as well as the seeds of deep-seated animosity between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours. 
Regional tensions came to their climax in the 1967 War. After only six days, the 
war ended with the Israeli occupation of territories east of the Green Line (including East 
Jerusalem) as well as the Golan Heights in Syria and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Almost 
immediately after the occupation of Palestinian lands Israel's actions were condemned by 
the UN Security Council (UNSC) in Resolution 242. UN resolutions following the conflict 
accepted the cease-fire lines (including the 'Green Line' delimiting the West Bank) but 
rejected the 'conferring of any title to the territory occupied by Israel. ' 16 Since 1967 
Palestine has remained a central concern of the UN, and yet independence is as elusive now 
as it was with the creation of the Mandate. Both the UNGA and the UNSC have issued 
countless resolutions on specific aspects of the conflict. The central themes to emerge from 
these include the Palestinian right to self-determination, the non-recognition of Israeli 
sovereignty over the territory and its status instead as a belligerent occupier under the ambit 
of international humanitarian law (IHL), the importance of regional peace agreements, the 
illegality of Israeli settlements, and the need for both Palestinians and Israelis to cease the 
cycle of violence perpetrated by both public and private actors against civilians.17 
Only a year before the UNGA requested the Court's assistance, a 'Roadmap' was 
first mooted as a way of ameliorating regional tensions. The Roadmap laid out steps to be 
followed by Palestine and Israel and it was to be overseen by the UN, the United States 
(US), the European Union (EU) and Russia. 18 These countries came to be known as the 
Quartet and they continued their efforts throughout the Advisory Opinion proceedings. 
Palestine's occupation is a classic example of neocolonialism in a postcolonial age. 
In the Wall Case, postcolonial states employed the language of international law in pursuit 
of the Palestinian cause of self-determination, which suggests that international law was 
being used as a weapon of the weak in their attempt to solidify a world free of 
16 Q Wright, 'The Middle East Problem' (1970) 64 American Journal of International Law 270, at 272. 
17 For a comprehensive list of UN resolutions relating to Palestine, see 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/english/level2 en.jsp?level id=70 I . 
18 For some background about the Roadmap, see International Crisis Group, Report N. 14, 'A Middle East 
Roadmap to Where?', 2 May 2003, avai lable at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=l659&1= 1. 
The Roadmap was endorsed by the UNSC in Resolution 1515, 19 November 2003: S/RES/1515 (2003). 
238 
Chapter Six: 
Discourses of Division? Law, Politics and the !CJ Advisory Opinion on the 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
colonialism. 19 Whether international law as a body of norms is capable of supporting such 
aims is the subject of discussion below. 
b) Bringing the Conflict before the Court: The Request.for an Advisory Opinion 
Although Palestine has been a constant on the agendas of the UNGA and UNSC, it was not 
until Israel's construction of a wall that the UNGA sought the assistance of the ICJ. We 
saw in Part Three's Introduction that only the UNSC, UNGA or specialised UN bodies 
acting within the scope of their mandate can request an Advisory Opinion from the Court.20 
Under the Charter, the power of the UNGA to make a request is further limited by Article 
24, which establishes that the UNSC has 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.' Although this provision can be read to prohibit all UNGA 
involvement in affairs under the Council's consideration, Article 24 only stipulates 
'primary responsibility'. 21 Further, in 1950, the UNGA passed its 'Uniting for Peace' 
resolution, which provides that 
if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, 
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the 
matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to 
members for collective measures .. .If not in session at the time, the General 
Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the 
request therefor.22 
The Tenth UNGA Emergency Special Session had been convened in 1997 to discuss Israeli 
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) after a veto by the US in the 
Security Council.23 The Tenth Session was reconvened on 20 October 2003 in the wake of 
another US veto of a Council Resolution, which was partially concerned with the 
construction of a wall in the OPT.24 
19 Power disparities were illustrated in Professor Salmon's speech on behalf of Palestine: 'Advocating 
negotiations between the wolf and the lamb implies ensuring minimum protection for the lamb. ', Oral 
Statement of Palestine, at 59, para. 7, 23 February 2004, CR 2004/1, (translation). Available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/tiles/J 3 I /1505.pdf. 
20 See Part Three's Introduction, at 193-195. 
21 This is discussed by the Court in the Wall Opinion: ICJ Reps (2004), at para. 24. 
22 3 November 1950, 377(Y). 
23 For resolutions passed on this issue in the session, see A/RES/ES-10/2, 5 May 1997; A/Res/ES-10/3, 30 
July 1997; A/RES/ES-1 0/4, 19 November 1997. 
24 Draft Resolution S/2003/980, 14 October 2003. 
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The minutes from the Emergency Special Sessions preceding the Advisory Opinion 
pleadings indicate that political and legal positions about the Court's role in the Case and 
the legal issues raised were already clearly established. Many UN member states that spoke 
during the 2003 Emergency Special Sessions also went on to present submissions to the 
Court and there is very little internal discrepancy in their positions.25 Although stances on 
legality or illegality and the applicable law used remained relatively constant, there was a 
significant shift in the language and imagery used in the two settings. Speaking before 
fellow UN members in a highly charged political setting, speakers were more confident in 
employing 'inflammatory' language. 26 Speakers in the UN setting also appeared more 
confident about using or abusing international law for their own purposes.27 The use of 
legalese was rare. It would seem that the atmosphere of the Court produced a marked 
difference in the behaviour of parties. These observations suggest that states regard the 
practice and discourse of international law used in ICJ adjudication as qualitatively distinct 
from political debate. 
After heated discussions, a number of resolutions were passed about the wall's 
construction and the scope for requesting an Advisory Opinion. In Resolution ES-10/13 
calling for Israel to 'stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem' as well as report by the 
Secretary-General on Israel's compliance,28 144 states supported the Resolution with four 
against and twelve abstaining.29 Shortly after the Secretary-General's report was received 
and after the Security Council veto, Kuwait on behalf of the Arab group and Malaysia on 
behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) sought the reconvention of the Emergency 
Special Session to respond to the report's findings. The various references made to the 
25 For ease of expression, 'states' will be used to denote state, and quasi-state entities (such as Palestine) where 
I am discussing general UN activities by its member states and permanent observers. 
26 In the words of the President of the 26'h Emergency Special Session, 'I really want lo caution against the 
language being used in matters that are ticklish debates which sometimes have the tendency of being 
inflammatory and not necessarily helping the cause. I really want to make it clear, that for whatever reason -
and I do not really care who is upset - I really object to any analogy that is made, particularly from the inside, 
which may have a tendency to describe as in the Assembly as inmates in an asylum. I think that we can find 
better language to use in terms of describing the debates that are taking place here'. E/ES-10/PV.26, 19 July 
2004, at 3. 
27 For example, 'it is abundantly clear that the construction of the expansionist annexation wall by the 
occupying Power is a war crime and, I reiterate, a war crime of such seriousness and intensity that it 
constitutes a crime against humanity.' Mr. Al-Kidwa, UN Observer of Palestine, A/ES- I O/PV .21 , 20 October 
2003, at 3. 
28 A/RES/ES-10/13, 27 October2003. 
29 A/ES-10/PY.22, 21 October 2003, al 2-3. 
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Arab and NAM positions throughout the meetings suggest a mutual position not only about 
the wall' s illegality but also the need for an Advisory Opinion.30 In this vein and after much 
hyperbole, a resolution requesting the Court's Advisory Opinion was put to the vote and 
passed. Like other earlier resolutions, Resolution ES 10/14 condemned the wall 's 
construction.31 Its call for the Court's intercession, however, aroused caution in many -
particularly European - states and the resolution passed with a smaller majority (111, with 
55 abstentions and 7 against).32 Despite this, numbers were sufficient in transferring the 
debate from New York to The Hague.33 
30 G enerally see A/ES/ I O/PY.23, 8 December 2003 . 
31 A/RES/ES-J0/14, 12 December 2003. 
32 A/ES/ 10/PV.23, 8 December 2003, at 20-2 1. 
33 It must be pointed out that this was not the only ICJ case dealing with Palestine. Others include: Reparation 
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) ( 1949) ICJ Reps, p. 174; and 
Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement 
of June 26 1947 (Advisory Opinion) (1988) ICJ Reps, p . 12. 
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3) The Decision of the Court34 
In its resolution, the UNGA had asked the Court to give its advice on the following 
question: 
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being 
built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the 
Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, 
including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council 
and General Assembly resolutions?35 
The Court provided its response in the form of an Opinion as well as a number of separate 
opinions and one dissenting declaration.36 The bench went about answering this question by 
first considering whether it had jurisdiction and if it was proper to exercise its jurisdiction. 
a) Jurisdiction 
The Court's jurisdiction was challenged on a number of grounds. First, the Court had to 
consider whether the Emergency Special Session request was valid. The Court accepted the 
nexus between the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the UNGA's request to hold that there 
were no reasons to 
regard the request as invalid.37 Second, a number of submissions argued that the UNGA 
request was insufficiently ' legal' as per Article 96 of the Charter,38 that the request lacked 
clarity; and that it was too political. The Court drew on its jurisprudence to show that none 
of the objections raised constituted grounds for declining its jurisdiction;39 It held that the 
request centred on a sufficiently legal matter.40 In the words of Judge Koroma, the question 
34 For summaries of the case, see P H F Bekker, 'The World Court Rules that Israel 's West Bank Barrier 
Violates International Law', ASJL Insights, July 2004, S C Breau, 'Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004' (2005) 54 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly l 003; N Lubell, 'The lCJ Advisory Opinion and the Separation Barrier: A 
Troublesome Route ' (2005) 35 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 283; and N Strapatsas, ' Case Note on the 
ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory' (2005) 35 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 25 1. 
35 A/RES/ES-10/ 14, at 3. 
36 Judges Koroma, Higgins, Kooijmans. Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby and Owada issued separate opinions; and 
Judge Buergenthal issued a dissenting declaration. 
37 lCJ Reps (2004) at para. 35. 
38 Article 96 states: 'The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of 
Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. ' Italics added. 
39 ICJ Reps (2004), at paras. 38-41. 
40 ICJ Reps (2004), at para. 37. 
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was 'eminently legal ' .41 The Court was not concerned that the wording of the UNGA's 
request was somewhat vague, as it pointed out that such a situation simply required 
'clarification in interpretation, and such necessary clarifications have frequently been given 
by the Court.' 42 Lastly, 'the Court cannot accept the view ... that is has no jurisdiction 
because of the "political" character of the question' .43 The Opinion relied on ICJ decisions, 
especially Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 44 to rebut this argument.45 
The Court acknowledged the existence of politics in its work, but maintained that politics 
and many other issues were inherent aspects of international Jaw and did not negate the 
quality of the legal question under consideration. Accordingly, the Court found it had 
jurisdiction to give the requested Advisory Opinion.46 The Court may have acknowledged 
the political context, but its judgment on the merits demonstrated how it strove to overlook 
tensions beyond the Courtroom. As is typical, the language of the Opinion was used to 
avoid many of the complexities highlighted from a reading of the pleadings. 
b) Propriety 
Although the Court affirmed its jurisdiction, it also considered whether there were elements 
of the UNGA's request 'that would render the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction improper 
and inconsistent with the Court' s judicial function ' .47 A substantial body of jurisprudence 
has grown up around this question, which generally focuses on whether there would be any 
'compelling reasons'48 leading to its jurisdiction being declined. The Opinion restated a 
well-known fact that the ICJ had never declined jurisdiction on these grounds and 
acknowledged its special responsibility as the 'principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations' .49 One of the most important reasons against its jurisdiction was the proposition 
advanced in a number of submissions that 'the request concerns a contentious matter 
between Israel and Palestine' 50 lacking Israeli consent. Here, the Court reaffirmed that 
41 ICJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Koroma), at para. 3. 
42 JCJ Reps (2004), at para. 38. 
43 ICJ Reps (2004), at para. 41. 
44 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) (1996) ICJ Reps, p. 26. 
45 ICJ Reps (2004 ), at para. 41. 
46 !CJ Reps (2004), at para. 42. 
47 ICJ Reps (2004), at para. 43. 
48 Certain Expenses of the United Nations {article 17, paragraph of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) (1962) 
ICJ Reps, p. 155. 
49 Citing United Nations Charter art 92, ICJ Reps (2004), at I 56, para. 44. 
50 lCJ Reps (2004 ), at 157, para. 46. 
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advisory opinions as opposed to contentious cases do not ipso facto require a state's 
consent, and that previous opinions had been rendered in the absence of consent.51 So as to 
distinguish the PCIJ case of Eastern Carelia, 52 the Court relied on Western Sahara's 
dictum that jurisdiction could be upheld despite a lack of consent as well as the presence of 
a bilateral dispute as long as this was not 'incompatible with the Court's judicial 
character'. 53 The Court acknowledged that Israel and Palestine had 'expressed radically 
different views'. 54 It also recognised an aspect of the Case partly comprised a bilateral 
dispute, however, as in the Western Sahara Case, it chose to focus on the relationship 
between its advisory jurisdiction and the mandate of the General Assembly. It held that the 
construction of the wall 'to be directly of concern to the United Nations. ' 55 The Opinion 
would primarily function as judicial assistance to the Charter-determined duties of the 
General Assembly, rather than act as an alternative forum for a bilateral dispute. By using 
these arguments the Court could carve out a legal niche for itself within the broader context 
of the 'political ' conflict. 
The Court considered and refuted four more challenges to its competence: that the 
Opinion would impede negotiations between the parties; that the Court lacked adequate 
factual materials on the Case, especially because of the absence of Israeli consent; that the 
Opinion would serve no useful purpose; and that Palestine did not come to the proceedings 
in good faith.56 First, with very little investigation of the ensuing negotiations, the Court 
erred on the side of jurisdiction when it argued that opinions differed as to the possible 
relationship between an Opinion and negotiations. Ultimately, it did not regard potential 
interference 'as a compelling reason to decline' jurisdiction. 57 On the requirement of 
sufficient information, the Court again distinguished Eastern Carelia to hold that the 
current Case did not require factual material only available from a non-consenting party.58 
si Judge Burgenthal also noted this point, but placed much greater weight on it, arguing that fairness would 
have been improved iflsrael were permitted to appoint a judge ad hoc. ICJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Burgenthal), 
at 265-267. 
s
2 Status of Eastern Carelia (Advisory Opinion), 1923, P.C.IJ. , Series B, No. 5. Judge Burgenthal in his 
dissent also pointed out that in the case that as Russia was not a member of the League it had therefore not 
consented to have its disputes heard by the PCIJ at all. However, in this case, Israeli membership of the UN 
created a qualitatively different scenario. !CJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Burgenthal), at 263, para. 9. 
53 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) lCJ Reps. ( 1975), at 25, paras. 32-33, in ICJ Reps (2004), at 158, para. 
47. 
s
4 ICJ Reps (2004), at 158, para. 48. 
ss ICJ Reps (2004), at 159, para. 49. 
s6 ICJ Reps (2004), at paras. 46-65 . 
57 JCJ Reps (2004), at 160, para. 53 . 
ss lCJ Reps (2004), at paras. 55-58. 
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Instead, ' the Court has at its disposal the report of the Secretary-General, as well as a 
voluminous dossier submitted by him to the Court', the submissions from the pleadings 
and, lastly, material available in the 'public domain' .59 Third, in relation to the contention 
that the Opinion would be of no value, the Court held that it 'cannot substitute its 
assessment of the usefulness of the opinion requested for that of the organ that seeks such 
opinion'.60 Both the UNGA and UNSC would be free to 'draw [their own] conclusions ' .61 
Finally, the Court dismissed Israel's contention that Palestine's responsibility for acts of 
violence meant that it came to the Case in bad faith and without 'clean hands' .62 This was 
not a ' pertinent' consideration because the Case involved a request by the UNGA rather 
than a bilateral dispute per se. 63 
Judges Higgins and Kooijmans criticised aspects of the Court's reasoning in relation 
to its competence. Their reservations centred on the bilateral and political aspects of the 
Case as well as the Opinion's ill-founded reliance on the Namibia decision.64 Both separate 
opinions indicate that the Court's compromise was an awkward one. Nevertheless, there 
was sufficient agreement for fourteen of its members to accept the UNGA's request and 
consider the matter on its merits. 
c) Merits 
The Opinion's discussion of the legal principles lacked detail. The Court' s decision has 
especially been questioned in relation to its 'somewhat light treatment of international 
humanitarian law', human rights law, as well as the requirements of self-defence.65 These 
59 ICJ Reps (2004), at 16 1-162, para. 57. Cf Judge Burgenthal 's disagreement on this point, ICJ Reps (2004) 
(sep. op. Burgenthal), at 268, para. 22. 
60 ICJ Reps (2004), at 163, para. 62. 
61 Ibid. 
62 I CJ Reps (2004 ), at 163, para. 63. 
63 ICJ Reps (2004), at 164, para. 64. 
64 legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (J 970) (Advisory Opinion) ( 1971) lCJ Reps, p.12. ICJ Reps 
(2004) (sep. op. Higgins), at 207, at paras. 1-1 l ; ICJ Reps (sep. op. Kooijmans), at 2 19, al paras. 23-25. 
65 ICJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Higgins), at 213, para 25. For some responses to the Court's treatment of IHL, 
human rights and self-defence issues, see A lmseis, 'Critical Reflections on the International Humanitarian 
Law Aspects of the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion' (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 102; F 
Megret, ' A Sacred Trust of Civilization ' (2005) 1 Journal of International Law & International Relations 
305; SD Murphy, 'Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An lpse Dixit from the ICJ?' (2005) 
99 American Journal of International Law 62; AM Smith, 'Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?: The "Wall 
Decision" and the Troubling Rise of the !CJ as a Human Rights Court' (2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 251; C J Tams, 'Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: The Law of Self-Defence in the Wall Case' 
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factors fall outside of the chapter's focus, but it is useful to note that the Court adopted its 
usual approach in obfuscating norm conflict and relying on formalism. 66 It must also be 
remembered that a number of states that had made submissions did not address issues of 
substance because they had requested the Court to decline its jurisdiction. Thus the 
available material from both the Court as well as various parties was somewhat superficial. 
Before the Court could consider the legal consequences of the wall's construction, it 
needed to determine what bodies of law applied and whether any breaches had occurred 
within the OPT. At the outset, it distinguished between those parts of the wall west of the 
Green Line (in Israel proper) and those in the OPT. It held that only the latter were of 
relevance because any state was free to construct walls within its own territory.67 Before it 
considered the applicable laws, it discussed the territorial status of the OPT since the time 
of the Mandate. Although the Opinion did not consider the territorial status of Palestine 
between 1948 and 1967, 68 it highlighted League of Nations principles pertaining to the 
territory: non-annexation and ' the well-being and development of peoples'. 69 What was 
clear for the Court at least was the status of Palestine after the June War in 1967: it was 
under Israeli belligerent occupation. This recognition of Palestine's occupied status is 
confirmed by numerous UNSC resolutions issued since 1967.70 
Echoing the Mandate ideals, the Court first identified both the right of self-
detennination and the prohibition against the use of force as constituting tbe general legal 
principles applicable. It cited the East Timar Case71 in support of the notion that ' the right 
of self-determination of peoples today is a right erga omnes' .72 This right therefore applled 
to Israeli policies, which included building the wall, transferring its population to 
(2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 963; R Wedgwood, 'The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the 
Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defence' (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 52. 
66 Judge Higgins characterised the majority's strict definition of self-defence as only applying between states 
as 'formalism of an unevenhanded sort.' !CJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Higgins), al 215, para. 34. 
67 ICJ Reps (2004), at I 64, para. 67. 
68 Judge Al-Khasawneh applauded this approach of the Opinion's and explained the underlying motives of the 
Court: 'The Court followed a wise course in steering away from embarking on an enquiry into the precise 
prior status of those territories not only because such an enquiry is unnecessary for the purpose of establishing 
their present status as occupied territories affirming the dejure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
to them, but also because the prior stah1s of the territories would make no difference whatsoever lo their status 
as occupied territories except that they were terra nu/lius when they were occupied by Israel, which no one 
would seriously argue given that discredited concept is of no contemporary application, besides being 
incompatible with the territories ' status as a former mandatory territory.' ICJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Al-
Khasawneh), at 237, para. 8. 
69 Citing ICJ Reps (1950), p. 13 1, in ICJ Reps (2004), at I 65, para. 70. 
70 Particularly, UNSC Resolution 242 (1967), 22 November. 
71 East Timar (Australia/ Portugal) (Merits) lCJ Reps ( 1995), p. 102 
72 JCJ Reps (2004), at 172, para. 88. 
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settlements in the OPT, and the resulting flight of Palestinians from the territory. These acts 
impeded the Palestinian right to self-determination and are discussed further below in this 
chapter's comparison of the pleadings and the Opinion. Although supportive of the notion 
of self-determination generally in the OPT, Judges Higgins and Kooijmans argued that 
there was no direct relationship between the wall and this right; it could only be appreciated 
with regard to the broader context, and this was beyond the scope of the UNGA's request.73 
Judge Higgins pointed out that the wall did not change the territorial status of Palestine: 
both before and after its construction Palestine would remain an occupied territory.74 This 
view placed too little weight on what the Opinion described as the expansionist aims 
embodied by the wall; the Court regarded the walls' construction as constituting de facto 
annexation.75 In such a case, the right of self-determination was being breached. Most of 
the Court was unwilling to accept Israeli statements about the ' temporary'76 nature of the 
structure and thus interpreted the right of self-determination in a more contextual and 
flexible manner than Judges Kooijmans and Higgins. These difficulties of definition faced 
by the bench indicate how international legal discourse is ill-equipped to express 
hypothetical, future scenarios with possible legal implications attached. 
After examining the various laws applicable and instances of Israeli breaches, the 
Court discussed the legal consequences for both Israel and third states. As the Court had 
dete1mined that the wall's construction was in breach of the right to self-determination, IHL 
and human rights law, it held that Israel must respect such obligations. Israel was required 
to stop and reverse the wall's construction. Relying on the Factory at Chorz6w Case,77 the 
Court further held that Israel was required to make reparations or, where this was not 
possible, to compensate the victims for the damage suffered during the wall's 
construction. 78 As for third states, the Opinion stated that self-determination as well as 
73 ICJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Higgins) p. 214, para. 30. ICJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Kooijmans), at 228, para. 32. 
74 ICJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Higgins), at 213-214, paras. 30-3 1. 
75 Cf Kretzmer's critique on the Court's unsatisfying treatment of future acts: D Kretzmer, 'The Advisory 
Opinion: the Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law' (2005) 99 American Journal of 
International Law 88, at 92. 
76 According to Israel, the Wall's construction is 'a non-violent and temporary measure oflast resort.' Written 
Statement of Israel, 30 January 2004, at para. 1.16. Available at http://www.ic j-
cij.org/docket/filesil 3 J /1579 .pdf. 
77 Factory at Chorz6w (Merits) (1928) P.C.l.J. , Series A, No. 17. 
78 lCJ Reps (2004), at 198, para. 153. 
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aspects of IHL were 'of an erga omnes character'79 permitting no derogation. 80 Thus, in its 
dispositifthe Court held: 
(3) A. By fourteen votes to one,81 
The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its 
associated regime, are contrary to international law; 
B. By fourteen votes to one, 
Israel is under an obligation to tenninate its breaches of international law; it is 
under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being 
built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory ... to dismantle forthwith the structure 
therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and 
regulatory acts relating thereto ... 
C. By fourteen votes to one, Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all 
damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory ... 
D. By thi1teen votes to two,82 All States are under an obligation not to recognize the 
illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or 
assistance in maintaining the situation created by such a construction .. . 
E. By fourteen votes to one,83 The United Nations ... should consider what further 
action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation ... 84 
Judge Buergenthal did not support the Court's jurisdiction and so he voted consistently 
against all dispositive paragraphs. Although Judge Higgins voted for paragraph 3 (D), she 
expressed reservations about its operation, because it called for states 'to ensure compliance 
by Israel with international humanitarian law.'85 Judge Kooijmans also argued that there 
was no positive duty for States in the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding breaches and 
that it was not practicable for the Court to rule on this anyway.86 Finally, it was unclear 
from the Court's discussion whether it was eliding the term erga omnes with jus cogens, 
especially in relation to the right of self-determination. 87 
Despite the Opinion's rather sketchy and shallow treatment of many aspects of the 
Case, it still provides a useful statement on many international legal principles and needs to 
be appreciated for what it is: a difficult compromise reached by fourteen out of the Court's 
79ICJ Reps (2004), at 199, para. 157. 
80 ICJ Reps (2004), at 200, para. 159. 
81 Judge Buergenlhal in dissent to paragraphs 3 A, B & C. 
82 Judges Buergenthal and Kooij mans in dissent. 
83 Judge Buergenlhal in dissent. 
84 ICJ Reps (2004), at para. 163. 
85 ICJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Higgins), at 207, at paras. 37-39. 
86 ICJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Kooijmans), at 219, paras. 46-50. 
87 See generally, A Orakhelashvili , 'International Public Order and the international Court 's Advisory 
Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory' (2005) 
43 Archiv des Volkerrechts 240. 
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fifteen members. For Falk 'the degree of consensus is rather remarkable, given the 
controversial subject matter, and the far-reaching and drastic responses given to the General 
Assembly's question. ' 88 Damrosch and Oxman are less forthcoming with praise for the 
Opinion, because substantial agreement between the judges 'came at the price of a lowest-
common-denominator approach to the reasoning of the opinion' .89 O'Keefe echoes these 
sentiments, arguing that the Opinion 'is often unsatisfying in methodological and stylistic 
terms . . . [and it] is too prone to bald, ex cathedra pronouncements of law and fact, which 
give little indication of the Court's reasoning' .90 At times the Opinion's ' certain delphic 
quality'91 may have been necessary because of the tense legal and political issues the Case 
straddled, but O'Keefe argues that the Court need not have been so 'exceedingly spare' in 
its approach. 92 An opportunity to clarify some particularly pertinent issues, such as the 
emerging norm relating to self-defence, as well as the finer points of IHL, was wasted. In 
her separate opinion, Higgins opines that she did not feel compelled to add to the Opinion 
because of any major di screpancies with what was written; rather, her 'regrets are . .. about 
what [the Court] has chosen not to write. ' 93 
As shown by Higgins, its silences tell us a great deal about international law and its 
relevance to the dispute. In the following sections, I compare positions taken in the 
pleadings with both the statements and silences of the Court. 
4) Contesting the Court's Jurisdiction 
In contrast with contentious ICJ cases, Advisory Opinions offer much greater scope for the 
participation of a range of states as well as IGOs and in the case of Palestine, nascent state 
entities.94 States are under no compulsion to submit written or oral arguments and non-state 
88 R A Falk, 'Towards Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel's Security Wall' (2005) 99 American 
Journal of International Law 42, at 43. 
89 L F Damrosch, & B H Oxman, 'Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory: Editors' Introduction' (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law l, at I. 
90 R O'Keefe, 'Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri tory: A 
Commentary' (2004) 37 Revue beige de droit international 92, at 126; Scobbie concurs with this position: I 
Scobbie,'Smoke, Mirrors and Killer Whales: the International Court's Opinion and the Israeli Barrier Wall' 
(2004) 5 German Law Journal 1107, at J 107. 
91 O'Keefe, Ibid, at 126. 
92 Ibid, at 127. 
93 Emphasis added, ICJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Higgins), at 207, para. 20. 
94 Despite significant scholarly attention generated by the Wall Opinion, very little work has considered the 
pleadings. In cases where authors have looked at the pleadings at all, they have tended to focus excessively on 
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entities must first secure the permission of the Court. 95 The prestige, prominence and 
authority of the Court may induce states to act, but there are also other considerations such 
as resources and priorities to take into account. In the Wall pleadings many states 
participated, but many also chose to play no part. Links can be made between the relative 
regard for the proceedings among the states participating and their method of engagement. 
There was a much greater number of written as opposed to oral submissions, and often 
those states requesting the Court to decline its jurisdiction - namely, various EU states, the 
US, Israel and some others - only submitted written arguments. There was an 
overwhelming consensus among these states on the issue of jurisdiction: negotiations 
through the prism of the Roadmap were to take priority over legal proceedings likely to 
jeopardise this process. Such a stance suggests that these mostly First World states regarded 
the role of the ICJ as of limited value in such a highly 'political ' matter. It would also seem 
that states were strongly influenced by regional and strategic affiliations. 96 The views 
espoused in these written submissions indicated a tendency to set clear boundaries between 
legal and political spheres in international life with law being deemed as only appropriate in 
limited situations. It should also be noted that all states parties to the Roadmap ' s Quartet, 
namely Russia, the US and the EU submitted that the Court should decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction. 
While strong agreement existed among mostly First World states in relation to the 
ICJ's minor role,97 there was a similar pattern for Third World, and particularly Arab, states 
Israel's written submission. For those authors who regarded the case as a bilateral dispute, they seized on the 
Israeli position and juxtaposed it with the Opinion. Some authors who have considered other submissions 
include: I Scobbie, 'Words my Mother Never Taught me - "In Defense of the International Court"' (2005) 99 
American Journal of International Law 76; and G R Watson, 'The "Wall" Decision in Legal and Political 
Context' (2005) 99 American Journal of international Law 6. 
95 Article 66, Statute of the International Court of Justice. In the Wall Opinion, the Court decided to invite 
submissions from Palestine, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab League. In the case 
of Palestine, it grounded its reasons on A/RES/ES-10/ 14 (discussed above), the Secretary-General's report a 
well as Palestine's ' special status of observer [in the UN) and that...[Palestine) is co-sponsor of the draft 
resolution requesting the advisory opinion'. As for the Arab League and the OIC, ' these two international 
organizations were likely to be able to furnish infonnation on the question.' President Shi, Opening Address, 
Public Sitting, CR 2004/1, 23 February 2004, at 15. 
96 According to Hirsch, regional interests may well be of greater importance for Israeli compliance than any 
commitment to the international community as represented in the ICJ as well as the UNGA's request: 'This 
social influence of international reference groups indicates that the position of states belonging to the Western 
group regarding the recent Advisory Opinion is of significance to Israeli decision makers, even if it is not 
translated into coherent sanctions.' M Hirsch, 'The Impact of the Advisory Opinion on Israel's Future Policy: 
International Relations Perspective' (2005) 1 Journal of international Law and International Relations 3 19, al 
340. 
97 Exceptions included: Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands continued in their strong allegiance with 
the US on matters re lating to Israel and asked for the Court to decline jurisdiction. This was also the case for 
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regarding the importance and place of international law and the ICJ in resolving the 
protracted conflict. Many Third World states regarded the Case to be of great importance.98 
There were a disproportionate number of Third World states submitting oral (as well as 
written) statements and a connection can be made between the relative importance that 
these states placed on the proceedings and their participation. Saudi Arabia declared in the 
hearings that '[t]his is the first time ... Saudi Arabia has made an oral presentation to the 
International Court of Justice. '99 Other Third World states expressed their awareness of the 
'momentousness of the occasion' 100 by declaring their reverence for the Court in more 
florid language than their First World counterparts. 101 This was especially so for small 
states, such as Belize and Cuba, which were cognisant of their minor international 
influence, but still wanted to make a contribution to the proceedings. 
As in the case of the Quartet states and Israel, there were identifiable allegiances 
and alliances within the pleadings as well as a degree of cross-referencing across 
submissions. 102 The NAM 103 along with the Arab Group at the UN (which happens to 
comprise NAM members) were the co-sponsors of the original UNGA resolution 
requesting the Opinion, and many submissions acknowledged these links. The Organisation 
of Islamic Conference (OIC) also submitted both written and oral pleadings and many of its 
members are both members of the NAM104 and the Arab League. 105 It is not surprising then 
that the OIC was invited to participate in the hearings. Palestine is a member, but also, 
Cameroon, despite its membership in the Organisation of Islamic Conference. Finally, although was a 
relatively united European stance, some states broke away from this or were more sympathetic to the legal 
process. 
98 For example, Written Submission of Yemen, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 131 I1581.pdf; and 
Professor Sorel, Oral Statement of Belize, 24 February 2004, CR 2004/3, at 14. 
99 Ambassador Shobokshi, Oral Statement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 23 February 2004, CR 2004/2 at 
43, para. I . 
100 Professor Sorel, Oral Pleadings of Belize, 24 February, CR 2004/3, at 14, para. 1. 
101 See especially Oral Statement of Malaysia, 24 February 2004, CR 2004/4; Oral Statement of Madagascar, 
24 Februa1y 2004, CR 2004/4; and Oral Statement of South Africa, 23 February 2004, CR 2004/2. These 
states all spoke in the Emergency Special Sessions as well. 
102 Sudan provides an example of inter-Arab cross-referencing to other Arab states: 'At the outset, we would 
like to associate ourselves with the Written Statements submitted to this Court by both the League of Arab 
States and the Organization of Is lamic Conference (OIC), and we fully endorse their legal arguments, 
opinions and conclusions on the matter. We also subscribe to the views and legal arguments presented by 
Palestine and by other delegations appearing before this Court.' Ambassador Idris, Oral Statement of Sudan, 
25 February 2004, CR 2004/5, at 14, para. 2. 
103 For a full list of NAM members, see http://www.nam.gov.za/background/members.htm 
104 For example, in its written submission, Bangladesh highlighted its membership of both the NAM and OIC 
and linked this with its position in the pleadings. Oral Statement of Bangladesh, 23 February 2004, CR 
2004/2, at 59. 
105 Jn addition, both the Arab League and the OIC are Observer Organisations within the NAM. 
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more importantly, Article 2 of the OIC Charter lists one of the Organisation's principal 
objectives as being: 'to coordinate efforts for the safeguarding of the Holy Places and 
support of the struggle of the people of Palestine, to help them regain their rights and 
liberate their land' .106 The ore has a committee overseeing the implementation of this 
Article 'on the Arab-Israeli conflict in view of the fundamental connection between the Al-
Quds 107 [Jerusalem] question and the conflict.' 108 At the time of the pleadings, Morocco's 
King Muhammed VI was the chair of Al-Quds committee and Morocco listed this as a 
factor in its participation. 109 
Similarly, the Arab League emphasised its own motivations m the pleadings as 
being directly ' at the top of the League of Arab States' agenda since its creation in 1945.110 
The League's Pact asserted the right of Palestine to independence. Accordingly, Palestine 
was granted the full membership in the Arab League. ' 111 The matter of Palestine led to 
Egypt's decade-long suspension as well as the temporary transferral of the League's 
headquarters in Cairo after Egypt's peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Ultimately, the NAM, 
the Arab League and the OIC need not have given international law, and its embodiment in 
the form of the ICJ, such attention. Many member states of these organisations have been 
actively involved in diplomatic efforts regarding both the conflict and the wall in particular. 
However, their choice to support the legal process suggests a commitment to legal 
institutions as well as a faith in international legal principles. The link between the 
language of faith and international law for Third World states is explored further below. 
A few observations about the relative quality of the legal teams and statements 
presented are worthwhile before considering the nature of the pleadings themselves. 
Written submissions varied dramatically in terms of their quality of style and length and as 
106 A copy of the Charter can be found on the OIC's website: http://www.oic-oci.org/. 
107 Al-Quds (U"~I) is the Arabic name for Jerusalem, which is the third most holy site for Muslims. This is 
reflected in the derivation of the name: the word is based on the verb qada.1·a (...w.li (to be holy) and the literal 
meaning of quds is holiness, sacredness, sanctity: Cowan, J. M. (ed), The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern 
Written Arabic (Ithaca, NY: Spoken Languages Services, 41h ed, 1994). The use of Al-Quds instead of 
Jerusalem is a highly symbolic act on the part of Arabs who have come to see ' Jerusalem ' as signifying a 
unified Jewish capital, see Y Suleiman, A War of Words: Language and Conflict in the Middle East 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 175. When I was in Al-Quds/Jerusalem in June 2005, I 
noticed that the (Israeli-made) Arabic street signs referring to the city used a transliteration of Jerusalem, 
rather than Al-Quds. 
108 This statement can also be found on the OIC's website, http:/iwww.oic-oci.org/ 
109 Written Submission of the Kingdom of Morocco, at 1, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/fi les/131 / 1585.pdf. 
110 The members of the Arab League are listed in the Introduction at 7, footnote 16. 
11 1 Written Submission of the League of Arab States, 28 January 2004, para 2.1. http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/ 131 /1545.pdf. 
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well as considered treatment of legal arguments. In instances where states placed great 
weight on the jurisdiction and substantive findings of the Court, submissions were often 
detailed and well-polished, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, the the Arab League, the OIC, 
Malaysia, South Africa and particularly, Jordan and Palestine. 11 2 In contrast, many states 
opposed to the jurisdiction of the Court submitted shorter and often perfunctory documents. 
Israel however had a strong interest in blocking the pleadings and so its written submission 
was quite detailed, in relation not only to jurisdiction but also, inadvertently, substance. 
From a quick perusal of both the drafting style and the legal teams employed, it is clear that 
there were disparities in the time and resources outlaid in the proceedings.113 Palestine's 
legal team in particular comprised a host of eminent international law experts, who were 
given the liberty to work on the Case as they saw fit; they were not under any instructions 
from Ramallah. 114 This fact alone is significant; 115 it suggests that Palestine's faith in the 
processes of international law - as embodied in the discipline 's finest - meant that no 
political direction was needed. Instead, international legal principles could speak for 
themselves. 
5) Strategies of Argument 
112 Written Submission of Saudi Arabia, ht1p://www.icj-cij .org/docket/files/ 131 / l 543.pdf; Written Submission 
of the League of Arab States, supra n 111, ; Written Submission of the Organisation of Islamic States, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/<locket/fi les/l 3 l/1589.pdf; Written Submission of Malaysia, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/tiles/13 l/J 625.pdf; Written Submission of South Africa, http://www.icj-
ci j. org/docket/files/l 31/l 597 .pd f; Written Submission of Jordan, http://www.icj-
cij. org/docket/files/ 131 / 1559.pdt; and Written Submission of Palestine, http://www.icj-
TiJ·org~d?cket/fil.es/ 13 J/1555.pdf. . . . 
Syna s subm1ss10n for example contained nwnerous errors and was utterly mcoherent at l!mes. A sample 
of its style illustrates this: 'The second: is what the second article referred to when expecting three cases in 
which the state could not have the state of emergency as a pretext. The first of these cases refers that it is not 
allowed to have the state of emergency as a pretext to violate a clear rule of the international law. These rules 
are not to be disobeyed for any reason. Consequently, we say here that catching the others' territories by 
force, settling, imposing the public punishment policy and adopting racial separation policy are on top 
of clear international rules that could not be violated or disobeyed with the pretext of existence.' Written 
Submission of the Syrian Arab Republic, 30 January 2004, 24, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/filcs/ 13111567.pdf, (emphasis in original). 
114 For an account about Palestine's legal team, see P H F Bekker, 'The World Court's Ruling Regarding 
Israel's West Bank Barrier and the Primacy oflnternational Law: An Insider's Perspective ' (2005) 38 Cornell 
International Law Journal 553, at 557. 
115 In particular, it should be noted that a member of the Palestinian team, James Crawford, has written on the 
territorial status of Palestine before, essentially holding that it does not yet manifest the qualities of statehood, 
supra n 4; J Crawford 'The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?' (J 990) 1 European 
Journal of International Law 307; and Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, supra n 4, at 
421-448. 
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This section is concerned with two strategic devices employed by the parties in presenting 
their respective positions: the use of language and the use of history. Both of these 
strategies reveal underlying Third World normative evaluations about the role of 
international law in a postcolonial era. 
a) Speaking before the Court 
States participating in the pleadings did not necessarily share the same vocabulary or 
understanding of international law. Whether such discrepancies can be explained as simply 
different dialects or different languages will be assessed in the Conclusion of the thesis. It is 
also evident from a comparison of the language used in the lead up to the Opinion in the 
Emergency Special Sessions, that parties were aware of the unique discourse that the 
Advisory Opinion elicited - language of the pleadings was far less emotive and florid. 
Choice of language was of importance for both the parties and the Court in relation 
to the name of the Case and its focus, the wall. Although, the Court must have been aware 
of the controversy over terminology, it chose not to delve into this. 116 In explaining its use 
of the word 'wall' (as opposed to 'fence' or 'barrier'), the Court simply stated that other 
words ' are no more accurate if understood in the physical sense.' 117 However, the Court did 
qualify its use of the word later in the Opinion by describing the surrounding circumstances 
as creating a 'regime': 118 the wall was more than a simple edifice, it took on complex 
qualities with legal consequences. This idea can be attributed to a number 
of submissions from Arab states, such as Palestine and Jordan. 119 
Within the pleadings themselves, there is an unambiguous correlation between 
Third World support for the Court's jurisdiction and their use of the term, 'wall'. Every 
Arab state and most Third World states (except those not in favour of the request: the 
116 Scobbie also acknowledged this controversy in his discussion of the Opinion. Scobbie, 'Words My Mother 
Never Taught Me', supra n 94, at 76, footnote 1. 
117 ICJ Reps (2004), at 164, para. 67. 
118 For example, ICJ Reps (2004), at 191 , para. 134. 
119 
'The wall, far from being a simple self-standing security measure, is thus to be understood as a regime 
serving Israeli policy towards the annexation of the West Bank or substantial parts thereof' (emphasis added), 
Written Submission of Jordan, supra n 112, at 97, para. 5. 151; 'The Wall is not a physical structure. It is a 
whole regime.' Mr. Al-Kidwa, Oral Statement of Palestine, 23 February 2004, CR 2004/1 , at 18, para. 4; 
Written Submission of Palestine, supra n 112, at 4, para. 11. 
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Pacific states and Cameroon), supported this pattern. Jordan's Prince Al-Hussein voiced the 
Third World position when he argued before the Court that the Case 'concerns a wall. And 
not just "a" wall, but a very specific wall ... (that] is not just a simple fence.' 12° For those 
Western states asking the Court to decline jurisdiction, many chose to use the term, 
'barrier' instead, and this conjures up the image of a structure less total than a wall. The use 
of the term ' fence ' was associated with Israel 's position and is 'highly symbolic', 
suggesting, as it does, an insubstantial and semi-permanent structure. 121 Israel consistently 
used (and continues to use) the term and only a few states followed suit in their 
submissions, all of which favoured negotiations over the Opinion.122 Israel went into detail 
about this: 
The use of the term 'wall ' in the resolution requesting an opm1011 is neither 
happenstance nor oversight. It reflects a calculated media campaign to raise 
pejorative connotations in the mind of the Court of great concrete constructions123 
of separation as the Berlin Wall, intended to stop people escaping from tyranny. 124 
This notion of the Berlin Wall was explored by the Arab League in its oral statement, and 
was the only delegation to do so.125 The broader idea of separation, however, was expressed 
by some other Arab states, which referred to the 'apartheid wall' 126 and the 'segregation 
wan·.127 
Language choice over 'wall' was bolder in the political setting of the earlier 
Emergency Special Settings discussed above. During the Emergency Special Sessions, 
speakers were more forthright in their language. Prominent parties in the Case also spoke at 
the Sessions and followed the Palestinian delegate's condemnatory language regarding the 
120 w. s b . . f ntten u m1ss10n o Jordan, supra n 112, at 53. 
121 In the words of Professor Sorel, Belize's counsel, 'Like the General Assembly, l shall use the word 
"Wall", not forgetting that other, highly symbolic expressions are used by Israel to describe this construction 
referred to as "security fence" then "security barrier".' Oral Statement of Belize, CR 2004/3, at 15, footnote 3. 
122Written Submission of Belgium, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/131/1635.pdf; Written Submission of 
the European Union, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/l 3 l /l 615.pdf. 
123 This statement is directly contradicted by the Arab League, which argued that Israel was denying the 
effects of the wall 'by calling the 'fence' a temporary security measure. But this claim veils the true situation. 
It is public notice that major parts of the Wall are built in a very solid way, concrete structures, ditches, and so 
on. ' Professor Bothe, Oral Statement of the League of Arab States, CR 2004/5, at p. 29. This position is 
corroborated by footage on B'Tselem's (a prominent Israeli human rights organisation) website: 
http:i/www.btselem.org/English/Photo Archive/List.asp?x Concatenate= I 5&z Concatenate=LlKE,%27%25 
.%25%27. 
124 Written Submission of Jsrael, supra n 76, at. I 0, para 2.7. 
I'S 
- Oral Statement of the League of Arab States, Mr Bothe, CR 2004/5, 25 Febraury, at 21-22. 
126 Written Submission of the League of Arab States, supra n 11 I, at 7 para. 1.4. 
127 Written Submission of Kuwait, 30 January 2004, http://www.icj-ci j .org/docket/files/ 131 11561.pdf. 
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wall, using phrases such as 'expansionist annexation wall' (Palestine), 128 ' expansionist 
conquest wall' (Palestine),129 ' Israeb expansionist wall ' (Malaysia speaking for NAM)130 
and 'that expansionist wall' (OIC). 131 Israel also employed much more inflammatory 
language to describe the wall: 'this is the Arafat fence. This is the fence that Arafat 
built.' 132 None of these expressions were employed before the Court; the participants were 
aware of international law's particular lexicon and translated their perspectives accordingly. 
In both the pleadings and the Opinion itself, ideas of 'existence' were touched on 
through certain linguistic techniques. As in the case of the use of 'wall' , the Court refused 
to be drawn into these debates on Palestine's existence: '[a]s regards the principle of the 
right of peoples to self-determination, the Court observes that the existence of a 
"Palestinian people" is no longer in issue.' 133 However, Palestine was described by Italy as 
existing 'still in an inchoate state', 134 and Israel was able to demonstrate this idea by always 
using quotation marks when discussing Palestine; it would seem that for some states 
Palestine was in a state of limbo. 135 In a postcolonial context where selfhood is best secured 
through statehood, Palestine's unresolved status fitted uncomfortably with international 
law's preference for precision and clarity. Perhaps the international legal lexicon was 
stretched to its limit with such an example, and states exploited this lacuna for their own 
agendas. Language usage was of such importance for Malaysia that it specifically 
addressed the issue during the pleadings: 'Malaysia takes strong exception to the pejorative 
way in which Israel refers to Palestine throughout its Written Statement, such as the use of 
inverted commas to refer to Palestine' .136 Syria also adopted the technique vis-a-vis Israel 
by employing quotation marks when referring to anything Israeli including Prime Minister, 
Ariel Sharon. 137 
Israel 's existence as a recognised state has been a contested issue for both Arab and 
Muslim states more generally. Many continue to refuse not only to make peace with Israel 
128 A/ES- I O/PV.21, at 3. 
129 Ibid, at 9. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 A/ES-10/PV.23, 6. 
133 ICJ Reps (2004), at 182-J 83, para. J 18. 
134 Written Submission of Italy, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 13 1/1593.pdf, at p. 4. 
135 See generally, Wniten Submission of Israel, supra n 76. 
136 Mr. Albar, Oral Statement of Malaysia, 24 February 2004, CR 2004/4, p. 24. 
137 However, it should be noted that Syria's submission was so poorly drafted that occasionally quotation 
marks were forgotten, but the intention was clear nevertheless. 
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or enter into diplomatic relations, but even to acknowledge its existence.138 This dissonance 
between legal fact and political predisposition was illustrated in parts of the written 
submission of the OIC, where the presence of Israel remained ambiguous; it was unclear 
whether the OIC was recognising it or not. 139 This example indicates that choices over 
language were of primary concern for certain states participating in the Case. Some words 
and phrases stretched international law's lexicon, which tends to comprise 'neutral', 'non-
emotional' language so as to preserve the underlying grammar of the law/politics 
dichotomy. 
Many parties employed inflammatory language in the UNGA Emergency Special 
Sessions and this was carried over to a lesser extent in the advisory pleadings themselves. 
Chapter One explored some of Koskenniemi's ideas, including his argument that 
international law cannot be used as a discourse to express the full range of human 
emotions; 'certain values cannot be translated to the idiom of legal reason.' 140 Did 
emotional discourses remain within the bounds of legal language and was this discourse 
understood in the courtroom? This is a question that cannot be answered with any 
precision, but it would seem from the Court's rejection of the more extreme phrases 
employed that their use fell on deaf ears; their meaning was lost on the border between 
'legal' and 'non-legal' language. Words and expressions such as 'apartheid', 
'bantustantisation ', 'racial discrimination', 'ghettoisation ', Israel as coloniser and its 
behaviour towards Palestinians as rendering them in a category of 'sub-humans' 141 were 
used frequently in the pleadings. However, their use was exclusively by Third World states, 
particularly Arab states. It is possible to argue that Third World states had a more expansive 
138 This is also reflected in one of most widespread English/ Arabic dictionaries, Al-Mawrid. Under 'I', in the 
English section, it is only possible lo find an entry for the adjective, ' Israeli'. A noun for the place does not 
exist in U1is dictionary. 
139 Written Submission of ilie Organisation of Islamic Conference, 30 January 2004, supra n 112, at 6-7. 
140 M Koskenniemi, 'Faiili, Identity, and the Killing of the Innocent: International Lawyers and Nuclear 
Weapons' (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 137, at 156. Also see Chapter One, at 39 A 
particularly emotive outburst came from Cuba: 'It is totally impossible lo estimate the degree of mourning 
imposed on Palestinian families, of pain lo the moiliers of the Palestinian children who have died as a result of 
violence exerted by the occupying Power, and ilie systematic lmmiliation to which ilie Palestinian people are 
subjected.' Written Statement of Cuba, 30 January 2004, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 131/1629 .pdf, at 
l. 
14 1 Written Statement of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, supra n 112, at para. 42. This idea of 'sub-
human' conjures up imagery of the Holocaust and iliis device is quite deliberate on the OIC's part. In the 
preceding section the submission makes a direct connection between the European Holocaust and ilie role of 
European guil t in the creation of Israel. The OIC is not so subtly reminding readers iliat Jews were rendered 
as sub-human in living memory and it is suggesting iliat the Jewish state is now behaving in a similar fashion 
towards Palestinians because of Israeli disregard for fundamental human rights principles. Also see Written 
Submission, at para. 20. 
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notion of the role that international law could play in highly contested matters and used a 
lexicon supportive of such ideas. The action of these states echoes Kritsiotis' supposition 
about international law's expanding linguistic and participation base: these states were 
trying to refashion the lexicon and grammar of international law and thus the spheres of its 
application.142 Here, Third World states had argued for the Court's jurisdiction along the 
familiar lines of the matter conforming to a ' legal' issue. Once inside the Peace Palace, 
Third World states maintained an awareness of legal niceties in toning down some of their 
rhetoric. However, the debates over word use and occasional flights into inflammatory 
language challenged clear divisions between law and politics. Given the Court's response, 
it would also appear that much of this language remained on the margins of international 
law, or even outside it. 
b) The Use of History 
Because historical narratives are mainly related to a case's substance, it is not surprising 
that those mainly First World states rejecting the jurisdiction of the Court overlooked 
matters from the past. Choices about the relationship between international law as well as 
its ability to confront its own past informed states' support for or opposition to jurisdiction. 
Although former imperial powers, such as France and Britain, submitted substantial written 
dossiers, neither revisited their own responsibility in the creation of the Mandate system. 
Either they were uncomfortable with their record or wanted it left unexamined because they 
regarded the past as irrelevant to the wall's construction, starting as it did only a few years 
before the Advisory Opinion proceedings. 
As a strategy of legal argument, the First World position can be contrasted with 
approaches taken by many Arab parties. Although Arab and non-Arab submissions within 
the Third World grouping were quite evenly balanced, only Arab parties (including the 
partly-Arab OIC) discussed the historical record in any detail. This indicates greater Arab 
sensitivity to the past even though many other Third World states had also experienced 
colonial rule. For a number of Arab states, participation in the Wall Case was an 
opportunity not only to revisit the past, but also to offer their own narrative about events 
142 D Kritsiotis 'The Power of International Law as Language' (1997-1998) 34 California Western Law 
Review 397. Also see Chapter One, at 34-35. 
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that are seen to have direct influence today. This desire to rewrite the past also occurs in the 
other cases of the thesis, where a Third World desire to decolonise history has been noted. 
Jordan's introductory comment highlighted the central role of historical narrative in legal 
proceedings: 
In addressing the issues which arise in these proceedings, Jordan is constrained to 
note that the substance of the matter which is the subject of these advisory 
proceedings raises some very major issues of law and fact, particularly the 
historical facts going back more than 50 years. Those facts shape the legal issues 
which call for consideration in these advisory proceedings. Moreover, the legal 
issues themselves are exceedingly complex and in many respects controversial, and 
require the most careful analysis. 143 
Other Arab parties echoing these sentiments included Palestine, Egypt, Sudan, the Arab 
League and the OIC. There was also a degree of reliance between Arab states on each 
other's submissions, such as in the case of Egypt: 'Since various memoranda submitted to 
the Court by Arab countries and the League of Arab Nations, have elaborately depicted the 
historical background of this issue, therefore, the Arab Republic of Egypt would like to 
refer thereto in order to avoid repetition.' 144 This statement suggests shared positions on 
both the importance of history as well as its content. 
All Arab submissions considering the historical record as well as the Court's 
summary of the past began their analysis at the time of the Mandate, thus indicating 
consensus about the historical trajectory relevant for the Advisory Opinion. Although both 
the Court's Opinion and Arab submissions highlighted the Mandate ideals of sacred trust 
and (eventual) independence, the Court's 'neutral' account of the period obscured 
colonialist agendas, such as the role of European powers in the Mandatory system and its 
allocation of responsibility and the impact of the Balfour Declaration on Arab inhabitants 
of Palestine. 
A thorough investigation of the historical record was not required of the Court; it 
was asked to consider the legal consequences arising from recent events. However, many 
Arab submissions devoted considerable attention to history because the past was seen as 
inextricably linked to the case at hand. Similarly, Judge Elaraby from Egypt distinguished 
himself from others on the bench through his emphasis on the historical record: 
An historical survey ... may appear as academic, without relevance to the present 
events. The present is however determined by the accumulation of past event and 
no reasonable and fair concern for the future can possibly disregard a firm grasp of 
143 Written Statement of Jordan, supra n 11 2, at 6, para. 1.6. 
144 Written Statement of the Arab Republic of Egypt, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/liles/ l 3 1fl54 7.rdf, at 16. 
260 
Chapter Six: 
Discourses of Division? Law, Politics and the !CJ Advisory Opinion on the 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
past events. In particular, when on more than one occasion the rule of law was 
consistently side-stepped.145 
In his section on the legal status of the OPT, Judge Elaraby sought to show how the Case 
for Palestine's non-annexation by Israel could be bolstered by the historical record; 146 the 
past and the present were interdependent. Like the deconstruction of the law/politics 
dichotomy, certain submissions challenged a closely related international legal grammar, 
the law/history dichotomy. 
In their strategic use of history Arab parties and the OIC not only demonstrated their 
greater reliance on history as a method of international legal argument but also explored 
some substantive and ongoing themes at work within international law. Neither 
international law itself nor colonial practice were regarded neutrally; each submission's 
narrative was flavoured by a normative evaluation of international society's characteristics 
in the past and the present. 
We saw in Chapter One that TW AIL m particular is interested in tracing the 
ongoing relationship between colonialism and the law. Chimni has categorised TW AIL II 
as having a more critical and structural approach to international law than TWAIL 1. 147 
TWAIL II authors are sceptical about international law's capacity to be truly inclusive of 
non-European, postcolonial peoples. International law is portrayed as structured by its 
colonial past, and despite Third World participation in the international system as 
sovereign, independent states, international law continues its colonialist, civilising 
tendencies in new forms. TW AIL I approaches, however, are generally much more 
optimistic and are imbued with significant faith in the potentiality of international law as 
liberator. 
Where the historical record is considered in Arab and OIC submissions, there is a 
strong resemblance to TWAIL I approaches: international law's relationship with past 
colonial practices is distinguished from its inclusive and anti-colonialist qualities in the 
post-1945 world. Many Arab and NAM states described Israel' s actions in the Emergency 
Special Sessions and pleadings as 'colonial', thus trying to demonstrate that colonialism 
persists in the postcolonial era. However, these accounts also tended to suggest that Israel' s 
actions were exceptional and contrary to international law; as the Court itself pointed out, 
145 !CJ Reps (2004) (sep. op. Elaraby), at 246, para. 2.1. 
146 Ibid, at para. 2.5. 
147 B S Chimni, 'Towards a Radical Third World Approach to International Law' (2002) 5 International 
Centre for Comparative Law and Politics Review 14. 
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the prohibition against the acquisition of territory by force is now a fundamental legal 
doctrine. 148 For many Third World states, there was a conviction that international law has 
qualitatively changed; norms against territorial annexation show that European colonialism 
is an event of the past, even if it did result in lasting effects on the ground for Palestinian 
self-determination. Rather than mistrust international Jaw's capacity for liberation, as many 
TWAIL II writers do, it seems that Arab historical accounts acknowledged the role of 
history not so much to remind us about European colonialism per se but to make us aware 
of how similar Israeli practices are with events of the past. Thus the recounting of historical 
events to highlight themes in legal doctrine was a strategic device for a number of Arab 
states as well as the OJC. We were made aware of the Arab endorsement of international 
law's vital role - as well as its legitimacy - in international society today. 
6) The Promise of Doctrine? 
Having surveyed some strategic devices of argument, this final section turns to matters of 
substance. Third World and First World perspectives are contrasted and compared with the 
Court's doctrinal position on the issues of conquest, self-determination and human rights 
norms. The final part of this section comes full circle by looking again at the issue of the 
Court's jurisdiction to reflect on the role of the ICJ in resolving even the most 'political' of 
disputes. 
The first two interrelated legal principles applicable in the Wall Opinion related to 
the prohibition against the acquisition of territory through the use of force and the right to 
self-determination. Here, the Court cited Article 2( 4) of the UN Charter banning the use of 
force. 149 It then linked this general prohibition to the action of territorial annexation -
conquest - by referring to the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (Resolution 2625(XXV) as well as ICJ 
jurisprudence to confirm that this rule was customary. 150 The Opinion then discussed the 
right to self-determination also by relying on UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), its 
148 ICJ Reps (2004), at para. 117. 
149 lCJ Reps (2004), at para. 87. 
150 
' Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations', 24 October 1970, ICJ Reps (2004), at 171, at 
para. 87. Also see Part Three Introduction, at 196 
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jurisprudence ' on a number of occasions' and common Article 1 in the two human rights 
covenants.151 Later, the Court went on to hold that the right to self-determination was erga 
omnes, but it remained unclear whether the Court was actually referring to the notion ofjus 
cogens as well. 152 This area of law remains unclear and many pleadings reflected this 
confusion. 153 
Uncertainty about norm conflict was also evident in submissions from Third World 
states. Parties generally gave only scanty consideration to the principles of conquest and 
self-determination, but they were also referred to as constituting the core of international 
legal norms for a number of states. For example, Palestine regarded the norm against the 
acquisition of territory to be so well-accepted that it did not need to cite any authorities in 
its submission; international law was irrefutable here. 154 Many states specifically relied on 
UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) and some sought to rely on the Kellog-Briand Pact of 
1928.155 Most First World states did not consider the merits of the Case, but even where 
they did, there was more of a tendency to explore IHL and human rights issues.156 Norms 
about conquest and self-determination were of far greater concern to Third World states, 
including Arab states. For states only recently endowed with full international legal 
personality could appreciate the primacy of statehood more than their First World 
counterparts. 
How did Third World states approach the question of human rights and their 
application in the OPT? In its Opinion the Court had discussed the scope for human rights 
derogation in some detail to hold that Israel was still bound by a number of human rights 
norms.
157 No state argued that human rights law was inapplicable in the OPT, because in 
the words of South Africa, such norms apply to the individual and not the state. 158 
151 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 1966) 999 UNTS 171; and International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 993 UNTS 3, ICJ Reps (2004), at 171-172, at para. 88. 
152 For a discussion about Judge Al-Khasawneh's implicit linking of the two concepts, see I Scobbie, 
' Unchart(er)ed Waters?: Consequences of the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory for the Responsibility of the UN for Palestine' 
16 (2005) European Journal of international Law 94 l, at 949. 
153 See for example, Written Statement of Jordan, supra n 11 2, at paras. 5.37, 5.100 
154 Written Statement of Palestine, supra n 11 2, at 156, para. 347. 
155 The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 27 August 1928, 94 LNTS 57. Written Submissions of Cuba, supra n 140; 
Written Statement of Senegal, http://www.icj-cij.org/clocket/files/1 31 /l 643.pdf; and Written Statement of 
Morocco, supra n 109. This agreement was not mentioned by the Court. 
156 For example, see Written Statement of the United Kingdom, 30 January 2004, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/fi Jes/ 13 1 /1 605 .pdf, at 23-24; Written Statement of lreland, 30 January 2004, bttp://www. icj-
ci j.org/docket/fi les/ J 31 11 613.pdt~ at paras. 2. 1-2.14. 
157 JCJ Reps (2004), 192-194, at paras. 136-137. 
158 Written Submission of South Africa, supra n 112, at 22, para. 55. 
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Commentary on human rights in general was minimal, but the unquestioning way in which 
parties recognised provisions as applicable in all contexts is significant. For example, 
Lebanon stated that human rights treaties 'now embody unquestionable universal 
values '. 159 The 0 IC echoed these sentiments 'by strongly reaffirming the inalienable and 
universal nature of human rights regardless of the circumstances in which a particular 
group finds itself.' 160 Although Gross has argued that the elision of human rights and IHL 
protections can weaken the position of persons in occupied territories,161 Third World states 
overlooked these subtleties in support of 'the more law, the better' approach. 
Although debate persists within some quarters about the Western biases inherent in 
human rights norms, 162 Arab states did not subscribe to such views in their submissions. On 
the contrary, their positions demonstrate support for such nonns and sometimes detailed 
analysis of how human rights norms apply on the ground. For example, Palestine 
considered in its written statement the ramifications of the wall's construction on the 
various human rights of the Palestinian population. It traced the actions of individuals and 
communities in their daily lives and indicated that human rights guarantees are embedded 
in all levels of social and political life. In his written statement for Palestine, Professor 
Vaughan Lowe argued that human rights in the Case fell into two categories: those affected 
directly by the construction of the wall (such as property seizures), and rights violated as a 
consequence (such as restrictions on movement). This position indicates how human rights 
were presented as far more than rigid rules; context and law were interdependent.163 Thus, 
Third World states used norms on human rights, self-determination and the prohibition 
against conquest as a shield in their defence of Palestinian (and postcolonial) interests. The 
promise of doctrine in the courtroom was embraced, rather than rejected as in the case of 
most First World states. 
Matters of jurisdiction and propriety also reflected normative positions about the 
role of the lCJ and international law within international society. Overall , most 
159 Written Statement of Lebanon, 30 January 2004, http://www. icj-cij.org/docket/filesi l 31/1 563.pdf. 8, para. 
37. 
160 Written Statement of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, supra n 112, 12, at para, 42. 
161 AM Gross, ' Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor' s New Clothes of the International Law 
of Occupation?' (2007) 18 European Journal of international Law l. 
162 See for example, A E Mayer, ' Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash 
within a Construct?' ( 1994) 15 Michigan Journal of i nternational Law 307; and A An-Na' im, ' Islam and 
Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate', Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting of the American 
Society oflntemational Law (2000), at 95. 
163 Professor Vaughan Lowe, Oral Statement of Palestine, CR 2004/ 1, 23 February 2004, at paras. 15-26. 
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consideration was given by both the Court and the various parties to the matter of 
jurisdiction. Submissions often relied on very similar material to reach opposite positions. 
This indicates that international law (especially the jurisprudence of the Court in relation to 
the exercise of its jurisdiction) was interpreted and applied by actors in different ways to 
serve different ends. All submissions were informed by a particular reading of the 
relationship between law and politics and, more specifically, how the 'peaceful settlement 
of this dispute' 164 fitted into such a relationship. In the pleadings, those parties favouring 
the Court's jurisdiction also tended to be more supportive of international law's primary 
role in resolving international disputes. 165 Both positions also acknowledged current 
diplomatic efforts in relation to the Road Map. However, there were strong differences over 
the relationship between the advisory function of the Court and negotiations - that is, law 
and politics. Submissions from both perspectives highlighted their support for negotiations 
and also detailed their direct role in such efforts. 166 
Like many First World states, Arab states have participated in negotiations to solve 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, but they did not see negotiations as precluding international law's 
role. Instead, Arab submissions embraced negotiations within the wider context of 
international law, where the Advisory Opinion was one important legal device in advancing 
the aim of Israeli compliance with international legal principles. Thus international law and 
international politics were not regarded as opposites but as mutually interdependent forces 
within international society. 
First World states, on the other hand, typically sought to construct a clear line (or 
wall) between political, diplomatic processes and international law. The starkest example of 
this position was provided by the US, which hardly mentioned international law at all. 
Instead, detailed discussion about diplomatic efforts demonstrated how international law 
was irrelevant and unhelpful in relation to the wall ' s construction and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in general. 167 European positions were more nuanced in their approach to the 
Advisory Opinion. EU states voted en masse for Resolution ES 10/13 calling on Israel to 
164 Professor Sorel, Oral Statement of Belize, CR 2004/3, at 14. 
165 As embodied in the Arab League's statement: 'The current request means the General Assembly has 
recognised the importance of the role of law in the solution of the problem.' Professor Bothe, Oral Statement 
of the League of Arab States, CR 2004/5, at 22. 
166 For example, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia draw attention to their efforts in previous negotiations to 
demonstrate that their support for the Advisory Opinion is not about taking sides; they are supportive of both 
legal and political processes and think that they can rely on each other to an extent. Written Submission of 
Egypt, supra n 144, at 3; and Oral Statement of Saudi Arabia, CR 2004/2, p. 46, at para. 16. 
167 Written Statement of the United States of America, http://www.icj-ci j.org/docket/files/13l/1583.pdf. 
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stop its construction of the wall. However, even though these legal ramifications were clear, 
the process of seeking Israeli compliance was seen as a political one. 168 A request for an 
Advisory Opinion was inappropriate, requiring as it would that the Court step into political 
territory. 
Some First World states were more supportive of the Court's wider role. For 
example, although it was part of the EU bloc, France's submission wavered in its support 
for an Advisory Opinion. It discussed substantive issues of IHL and human rights and 
deferred responsibility by arguing that questions of jurisdiction should be left to the 
Court. 169 Other EU states, such as Ireland, Cyprus and Malta were less forthright in their 
positions, but all supported the Advisory Opinion request and the Court. 170 Although 
Switzerland had abstained in the UNGA request for an Advisory Opinion, it shifted its 
position once the resolution was passed; it deferred to the will of the international 
community as embodied in the UNGA. 171 Similar motivations informed Sweden's 
submission in support of the Opinion, despite its EU membership. 172 From their brief 
statements on the matter, it would seem that First World states supportive of the Court's 
jurisdiction respected the Court as an institution of international law. Also, the status of the 
UNGA was regarded as significant and was seen as being able to straddle the political and 
legal spheres of international life. In the words of Syria, such First World states also saw 
the UNGA Emergency Special Session as 'an expression of the international 
community' .173 
Two academic perspectives about the relative weight to ascribe to ICJ Advisory 
Opinions illustrate First and Third World perspectives about the nature of international 
society and international law's place within it. On the one hand, Pomerance criticises the 
Court's decision to exercise its jurisdiction in the Wall opinion. She argues that the Court 
increasingly has come to act under a 'duty-to-cooperate' because of its institutional role as 
168 Written Submission of Germany, http://www.icj-cij .org/docket/files/ 131/1599.pdf, p. 3; Written Statement 
of the Netherlands, http://www.icj-ci j.org/docket/files/13 1/1627.pdf; Written Statement of Spain, 
http://www.ic j-cij.org/docke t/files/1 31/1633.pdf; and Written Statement of Italy, supra n 134. 
169 Written Submission of France, http://www.ic j-cij.org/docket/files/l 3 l/1 59 1.pdf, at 17, para. 74. 
170 Written Statement of Ireland, supra n J 56; Written Statement of Malta, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket!files/131/1623.pdf; Written Statement of Cyprus, http://www.icj-
c i j .org/docket/files/ 13111617 .pel f. 
171 Written Submission of Switzerland, h!tp://www.icj-cij .org/docket/files/131/ 1577 .pdt~ at paras. 1-6. 
172 Written Statement of Sweden, http:/iwww.icj-cij.org/docket/fi Jes/ 131I163 1.pdf. 
173 Written Submission of Syria, supra n 113, at 2. 
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the principal judicial organ of the UN. 174 Pomerance' s analysis tries to limit the effect of 
the Court and the UN more generally in international life: there should be no analogy made 
between the ICJ and international law or the UN and international society. The ICJ has 
become a UN Court (rather than a World Court) administering UN law (rather than 
international law). 175 Falk, on the other hand, tends to concur with the majority of Third 
World submissions in support of jurisdiction: the UN request for an Advisory Opinion was 
significant and should be respected. Rather than see the UN in narrow terms like 
Pomerance, Falk reminds us that it is ' the embodiment of an inchoate organized 
international community.' 176 Although a number of First World submissions relied on the 
case of Eastern Carelia to argue that jurisdiction should be declined, Falk reminds us that 
there was not the same relationship between the PCIJ and the League of Nations as is the 
case with the UN and the ICJ. 177 From the UN Charter, '"[j]udicial'' needs to be interpreted 
to encompass not only .. . contentious disputes ... but also the role of the Court in declaring 
and developing international law within the scope of the operations of the UN system.' 178 
Professor Crawford's oral statement for Palestine supported these sentiments, when he 
argued that the Court does ' not give just another political opinion' .179 Instead, it offers a 
legal perspective sufficiently autonomous and distinct from international political life to act 
as an 'authoritative,iso source ofregulation and legitimacy. 18 1 
Submissions seeking the Court's jurisdiction are indicative of broader faith and 
reliance on not only the ICJ but also international law itself. Various Third World 
submissions also made a connection between the UN's long history of involvement with 
the Palestinian cause and self-determination more generally to advance their claims about 
174 M Pomerance, 'The ICJ's Advisory Opinion and the Crumbling Wall between the Political and the 
Judicial' (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 26, at 30. 
175 Ibid, at 41. 
176 Falk, supra n 88, at 46, footnote 21. 
177 Ibid, at 46. Palestine also distinguished the ICJ from the PCIJ by arguing that the ICJ is more explicitly 
connected to the UN as its principal judicial organ. Written Statement of Palestine, supra n 112, at para. 60-
61. 
178 Falk, ibid, at 48. Madagascar also advocated greater use of the IC.T advisory function: 'Madagascar 
deplores the under-exploitation of the invaluable resource represented by the advisory procedure.' Mr Alfred 
Rambeloson, Oral Pleading of Madagascar, CR 2004/4, p. 20. 
179 Professor Crawford, Oral Statement of Palestine, CR 2004/1, at 33, para. 33. 
180 Mr. Albar, Oral Statement of Malaysia, CR 2004/4, at 23. 
181 Belize regarded the ICJ and international law in similar terms : 'The law is clearly a reflection of politics 
and its role as a social regulator is rooted in a reali ty that is at once political, economic and social, since it 
would otherwise be nothing. The Court is therefore acting quite logically when it detaches the legal aspects 
from their broader context, as it must do in the present case.' Professor Sorel, Oral Pleading of Belize, CR 
2004/3, at 17, para. 13. 
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the central role of its principal judicial organ, the ICJ. Arab states in particular regarded the 
Case as of singular importance in affirming their faith in international law. Saudi Arabia 
was optimistic about the effects of an opinion in quelling violence on both sides, stating 
that an opinion 'may give hope that the rule of law will be respected.' 182 For Palestine, the 
stakes were much higher. Mr. Al-Kidwa, Palestine's representative at the UN, and its first 
speaker in the pleadings, stated that if the wall's construction and self-determination's 
denial continued, it would 'destroy [the Palestinians' ] faith in the rule of international law 
and the international community's ability to uphold it in the face of such grievous 
violations.' 183 Palestine's position and its support by Arab states required the ICJ, the UN 
and international law to play central roles in the particular case pertaining to the wall, as 
well as the Arab-Israeli conflict. As was the case relating to their concern about the 
protection of Holy Sites in the OPT, 184 Arab states regarded the Advisory Opinion as being 
about more than legal doctrine or political negotiations; the Case was a test of their faith in 
international law itself 
7) Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that states and IGOs can operate m legal pleadings with very 
different perspectives about the strategic qualities of international law as well as its 
substantive content. The ways in which language was used provided some indication about 
the relative importance states placed on emotion and legal terminology. I have shown in 
this chapter that Third World, and especially Arab, states were more comfortable in 
stretching the lexicon of international law across the boundaries of standard 'neutral', non-
emotional discourse. This was reinforced by the way in which such states spoke openly 
about their trust in international law; international law was about more than legal doctrine, 
it also required a level of faith from the participants in the proceedings. The scope of 
182 Ambasador Shobokshi, Oral Statement of Saudi Arabia, CR 2004/2, at 54. 
183 Mr. Al-Kidwa, Oral Statement of Palestine, CR 2004/1, at 24. 
184 Arab states in particular as well as some other submissions highlighted the importance of preserving 
Christian, Jewish and Holy Sites for all worshippers in Jerusalem. For example, see Sir Arthur Watts, Oral 
Statement of Jordan, CR 2004/4, at 56, para. 8; Written Submission of Palestine, supra n l 12, at 74, para. 174; 
Written Submission of Morocco, supra n 109, at 8; Oral Statement of Saudi Arabia, CR 2004/2, at 58-59, 
para. 55; Written Submission of Sweden, supra n 172, at para. 11; Oral Statement of Bangladesh, CR 2004/2, 
at 64; Oral Statement of the League of Arab States, CR 2004/5, at 31. The Court (in relative terms) devoted a 
lot of attention to this issue in its judgment as well: !CJ Reps (2004), at 188-189, para. 129. 
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international law was extended further in the accounts of various Arab submissions and the 
Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby. Arab sensitivities about the relevance of history to 
present legal matters provided a more contextual narrative about the Case. Images of 
colonialism in the past and the present also tended to reinforce TW AIL I perspectives, 
which are supportive of the emancipatory potential of modem international law for non-
European peoples. 
The ways in which parties participated in the Case and the positions taken on the 
jurisdiction of the Court demonstrated the relative respect such states placed not only in the 
ICJ but also, in international law. Third World states tended to demonstrate greater 
reverence for the Court and its formal function. At the same time, however, they supported 
the work of the UNGA and viewed the resolution requesting an Advisory Opinion as 
indicative of international public opinion. Thus the spheres of international politics and 
international law were distinguished in such submissions but were also seen as 
interdependent and inclusive of Third World states. For First World states unsupportive of 
the jurisdiction of the Court, international law tended to gamer more formal engagement, as 
evidenced by less inflammatory language. International law was regarded as being of only 
limited use in international life. The broader goals discussed by Th ird World states, such as 
self-determination and an end to colonialism, were overlooked in most First World 
submissions, and negotiations were contrasted with international law to indicate a clear 
demarcation between legal and political spheres. 
Reactions to the Wall Opinion were diverse and varied. Once the Opinion was 
handed down, Palestine and Israel maintained their earlier positions about the value of the 
ICJ and international law in resolving the conflict. According to Palestine' s representative 
at the UN 
As for the Palestinian people, the advisory opinion has been having a positive - not 
a negative - impact on Palestinian society. People are seeing that international law 
can bring them justice. As a result, the law and compliance with it will take in even 
more importance and prominence within this society. This will be instrumental in 
developing and ingraining a culture of respect for the law ... this advisory opinion 
provides a tremendous lesson on the primacy of the law and its rules, and everyone, 
especially in the region, must see this.185 
Israel 's representative, on the other hand, argued that 
185 Mr. Al-Kidwa, UN Observer of Palestine, UN GA Emergency Special Session, 24th mtg (16th July, 2004), 
UN Doc A/ES-10, PV.24, at 9. 
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a disservice was done by the [General] Assembly not just to the International Court 
of Justice but to the balanced and non-selective application of the rule of law ... The 
reputation and credibility of international judicial institutions are the worse for it186 
The Court negotiated a path through these positions to render its judgment, which included 
as much as it omitted. As in the case of Third World submissions, the ICJ showed that 
international law could play a role in even the most divisive of issues. To bolster its 
jurisdiction as well as its contribution to the conflict, however, the Court retreated behind 
doctrinal defences. In its Opinion the Court employed familiar devices of the law/politics 
dichotomy: the dispute was sufficiently legal, norm conflict was downplayed, language was 
neutral and historical legacies were reduced to their most minimal and least political form. 
Postcolonial states were comfortable operating in this discursive environment, but 
their strategic and substantive legal grammars did not simply mimic the tone of the 
Court. Instead, Third World, and especially Arab, states used the Advisory Opinion to 
expand the Court's legal lexicon. These states maintained a faith in international law 
through the ICJ advisory jurisdiction while also placing the proceedings in a broader 
context by resorting to historical narratives and emotive discourse. The Court did not 
respond to most of these devices, but it is significant that they were used. More noteworthy 
was the fact that both the Court and Third World states showed that international law could 
play a role in the conflict. Agreement over the centrality of self-determination and conquest 
indicated that both postcolonial states and the Court were in sympathy about the territorial 
confines of contemporary international law. International legal personality was the sina qua 
non for Third World states, who in coming to the Peace Palace confirmed their support and 
acceptance for the Court and much of the law it applied. 
186 Mr. Gillerman, UN representative of Israel, UN GA Emergency Special Session, 271h mtg (20'11 July, 
2004), UN Doc A/ES-10/PY.27, at 7. 
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CONCLUSION 
CJ territorial adjudication is about more than geographical demarcation; it is also an 
exercise in discursive boundary-drawing. The thesis has highlighted how states and 
members of the Court engage in an ongoing dialogue about the boundaries of law and 
its linguistic limitations. On entering the Court's discursive domain, states bring a number 
of expectations and hopes about international law. To be heard, though, these aspirations 
have to be translated into a particular language, with its own grammar and lexicon. The 
cases have shown that international law contains some linguistic diversity, perhaps 
allowing us to speak of international legal dialects. As illustrated by the Arabic language 
with its multitude of distinctive articulations, understanding a range of dialects requires 
sophisticated linguistic capacities. Native speakers of Arabic can understand a range of 
local lexicons and syntactical forms, but meanings are not always clear. In relation both to 
Arabic and international law, we can ask, when are the boundaries between dialect and 
language crossed? When is it necessary to employ a translator? More importantly, can 
concepts and sensibilities be articulated across linguistic divides? 
Koskenniemi's idea about the silences of international law is relevant here. 
International law cannot speak of everything and for everyone; 1 it is a limited and limiting 
discourse. For the International Court of Justice hearing territorial claims in a postcolonial 
era, this is of fundamental importance. 'New' states entering the Court are required to speak 
a pre-established language structured through a radical division between law and politics 
and between the past and the present. Some of the arguments employed on behalf of Arab 
1 M Koskenniemi, 'Faith, Identity, and the Killing of the Innocent: International Lawyers and Nuclear 
Weapons' (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 137; and M Koskenniemi 'The Silence of Law/The 
Voice of Justice', L Soisson de Chazournes & P Sands (eds), international Law, the International Court of 
Justice and Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 488-510. 
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states have destabilised dominant approaches to international law, both through strategic 
and substantive devices. Here, I revisit some of these devices to answer my two central 
research questions. 
The first research question I asked in this thesis was, 'what are the structures of 
legal argument that emerge in ICJ territorial disputes involving Arab states?' Broadly, these 
patterns were explored through the lenses of strategic and substantive devices. These two 
devices are not mutually distinct, however. They are both informed by the law/politics 
dichotomy, which is the main grammar used in international legal discourse. We saw in 
Chapter One that critical approaches to international law have shown how mainstream 
accounts of international law, either in the academy or adjudicative bodies, have tried to 
quarantine law from the indeterminacy of politics. If doctrine can be distinguished from 
political choice, then its neutrality and legitimacy is easier to preserve. Indeterminacy, 
however, lies at the heart of the international legal project, which does not gain its structure 
and stability through normative rules; rather, international law as language is shaped 
through a combination of institutional biases, legal grammars, and a lexicon built from 
European experiences of authority over territory. 
Throughout the four cases, variations of the law/politics dichotomy shaped the way 
parties engaged with the Court. In discussions about the Court's jurisdictional role, for 
example, it was important to portray the ICJ as separate from the wider context of the case 
at hand. Questions about the 'legal' nature of a case are especially important in advisory 
opinions, and the Western Sahara Case and the Wall Case illustrated a variety of ways of 
defining ' legal' disputes. Both cases highlighted how Third World states are more 
comfortable with introducing contextual matters before the Court. These broader 
considerations, however, did not affect the Court's 'legal' role, because many of these 
states also displayed a profound faith in the promise of doctrine. Particularly in the Wall 
Case, postcolonial states seized upon international legal principles in an effort to strengthen 
their quest for Palestinian selfhood and statehood within the international legal community. 
The advisory opinions also allowed a comparison of the argumentative registers 
used by the parties. Typically, Third World states presented their claims in more emotive 
and inflammatory language than their First World counterparts. Perhaps the tenor of such 
arguments was not heard by the Court, because we saw that for much of the time the bench 
did not engage with such rhetorical flushes. The Court could not respond to all of the needs 
of these states and it had to retreat to the familiar territory of constrained, neutral language. 
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In the case of the Wall Opinion, we could sense that the Court was eager to provide a 
response to the claims of mostly Third World states. Within the limits set by the request by 
the UNGA, the Court affirmed that law can play a role even in the most contentious of 
cases. To preserve the integrity of the Court and the law it applies, however, the Court also 
showed us that deference to the law/politics dichotomy is vital. States toned down their 
language before the bench in invoking their cause of law as a weapon to secure Palestinian 
self-determination. 
Questioning the boundaries of law was a constant motif in Chapters Three, Four and 
Five, where an examination of territorial claims necessitated a journey into the murky 
practices of colonial domination. Both Libya in Chapter Three as well as Qatar in Chapter 
Four revealed a record of European intimidation and bias in the construction of treaties and 
resulting boundaries. These states provided an opportunity for the Court to re-evaluate the 
'legal' effects of such 'political' events. Treaties created in the context of coercion or 
arbitral awards tainted by the pursuit of petroleum profits undermined the distinction 
between law and politics. These narratives also questioned the legitimacy of a postcolonial 
legal order that has rarely delved into its own past. On both occasions, the Court indicated 
that such probing of the past was outside its remit. Here the Court was caught in a double 
bind. Should it acknowledge the way politics had infused colonial practice to lend greater 
legitimacy to certain Third World claims and thus undermine Jaw's determinacy? Or should 
the law/politics dichotomy be maintained by depicting colonial acts as simple 
confirmations of doctrine, thereby weakening the legitimacy of the law for Third World 
states trying to re-write its past? We saw time and again that the Court opted for the latter 
option, whose effects were not confined to the past. By confirming colonial practices, the 
Court also revealed a law less than universal and one that struggles to translate non-
European experiences during and after colonialism. 
The Court's denial of historical complexity was a constant throughout the cases, 
emphasising that the grammars of argument in territorial adjudication require constructions 
of a past supportive of dominant images of contemporary international law. Yet the Peace 
Palace witnessed conflicting accounts about the legacies of colonialism as well as the tools 
of historical analysis. For example, while states like Spain in Chapter Five and Chad in 
Chapter Three suggested that historical narration was an uncomplicated affair, other states 
argued that the selection of particular documents and maps and their interpretation 
produced conflicting historical perspectives. States with minimal archival material to 
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bolster their case faced a double bind: should they rely on materials drawn up in the 
interests of their former colonisers? Or should they try to convince the Court of their claims 
in a manner radically different from ICJ institutional conventions? Third World states often 
had no choice but to use material of their former colonisers, but it was surprising how this 
material was not scrutinised more rigorously by both the bench and the bar. Historical 
narratives had to be simplified for the task of rendering legal statements, and often this 
entailed uncritical reliance on European, as well as Ottoman, archival material. 
The Court was not capable of adjudicating these historical nuances, but when it did 
enter the annals of history it displayed an inability to grapple with the contingencies of 
choice. Further, where the Court was forced to deliberate on contrasting historical accounts, 
it generally favoured colonial discourses. We saw this most explicitly in relation to the 
classification of 'colonial protectorates' in the Cameroon/Nigeria Case discussed in the 
Introduction to Part Two.2 There, the Court adopted a European, colonial interpretation of 
legal title to dismiss the validity of African personality; the politics of colonialism was 
favoured over a Pandora's Box of territorial instability and legal uncertainty. This policy 
choice, also known as uti possidetis Juris, has come to dominate African territorial cases, 
but its reception has been less than total in the Arab world. Regardless of regional practices, 
however, the Court's jurisprudence has consistently shown that uti possidetis is the 
dominant norn1 to apply in postcolonial territorial matters, and the Court's motivations are 
explicable. Both African elites and the majority of international lawyers regard colonial 
lines across the continent as the price to be paid for more legitimate reappraisals of 
indigenous effective control and its clash with former colonisers. 
Historical narratives also supported positions about the substantive content of 
international law. Perhaps the most important aim of historical narration for Third World 
states was based on a desire to decolonise international law. By challenging European 
accounts of international law, these states were not t1ying to subvert international law; 
rather, they were trying to strengthen it. Third World submissions like those of Algeria's in 
Western Sahara, Qatar's in Qatar/Bahrain and Libya's in Libya/Chad all tried to 
incorporate Arab-Islamic traditions into the fabric of international law. By detailing cultural 
particularities, these states could boost international law's universal reach. If non-European 
modes of rule were recognised by the Court, territorial adjudication could expand the 
2 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea 
intervening) (2002) JCJ Reps, p.303, discussed at 110-111. 
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lexicon of international law. We saw, however, that the Court was reluctant to accept these 
overtures because they would have threatened its foundational grammar of the law/politics 
dichotomy in revealing international law's contingent past. Operating in a discourse framed 
largely by European statehood, the Court had to limit the legal effects of such arguments, 
and in so doing, it affirmed the centrality of European experiences in international law 's 
past and present configurations. The rich Arab record provided the Court with a chance to 
extend international law's cultural boundaries, but we have seen that it was only prepared 
to take a few tentative steps into the Sahara or swim a few strokes off the shores of the 
Gulf. 
Many would not be surprised by these findings, as they can be read to support 
narratives explored in Chapter One about increasing Third World participation in ICJ 
proceedings and a corresponding acceptance of international rules. Third World states have 
willingly brought their claims to the Court cognisant of its limited cultural and historical 
capacities. The story, however, is more complex. Each case demonstrated that Third World 
states both acknowledged ICJ conventions and also tried to stretch the boundaries of 
international law through a number of devices. Substantively, non-European approaches to 
authority challenged dominant European models, but, time and again, the Court rejected the 
implications of historical revision. Where states like Chad sought stable boundaries, it was 
'paradoxically required by the circumstances to espouse some particularly unacceptable 
propositions of colonialist discourse.' 3 These are the words of Judge Rezek in his 
declaration from the Bakassi Peninsula Case, but the idea is apt here for the way in which it 
encapsulates the postcolonial paradox. Third World states through their legal counsel seek 
to secure their statehood, but they must do so in a discourse that is not of their own making. 
If we return to debates about reasons for the Court's increased docket and Third 
World participation, the findings of Chapter Six contrast with those in the other cases. In 
Chapter One, I was sceptical about equating increased Third World participation with 
wholescale acceptance and approval of both the ICJ and international law. I suggested that 
Third World participation must be understood discursively before trying to explain this 
phenomenon. Chapters Three, Four and Five have all suggested that Third World 
participation has come at a price: in many instances colonial legacies have been reinforced 
so that particular renderings of the past will have significant effects into the future . Perhaps 
some postcolonial states, like Chad, will be pleased with such an outcome, but from the 
3 (Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening) (2002) ICJ Reps (sep. op. Rezek), at 489. 
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way the Court ignored so much of colonialism's dark sides, it is doubtful that a service was 
rendered in enhancing international law's wider legitimacy. Perhaps litigation is a useful 
resource and Third World states have now a wealth of evidence to show them what the 
likely results of territorial adjudication would be: certainty and doctrine as triumphant over 
historical redress. Unprecedented Third World participation in the Wall Opinion could be 
construed as acceptance on the part of much of the postcolonial world, indicating that 
international law's strengths and weaknesses are now recognised and embraced. In their 
optimism and faith in the ICJ process, these Third World states followed closely in the 
footsteps of TW AIL I scholars eager to reap the rewards of membership of international 
society. Yet the other cases have shown us that ICJ litigation and international legal 
language can only speak of certain experiences and deliver limited outcomes. 
These observations allow us to answer my second research question, which asked, 
'what do these structures of legal argument reveal about the scope for universalising the 
discourse of international law? ' There is no simple answer to this question because of the 
tension between inclusion and exclusion within international legal discourse. We have seen 
that the Peace Palace doors are now open for all states to enter, but at what financial cost, 
under which rules and in whose language? Third World states seeking to affirm their 
statehood via adjudication through a language forged in the crucible of colonialism can try 
to expand the cultural reach of international law, and thus its universalism, but such 
practices also reveal the limits of inclusion. Adjudicative argument is significant, but it is 
not enough to generate linguistic renewal per se and we have seen that rarely was the Court 
willing or able to understand some of the dialects used in the Peace Palace. Non-European 
histories and experiences were discussed, but were usually rejected by the Court through its 
silence. The cases have suggested that only the narrowest margin of linguistic change is 
permitted in most instances, but that at least a number of minority opinions and Third 
World states were willing to push the boundaries of international legal language. Thus the 
scope for universalising international law remains a limited one. 
I have shown in this thesis that mapping legal grammars in ICJ adjudication is a 
valuable device in probing linguistic patterns of the discipline. A discursive reading of Arab 
territorial disputes highlights how critical approaches provide useful tools for interrogating 
both legal speech and its silences. Although the thesis has revealed that legal discourse has 
a constricted lexicon and grammar, it has also shown that speech is never static. Thus, 
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international law contains within it many dialects with their nascent grammars and lexicons 
awaiting our appraisal and engagement. We just need to listen. 
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